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Abstract
This thesis provides an empirical study of how changes in the distributions of income and 
education affect the evolution of regional economic growth in the EU. It uses microeconomic 
data from the European Community Household Panel, as well as macroeconomic data from 
the Eurostat’s Regio databases for 102 regions over the period 1995-2002. Income 
distribution is measured in terms of income per capita and income inequality, not only for the 
population as a whole but also for those people normally in work; and educational distribution 
is measured in terms of educational attainment and inequality. Two proxies for educational 
distribution are considered: the distribution of the education level completed and the 
distribution of the age at which the highest education level was attained. These data are 
analysed using exploratory spatial data analysis methods and econometric analyses of static 
and dynamic panel data models.
The results of the analysis reveal the complexity of the interaction between income and 
educational inequalities and economic performance in the EU. First, they highlight the 
positive relationship between income and educational inequality. This relationship is robust to 
changes in the specification of the model (static or dynamic), in the definition of income and 
educational distributions and to the inclusion of different control variables, such as population 
ageing, work access, unemployment and inactivity. This link is related to the higher than 
expected responsiveness of the EU labour market to differences in qualifications and skills, 
and to the presence of a level of income inequalities that does not discourage involvement in 
education. Urbanisation and geography (i.e. latitude), as well as institutional factors, also 
seem to matter for inequalities. Both income and educational inequalities are lower in social- 
democratic regimes, in Protestant areas and in regions with Nordic family structures.
Second, the empirical analysis reveals that the increase in a region’s inequality in the level of 
income and the education level completed has a significantly positive — but not causal — 
relationship with subsequent regional economic growth. The regression results also identify 
the presence of convergence across European regions, although this is sensitive to the 
inclusion of control variables. However, when the distribution of age at which the higher 
education level was completed was considered rather than the level of education attained, the 
results indicate a negative, but non-robust, association between educational inequality and 
economic growth. Finally, urbanisation appears to affect regional economic growth, while 
latitude and institutions, in contrast to what was the case with inequalities, do not matter for 
growth.
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1 Chapter One. Introduction
1.1 Aim, Research Question(s) and Hypotheses
The focal point of this thesis is how microeconomic changes in income and in human 
capital endowment affect the evolution of regional economic growth in the European 
Union (EU). Microeconomic changes within a region may be examined through 
changes to the average income and education and also through inequalities in those 
areas. The aim of this study is to investigate how income per capita and educational 
attainment,1 as well as income and educational inequalities, affect regional economic 
growth in Europe.
The main research question is:
‘Do income and educational inequalities matter for growth? ’
This could be phrased in a slightly different way:
‘To what extent are income and educational inequalities associated with 
growth? '
The research question can be decomposed into a number of sub-questions.
• Are income inequalities associated with educational inequalities?
• Are income and educational inequalities affected by common factors, such as 
population ageing, access to work, unemployment and inactivity?
• Does the exploratory analysis of income and educational inequalities suggest 
any form of spatial heterogeneity such as an urban-rural divide or an EU north- 
south divide?
• What is the impact of institutional factors, such as the welfare state, religion and 
family structure, on inequalities?
1 The term ‘educational attainment’ is used interchangeably with the terms ‘educational achievement’ 
and ‘human capital stock’.
• Do population ageing, access to work, unemployment and inactivity directly 
affect regional economic growth or do they have an indirect effect through their 
impact on inequalities?
• Do urbanisation, geography and institutions shape growth patterns?
The key concepts of this study are: regional economic growth, educational attainment, 
income per capita, income inequalities, educational inequalities and Europe.
I address these questions at the regional level for at least four reasons. First, the 
bibliography that refers to the link between inequalities and growth is limited at the 
regional level. The empirical investigation of such a link is even more limited. I analyse 
that relationship at NUTS I or II level due to the availability of the main source of data, 
the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) dataset (European Commission, 
2003). Second, this research question provides new insights not only for regional 
growth analysis, but also for regional policy analysis. If, for example, income 
distribution is significantly associated with human capital distribution, the observed 
relationship between income distribution and regional growth may be governed by the 
relationship between human capital distribution and growth (Galor and Tsiddon, 1997a: 
95). Additionally, the data patterns and anomalies revealed can be used in regional 
policy. This thesis also illustrates whether more or less egalitarian societies may be 
good for regional growth and indicate the reasons why government interventions may 
harm or enhance growth. Third, this research question provides additional material in 
formulating the convergence and divergence regional economic growth theories. The 
neoclassical economic growth models (i.e. Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956; Mankiw et al., 
1992; Jones, 1997, 1998) not only predict the reduction of territorial income per capita, 
but also make a long-term forecast of convergence in the distribution of personal 
income (Benabou, 1996c). Fourth, this study is a preliminary step in the investigation of 
whether income and human capital growth have disproportionately benefited certain 
regions of the EU, and whether it is the richer regions that generally benefit much more 
than the poorer ones (between-region inequality). However, the trend in within-region 
inequality could affect the trend in between-region inequality, which may reveal a 
convergence (Firebaugh 2003). Therefore, the application of this research design draws 
attention not only to the significance of the within-region inequality for growth, but also 
to the analysis of the between-region inequality.
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I examine income distribution among individuals rather than among households for the 
following two reasons. First, following the arguments of Kuznets and Gallman (1989), 
it makes little sense to talk about income inequality among households, because the 
sizes of the underlying units vary significantly (Peracchi, 2002). Concentrating on 
individual rather than on household income allows one to abstract that data from 
changes in patterns of household formation. Second, income and human capital 
distributions are comparable only when they are measured using the same unit of 
analysis. Moreover, it is not possible to talk about inequality in the distribution of 
education among households, because human capital is a form of wealth which is 
embodied in individuals and not in households; skill and training and this form of 
wealth arise from ‘natural talent’ or individual application (Barr 2004).
This research addresses income, not wage, distribution, because as Aghion et al. (1999: 
1167) argue
‘when looking at the effects of inequality on growth, we are primarily 
interested in the ways in which ‘distribution’ can affect aggregate output 
and growth through its impact on individual investments in human or 
physical capital. What is relevant then is the distribution of wealth, no 
matter whether this wealth results from the accumulation of labor earnings 
or capital income’.
Park (1996) suggests four different conceptual rationales of human capital (education): 
the flow of human capital, the stock of human capital, the rate of return on human 
capital and the dispersion of human capital.2 This study focuses on the stock and 
dispersion (inequality) of human capital, because it investigates whether educational 
attainment and inequalities affect regional growth. However, the educational attainment 
of the population is one of the best proxy measures for human capital stock, because it
2 First, human capital stock refers to the existing levels o f human capital in an economy, such as the 
mean years o f schooling o f the labour force or the percentage o f people at secondary and tertiary 
education level. It is retained in the local workforce given the characteristics o f employment and 
represents the quality and quantity of the labour force (McNamara et al., 1988). Stock o f human capital 
may be regarded as the primary prediction o f human capital endowments. This means that human capital 
stock is affected by the accumulation o f human capital, which in turn is influenced by the rate o f return on 
human capital. For example, according to the neoclassical economic growth models, the stock o f human 
capital will move to those regions offering the highest rates of return. Second, human capital flows are the 
current level o f human capital being produced or added to local human capital stocks. They represent the 
marginal effect o f current human capital investments on the local human capital stock (McNamara et al., 
1988) such as enrolment at different levels o f education. Third, the rate o f return on human capital depicts 
the marginal productivity o f human capital such as the rate o f return on education at different levels o f 
education. Fourth, the dispersion o f human capital is the variation in the workforce and students over a 
number o f categories such as the dispersion o f employed people over the different employment levels 
(legislators, professionals, clerks, service workers, plant and machine operators etc) or over a range such 
as the dispersion o f educational attainment.
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does not look at human capital attributes directly, but rather at the completion of 
educational levels (Centre for Educational Research and Innovation and Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1998: 15). Nonetheless, some 
components of human capital are unmeasured such as the ‘specific’ human capital and 
the acquisition of information about the economic system.
This thesis faces many challenges. From a theoretical point of view, a challenge is to 
survey and to attempt to synthesise the various causal hypotheses and mechanisms that 
have been proposed in the economic, social, political and geographical literature to 
explain the observed relationships among educational distribution, income distribution 
and regional economic performance. The literature contributes to the debate over the 
impact of income and educational inequalities on economic growth. This study 
empirically contributes to two important research strands within the field of economic 
growth: educational attainment, income per capita and growth (the first strand); and 
inequality and growth (the second strand). Hence, a mix of different theoretical models 
is needed to explain the potential patterns. Notwithstanding the complexity and 
diversity of existing approaches to regional economic development, the vast majority of 
them tend to concentrate on macroeconomic variables and processes (Scott and Storper, 
2003: 580). This thesis considers both microeconomic (i.e. inequalities) and 
macroeconomic (i.e. economic growth) variables. A micro-foundation of both human 
capital endowments and income formation is proposed. Another challenge of this study 
is that educational distribution is a complex issue and not one that has been researched 
extensively (Lopez et al., 1998). Who gets educated matters a great deal. This thesis 
sheds light on that issue. Additionally, it places emphasis on the geographical location 
which is important in accounting for the economic performance of the regions due to the 
spatial interactions that take place among them (Ertur and Le Gallo, 2003). The data 
patterns revealed can be used in regional economic policy. Finally, this thesis places 
emphasis on the impact of geography, urbanisation and institutions on inequalities and 
on growth.
/
/
This research is carried out over two steps
1st step: The association between income and educational distribution
The first step of this study is to examine whether income distribution is associated with 
educational distribution. Since there is plenty of literature on the correlation between 
income per capita and educational attainment at both national and regional levels, this
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step is focused on the impact o f  educational inequalities, educational attainment and 
income per capita on income inequalities on the one hand, and on the impact o f income 
inequalities, income per capita and educational attainment on educational inequalities 
on the other (Figure 1.1), while also emphasising the potential patterns.
The first step requires the investigation o f  the determinants o f  income and educational 
inequalities. The level o f  inequality within a region is a composite o f many different 
forces. Furthermore, the average change o f  a force may be minimal, because increases 
in some regions are likely to be offset by declines in other regions. This step is based on 
the assumption that inequalities in income and human capital are affected by common 
factors such as population ageing, work access, unemployment and inactivity, because 
among others both inequalities are proxies for wealth inequalities and reflect the 
determinants o f  human behaviour.
Figure 1.1: Association between Income and Educational Distribution
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In analysing the causal factors o f  income inequality, my hypotheses are the following.
1. Income inequality is positively affected by income p er  capita, because only a 
limited number o f  people can be transferred to higher levels o f skills and thus 
higher wages, while the remainder have to wait their turn (Lydall, 1979). 
Additionally, intersectoral migration from low added value sectors to those with 
high added value is not in itself enough to decrease wage inequality.
2. Income inequality is positively affected by educational attainment, because 
although educational expansion in Europe has facilitated numerous favourable 
opportunities for all individuals, the human capital returns available to rich 
people are greater than those attained by poorer ones and thus rich people have 
greater opportunities to engage in higher paid jobs.
2 0
3. Income inequality is positively affected by educational inequality, due to the 
responsiveness of the EU labour market to differences in qualifications and 
skills. The existence of a larger share of highly-educated European workers 
within a region may signal to employers that those with less education have a 
lower ability (Wolf, 2004). However, formal education may be seen as an 
elaborate device for detecting and labelling those who have skills (Spence, 1973 
1974; Champemowne and Cowell, 1998).
Although the existing theoretical and empirical literature on educational inequality is 
quite limited, my hypotheses are the following.
1. Educational inequality is positively affected by income per capita, because an 
increase in the income per capita of a region raises the educational opportunities 
of the highest strata, which implies greater educational inequality. Moreover, the 
higher the income per capita, the greater the expenditure on private education 
programmes and the greater the investments in human capital. This, in turn, also 
implies higher educational inequality.
2. Educational inequality is positively affected by educational attainment, because 
the educational opportunities available to different sectors are not equal. State 
grants are not sufficient to provide educational opportunities to poor people 
equal to those enjoyed by the rich. Furthermore, the educational opportunities 
open to poor people are linked not only to their own human capital and 
socioeconomic background, but also to those of their communities and families 
ones (Hannum and Buchmann, 2005).
3. Educational inequality is positively affected by income inequality, because rich 
people have better job chances and greater opportunities to progress to a higher, 
more profitable education level, should it be necessary. Additionally, a further 
increase in income inequality, for whatever reason, may lead to a self- 
perpetuating poverty trap that may in turn increase the population share 
excluded from schooling (Checchi, 2000).
2nd step: To analyse the combined impact o f income and educational inequalities 
on regional economic growth
The second step in this study will be to examine the impact of income and educational 
distributions on regional economic growth. In this step, the determinants of European 
regional growth are analysed (Figure 1.2). My intention here is to examine how
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microeconomic changes in educational attainment and in educational inequality, as well 
as microeconomic changes in income per capita and in income inequality, affect the 
evolution o f regional economic performance in the EU. Hence, the influence that 
income and educational distribution can exert on regional economic growth. The 
determinants o f  inequalities may affect regional economic growth either directly or 
indirectly.
Figure 1.2: The Impact of Income and Educational Distribution on Growth
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My hypotheses are the following:
1. Regional growth is positively affected by income inequalities, because in a 
laissez-faire  economy, in which government intervention is minimal, income 
inequality is fundamentally good for economic (i.e. stipendiary) incentives and 
therefore should be viewed as being growth-enhancing (Mirrlees, 1971; Rebelo, 
1991; Aghion eta l., 1998).
2. Regional growth is positively affected by educational inequalities, because 
educational inequality is fundamentally good for socioeconomic incentives (i.e. 
better education) and therefore should be viewed as being growth-enhancing 
(Mirrlees, 1971; Rebelo, 1991; Aghion et al., 1998). However, most people 
require qualifications that are not possessed by everyone. Inequality enables 
people to increase their investment in human capital by obtaining higher 
educational qualifications. In addition, the existence o f  less talented and
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educated people imply incentives for those who have achieved such 
qualifications to seize the higher returns to their skills (Voitchovsky, 2005).
3. Regional growth is negatively affected by income per capita, because poor 
regions grow faster than rich ones, highlighting the convergence process in the 
EU (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956; Mankiwet al., 1992; Jones, 1997, 1998).
4. Regional growth is positively affected by educational attainment, since 
education is one of the most powerful instruments known for laying the 
foundations for sustained growth (Hannum and Buchmann, 2005). Furthermore, 
the stock of human capital affects the European region’s ability to innovate or to 
catch up with more advanced regions (Nelson et al., 1966). Thus, an increase, 
for whatever reason, of human capital stock increases the individual’s capacity 
to achieve. This allows individuals to adapt to new technologies and to promote 
economic growth.
1.2 Research Design
The research design is the means to provide information on the research question(s) in 
an efficient way that meets the criteria of public accountability, in the sense of openness 
to public scrutiny (Gaskell, 2003). The research design of the present work is 
quantitative analysis. More specifically, this thesis is an exploratory analysis, where 
innovative techniques are applied to spatial data in order to generate hypotheses about 
the underlying dynamics of the regional economic system (Rey and Janikas, 2005). It is 
not a confirmatory analysis, because it does not draw on formal economic theories in 
order to construct econometric equations, such as p convergence models. Exploratory 
analysis does not impose any prior restrictive assumption on income, education and 
regional economic growth distribution. This study also fits into the classical statistical 
framework omitting the use of Bayesian approaches. The focus of attention is on 
identifying differences across space rather than similarities. It places an emphasis on the 
role of spatial effects. However, the treatment of space in the analysis of income, 
education and regional growth has received much less attention.
The research design can be classified in the following categories:
• spatial data manipulation and utilities: data input (sources of data), conversion 
(i.e. from dbf file to ASCII file) and data output;
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• data transformation: variable transformation (i.e. merging regions and 
transforming net personal income from nominal to real) and creation of new 
variables (i.e. growth variables);
• initial examination o f the transformed datasets: histograms (i.e. representing the 
distribution of personal income), boxplots (i.e. identifying outliers and extreme 
cases), visualisation (i.e. choropleth map) and correlation indices (i.e. the 
Pearson correlation index);
• spatial autocorrelation analysis: spatial weights creation and characteristics (i.e. 
rook, connectedness, statistical graphics), global and local spatial autocorrelation 
statistics (i.e. global and local version of Moran’s I) and;
• regression analysis: static and dynamic regressions (i.e. identifying the 
mechanisms behind income inequality, educational inequality and regional 
economic growth).
Briefly speaking, this study starts with simple mapping and geovisualisation, moves on 
to exploration, spatial autocorrelation analysis and ends with regression analysis.
1.3 Data
The selected methodology depends on the availability of data. This section relates to the 
analysis of data. It firstly describes the type and sources of the database which define 
the study area. Then, the benefits and limitations of data and the properties of spatially 
aggregated data are presented.
1.3.1 Sources o f  Data and Study Area
The main innovation of this study will be its use of microeconomic data in order to 
measure intra-regional inequalities in income and human capital endowment. 
Microeconomic variables will be extracted from the ECHP data survey for the period 
1994-20013 and will be complemented by macroeconomic variables from the Eurostat
3 The surveys were conducted regularly at approximately one-year intervals. In these surveys 
individuals were interviewed about their socioeconomic status, and information was collected about 
changes to their income changes, job, education status, living space, age, etc. For a review o f the ECHP, 
see the paper by Peracchi (2002).
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Regio dataset.4 The ECHP dataset is based on the 1995 version of NUTS regions and 
the Eurostat Regio data on the NUTS regions, version 2002. The elaboration process of 
both databasets is coordinated by Eurostat, making comparisons reliable. However, 
some adjustment of regions will be required in order to match different datasets 
(Appendix A 1.1).
The availability of the ECHP dataset determines the study area over space and time. 
The time period 1994 was dropped from the sample due to missing data. Unfortunately, 
there are no data available for the Netherlands. Finnish regions also had to be dropped 
from the sample because of discrepancies between the regional division included in the 
ECHP and those in the Regio databank. The resulting database includes 102 NUTS I or 
II regions from 13 countries in the EU (Table 1.1). On average 116,574 individuals 
were surveyed, with a maximum of 124,759 in 1997 and a minimum of 105,079 in 
2001. Therefore, the choice of the spatial scale of analysis is not based on theoretical 
considerations, but on data availability.
Table 1.1: European Community Household Panel Data Survey
CODE COUNTRY TYPE OF 
SURVEY
NUTS NUMBER OF 
REGIONS
be Belgium ECHP NUTS1 3
dk Denmark ECHP NUTS1 1
de Germany SOEP NUTSI 15
gr Greece ECHP NUTSI 4
es Spain ECHP NUTSI 7
fr France ECHP NUTSI 8
ie Ireland ECHP NUTSI 1
it Italy ECHP NUTSI 11
lu Luxemburg PSELL NUTSI 1
at Austria ECHP NUTSI 3
Pt Portugal ECHP NUTS2 5
se Sweden ECHP NUTS2 8
uk United Kingdom BHPS NUTS2 35
Total number of regions 102
Note: SOEP: ECHP based on national survey-SOEP; PSELL: ECHP based on national survey-PSELL; BHPS: ECHP based on national 
survey-BHPS
1.3.2 The Benefits and Limitations o f  Panel Data
This study is based on panel data. According to Klevmarken (1989), Hsiao (2003) and 
Baltagi (2005), the benefits of using panel data are as follows:
1. Panel data control for regional heterogeneity as they suggest that regions are 
heterogeneous. They are able to control for region- and time-invariant variables. 
On the contrary, time-series and cross-section studies cannot control the
4 This type o f  panel data consists o f repeated observations on larger entities, the individual regions 
(NUTS) o f the EU.
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heterogeneity, so there is the risk that results obtained may be biased (Moulton, 
1986, 1987).
2. Panel data give more informative data and variability, along with a greater 
degree of freedom and efficiency. The variation in the data can be decomposed 
into the variation between regions of different sizes and characteristics and the 
variation within regions. More informative data implies more reliable parameter 
estimates.
3. Panel data facilitate the study of the dynamics of adjustment. They can be used 
to estimate, for example, what proportion of income inequality in one period 
may remain over another period. Therefore, they allow one to estimate 
intertemporal relations and intergenerational models. However, they do not shed 
any light on the speed of adjustment to regional economic changes, since the 
panel is not long enough. In addition, they enable the researcher to construct and 
test more complex models than purely cross-section or time-series data. For 
instance, they are able to interact the time-dummies variables with a fixed 
variable (i.e. urbanisation degree) in order to see how that variable has changed 
over time. Hence, one is able to identify and measure effects that are not 
detectable in cross-section or time-series data.
Panel data are not without limitations. The microeconomic panel data (ECHP database) 
involve annual data covering a short time span for each individual, which implies that 
asymptotic arguments rely crucially on the number of individuals tending to infinity 
(Baltagi, 2005: 8). On the other hand, increasing the time span of the panel is not 
without cost due to the amount of non-respondents. Hence, if attrition is a big problem 
in cross-section studies, it is more serious problem in panels, because subsequent waves 
of the panel are still subject to non-response (Baltagi, 2005: 8). The rate of attrition 
increases from one wave to next. Although the country availability increased over time, 
the overall rate of attrition also increased, since respondents may have died or moved. 
The major limitation of macroeconomic panel data (such as Eurostat’s Regio dataset) is 
that regional economic development is not instantaneous, so that changes in economic 
development from one year to the next are probably too short term to be really useful 
(Deaton, 1995). Although the payoff for panel data is over long time periods (i.e. five 
years), changes in economic development (growth) are calculated every two years, 
because data cover a short time span for each region.
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1.3.3 Spatially Aggregated Data
This study modifies individual data to aggregated data in order to calculate average 
income and educational attainment, as well as inequalities in those areas, and to relate 
those variables to macroeconomic variables such as regional economic growth, GDP per 
capita and public infrastructure. Although the biases resulting from aggregation over 
individuals may be reduced or eliminated by panel data (Blundell, 1988; Klevmarken, 
1989), certain problems are likely to emerge due to the spatial dimension of data.
One problem that has long been identified in the analysis of spatially aggregated data is 
the ‘modifiable areal unit problem’ (Openshaw, 1983; Arbia, 1989; Amrhein, 1995). It 
occurs when arbitrarily defined boundaries are used for measurement. This implies that 
spatially aggregated data contain a higher degree of uncertainty than the individual 
components undergoing aggregation and, thus, some observed patterns could be the 
result of the aggregation level (Fotheringham et al., 2000: 74). Aggregating 
establishments at any spatial level usually leads to spurious correlations across 
aggregated variables (Duranton and Overman, 2005). Moreover, the ‘modifiable areal 
unit problem’ implies that different results can be obtained from the same statistical 
analysis at different levels (hence, local, regional or state level) of spatial resolution 
(Fotheringham et al., 2000: 237). However, Florax and Van der Vlist (2003) have 
pointed out that straightforward aggregation over space is warranted when the 
phenomenon to be examined is homogeneously distributed over space (Anselin, 1988a) 
and the effect of spatial scale on test statistics is pervasive (Griffith et al., 2003). The 
‘modifiable areal unit problem’ typically worsens as higher levels of aggregations are 
considered, as has been widely recognised by quantitative geographers (Yule and 
Kendall, 1950; Cressie, 1993). Therefore, the degree of uncertainty with regard to data 
is higher at national level than at the regional level, and at both levels some observed 
interactions are eliminated. Accordingly, disparity measures are sensitive to the 
definition of regions or to the definition of any spatial units (Brulhart and Traeger, 
2005: 6) and statistical results are likely to change when the areal units are modified. 
Nevertheless, spatial analysis cannot completely escape the aggregation biases.
Another characteristic of spatially aggregated data is spatial effects. This term refers to 
both spatial autocorrelation (spatial dependence) and spatial heterogeneity (non- 
stationarity). The new theories, such as the New Economic Geography (NEG) models 
(i.e. Krugman, 1991a, 1991b; Krugman, 1993; Krugman and Venables, 1995, 1996; 
Puga and Venables, 1996; Martin, 1998; Fujita et al., 1999; Martin, 1999a, 1999b;
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Martin, 1999c; Puga, 1999; and Fujita and Thisse, 2002), stress the significance of 
spatial effects, via, for instance, home market (Krugman, 1980; Helpman and Krugman, 
1985; Davis and Weinstein, 2003) and price index (Fujita et al., 1999) effects, and the 
growing awareness that space matters for regional economic analysis and policy. In 
neoclassical economic growth models, however, regions are treated as ‘isolated islands’ 
(Quah, 1993), because the growth process is a matter of assumptions on the form of the 
production function and not of interactions across regional economies (Durlauf and 
Quah, 1999; Fischer and Stirbock, 2006). Geographical location, therefore, is important 
in accounting for the economic performance of the European regions (Ertur and Le 
Gallo, 2003).
1. Spatial autocorrelation can be defined as the coincidence of value similarity with 
location similarity (Anselin, 1988b; Baumont et al., 2003). In other words, it 
examines whether the data are random or there are similarities between 
neighbours. For instance, positive spatial autocorrelation means that rich regions 
tend to be geographically clustered. Another source of autocorrelation is the 
manner in which some published statistics are produced (Greene, 2003). Spatial 
dependence has to do with the spatial level of analysis or the geographical scale. 
Cressie (1993) states that data that are close together in space are more often 
alike than those that are far apart.5 Thus, it is possible for spatial autocorrelation 
to appear at the very local level, but it usually disappears at a larger level, such 
as national level, due to ‘modifiable areal unit problem’. Spatial dependence can 
also arise from boundary mismatching between the administrative boundaries 
used to organise the data series (NUTS) and the actual market boundaries over 
which economic processes operate (Cheshire and Magrini, 2000; Rey and 
Janikas, 2005; Fischer and Stirbock, 2006). Therefore, if the administrative 
boundaries do not coincide perfectly with the actual boundaries, then a form of 
measurement error will introduce spatial autocorrelation into the data (Anselin 
and Rey, 1991).
2. Spatial heterogeneity means that economic behaviour is not stable over space. It 
is linked with spatial differentiation. In a regression model, for example, it can 
be reflected by varying coefficients across regimes (structural instability) or by
5 Additionally, Cressie (1993) observes that data that are close together in time are more often alike than 
those that are far apart.
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varying error variances across regimes (heteroskedasticity) 6 (Anselin, 1990a, 
1990b). A cluster of rich regions (the ‘core’) is probably distinguished from a 
cluster of poor regions (the ‘periphery’) due to spatial heterogeneity (Baumont et 
al., 2003). A study by Neven and Gouyette (1995), for example, shows that 
homogeneity is higher among the northern regions of the EU than among the 
southern ones. Their study suggests the possible existence of different patterns 
(regimes) in the change in disparities. Anselin (2003c) argues that spatial 
heterogeneity often occurs concurrently with spatial dependence. Therefore, 
spatial dependence and spatial heterogeneity may be observationally equivalent 
(Baumont et al., 2003). For instance, heteroskedasticity is likely to be implied by 
spatial autocorrelation (Anselin, 1988b; Anselin and Griffith, 1988).
1.4 Methodology: Quantitative Methods
As mentioned above, this study will be conducted using quantitative methods. The 
methodology is divided into two parts: descriptive analysis and regression analysis of 
panel data.
1.4.1 Descriptive Analysis: Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis
Descriptive analysis allows us to make sense of the multidimensional micro and macro 
datasets, to check assumptions and to suggest ways in which research question(s) and 
hypotheses should be modelled in subsequent stages of the analysis. Therefore, 
descriptive analysis gives one a feel for how one might best analyse the data. There is 
increasing recognition of the need to visualise data prior to performing any type of 
econometric analysis (Fotheringham et al., 2000: 8 ). Global spatial autocorrelation 
analysis, for instance, allows one to examine the role of randomness in generated spatial 
patterns of inequality and growth and to test hypotheses regarding such patterns. 
Finally, descriptive statistics may tell us something about the theory, without claiming 
to give the full picture (Overman 2003). Although they are not claimed to reveal a great 
deal about the theory, they can give an indication of how one might best analyse the 
data (Fotheringham et al., 2002; Overman, 2003).
6 It usually arises in cross-section data where the scale o f the dependent variable and the explanatory 
power o f the model tend to vary across regions (Greene, 2003).
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More specifically, this thesis focuses on Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis (ESDA). 
ESDA is a set of techniques aimed at visualising and describing spatial distributions 
(Baumont et al., 2003), such as the distribution of inequality and growth. The 
exploratory analysis does not impose any prior restrictive assumption on distributions. 
Thus, the techniques of the exploratory analysis are applied to data in order to generate 
hypotheses about the underlying dynamics of regional economies. ESDA is a set of 
techniques aimed at detecting patterns of global and local spatial association and 
suggesting spatial regimes or other forms of spatial heterogeneity (Haining, 1995; 
Unwin and Unwin, 1998; Baumont et al., 2003). ESDA highlights the importance of 
spatial interactions and geographical location in the economic performance of the 
European regions. However, it is based on the assumption that the value in the region is 
spread uniformly throughout that region, an assumption which is known as ‘ecological 
fallacy’ (Cressie, 1993).
The first (initial) technique of ESDA is to map the data. This allows one to obtain a 
visual image of them and to identify clusters of similar or dissimilar values. Following
*7
Jenk’s classification, data are divided into six categories (method of natural breaks).
The second technique of ESDA is the application of boxplots, which is a common but 
very useful method. The boxplot uses order-based statistics; it clearly shows the median 
value (the stripe on the box), the first and third quartile (the box), and the largest and 
smallest values in the dataset (the whiskers) (Fotheringham et al., 2000: 6 8 ). Although 
boxplots tend to emphasise the tails of a distribution, which are the least certain points 
in the dataset hiding many details of the distribution, they provide some indication of 
the symmetry of the data and of the presence of bias.8 Boxplots clearly display the 
outliers, that are cases with values between 1.5 and 3 box lengths from the upper or 
lower edge of the box and the extremes that are cases with values of more than 3 box 
lengths. The outliers and extreme cases play a prominent role in regression analysis and, 
therefore, they are likely to crucially affect the determinants of inequality and growth. 
In addition, outliers usually depict ‘cores’ of clusters. The box length is the interquartile
7 However, different classification schemes are available, such as ‘exogenous’ schemes, defined by 
criteria external to the distribution of data; ‘arbitrary’ schemes, in which class boundaries are set by 
arbitrary criteria such as equal intervals; ‘ideographic’ schemes, where class boundaries are defined by 
the shape of the distribution, such as the natural breaks and quantiles; and ‘serial’ schemes that are 
defined by statistical or mathematical functions (Wright, 2005).
8 www.netmba.com/statistics/plot/box.
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range, which is a measure of spread. A boxplot is a useful way of summarising a set of 
data measured on an interval scale. It is type of graph which is used to show the shape 
of the distribution, its central value and variability. The first and third quartiles show the 
interquartile range. The outliers may present erroneous data.
The third technique of ESDA is spatial autocorrelation analysis. It is likely to reveal 
relationships in regional data that may otherwise be invisible (i.e. the EU north-south 
divide). The functionality of the spatial autocorrelation analysis is rounded out by 
constructing spatial weights (Anselin et al., 2004). Generally speaking, it includes tests 
for, and visualisation of, both global (test for clustering) and local (test for clusters) 
statistics (Anselin et al., 2004). Spatial autocorrelation analysis consists of three basic 
methodological steps.
The first, and the most crucial, step is the construction of spatial weights matrices. One 
of the main distinguishing characteristics of spatial data analysis is that the spatial 
arrangement of the regions is taken into account. This is formally expressed in a spatial 
weights matrix W , with elements wv, where the ij index corresponds to each region
pair (Anselin, 1992: 64). Thus, the first step in the analysis of spatial autocorrelation is 
to construct the spatial weights that contain information on the ‘neighbourhood’ 
structure for each region. Each region is connected to a set of neighbouring regions by 
means of a spatial pattern introduced exogenously as spatial weights in order to avoid 
the identification problems raised by Manski (1993).9
The two broad ways to create the spatial weights matrix are through the contiguity 
based spatial weights and the distance band spatial weights. First, the contiguity based 
spatial weights comprise either rook contiguity that uses only common boundaries to 
define neighbours or queen contiguity that includes all common points (boundaries and 
vertices) in the definition (Anselin, 2003a, 2003b). These weights need not to be limited 
to first order contiguity weights, but higher order weights can also be constructed 
(Anselin and Smirnov. 1996; Anselin, 2003a, 2003b). Second, the distance band spatial 
weights can be derived from the distance between points (i.e. X, Y coordinates) 
computing the minimum distance required to assure that each region has at least one 
neighbour. However, these weights often lead to a very unbalanced connectedness
9 For instance, if  the spatial weights matrix contains the exogenous or endogenous variables used in the 
regression models, the empirical model is highly non-linear (Abreu et al., 2004).
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structure, especially when the spatial units have very different areas, such as the 
European regions at different NUTS levels. This is because smaller regions have many 
neighbours, while the larger ones may have very few or none, yielding unconnected 
observations or ‘islands’ (Anselin, 2003a, 2003b). An alternative to distance band 
spatial weights consists of considering the k-nearest neighbours, choosing the number 
of neighbours. Hence the critical cut-off for each European region may be expressed as 
a fixed distance or as a fixed number of neighbours. 10 It is clear that the ‘modifiable 
areal unit problem’ is the basis for the introduction of any spatial weights matrix, 
because a specific level (NUTS) of spatial aggregation has to be chosen as well as a 
spatial arrangement in terms of patterns of contiguity or distance (Florax and Rey, 
1995). Therefore, the specific geographical configuration of the European regions will 
have some bearing on the choice of the spatial weights matrix (Ertur and Le Gallo, 
2003).
In this research, three different spatial weights are considered, because the appropriate 
choice of the spatial weights is one of the most difficult and controversial issues in 
ESDA and in spatial econometrics (Anselin, 1988b; Florax and Rey, 1995; Anselin and 
Bera, 1998; Ertur and Le Gallo, 2003). One advantage of ESDA is that spatial 
relationships are summarised in spatial weights matrices (Abreu et al., 2004) and thus 
externalities, among other aspects, are summarised in these matrices. The specific 
geographical configuration of the European regions and the choice of the scale of 
analysis (NUTS I or II) will indeed have some bearing on the choice of the weights 
matrix (Ertur and Le Gallo, 2003). Furthermore, the drawbacks of a specific spatial 
weights matrix are likely to be the advantages of another. The three different spatial 
weights schemes considered were as follows:
1. The rook first order contiguity spatial weights matrix: It is constructed in order 
to reduce the effect of the unbalanced connectedness structure of the European 
regions.
2. The 3-nearest neighbours spatial weights matrix: The main advantage of this 
matrix is that it connects a number of ‘islands’ such as Sicilia and Sardinia to 
continental Europe. Additionally, the southern United Kingdom is connected to
10 Other, less favoured, spatial weights schemes are the distance measured by some non-spatial matrices 
(Gibbons, 2003), as well as schemes which are derived from graph-theoretic concepts such as Gabriel 
graphs (Bivand and Portnov, 2004).
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France and parts of Greece to Italy. However, the European regions are not very 
closely connected and compact. Two relevant empirical studies in this area are 
the works of Lopez-Bazo et al. (1999) and Ertur and Le Gallo (2003).
3. The threshold distance spatial weights matrix: The minimum distance required 
to assume that each region has at least one neighbour is relatively long, because 
A9ores and Madeira are situated far from continental Europe. Nevertheless, one 
advantage of these spatial weights is that there are no unconnected observations.
A major problem in the construction of critical cut-off spatial weights occurs when 
many values are missing, since every region must be connected to every other via the 
spatial weights matrix. 11 For instance, increasing the number of nearest neighbours 
implies that more regions are affected by the missing observations of the nearest 
neighbours. Another important consideration is that there must be a limit to the range of 
spatial dependence by the spatial weights matrix (Abreu et al., 2004).
The second step is the global spatial autocorrelation analysis. It is not always obvious 
whether a variable x  is unevenly distributed over space just by looking at a map. If I 
want to know how strong the spatial association is between neighbouring places, I need 
some statistical measures. There are a number of simple univariate indicators which 
allow us to test, in a statistical sense, for unevenness in the spatial distribution of x , 
such as the geographical distribution of income per capita. The most well-known index
17is Moran’s contiguity ratio or simply Moran’s I (Moran, 1950).
Cov(x„m,(x))
Var(x,)
where mi( x ) = ^ iwijxJ and wtJ is the weight given to region j in the neighborhood
j
average for region i. 13 Each matrix is row-standardised so that it displays relative and 
not absolute distance. The non-zero elements of the weights matrix reveal the potential
11 Although the method o f ‘interpolation’ could make predictions for the missing values (Stein. 1999), it 
is not suggested because o f the missing national data.
12 Other relevant statistical measures o f global spatial association are the Getis and Ord statistic (Getis 
and Ord, 1992,1993) and the rank adjastency statistic (Ekwaru and Walter, 2001).
x'Wx _
13 Using matrix notation /  =  ■ where x is the mean value o f X .
x 'x
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spatial interaction between two regions (Anselin, 1992: 64). Moran’s I describes an 
average trend in the way that a variable x is distributed over space. It is a test for global 
spatial autocorrelation (Cliff and Ord, 1981). The inference for Moran’s I statistic is 
based on the permutation approach. This is carried out by permuting 999 times the 
observed values over all locations and by recomputing Moran’s I for each new sample. 
Although several statistics for spatial correlation were developed, the Moran’s I test 
statistic remains an important focus of investigation (Anselin et al., 2004). Hence, the 
second step in the spatial autocorrelation analysis is to calculate the Moran’s I statistic 
of a variable and its visualisation in the form of a univariate or bivariate Moran scatter 
plot (Anselin, 1995a, 1995b, 2003c).14
The third step is the local spatial autocorrelation analysis. This step makes spatial 
autocorrelation a problem of local analysis. Fotheringham et al. (2000) stress that the 
focus of attention in local analysis is on testing for the presence of differences across 
regions rather than on assuming that such differences do not exist. Those differences 
exist for many reasons, such as the random sampling variations or the misspecification 
of reality (Fotheringham et al., 2000). The most well-known index for measuring local 
relationships in univariate data is the local variant of Moran’s I (Anselin, 1995a).15 The 
localised version of Moran’s I is:
j  _  * , ” *, (*)
Var(xj) ’
which is known as Local Indicator of Spatial Association (LISA). This index can be 
used to identify spatial outliers, defined as zones having very different values of an
14 In a univariate Moran scatter plot, the variables are standardised (their mean is zero and variance one) 
so that the units in the graph correspond to standard deviations. The four quadrants in any Moran scatter 
plot provide a classification o f four types o f spatial autocorrelation: high-high (upper right) and low-low 
(lower left), for positive spatial autocorrelation; high-low (lower right) and low-high (upper left), for 
negative spatial autocorrelation (Anselin, 2003a, 2003b). The slope o f the regression line corresponds to 
Moran’s I. To assess the significance o f Moran’s I statistic against a null hypothesis o f no spatial 
autocorrelation, a 999 permutation procedure is used. The plots depict income patterns o f local spatial 
association and spatial instability (observations which lie on the horizontal axis are ‘islands’). A bivariate 
measure o f spatial correlation relates the value o f a variable in a given location to that o f a different 
variable in neighbouring locations (Anselin, 2003a, 2003b). This is useful for the analysis o f space-time 
correlation, where the two variables are the same, but measured at two points in time (Anselin, 2003a, 
2003b). Both variables are also standardised. One particularly interesting exercise is to compare the 
spatial autocorrelation o f a variable to its space-time correlation.
15 Another alternative measure of local relationships in univariate data is the local variant o f the global 
statistic that it is suggested by Getis and Ord (1992; 1993). However, this statistic does not belong to 
LISA class, because the overall statistic is not equal to the (scaled) sum o f  the local statistics (Florax and 
Van derVlist, 2003:237).
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attribute from their neighbours (Fotheringham et al., 2002: 99). It indicates spatial 
clustering of similar values around the observations (Anselin, 1995a). In other words, it 
yields a measure of spatial autocorrelation for each individual region. The results are 
illustrated in a cluster map. The cluster map, which is a special choropleth map, shows 
those European regions with a significant local Moran statistic classified by the type of 
spatial correlation generated. The high-high (high surrounded by high) and low-low 
(low surrounded by low) regions suggest clustering of similar values (positive spatial 
autocorrelation), whereas the high-low and low-high locations indicate clustering of 
dissimilar values (negative spatial autocorrelation). The cluster itself consists of the core 
as well as the neighbours. Anselin (2003a; 2003b) strongly recommends a sensitivity 
analysis before interpreting the results of LISA maps. More specifically, a 999 
permutation procedure at the 0.05 significance level (p-value) is chosen in order to 
provide stability of the results (Anselin, 1995a).16
Then, the Pearson correlation coefficient is used as a measure of linear association. In 
the correlation analysis, there is no distinction between the dependent and explanatory 
variables, while both variables are assumed to be random (Gujarati, 2003).
Finally, ESDA is likely to suggest spatial regimes or other forms of spatial 
heterogeneity (Haining, 1995; Baumont et al., 2003). It enables one to investigate the 
underlying factors behind income inequality, educational inequality and regional 
economic growth. In mapping the data, it is possible to establish links between clusters 
(or ‘hot spots’) and the underpinning factors such as urbanisation, geography (latitude) 
and institutions (welfare state, religion and family structure). A cluster (or spatial club) 
is a group of regional economies that interact more with one another than with those 
outside the cluster (Fischer and Stirbock, 2006).
16 The tighter significance criterion eliminates some regions from the map.
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Economic theory provides no information on the number o f  regimes or on the way in 
which foundation factors determine the different clusters o f  agglomeration (Durlauf and 
Johnson, 1995). However, the methodology examines three factors (Figure 1.3).
1. Urbanisation'. The aim with this variable is to explain differences between 
highly agglomerated urban regions and rural (and usually peripheral) regions.17
2. Geographical variables such as latitude: The aim with this variable is to 
investigate differences between the southern and the northern regions o f  Europe.
3. Some institutional variables such as the welfare state, religion and fam ily  
structure: The aim with these variables is to investigate whether inequalities and 
growth evolve differently across institutions. However, the detection o f  this 
spatial regime is likely to be vague due to many categories.
To sum up:
‘ESDA should be considered as a first descriptive step before suggesting 
factors to explain the spatial patterns highlighted and before estimating and 
testing more sophisticated econometric m odels’ (Ertur and Le Gallo, 2003:
86).
1.4.2 E conom etric Analysis
The broad scope o f  econometric analysis can be seen from the following quotation.
17 For instance, Brauninger and Niebuhr (2005) use a partition o f EU regions into spatial categories, 
which are based on a typology o f settlement structure established by the Study Programme o f European 
Spatial Planning.
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‘...econometrics may be defined as the quantitative analysis of actual 
economic phenomena based on the concurrent development of theory and 
observation, related by appropriate methods of inference’ (Samuelson et al.,
1954).'®
The underlying empirical strategies used in the econometric analysis of income, human 
capital and economic growth patterns are presented. The calibration of econometric 
models provides information on the determinants of the patterns through the estimates 
of the model’s parameters. The econometric models give empirical content to the 
hypotheses.
This study considers the non-spatial econometric literature, which has focused on 
models of absolute location (Abreu et al., 2004). The notion of spatial heterogeneity 
addressed here is broader than the one typically used in the spatial econometrics 
literature, which has concentrated on models of relative location (or spatial dependence) 
and is tightly linked to the concept of spatial regimes. Following the argument of Abreu 
et al. (2004), while spatial regimes are an extreme form of spatial heterogeneity, 
incorporating spatial variables such as urbanisation, latitude, the welfare state, religion 
and family structure directly into the regression also takes account of spatial 
heterogeneity, albeit on a more gradual and refined scale. Although studies on relative 
location do not apply sophisticated econometric techniques to account for spatial 
effects, the non-spatial econometric literature can gain insights from conducting ESDA, 
because it reveals variables that might otherwise be invisible.
This study uses linear regression analysis. The econometric models deal only with 
cases where the number of regions is large relative to the number of years. It is simpler 
to treat the smaller set (time-effect) as an ordinary set of variables. Thus, the 
econometric model is a one-way error component regression model. Additionally, 
econometric analysis provides a robust and non-robust testing ground for hypotheses 
about the underlying mechanisms behind inequality and growth. Concerning the causal 
impact, there is difficulty in distinguishing, for instance, the effects of inequality on 
growth from the effects of growth on inequality, and the possibility that other factors are 
the cause of both inequality and growth.
18 Cited in Gujarati (2003: 1)
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In the regression models, an inference about an individual is made using aggregate data 
for a region due to ‘ecological fallacy’ (Cressie, 1993). Therefore, the regression models 
depend on individual, group and regional specific characteristics.
The selection of the determinants of income inequality, educational inequality and 
regional economic growth are based not only on the theoretical background but also on 
the availability of datasets. As the available regional datasets have not included a 
satisfactory range of time-series (1995-2002), I use pooled time-series — cross-section 
(panel) analysis. The complexity of the relationships will possibly dictate causality, 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation tests (Wooldridge, 2002; Greene, 2003; Gujarati, 
2003; Hsiao, 2003; Baltagi, 2005). I also prefer the panel analysis rather than the cross- 
section alternative because there are two potential econometric problems with cross- 
section regression: the measurement error (in income inequality and in educational 
variables) and the omitted variable bias.
This study uses two methods of panel regression analysis: static models and dynamic 
models. These models are increasingly popular for panel data analysis among regional 
science researchers. With repeated observations for 102 regions, panel analysis permits 
us to study the dynamics of change within short time-series. The combination of time- 
series with cross-regions can enhance the quality and quantity of data in ways that 
would be impossible using only one of those two dimensions (Gujarati, 2003). The 
static models endow regression analysis with both a spatial and temporal dimension. 
The first dimension pertains to a set of cross-regional units of observation, while the 
second pertains to periodic observations of a set of variables characterising those cross- 
regional units over a particular time span. There are several types of static panel data 
analytic models. The static methods of panel estimation presented here are the pooled 
ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects (FEs) and random effects (REs) models. 
These models are the most widely used in panel regression analysis. They allow one to 
use the pooled regression model as the baseline for comparison. As the surveys of the 
ECHP dataset were conducted regularly at approximately one-year intervals, the error 
terms of inequality regressions are expected to be correlated with the regional specific 
effect. This problem can be dealt with using the FEs models, in which the error terms 
may be correlated with the regional specific effects. Nevertheless, according to Yaffee 
(2003), the FEs models are not without their drawbacks. These models frequently have 
too many cross-sectional units of observation, requiring too many dummy variables for 
their specification. Too many dummy variables may sap the model of a sufficient degree
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of freedom to conduct adequately powerful statistical tests. He also notes that a model 
with many such variables may be plagued with multicollinearity, which increases the 
standard errors and thereby drains the model of the statistical power to test parameters. 
If these models contain variables that do not vary within the groups, parameter 
estimation may be precluded. This study also includes dynamic models due to the short 
time period of analysis. For instance, the equilibrium may be constrained in the short- 
run because of supply rigidities or factor immobilities that are removed in the longer- 
run (Combes et al., 2005). The dynamic models test for the existence of autocorrelation. 
Finally, using the dynamic models, I can obtain both short-run and long-run parameters.
More specifically, the econometric analysis in this study starts with a static panel data 
model of the form
y» = fi 'x ll+vl +e„
with i denoting regions (i = l,...,N )  and t time = y it is the dependent
variable (income inequality, educational inequality or regional economic growth), xu is 
a vector of explanatory variables, p  is the coefficient, v i is an unobserved regional 
specific effect (unobserved heterogeneity) and eu is the disturbance term with 
E[eu ] = 0 and Var[sit ] = a]  (idiosyncratic error). The term v, + eit is known as the 
composite error.
I then consider the role of the welfare state, religion and family structure. These are 
explanatory variables, represented by dummies in the static panel data model. My 
analysis takes the following form:
yi,=P'x»+V'du+v,+sl„
where 77 are coefficients and dXi is a vector of dummy variables with X denoting 
categories (X  = 2,...,/w). If a qualitative variable has m categories, I introduce m - 1 
dummy variables (categories). Category dh is referred to as the base category. 
Comparisons are made with that category (Gujarati, 2003).
This static model is characterised by one source of persistence over time, due to the 
presence of unobserved regional specific effects. As mentioned earlier, the static 
methods of panel estimation used are the OLS, FEs and REs methods. To evaluate 
which technique is optimal, it is necessary to consider the relationship between the
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regional specific effects and the regressors, among others. First, in the event that there 
are neither significant regional nor significant temporal effects, I pool all of the data and 
run an OLS regression model. Although for the most part there are either regional or 
temporal effects present, there are occasions when neither of these is statistically 
significant. In other words, the pooled OLS estimator assumes that the unobserved 
regional specific effect is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables and that each 
region is independent and identically distributed, ignoring the panel structure of the data 
and the information they provide (Johnston and Dinardo, 1997). The resulting bias in 
pooled OLS is caused by omitting a time-constant variable and is sometimes called the 
heterogeneity bias (Wooldridge, 2003: 439). Second, the FEs estimator (or within 
estimator) assumes that some or all of the regressors are correlated with the unobserved 
heterogeneity. Besides, the main reason for collecting panel data is to allow the 
unobserved heterogeneity to be correlated with the explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 
2003: 440). The FEs estimator is obtained by removing the unobserved regional 
characteristics, which are a potential source of bias. More specifically, it is a pooled 
OLS estimator that is based on the time-demeaned variables. The FEs estimator also 
requires that there be within-group variation in variables for at least some groups. I 
therefore introduce a year dummy variable with the degree of urbanisation (time- 
constant variable) in order to see whether the effect of urbanisation has changed over 
the period 1995-2000. Third, the REs estimator assumes that the regional specific 
effects are uncorrelated with all of the explanatory variables in all time periods. The 
efficient estimator of the REs model provided in this study is the generalised least 
squares (GLS) estimator. Both the FEs and the REs models deal with heterogeneity 
bias. The former treats the v, as fixed effects to be estimated, while the latter treats the
v( as a random component of the error term.
Both the FEs and REs estimators are based on the strict exogeneity assumption. Hence, 
the vector of the explanatory variables ( xit and z, ) is strictly exogenous. The usual
diagnostic tests are also presented. Hausman’s (1978) chi-squared statistic tests whether 
the GLS estimator is an appropriate alternative to the FEs estimator. Another critical 
diagnostic test is Breusch and Pagan’s (1980) Lagrange Multiplier (LM) statistic, which 
is a test of the REs model against the OLS model. The LM test is a test for regional 
effects. Large values for the LM statistic favour the REs model.
In the static models, I assume that the regression disturbances are homoskedastic, with 
the same variance across time and regions. However, heteroskedasticity potentially
40
causes problems for inferences based on least squares. Assuming homoskedastic 
disturbances in the FEs model, for example, might be a restrictive assumption for panels 
(Baltagi, 2005). Thus, when heteroskedasticity is present, the consistent estimates are 
not efficient. If every s it has a different variance, the robust estimation of the
covariance matrix is presented following the White estimator for unspecified 
heteroskedasticity (White, 1980).
There are a variety of different techniques that can be used to estimate a dynamic model 
of the form:
y* = fyu - i  + P ' X« + C x ij-1 +r'z< + y ,+ e „
with i denoting regions (/ = l,...,Af) and t time y i{ is the dependent
variable (income inequality or educational inequality), y it_x is the (first) lagged 
dependent variable, xit is a vector of explanatory variables, x , i s  a vector of (first) 
lagged independent variables, 8 , p  and y are coefficients, a is an intercept, v, are the 
random effects that are independent and identically distributed over the panels and s it is 
the disturbance term with E[sit ] = 0 and Var[eu ] =  c f] (idiosyncratic error). It is 
assumed that the v i and the s it are independent for each i over all t .
This dynamic model is characterised by two sources of persistence over time: 
autocorrelation due to the presence of a lagged dependent variable among the 
regressors; and unobserved regional specific effects (Baltagi, 2005). Pooled OLS, FEs 
and REs estimators are now biased and inconsistent, because the econometric model 
contains a lagged endogenous variable (Baltagi, 2005).
The dynamic panel structure of my data is exploited by a generalised method of 
moments (GMM) estimation suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) (Arellano-Bond 
estimation). The main idea behind GMM estimation is to establish population moment 
conditions and then use sample analogs of these moment conditions to compute 
parameter estimates (Greene, 2003; Wooldridge, 2003; Baltagi, 2005). Arellano and 
Bond first transform the model to eliminate the regional specific effect ( v ,). The
observed urbanisation ratio (z ,)  is eliminated as well. The first-differencing 
transformation is:
y« ~ y ,.<-1 =<yO v i  - > V 2 )+ /? ’(*„ i)+ r(* ,v - i  -* u -2 )+(*#
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where all variables are expressed as deviations from period means. Models in first 
differences usually encounter problems arising from the non-stationarity of the data. 
The correlation between the explanatory variables and the error is handled by 
instrument variables (IVs). In Arellano-Bond estimations, the predetermined and 
endogenous variables in first differences are instrumented with suitable lags of their 
own levels, while the strictly exogenous regressors can enter the instrument matrix in 
first differences. For instance, for 1997 (t = 3), y t , is an instrument for (yi2 ->>, ,) and
not correlated with (si3 -  s i2) as long as the eu themselves are not serially correlated;
for 1998 (/ = 4), y tl and y i2 are instruments for (y it3- y i<2), and so on. This
procedure is more efficient than the Anderson and Hsiao (1981; 1982) two stage least 
squares estimator, which does not make use of all of the available moment conditions 
(Ahn and Schmidt, 1995). Anderson and Hsiao use {yit_2 ~ y ^ - i)  or 2 only as ^
instrument for -  y, ,_2. The Arellano-Bond structure provides a large number of
I Vs by GMM estimator. The Arellano-Bond framework, which is called ‘difference 
GMM’ (GMM-DIF), treats the dynamic model as a system of equations, one for each 
time period.
In the model, I assume that the explanatory variables might be:
• strictly exogenous, if E[xtteiJ  = 0 for all t and s ,
• predetermined, if E[xits is ] * 0 for s < t , but E[xiteis ] = 0 for all s > t , and
• endogenous, if E[xits is] *  0 for s < t ,  but E[xu£b ] = 0 for all s > t;
except for population ageing which is definitely a strictly exogenous variable.
The GMM methodology is based on a set of diagnostics. First of all, it assumes that 
there is no second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced idiosyncratic errors. 19 
Additionally, Arellano and Bond (1991) developed Sargan’s test (Sargan, 1958) for 
over-identifying restrictions. The Sargan test has an asymptotic chi-squared distribution 
in the case of the homoskedastic error term only. Both the homoskedastic one-step and 
the robust one-step GMM estimators are presented. The two-step standard error model
19 The consistency o f the GMM estimator relies upon the fact that E [ A e ^ A s , (_2] =  0  (Arellano and 
Bond, 1991:282).
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is not recommended, because it tends to be biased downward in small samples 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998). It also should be stressed that 
treating variables as predetermined or endogenous increases the size of the instrument 
matrix very quickly. This implies that GMM estimators with too many overidentifying 
restrictions may perform poorly in small samples (Kiviet, 1995).
As mentioned above, the dynamic model is used in order to obtain short-run and long- 
run parameters. The short-run effect of an independent variable is the first year effect of 
a change in that variable, whereas the long-run effect is the effect obtained after full 
adjustment of the dependent variable. The short-run effect of the variable x is p  and its
long-run effect is ft + f /1  -  5 . Long-run standard errors are calculated using the Delta 
method (Greene, 2003).
Broadly speaking, the advantage of dynamic over static models is that the former 
correct the inconsistentcy introduced by lagged endogenous variables and also permit a 
certain degree of endogeneity in the regressors.
1.5 The Structure of the Present Study
The next chapter presents the main theoretical background of this study. It investigates 
statements by drawing on evidence from studies in economics, sociology, political 
science and geography. The determinants of income and educational inequalities have 
been examined in numerous studies using a variety of different approaches. This paper 
aims to develop the understanding of inequalities within the context of regional science. 
Chapter 2, then, gathers together knowledge from diverse disciplines and promotes 
interdisciplinary research on the impact of inequalities in income and education 
inequalities on regional economic growth.
Chapters 3 and 4 explore and analyse the European income and educational 
distributions, respectively. The core methodology of these chapters is ESDA. The focus 
of attention is on identifying income and educational differences across space, rather 
than similarities. These chapters examine whether income and educational externalities, 
among other things, spill over the barriers of regional economies, indicating the 
existence of spatial dependence, and whether the probability of neighbouring economies 
sharing similar urban, geographical (such as latitude) and institutional (such as welfare 
state, religion and family structure) conditions is relatively high, indicating the existence 
of spatial heterogeneity. I examine whether the geographical distributions of the
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European regions exhibit any patterns of income and educational polarisation. Chapters 
3 and 4 also highlight the within-region inequalities in income and education as 
components of the European income and educational distributions, respectively.
Chapter 5 compares European income and educational distributions through the 
parametric models of lognormal and gamma distributions, cross-tabulation analysis and 
the within-region component. This chapter also examines whether spatial interactions 
and geographical location are important in regional growth issues. It goes on to explore 
the possibility of a persistent polarisation pattern among regions.
Chapter 6  explores the determinants of income and educational inequalities in the 
regions of the EU. More specifically, it examines not only how microeconomic changes 
in income distributions affect educational inequalities, but also how microeconomic 
changes in educational distributions affect income inequalities. The methodology of this 
chapter is econometric analysis, which deals with the estimation of both static and 
dynamic models. A number of alternative specifications are tested in order to evaluate 
the robustness of the results and the impact of population ageing, work access, 
unemployment and inactivity on inequalities. This chapter provides an empirical 
framework for understanding the differences in income and educational inequalities in 
the EU and testing whether they correspond to differences in urbanisation, geography 
and institutions.
Chapter 7 deals with the main research question of this study. It examines whether and 
to what extent income and educational inequalities are associated with growth. The 
methodology of this chapter is econometric analysis. Similar to the previous chapter, it 
tests the robustness of the results to the inclusion of additional variables in the model 
specification such as population ageing, work access, unemployment and inactivity. 
Finally, it explores the role of urbanisation, geography and institutions in the regional 
economic growth process.
The final chapter summarises the main points of the inquiry, synthesises the empirical 
results, draws some policy implications for regional economic policy and discusses 
directions for future research.
44
Appendix A l
Appendix A l.l:  Regions: Code and Name
MICRO-DATA (based on NUTS, version 1995) MACRO-DATA (based on NUTS, version 2002)
NUTS
(version
1995)
CODE NAME CODE NAME
NUTSO be Belgium Be Belgium
NUTSI bel Region Bruxelles-capitale/Brussels hoofdstad 
gewest
bel Region de Bruxelles-Capitale/Brussels 
Hoofdstedelijk Gewest
NUTSI be2 Vlaams Gewest be2 Vlaams Gewest
NUTSI be3 Region Wallonne be3 Rdgion Wallonne
NUTSO-
NUTS1
dk Denmark Dk Denmark
NUTSO de Federal Republic of Germany (including ex- 
GDR from 1991)
De Germany (including ex-GDR from 1991)
NUTSI del Baden-W Qrttemberg del Baden-WOrttemberg
NUTSI de2 Bayern de2 Bayern
NUTSI de3 Berlin de3 Berlin
NUTSI de4 Brandenburg de4 Brandenburg
NUTSI de5 Bremen de5 Bremen
NUTSI de6 Hamburg de6 Hamburg
NUTSI de7 Hessen de7 Hessen
NUTSI de8 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern de8 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
NUTSI de9 Niedersachsen de9 Niedersachsen
NUTSI dea Nordrhein-Westfalen Dea Nordrhein-Westfalen
NUTSNEW dex Rheinland-Pfalz+Saarland Deb Rheinland-Pfalz
Dec Saarland
NUTSI ded Sachsen Ded Sachsen
NUTSI dee Sachsen-Anhalt Dee Sachsen-Anhalt
NUTSI def Schleswig-Holstein Def Schleswig-Holstein
NUTSI deg ThQringen Deg ThQringen
NUTSO gr Greece Gr Greece
NUTSI grl Voreia Ellada grl Voreia Ellada
NUTSI gr2 Kentriki Ellada gr2 Kentriki Ellada
NUTSI gr3 Attiki gr3 Attiki
NUTSI gr4 Nisia Aigaiou, Kriti gr4 Nisia Aigaiou, Kriti
NUTSO es Spain Es Spain
NUTSI esl Noroeste esl Noroeste
NUTSI es2 Noreste es2 Noreste
NUTSI es3 Comunidad de Madrid es3 Comunidad de Madrid
NUTSI es4 Centro (ES) es4 Centro (ES)
NUTSI es5 Este es5 Este
NUTSI es6 Sur es6 Sur
NUTSI es7 Canarias (ES) es7 Canarias (ES)
NUTSO fr France Fr France
NUTSI frl lie de France frl lie de France
NUTSI fr2 Bassin Parisien ff2 Bassin Parisien
NUTSI fr3 Nord - Pas-de-Calais ff3 Nord - Pas-de-Calais
NUTSI fr4 Est ff4 Est
NUTSI fr5 Ouest fr5 Ouest
NUTSI fr6 Sud-Ouest fr6 Sud-Ouest
NUTSI fr7 Centre-Est fr7 Centre-Est
NUTSI fr8 M6diterran6e fr8 M6diterran6e
NUTSO-
NUTSI
ie Ireland Ie Ireland
NUTSO it Italy It Italy
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NUTSI itl Nord Ovest tel Piemonte
tc2 Valle d ’Aosta/Vallde d’Aoste
tc3 Liguria
NUTSI it2 Lombardia tc4 Lombardia
NUTSI it3 Nord Est tdl Provincia Autonoma Bolzano-Bozen
td2 Provincia Autonoma Trento
td3 Veneto
td4 Friuli-Venezia Giulia
NUTSI it4 Emilia-Romagna td3 Emilia-Romagna
NUTSI itS Centro (I) tel Toscana
te2 Umbria
te3 Marche
NUTSI it6 Lazio te4 Lazio
NUTSI it7 Abruzzo-Molise tfl Abruzzo
to Molise
NUTSI U8 Campania to Campania
NUTSI it9 Sud tf4 Puglia
tf5 Basilicata
tf6 Calabria
NUTSI ita Sicilia tgl Sicilia
NUTSI itb Sardegna tg2 Sardegna
NUTSO-
NUTSI
lu Luxembourg Lu Luxembourg (Grand-DuchO)
NUTSO at Austria At Austria
NUTSI atl OstOsterreich atl OstOsterreich
NUTSI at2 SudOsterreich at2 SQdOsteneich
NUTSI at3 WestOsterreich at3 WestOsterreich
NUTSO Pt Portugal Pt Portugal
NUTS2 p tll Norte p tll Norte
NUTS2 ptl 2 Centro (PT) ptl 6 Centro (PT)
NUTS2 ptl 3 Lisboa e Vale do Tejo ptl 7 Lisboa
NUTS2 ptl 4 Alentejo ptl 8 Alentejo
NUTS2 ptl 5 Algarve ptl 5 Algarve
NUTS2 Pt2 A?ores (PT) pt2 Regiao AutOnoma dos A9ores (PT)
NUTS2 pt3 Madeira (PT) Pt3 Regiao AutOnoma da Madeira (PT)
NUTSO se Sweden Se Sweden
NUTS2 seOI Stockholm seOI Stockholm
NUTS2 se02 Ostra Mellansverige se02 Ostra Mellansverige
NUTS2 se04 Sydsverige se04 Sydsverige
NUTS2 se06 Norra Mellansverige se06 Norra Mellansverige
NUTS2 se07 Mellersta Norrland se07 Mellersta Norrland
NUTS2 se08 Ovre Norrland se08 Ovre Norrland
NUTS2 se03 Sm&land med Oama se09 Sm&land med Oama
NUTS2 se05 Vastsverige seOa Vastsverige
NUTSO uk United Kingdom Uk United Kingdom
NUTS2 ukll Cleveland, Durham ukcl Tees Valley and Durham
NUTS2 ■ uk!3 Northumberland, Tyne and Wear ukc2 Northumberland, Tyne and Wear
NUTS2 uk 12 Cumbria ukdl Cumbria
NUTS2 uk8l Cheshire ukd2 Cheshire
NUTS2 uk82 Greater Manchester ukd3 Greater Manchester
NUTS2 uk83 Lancashire ukd4 Lancashire
NUTS2 uk84 Merseyside ukd5 Merseyside
NUTS2 uk21 Humberside ukel East Riding and North Lincolnshire
NUTS2 uk22 North Yorkshire uke2 North Yorkshire
NUTS2 uk23 South Yorkshire uke3 South Yorkshire
NUTS2 uk24 West Yorkshire uke4 West Yorkshire
NUTS2 uk31 Derbyshire, Nottinghamshire ukH Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire
NUTS2 uk32 Leicestershire, Northamptonshire ukf2 Leicestershire, Rutland and Northants
46
NUTS2 uk33 Lincolnshire ukf3 Lincolnshire
NUTS2 uk71 Hereford and Worcester, Warwickshire ukgl Herefordshire, Worcestershire and Warks
NUTS2 uk72 Shropshire, Staffordshire ukg2 Shropshire and Staffordshire
NUTS2 uk73 West Midlands (County) ukg3 West Midlands
NUTS2 uk40 East Anglia ukhl East Anglia
NUTS2 ukSl Bedfordshire, Hertfordshire ukh2 Bedfordshire, Hertfordshire
NUTS2 uk54 Essex ukh3 Essex
NUTS2 uk55 Greater London Uki London
NUTS2 uk52 Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire ukjl Berkshire, Bucks and Oxfordshire
NUTS2 uk53 Surrey, East-West Sussex ukj2 Surrey, East and West Sussex
NUTS2 uk56 Hampshire, Isle of Wight ukj3 Hampshire and Isle of Wight
NUTS2 uk57 Kent ukj4 Kent
NUTS2 uk61 Avon, Gloucestershire, Wiltshire ukkl Gloucestershire, Wiltshire and North Somerset
NUTS2 uk63 Dorset, Somerset ukk2 Dorset and Somerset
NUTS2 uk62 Cornwall, Devon ukk3 Cornwall and Isles of Scilly
ukk4 Devon
NUTS2 uk92 Gwent, Mid-South-West Glamorgan ukll West Wales and The Valleys
NUTS2 uk91 Clwyd, Dyfed, Gwynedd, Powys ukl2 East Wales
NUTS2 uka4 Grampian Ukml North Eastern Scotland
NUTS2 ukal Borders-Central-Fife-Lothian-Tayside Ukm2 Eastern Scotland
NUTS2 uka2 Dumfries and Galloway, Strathclyde Ukm3 South Western Scotland
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2 Chapter Two. Literature Review: Income and 
Educational Inequality and Regional Economic 
Growth
2.1 Introduction
Inequalities are significant in regional economic analysis. This chapter examines cases 
of income and educational inequalities. The current belief is that these inequalities are 
almost perfectly correlated and affect regional economic progress. A challenge in 
regional economic growth literature is to survey and to attempt to synthesise the various 
causal hypotheses and mechanisms that have been proposed in the social science 
literature — particularly by economists — to explain the observed relationships 
between income inequality, educational inequality and regional economic performance. 
Although there is a large amount of literature on the subject (Saint-Paul and Verdier, 
1993; Aghion et al., 1999; Benabou, 2000; Checchi, 2000; Benabou, 2002; Thorbecke 
and Charumilind, 2002; Galor and Moav, 2004), this chapter will not examine all the 
relevant theories and arguments in great detail. Instead, it concentrates on the central 
issue of the microeconomic foundation of regional economic growth; that is, whether 
income and educational inequalities affect growth. Put differently, a great challenge is 
whether more or less egalitarian societies are conducive to growth.
This chapter seeks to contribute to the debate over the role of income and educational 
inequalities in regional economic growth. There are several channels through which 
inequalities influence regional economic performance. This chapter attempts to cross 
disciplinary boundaries within economic, social, political, psychological and 
geographical fields. The first step is to investigate any association between income and 
educational distribution, measured in terms of average levels and inequality therein. The 
second step is to analyse the impact of inequalities on growth.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 analyses the concepts of human 
capital, the income level of an economy20 and regional growth. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 
outline the determinants by which people’s income and education level are
20 Hereafter, I use ‘economy’ to refer to countries, regions or states.
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differentiated from one another. They consider the extent to which income distribution 
correlates with educational distribution. Both sections examine the determinants of 
social polarisation,21 known as between-group inequalities. They shed light on the 
investigation of whether illiterate people and poor people are synonymous. More 
specifically, Section 2.3 presents the determinants of income inequality. It describes the 
impact of income per capita, educational attainment and educational inequality on 
income inequality. Section 2.4 presents the determinants of educational inequality. It 
reviews the impact of educational attainment, income per capita and income inequality 
on educational inequality. Sections 2.5 and 2.6 examine the impact of income and 
educational inequality, respectively, on growth. The last section offers some 
conclusions.
2.2 Defining Education, Income and Regional Growth
Concepts are common points of reference used to group phenomena that are otherwise 
differentiated geographically and linguistically (Rose, 1991: 447). Without concepts, 
information about different regions may be assembled together, yet there is no basis 
upon which to relate one region to another (Rose 1991: 447). Bearing in mind that 
concepts are chosen depending upon the purpose of the research (Sartori, 1984), this 
section looks at the concepts of education, income and regional growth.
Education (human capital) is a multidimensional concept. It has been defined by the 
Centre for Educational Research and Innovation and Organisation for Economic Co­
operation and Development (1998: 9) as 'the knowledge, skills, competences and other 
attributes embodied in individuals that are relevant to economic activity’. A number of 
economists have adopted the broad concept of human capital, including the work of 
Adam Smith in the eighteenth century. The pioneering work of Schultz (1959; 1961a; 
1961b; 1962; 1963) views human beings as types of capital and investment. He treats 
human resources as a form of capital. People who invest themselves extend the range of
21 Social polarisation may be described as the ‘extreme case’ (high value) o f social stratification. 
However, what does ‘social stratification’ mean? According to Parsons (1949: 166) social stratification 
concerns ‘ the differential ranking o f the human individuals who compose a given social system and their 
treatment as superior and inferior relative to one another in certain socially important respects'. Social 
stratification, and hence social polarisation, depends on ranking, which is considered a truly fundamental 
phenomenon o f socioeconomic systems. In quantitative variables ranking is objective, while in qualitative 
variables the selection o f a moral evaluation as the central criterion o f the social rank involved in 
polarisation might be considered arbitrary (Parsons, 1949). In this research, since quantitative analysis is 
used in the measurement o f both income and education , moral evaluations are not involved.
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choice that is available to them, enhance their welfare and, subsequently, the welfare of 
their society.
Schultz (1961a) has classified human activities using five major dimensions. The first 
dimension is that of formally organised education at the elementary, secondary and 
tertiary levels. The cost of this type of human capital consists of the costs of the services 
of teachers, librarians and administrators. It also includes the costs of maintaining and 
operating the educational plant and the income foregone by students. The second 
dimension is the on-the-job training organised by firms. It differs from formal education 
in that investment is made within the workplace rather than in an institution that 
specialises in teaching (Becker, 1962: 11). The cost of this training is usually borne by 
employers and depends on the type of training and on the demand for different skills. 
The aim of such training programmes is to adjust the education of workers to the 
demand for new skills and abilities. Training is regarded as an important aspect of 
labour market flexibility. A lack of mobility, for instance, may inhibit the scope for 
firms to bring about changes in work practice and organisational structures (De Serres, 
2003; OECD, 2003). Less-educated workers and those working on a part-time basis are 
much less likely to receive training, especially when employed by a small firm (De 
Serres, 2003: 14). On the other hand, Wolf (2002: 251) has argued that vocational 
training has been used as a panacea for the disadvantaged and the unemployed for many 
years. The third dimension is the study programmes for adults that are not organised by 
firms, such as the extension programmes in agriculture that contribute to transmitting 
new knowledge and to developing skills among farmers. Nowadays, people quite often 
spend some of their leisure time in improving their skills and knowledge. The fourth 
dimension is the migration of individuals and families to adjust to changing job 
opportunities. The movement of people from one sector to another changes their overall 
welfare. The fifth dimension of human capital is that of health facilities and services. 
This concept includes all expenditures that affect life expectancy, strength and stamina, 
and the vitality of people, among others.
Economists, sociologists and geographers have extended the concept of human capital 
to many other areas. According to Becker (1962), an additional dimension of human 
capital concerns the acquisition of information about the economic system. Generally 
speaking, the economic system influences the efficiency, allocation and distribution of 
human resources. People can reduce the risk of their investment if they have a better 
knowledge of the market. Spence (1973; 1974) supports the notion that education may
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act as a ‘signal’ because of imperfect information which may generate temporary 
educational mismatch. For instance, the coexistence of a high incidence of 
overeducation among school-leavers and a lack of work experience reflects the 
educational mismatch (Hartog, 2000). This type of mismatch conceptually differs from 
the skill mismatch that is the actual mismatch between acquired and required skills 
(Allen and van der Velden, 2001). Hence, the acquisition of information about the 
economic system influences not only the distribution of human beings, but also the 
educational and skill mismatch.
Benporath (1980) places emphasis on another dimension of human capital, the personal 
or ‘specific’ human capital created by investments in reputation and personal 
relationships, which is known as the F-connection (families, friends and firms). He 
argues that families, friends and firms play a major role in the allocation and 
distribution of human resources. Similarly, Becker (1962), Becker and Tomes (1986) 
and Becker and Barro (1988) have extended human capital to encompass marriage, 
fertility and family relations. For example, the learning of children is closely related to 
their parental human capital. Closely related to ‘specific’ human capital is the concept 
of social capital (Coleman, 1988; Coleman, 1990; Bourdieu, 1993; Putnam, 1993; 
Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1995). However, social capital is generally understood to be 
a matter of relationships rather than the property of individuals (Schuller, 2000). Thus, 
human capital focuses on the economic behaviour of individuals, while social capital on 
networks, norms and trust. Social capital contributes significantly to the formation of 
human capital, since family and community support may have a greater pay-off than 
investment in buildings and teacher’s salaries (Fedderke et al., 1999; Inkeles, 2000).
The significance of, and emphasis on, the above human capital dimensions varies in the 
existing literature. Becker (1964), for example, argues that formal education, informal 
education within the family and on-the-job training are the most important investments 
made in human capital. Denison (1962), on the other hand, places an emphasis on the
99advancement of knowledge and technical progress. Arrow (1962) highlights the 
economic implications of leaming-by-doing. He states that the concept of leaming-by- 
doing differs from the concept of formal education in the sense that learning is the
22 Denison (1962) argues that the contribution o f schooling to growth and to income differentials is an 
issue o f ‘ability bias’ (Griliches, 1997). For this reason human capital is usually the residual factor in 
many economic growth equations.
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product of experience; it can only take place through the attempt to solve a problem and 
therefore takes place during activity.
A significant characteristic of all the above dimensions of human capital is spillovers. 
They may occur via investments in education and on-the-job training (i.e. the gains that 
accrue to other producers from observing and imitating their successful counterparts), 
and via investments in health (i.e. when one person invests in his/her health, he is less 
likely to make other people ill due to a contagious disease) (Abler, 2005). Spillovers 
may also occur through social relations and within families from generation to 
generation. For example, Loury (1981: 843) has argued that the allocation of training 
and education resources among any generation of young people depends upon the 
income and human capital distribution among their parents. An individual’s level of 
human capital is an increasing function of the parental level of human capital.
The multidimensional concept of education is governed by the criterion of optimisation 
subject to the constraints that are specific to the circumstances and surroundings 
pertaining to each individual (Schultz, 1975: 827). People usually reallocate their 
resources in response to changes in socioeconomic conditions, formal education, on- 
the-job training, social capital and any other form of human capital.
The investment in human capital differs substantially among countries, regions, cities 
and persons. Younger persons, for example, change jobs more frequently than older 
ones. More talented individuals are expected to receive more opportunities for 
educational and on-the-job training programmes than less-educated ones. Furthermore, 
the cost of education varies across space, because each location has a different 
production function, without taking into account the differences in natural resource 
endowments.
Income is a more straightforward concept than that of human capital. First of all, income 
is a ‘pure’ quantitative concept, while the concept of human capital is more likely to be 
a ‘derived’ quantitative concept (Centre for Educational Research and innovation and 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1998). Income, like human 
capital, may differ among countries, regions, cities and persons. For example, the main 
source of personal income among students and younger persons is payments from their 
parents or unemployment and redundancy benefits. The main source of income of 
workers is wages and salaries, while the income of older people usually comes from 
pensions. Income levels differ across space because wages, salaries and pensions differ
52
according to location. For instance, the main source of income in rural areas might be 
the income from self-employment or farming. Even if one takes into account the same 
source of personal income, the income levels may differ across space, since the 
underlying determinants may also differ. Kalleberg and Lincoln (1988), for instance, 
have found evidence of cross-country differences in income inequalities. The earnings 
of US employees are conditioned by job characteristics, positions in the authority 
hierarchy and union representation, while the earnings of Japanese employees are 
shaped by age and organisational structures.
The most widely acknowledged broad categories of regional growth are regional 
income growth (the ‘micro-approach’ to growth) and regional economic growth (the 
‘macro-approach’ to growth). Generally speaking, regional economic growth is a 
broader concept than growth in regional income, because the macroeconomic concept 
takes into account externalities to physical and human capital (Temple, 1999), and 
inseparable public policies such as public infrastructure policies. Moreover, the concept 
of regional economic growth encompasses the overall growth effect of a policy 
outcome, like inflation or the budget deficit (Temple, 1999: 121). Nevertheless, both 
regional income and economic growth differ across space.
On analysing the concepts of human capital, income and economic growth, it is clear 
that they are closely associated with one another. Economist, sociologists and 
geographers have detected numerous signs that improvements made at the individual 
level are among the major sources of economic growth. Furthermore, the structure of 
income is primarily determined by investment in schooling, on-the-job training and 
investment in migration (Schultz, 1962). Becker (1962) argues that an examination of 
investment in human capital may be useful in understanding income inequality. Human 
capital investment activities are associated with other types of investment activities such 
as investment in physical capital or in the real estate market. Those activities also 
contribute to regional economic growth. Some of those activities have lagged effects on 
others. For instance, human capital activities have a greater influence on future real 
income than on present income levels.
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2.3 The Impact of Income Per Capita, Educational 
Attainment and Educational Inequality on Income Inequality
There is a vast body of literature on the determinants of income inequality. It is 
therefore not the aim of this section to review this vast array of sources, but simply to 
focus on how the impact of income per capita, as well as of average education levels 
and inequality in that area, on income inequality is perceived by the literature. To 
achieve that aim, I will first review the link between income and inequality, before 
going on to analyse the impact of educational attainment and inequality on income 
inequality. The dynamic structure of inequalities is also considered.
Changes in the distribution of income take place at a very slow pace. There are several 
reasons for this. First, people are often reluctant to change jobs for psychological and 
institutional reasons (Gujarati, 2003). Additionally, income levels are often perpetuated 
from one generation to another by means of inheritance, cultural background and, more 
generally, the characteristics of the community (Bourguignon and Morrisson, 1990; 
Cooper et al., 1994; Durlauf, 1996; Checchi, 2000). This allows for intergenerational 
stability in income, indicating the existence of a positive autocorrelation in inequalities. 
Cooper (1998), for instance, has pointed out that families from the poorer or more 
wealthy communities tend to exhibit a greater degree of intergenerational income 
stability than families living in middle income communities. Hence, it is often the case 
that a proportion of the population remains trapped at the same level of income for more 
than one generation. Income persistence is often viewed (as in Lane, 1971) as an 
essential characteristic in rewarding achievement and, particularly, in ensuring that the 
most suitable people are allocated the most suitable roles. The presence of inequalities 
in income provides an additional incentive for achievement and innovation, which are 
an integral part of modem society. Some degree of inequality is generally perceived as a 
necessary constituent of a healthily functioning economy (Champemowne and Cowell, 
1998: 14). According to Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Galor and Zeira (1993), the 
persistence of income inequalities across generations is possible only if capital markets 
are imperfect. High intergenerational correlations imply less mobility in the distribution 
of income. The key question is whether the persistence of inequality has an impact on 
economic performance. Do unequal societies perform better than more equal ones?
This relationship has been most famously addressed by Kuznets (1955). Income per 
capita was found to have an inverted U-curve effect on income inequality (Kuznets,
1955). Income inequality increases as nations begin to industrialise and, then, declines 
at later stages of industrialisation. This relationship is known as ‘Kuznets curve’ and 
was formalised later by Knight (1976a; 1976b), Robinson (1976) and Fields (1979). The 
Kuznets curve shows that in the early stages of industrialisation, the labour force is 
primarily engaged in agriculture. As industrialisation takes hold, workers move from the 
larger agricultural sector to the smaller industrial one and, since wages are usually 
higher in the industrial sector, this migration boosts further income inequality 
(Firebaugh, 2003). Therefore, at first income distribution becomes more unequal as 
income increases. At a highly advanced stage of economic development, income 
inequality and income per capita are negatively related. More explicitly, according to 
the neoclassical economic theory, as the agricultural sector shrinks and the industrial 
sector increases in size, further movement from the agricultural sector to the industrial 
sector serves to reduce, rather than increase, income inequality. Therefore, development 
is inegalitarian in the early stages of development and becomes more egalitarian during 
subsequent stages.
The key factors underlying the inverted U-curve effect of income per capita on 
inequality are industrialisation and labour migration. The additional factors behind this 
association include market and government failures, government social expenditures 
and the development of financial services. For example, De Gregorio and Lee (2002) 
show that income inequalities are negatively correlated with government social 
expenditure. Schultz (1962) indicated that modifications in income transfers and in 
progressive taxation are relatively weak factors in altering the distribution of income. 
Motonishi (2000; 2006) argues that the effect of financial service development on 
income inequalities is not straightforward. On the one hand, more developed financial 
services enable the poor to borrow from the rich and this leads to a decrease in income 
inequality; while on the other hand, the new financial services are often notavailable to 
the poor due to constraints on the credit market arising from information asymmetries. 
Finally, market failures, such as credit constraints and monopsony or monopoly power 
and government failures, often increase income inequalities (Graham, 2002).
Despite the significant amount of the research that has set out to test the Kuznets curve 
at the national level, the results are ambiguous (i.e. Ahluwalia, 1976; Papanek and Kyn, 
1986; Anand and Kanbur, 1993; Bourguignon and Morrisson, 1998; Checchi, 2000; 
Motonishi, 2006). Ahluwalia (1976), for instance, finds for a cross-section of counties 
evidence to support the inverted U-curve, while Anand and Kanbur (1993) report that
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the Kuznets curve is not inverse at all. Overall, the literature seems unable to provide 
conclusive empirical results on the relationship between income inequality and per 
capita income, since social structures, such as historical heritage, religion, ethnic 
composition and cultural traditions, evolve quite differently across countries (Checchi, 
2000). In this thesis, I do not expect to test the validity of the Kuznets curve for two 
reasons. Firstly, the majority of the relevant empirical studies focus not only on 
European but also on less economically advanced countries (i.e. African countries). 
Secondly, the studies in question show that the declining segment of the Kuznets curve 
begins around 1970 (Nielsen and Alderson, 1997). However, I use Kuznets’ theory in 
order to assume a linear association between income per capita and income inequality 
for developed countries over a relatively limited period of time. I therefore expect to 
find that over the period 1995-2000 income per capita had a negative effect on income 
inequality.
The notion of education as an underlying factor in income differences also has a long 
history, dating back to the work of Adam Smith (Griliches, 1997). Based on the work of 
Schultz (1961a; 1962; 1963), Becker (1962; 1964) and Mincer (1958; 1962; 1974), 
income inequality is generally considered to be affected by educational attainment, in a 
process which is sometimes referred to as ‘skills deepening’ (Williamson, 1991). A 
higher level of educational attainment is achieved through improvements in access to 
education (i.e. lower tuition fees, better education financing, improved vocational 
training), a higher quality of education (i.e. better services from teachers, librarians and 
administrators) and greater investment in physical capital for education. Improved 
access to education, for example, is likely to increase the earning opportunity of the 
lowest strata, leading to a reduction in earning inequality (Checchi, 2000)23. 
Furthermore, more widespread access to education allows for a more informed 
participation in the market economy, reducing the lobbying ability of the rich, while 
simultaneously increasing the social and job opportunities of the poor, implying lower 
inequality. According to a statement from the World Bank statement, education is one 
of the most powerful instruments known for reducing income inequality (World Bank, 
2002). Education, in addition, facilitates numerous favourable changes for individuals, 
because it reflects abilities, choices and preferences (Hannum and Buchmann, 2005).
23 Income inequality, at least in industrialised countries, is explained by a rise in earning inequality 
(Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997; Cornia et al., 2001). Hence inequality in pay is definitely an important 
component of total income inequality (Blinder, 1974; Brown, 1977).
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Educational achievement is not only process of increasing credentials, but it is also an 
instrument that leads to a higher level of aspiration, with people tending to be more 
informed and therefore gaining specific traits which are likely to increase productivity. 
Increasing in educational attainment raise the individual’s occupational outcomes and 
subsequent economic status. For example, the elimination of tuition fees means that a 
wider population are more likely to obtain degrees and enrol in graduate school. Recent 
studies by Eicher and Garcia-Penalosa (2001), De Gregorio and Lee (2002) and 
Heshmati (2004) demonstrate how higher levels of educational attainment contribute 
towards making income distribution more equal.
According to Knight and Sabot (1983), the impact of educational attainment on income 
inequalities depends on the balance between the ‘composition’ and the ‘wage 
compression’ effect. Concerning the ‘composition’ effect, an increase in the levels of 
education of the population tends, at least initially, to increase income inequality. With 
respect to the ‘wage compression’ effect, over time education tends to decreased income 
inequality. An increase in the level of education reduces the wages of highly-educated 
workers, because their supply goes up, and simultaneously raises the wages of the less- 
educated workers, because their supply goes down. Thus, an increase in the educated 
labour supply is likely to increase competition for positions requiring advanced 
educational credentials and thereby should reduce the income differential between the 
educated and uneducated people (Tinbergen, 1975; Lecaillon, 1984). Moreover, an 
increased proportion of the population attaining a higher level of education leads to 
inflation in the value of educational credentials and in the long run to decreasing wages 
for highly-educated workers. Thus, the effect of education on income inequality is based 
on a balance of supply and demand.
The effect of educational attainment on income inequality also depends on the type of 
education. Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) claim that public education reduces income 
inequality more quickly than private education. Cardak (1999) extends the work of 
Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and shows, first, that heterogeneous preferences increase 
income inequality and second, public education can compensate for the added 
heterogeneity and reduce income inequality. The promotion of public education causes 
the distribution of income to become less skewed, because although the revenues of the 
poor are taxed, they enjoy the benefits of the public education system. Hence one way 
to decrease income inequality is through increased support for public education.
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Spence’s (1973; 1974; 1976) signalling model offers a different perspective on the 
relationship between income and education. This model demonstrates that education has 
no direct effect on income distribution, because education acts as a ‘label’ or ‘signal’. 
More specifically, his model posits a situation in which the possibility of higher pay for 
more educated people has little to do with academic and vocational skills, because 
formal education is seen as an elaborate device for detecting and labelling those who 
have skills (Champemowne and Cowell, 1998; Wolf, 2004). The individual’s education 
level is more closely related to innate ability and to psychological and personality traits, 
such as diligence, and these are what employers reward, rather than regarding education 
as a means of instilling or enhancing skills (Wolf, 2004). Differences in educational 
attainment may arise as a consequence of heterogeneity in ability. Galor and Tsiddon 
(1997b) and Hassler and Mora (2000), for example, support the idea that individuals 
with a higher level of innate cognitive ability can fare better with less knowledge than 
others do. They state that talented individuals are also more productive and opt for a 
higher rate of technological growth. For them, genetic characteristics are highly 
correlated with the education that children receive and their skills. In contrast, Lopez et 
al. (1998) support the notion that education levels are not necessarily correlated with 
abilities. Nevertheless, education still works as a marker for achieving better jobs. To 
sum up, given the complexity of the relationship between education and income, it is 
difficult to predict a priori the sign and the significance of the relationship between 
educational attainment and income inequality.
Finally, most theoretical analyses tend to report that income and educational inequality 
are positively correlated (Jacobs, 1985; Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992; Saint-Paul and 
Verdier, 1993; Galor and Tsiddon, 1997a; Chakraborty and Das, 2005). More explicitly, 
Thorbecke and Charumilind (2002: 1488) have pointed out that, with regard to the
supply side of skilled labour education, a greater share of highly-educated workers
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within a cohort may signal to employers that those with less education have less ability, 
and hence the latter’s earnings may be reduced accordingly, which may also lead to a 
greater wage inequality between workers with high and low levels of education. With 
respect to the demand side of skilled labour education, if the demand for unskilled 
labour is either contracting or growing at a slower rate than the demand for skilled 
labour, then earning inequalities will increase.
Taking into consideration Bowles’ (1972) statement, more equal levels of education 
could lead to significantly greater equality of economic opportunity and incomes
without challenging the European institutions and without requiring any major 
redistribution of capital. Human capital inequalities may be a significant cause of 
occupational disparities across social groups and therefore a cause of income 
inequalities. Since education offers economic opportunities to both advantaged and 
disadvantaged groups, the poor but talented members of society can achieve appropriate 
positions in the European economy regardless of their social background, thus 
improving their relative economic standing (Hannum and Buchmann, 2005), while 
elites can manage to maintain their socioeconomic status by getting more education 
than the masses (Walters, 2000). Therefore, the positive relationship between income 
and educational inequality is likely to highlight the responsiveness of the European 
labour market to differences in qualifications and skills.
Extremely low income individuals might face credit constraints that prevent them from 
rising to a profitable education level (Dur et al., 2004). They also face constraints if 
credit markets are imperfect. Hence, due borrowing constraints and imperfect markets, 
the ability of poorer people to invest in education may depend on their parental wealth.
Two of the most salient empirical works that focus on the impact of educational 
distribution on income inequality are Becker and Chiswick (1966) and Park (1996). 
Both studies illustrate that a higher level of educational attainment among the labour 
force has an equalising effect on income distribution and the greater the inequality in 
educational attainment, the greater the income inequality.
2.4 The Impact of Educational Attainment, Income Per 
Capita and Income Inequality on Educational Inequality
The distribution of human capital is a complex but little explored issue. Who gets 
educated is important. This section considers the determinants by which people’s 
investment in human capital are differentiated. It considers the impact of educational 
attainment and income distribution on educational inequalities, as well as their dynamic 
structures.
Firstly, educational inequality is determined by its initial value. The cultural 
reproduction theory (i.e. Bowles and Gintis, 1976), on the one hand, bears testimony to 
the persistence, and sometimes the increase, of educational inequality in a modem 
society. The intergenerational transmission of educational achievement is a result of 
social backgrounds. People’s educational opportunities are linked not only to their own
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human capital, but also to those of their communities and families. The value of an 
individual’s own educational credentials depends in part on how they compare to the 
credentials of their family and, more generally, those of the local population (Hannum 
and Buchmann, 2005: 339). For example, students in higher education usually tend to 
come from relatively favoured backgrounds (Blondal et al., 2002: 7). Mosteller and 
Moynihan (1972), Becker and Tomes (1986) and Galor and Tsiddon (1997a) point out 
that the individual’s level of human capital is an increasing function of the parental level 
of human capital. This is known as the home environment externality. The powerful 
force exerted by family background on educational inequality is also discussed by 
Machin and Vignoles (2004). They demonstrate that levels of human capital among the 
British became more closely connected to parental income and human capital in the 
1970 cohort than was the case for the 1958 cohort. Nevertheless, Hauser and Sewell 
(1986) have found that family background has independent effects not only on 
schooling but also on ability. On the other hand, the general theory of industrialisation 
(i.e. Treiman, 1970) argues that the decrease in educational inequality is a result of 
educational expansion. Educational inequality is a temporal characteristic of 
industrialisation. The more industrialised a society, the greater the educational 
expansion. This implies more educational opportunities for the lower strata and, thus, a 
lowering of human capital inequality (Blau and Duncan, 1967). Empirically, Kikkawa 
(2004) supports the general theory of industrialisation in Japan and in the United States, 
showing that the more that education expands, the smaller the effect of social 
background on educational attainment.
Economic theory and empirical studies yield ambiguous predictions about the likely 
effects of educational attainment on educational inequalities. It has been mentioned that 
with respect to the general theory of industrialisation, the stock of education negatively 
affects educational inequality as result of educational expansion, which is an excellent 
device for a wider diffusion of opportunities and thus economic well-being (Ram, 1990: 
266). Educational expansion narrows human capital inequalities within regions by 
promoting a meritocratic basis for status attainment in which the talented can achieve 
appropriate positions in the economy, regardless of their social background (Hannum 
and Buchmann, 2005).24 However, one critical factor underlying the negative
24 Walters (2000: 254), however, argues that educational expansion alone does not change the relative 
position o f social groups in the ‘education queue’, and elites manage to maintain their status by getting 
more education than the masses. For this reason one needs to consider separately the effects on
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relationship between educational attainment and educational inequality is the cost of 
human capital. Low cost makes education more affordable. A lower cost of education 
could be achieved through higher grants, subsidised loans, subsidised ‘work-study’ jobs 
and other financial devices or through lower tuition fees and a lower interest rate on 
borrowing for educational purposes. The empirical studies by Londono (1990), Lam and 
Levison (1991) and Thomas et al. (2001) illustrate that educational inequality is 
negatively associated with the average years of schooling in a country. Ram (1990) 
shows that the Kuznets curve in education exists only when standard deviation is used 
as an inequality measure. He shows that as the human capital stock increases, 
educational inequality first increases and, after reaching a peak, starts to decline in later 
phases of educational expansion. Comia et al. (2001) also test the Kuznets curve in 
education. Their study finds that in the early stages of economic development, 
educational expansion increases the number of skilled workers less rapidly than their 
demand, thus leading to an increase in inequality. As the relative abundance of skilled 
workers rises, the wage rate of skilled workers declines relative to that of unskilled 
workers and inequality drops. Most empirical studies show that countries with higher 
levels of human capital stock are more likely to achieve equality in human capital than 
those with a lower stock. These studies illustrate that the ‘maximum inequality 
threshold’ in education is likely to rise with economic development, as it is with the 
adoption of skill-intensive technologies. Nevertheless, Ceroni (2001) stresses the 
positive effects of educational attainment on educational inequality. She argues that if 
education is privately financed, the poor require relatively higher returns to increased 
expenditure on education in order to increase the human capital stock. For this reason 
the poor invest a smaller share of their income in education than the rich do. Moreover, 
occupations that require high levels of investment in human capital are beyond the reach 
of poor people, who choose instead to work for others (Banerjee and Newman, 1993).
The overall impact of income per capita on educational inequality seems to be negative. 
More explicitly, the higher the individual income, the higher the expenditure on 
education for all strata. This identifies education as a key instrument for securing equal 
opportunities for people and for helping to improve their life chances (Wolf, 2002). An 
increase in income per capita within a region is likely to increase the income levels of
educational inequality o f an overall increase in educational expansion and changes in educational 
reforms.
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the poor. This raises the educational opportunities for the lowest strata, which implies a 
lower level of educational inequality. Moreover, the higher the income levels of the 
rich, the higher the rate of taxation, and thus the greater the expenditure on public 
education programmes (Saint-Paul and Verdier, 1993), which usually constitute the 
major portion of the European educational programmes. This will mean more public 
investment in human capital, and, therefore, increased educational opportunities for the 
lowest strata, leading to a decline in educational inequalities.
Nevertheless, the level of income within a region depends on the financial, economic 
market and government shortcomings. The greater the failings, the lower the level of 
income per capita. These failings limit the opportunities open to the poor and their 
economic well-being. For example, credit constraints may prevent the poor from 
undertaking the efficient amount of human capital investment, perpetuating human 
capital inequalities (Loury, 1981; Benabou, 1996c; Graham, 2002). More explicitly, 
Graham (2002: 67) argues that due to credit market imperfections, access to capital 
depends on the wealth that may be offered as collateral, which means that an 
individual’s initial assets (i.e. land, credits, education) may be an important determinant 
of his/her ability to finance investments with even higher returns. This may cause a 
particular problem for human capital investments, because future earnings cannot be 
used as collateral and, since education plays a central role in determining opportunity 
investments, this market failure has a particularly negative impact in terms of the 
opportunities for the poor to move out of poverty. Akin to market failure, government 
failure contributes to the perpetuation of educational inequality. The behaviour of 
governments and the allocation of public goods reflect the distribution of political 
power and the organisational capacity of different societal groups (Birdsall and Estelle, 
1993; Graham, 2002). Thus, government failure is likely to generate an unequal 
distribution of political power that can lead to a perpetuation or concentration of income 
and educational inequality.
The effect of income inequality on educational inequality is not unambiguous. On the 
one hand, Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993) have supported the idea that income inequality 
has a negative effect on human capital inequality. More explicitly, the greater the 
income inequality, the higher the rate of taxation and the larger the expenditure on 
public education programmes. This yields higher public investment in human capital, 
that in turn implies decreased educational inequality. If income inequality is found to 
have a negative effect on educational inequality, this is likely to indicate the
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effectiveness of the European social system, or from a different perspective, the lack of 
responsiveness of the European labour market to differences in qualifications and skills. 
On the other hand, Checchi (2000) argues that an increase in income inequality may 
involve a self-perpetuating poverty trap that may increase educational inequality. The 
more skewed the income distribution, the larger the share of the population that are 
excluded from schooling and the greater the inequality in educational achievement. 
From this perspective, European citizens who live under poverty can only escape that 
condition by increasing their educational attainment. A positive relationship between 
income and educational inequality is likely to indicate the responsiveness of the 
European labour market to differences in qualifications and skills.
Empirically, Jensen and Nielsen (1997) have found some support for the notion that 
poverty forces households to keep their children out of school. Mayer (2001) examined 
the effect of growing income inequality on the educational attainment of low-income 
and high-income children. Her results indicate that inequality has not led to an increase 
in high school graduation, but may have brought a slight decrease, especially for low- 
income people, whereas the growth in inequality appears to have led to an increase in 
college graduation, but only among young people from the top half of the income 
distribution. Mayer also considers two contrasting economic theories about how income 
inequality may affect children’s educational attainment: effects due to the parents’ 
income and effects due to the consequences of other people’s income. Finally, 
Acemoglu and Pischke (2000) analysed the patterns of college enrolments across the 
United States. They did not find any evidence to support the idea that college 
enrolments increase more in states where wage inequality and a return to schooling rise 
more substantially (Thorbecke and Charumilind, 2002: 1488).
2.5 The Impact of Income Inequality on Regional Economic 
Growth
A number of economic theories and arguments have been constructed in the quest to 
find the linkage between income inequality and economic growth. When looking at the 
effects of inequality on growth, we are primarily interested in the ways in which income 
distribution can affect aggregate output and growth through its impact on different 
channels (Aghion et al., 1999), such as incentives, investments in physical and human 
capital and habits. What are possible transition mechanisms that might link inequality 
and growth? A number of arguments have been made as to why more or less egalitarian
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societies can actually be good for growth and why redistribution policies from rich to 
poor and government interventions may harm or enhance growth. This section primarily 
presents the arguments that shed light on the inequality-growth relationship.
First of all, the relationship between economic growth and income inequality is 
determined by economic incentives. The operation of the free market in the pursuit of 
private profit not only provides strong incentives for work, but may also generate 
inequalities (Champemowne and Cowell, 1998). Many sociologists and economists — 
going back to Adam Smith — support the idea that inequality is fundamentally good for 
incentives and therefore should be viewed as being growth-enhancing (Mirrlees, 1971; 
Rebelo, 1991; Aghion et al., 1998). Inequality promotes a productive economy by 
creating incentives and encouraging competition. Free markets provide signals that can 
help to optimise production, resulting in greater gains, but not necessarily in lower 
income inequality (Heyns, 2005: 167). Along these lines, Voitchovsky (2005: 276) 
argues that in an economic structure where ability is rewarded, effort, productivity and 
risk-taking will also be encouraged, generating higher growth rates and income 
inequality as a result. To sum up, the greater the income inequality, the stronger the 
incentive to invest either in physical or in human capital, and thus the higher the growth 
rate. Barro (2000) states that this is the case only if investments incur high costs in 
relation to median income that may be only be in the range of very wealthy agents. 
Incentives appear to stimulate preponderantly production of such goods and services 
that only the rich can afford to buy, rather than to enable the poor to buy the goods that 
they most urgently need. Without incentives, entrepreneurial and business activity and 
risk-taking might cease, capital markets would dry up and economic growth would 
grind to a halt (Heyns, 2005: 165). Any public policy aimed at reducing income 
inequality may produce negative incentives for economic efficiency and, therefore, may 
harm economic growth. Such policies include the taxation system and the public 
housing policies, among the key devices used to redistribute income (Chang, 1994; Lui, 
1997; Chang, 1998). Champemowne and Cowell (1998: 16) demonstrate that strong 
policies of redistribution may hamper the ability of exceptionally efficient and 
successful firms and entrepreneurships to expand and attract staff with the best talents 
by offering them the inducement of unusually high pay. Thus, in a laissez-faire 
economy, in which government intervention is minimal, inequality is fundamentally 
good for incentives, which, in turn, enhance growth. In contrast to this view, equality is 
a major tenet of socialism and a primary source of communist legitimation (Austen, 
2002; Gijsberts, 2002).
Income inequality can affect growth through investments in physical and human capital. 
Classical economists (i.e. Smith, 1776; Keynes, 1920; Kaldor, 1956, 1957; Lewis, 
1961) support the notion that more income inequality favours physical capital 
accumulation, because the rich agents have a higher marginal propensity to save 
compared to the poor.25 This increases aggregate savings,26 which in turn increases 
growth rates. Contrary to the classical approach, the modem one (Galor, 2000; Galor 
and Moav, 2000, 2004) suggests that the relationship between income inequality and 
growth depends on the stage of economic development (or industrialisation). During the 
early stages of economic development, physical capital accumulation is the prime 
engine of economic growth. High initial income inequality stimulates high aggregate 
saving, which, in turn, increases physical capital accumulation. Physical capital then 
stimulates the process of economic development. Hence, income inequality enhances 
economic development by channelling resources towards individuals with a higher 
propensity to save. The modem approach is similar to the classical one only for the 
early stages of economic development. At later stages of economic development, human 
capital accumulation replaces the accumulation of physical capital as the prime engine 
of growth, due to capital-skill complementarity. During the economic process, the 
increased availability of physical capital raises the return on investment in human 
capital. However, due to credit market imperfections (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Benabou, 
1994, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c; Durlauf, 1996; Benabou, 2000, 2002), poorer agents may 
find their access to human capital curtailed.27 Thus, in sufficiently wealthy economies, 
equality may stimulate investment in human capital which promotes economic growth, 
because human capital accumulation is greater if it is shared by a larger segment of the 
society. In other words, equality promotes growth via investment in human capital, 
because more individuals are able to invest in human capital (Perotti, 1996; Easterly, 
2001); and equality could alleviate the adverse effect of credit market constraints on 
human capital accumulation (Galor and Moav, 2004). Furthermore, during the process
25 Most empirical studies support the theory o f a positive relationship between inequality and savings 
(Kelley and Williamson, 1968). Smith (2001), however, has found evidence that income inequality affects 
savings only in countries with low levels o f financial market development.
26 Dynan et al. (2004) demonstrate that saving rates increase with wealth.
27 Flug et al. (1998), for example, show that economic volatility —  lack o f financial markets, income or 
employment volatility and income inequality —  has a negative effect on the accumulation o f human 
capital. Dixit and Pindyck (1993) show that uncertainty also has a negative effect on investment in 
physical capital. Flug et al. (1998) argue that volatility has a stronger correlation with investment in 
human capital than with investment in physical capital.
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of development, the constraints on the credit market gradually diminish, differences in 
savings behaviour between rich and poor agents decline and the effect of income 
inequality on economic growth becomes insignificant (Galor and Moav, 2004: 1021). 
Nevertheless, Benabou (1994) argues that even minor imperfections in capital markets 
can lead to a high degree of stratification. Low levels of income inequality facilitate 
numerous favourable changes for regions, because they offer plenty of economic 
chances to both advantaged and disadvantaged groups. This allows for a better 
allocation of resources and more efficiency in physical and human capital investments. 
For instance, as income inequalities decline, fewer people under-invest in education 
because of credit market imperfections (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Owen and Weil, 1998; 
Maoz and Moav, 1999; Benabou, 2000; Galor and Moav, 2000). Finally, taking into 
consideration only physical capital, Baneijee and Newman (1991; 1993) and Aghion 
and Bolton (1992; 1997) support the notion that with credit market imperfections, 
equality positively affects an individual’s physical capital investment opportunities. To 
summarise, the effect of inequality on economic growth depends not only on the 
region’s level of income, but also on the relative returns to physical and human capital.
Income inequality and economic growth are closely interlinked with habits. 
Champemowne and Cowell (1998: 16) argue that once people are accustomed to a 
degree of comfort they will regard it as a hardship to return to an earlier and lower 
standard of living. This means that a rapid reduction in income inequality is likely to 
slow down or even halt economic progress, highlighting the difficulty of the adjustment 
process.
The relationship between income inequality within a nation and economic growth can 
also be investigated through political economy models such as the voting models (i.e. 
Perotti, 1992, 1993; Alesina and Perotti, 1994; Aghion et al., 1999), but it is not clear- 
cut. The basic argument for the negative effect of inequality on growth is that the higher 
the income inequality, the higher the rate of taxation, the lower the incentive to invest 
and the lower the growth rate (Bertola, 1993; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and 
Tabellini, 1994). The argument in support of a positive effect, on the other hand, is that 
the higher the income inequality, the higher the rate of taxation, the larger the 
expenditure on public education programmes, and thus the higher the public investment 
in human capital and the higher the growth rate (Aghion and Bolton, 1990; Saint-Paul
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and Verdier, 1993).28 Hence, the trade-off between the incentive to invest (which is the 
fundamental mechanism of a laissez-faire economy) and the expenditure on public 
education programmes (which reflects a fundamental government policy of a command 
economy) determines the inequality-growth relationship. However, government controls 
regulate the extent to which individuals might pursue their own self-interest (Begg et 
al., 2000).
The effect of income inequality within a nation on economic growth also depends upon 
the effect of socio-political instability (i.e. Venieris and Gupta, 1983, 1986; Londregan 
and Poole, 1990; Mauro, 1995; Alesina et al., 1996; Alesina and Perotti, 1996; 
Svensson, 1998; Mauro, 2004). However, this channel plays a key role in the inequality- 
growth relationship of less-developed countries beset by political and social unrest or 
violence, such as African and Latin America countries and less so for European 
countries. In a society with considerable income inequality, the gap between the mean 
income and the potential legal income of low-skilled workers is large, and hence this is 
likely to give incentives for very poor people to engage in disruptive activities such as 
crimes against property and crimes of violence (Nilsson, 2004: 3). Additionally, the 
more unequal the distribution of income, the higher the probability for disruptive 
activities and protests, and the higher the frequency of government changes. Thus, when 
the gap between rich and poor widens, the poor may experience a greater temptation to 
engage in disruptive activities that are usually at the expense of the rich (Benabou, 
1996c). The above cases accentuate the negative effect of inequalities on growth.
The empirical research that has been carried out on the effect of income inequality on 
economic growth is less unambiguous than the theory. The vast majority of the reduced- 
form estimates find that inequality has a negative effect on growth (i.e. Persson and 
Tabellini, 1994; Perotti, 1996; Barro, 2000). Less empirical studies support the positive 
effect of inequality on growth (i.e. Li and Zou, 1999; Forbes, 2000). For instance, 
Forbes (2000) uses panel estimation and her results suggest that in the short and 
medium term, an increase in a country’s level of income inequality has a significant 
positive relationship with subsequent economic growth. Her estimates are highly robust 
across samples, variable definitions and model specifications. Nonetheless, all the above
28 Nevertheless, Sylwester (2000) stresses that the larger the expenditure on public education 
programmes, the lower the growth rate.
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studies examine the relationship between income inequality within a nation and 
economic growth.
2.6 The Impact of Educational Inequality on Regional 
Economic Growth
Economic performance depends increasingly on talent, creativity, knowledge, skills and 
experiences. In modem economies, those characteristics shape opportunities and 
rewards (Wolf, 2002: 14). Although educational attainment has gained a central role in 
economic growth analysis (i.e. Stokey, 1991; Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994; Barro, 
2001), the link between educational inequality and economic performance is less 
straightforward than it may appear. The literature on the influence of educational 
inequality on economic growth is quite limited. This section analyses the contributions 
of incentives, technological progress in production and life expectancy to the 
relationship between educational inequality and growth.
It has been argued that inequality is fundamentally good for incentives and therefore 
should be viewed as being growth-enhancing (Mirrlees, 1971; Rebelo, 1991; Aghion et 
al., 1998). Not only income inequality, but also educational inequality, is good for 
incentives. The greater the educational inequality, the greater the incentive for an 
individual to attain a higher educational level and to get more academic qualifications 
and training. However, most people require qualifications that are not possessed by 
everyone (Wolf, 2002). The existence of less talented and educated people implies 
incentives to seize the higher returns for ones skills (Voitchovsky, 2005). As Chiswick 
(1974: 17)says
‘since human capital is created at a cost, no one would willingly invest in 
human capital unless it generated sufficient monetary or nonmonetary 
benefits to compensate for the cost’.
This is likely to enhance economic growth.
Educational inequality also determines growth through technological progress. In the 
early stages of economic development, a wide distribution of human capital might be a 
necessary condition for take-off. Inequality encourages members of the highly-educated 
segments of society to increase their investment in human capital, while equality traps 
the society as a whole at a low level of investment in human capital (Galor and Tsiddon, 
1997a: 94). Inequality is essential in order for a region to increase the aggregate level of 
human capital and output. In addition, economic growth is affected by the percentage of
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individuals who inherit a large enough amount of wealth to enable them to invest in 
human capital (Galor and Zeira, 1993: 51) and only rich people are able to do so. The 
parental level of human capital, which is known as the home (or local) environment 
externality is a critical factor in the positive inequality-growth relationship. The 
importance of the parental education input in the formation of the child’s education has 
been stressed in the studies by Mosteller and Moynihan (1972), Becker and Tomes 
(1986) and Coleman (1990). The local human capital externalities may also perpetuate 
income inequality across generations (Benabou, 1994). In the mature stages of 
economic development, technological progress is positively related to the level of 
human capital in society (Schultz, 1975). The growth process may increase the rate of 
adoption of new technologies, which induces income convergence via diffusion. More 
specifically, as the investment in human capital of highly-educated individuals 
increases, the accumulated knowledge trickles down to the less-educated persons via a 
technological progress in production which is known as the global production 
externality (Galor and Tsiddon, 1997a: 94).
The relationship between educational inequality and economic growth is affected by life 
expectancy. Investment in human capital depends on the individual’s life expectancy, 
which, in turn, depends to a large extent on the environment in which individuals grow 
up. An individual’s level of human capital is not only an increasing function of the 
parental level of human capital, but also a function of the number of children bom to 
their parents and life expectancy (de la Croix and Licandro, 1999; Blackburn and 
Cipriani, 2002; Kalemli-Ozcan, 2002). Children raised in poor families usually have a 
low life expectancy and work in low-skilled positions all their lives (Castello and 
Domenech, 2006).
Due to the lack of available data on educational inequality, little attention has been paid 
to the empirical impact of inequality on growth (i.e. Birdsall and Londono, 1997; Lopez 
et al., 1998; Castello and Domenech, 2002). Most of empirical studies are based on the 
international data on educational attainment of Barro and Lee (1993; 1996; 2001). 
Birdsall and Londono (1997) explored the impact of the distribution of assets (both 
physical and human capital) on growth. They placed an emphasis on human capital 
accumulation via basic education and health. Their results illustrate a significant 
negative correlation between education dispersion and economic growth. Lopez et al. 
(1998) demonstrated that the unequal distribution of education tends to have a negative 
effect on growth, while an increase in mean education has a positive impact. The impact
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of education on growth is also affected by the macroeconomic policy environment of a 
country, which determines what people can do with their education. For example, policy 
reforms can increase the returns from formal education and enhance the impact of 
education on growth through trade and investment. Lopez et al. (1998) also showed that 
the distribution of education is related to technological progress and industrial 
upgrading. They emphasise the interaction of human capital distribution and policy 
reforms on economic growth. Finally, Castello and Domenech (2002) found a negative 
relationship between human capital inequality and growth for a broad panel of 
countries. This negative relationship exists not only through the efficiency of resource 
allocation, but also through a reduction in investment rates. They argue that countries 
which showed higher educational inequality had experienced lower investment rates and 
less efficiency in resource allocation than countries which registered lower levels of 
human capital inequality. The lower the investment rates and the less efficiency in the 
allocation of resources, the lower the growth rates. Their educational inequality 
measures provide more robust results than the income inequality measures.
To sum up, educational inequality is a significant factor in the economic process and 
economic growth rates. Although the theoretical and empirical literature on the impact 
of educational inequality on growth is more than limited, the existing literature provides 
much insight into the inequality-growth relationship.
2.7 Conclusion
While human capital is a multidimensional concept encompassing not only formal 
education, but also on-the-job training, study programmes for adults that are not 
organised by firms, migration, the acquisition of information about the economic system 
and investments in reputations and personal relationships; income is a straightforward 
concept. From a theoretical and empirical point of view, however, income and 
educational inequalities seem to be associated with one another. Wolf (2002: 18), for 
instance, pointed out that the more education and qualifications you acquire, the higher 
your income is likely to be, the more likely you are to be in work, to stay in work and to 
enjoy long-term employment on a permanent contract. Her arguments show that 
educational distribution is a basic determinant of income distribution, and vice versa. In 
addition, education is associated with labour market gains for individuals, including 
higher average post-tax earnings and an improved employment probability (Blondal et 
al., 2002: 5).
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Both income and educational distribution are basic determinants of regional economic 
growth analysis. First, educational distribution is regarded as the engine of economic 
growth and so is central to any modem economy. Wolf (2002: 244) argued that 
education now matters for growth more than ever before in history, but only when 
individuals have the right qualifications, they are studying the right subjects and they 
are in the right institutions. She also stressed that education still remains a key 
instrument for securing equal opportunities for people and for helping to improve their 
life chances. Second, income distribution is also a fundamental determinant in economic 
growth analysis. However, the impact of both income and educational inequality on 
growth is not clear-cut, at least at a regional level of analysis. This remains a challenge.
Overall, the relationship between inequalities and the process of economic development 
is still far from being understood and is, indeed, complex. The links between income 
inequality and growth and the links between educational inequality and growth are far 
less direct. The existing theoretical and empirical literature shows that there is a high 
correlation between income and educational inequalities, which, in turn, affect regional 
growth. It is still a great great challenge to find the determinants of regional growth, 
based on a microeconomic analysis of income and educational distribution. 
Nonetheless, as Krugman (1994: 29) states,
‘economic theory suggests no particular connection between equity or 
justice and growth, and no evidence exists that income inequality has any 
large effects on the rate of economic growth, positive or negative’.
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3 Chapter Three. An Analysis of European Income 
Distribution: Income Per Capita and Inequality
3.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on income distribution in Europe. More specifically, it sets out to 
explore and analyse the average level of income distribution within regions and 
inequalities in that distribution, taking into consideration the spatial pattern and 
association between regions. The core methodology of this chapter is ESDA, focused on 
a variety of parametric methods. Spatial economic analysis reveals relationships in 
economic data that may be invisible, like the EU north-south income divide and the 
urban-rural divide. The empirical study encompasses a set of techniques aimed at 
describing and visualising spatial distributions of income per capita (both for the whole 
of the population and for normally working people), GDP per capita and income 
inequalities. The focus of attention is on identifying income differences across space 
rather than similarities.
The theoretical frameworks on neighbourhood effects, such as the endogenous growth 
theories (i.e. Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988; Stokey, 1991; Lucas, 1993; Romer, 1994), the 
school of NEG and the cumulative causation theories (i.e. Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; 
Perroux, 1950; Myrdal, 1957; Hirschman, 1958; Kaldor, 1970, 1981, 1985; Arthur, 
1994) raise interesting questions about how interactions, which are summarised in 
spatial weights matrices (Abreu et al., 2004), can lead to emergent collective behaviour 
and aggregate patterns (Anselin, 2000). For instance, income is expected to be 
geographically concentrated in particular areas, due to certain processes such as market 
potential which induces factor inflows and raises local factor prices. Nevertheless, the 
theoretical framework of income agglomeration may be the natural advantages of the 
regions. Natural resources are not uniformly distributed across locations. Regions 
exploit their comparative advantage and, thus, the regional concentration of economic 
activities arises as regions produce and export products that are relatively intensive in 
the use of their abundant resource (Kim, 1995). The first theoretical framework 
highlights the geography of distance between economic agents (the ‘second’ nature of
29 It is on this unevenness that most of trade theory has been built (Fujita and Thisse, 2002: 6).
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geography), while the second framework places an emphasis on the physical geography 
(the ‘first’ nature of geography) (Brakman et al., 2001). It is not the aim of this chapter 
to review this vast array of sources, but simply to focus on the patterns of income 
distribution. The null hypothesis of randomness is that the unequal distribution of 
economic activity is a natural outcome of a random process (Ellison and Glaeser, 1997), 
without any recourse to arguments about the ‘first’ and the ‘second’ nature of 
geography.
This chapter is structured in four sections. Section 3.2 examines the average income 
distribution within a region and that region’s economic development. Hence, ESDA on 
income and GDP per capita is presented. Section 3.3 analyses the concept of income 
inequality in detail. More specifically, income inequality is conceptualised as average 
disproportionality (Allison, 1978; Firebaugh, 1999, 2003), while four income inequality 
indices are derived: the mean logarithmic deviation index, the Gini index, the 
generalised entropy index and the Atkinson index. These indices are evaluated against a 
set of four criteria: the scale independence, the population size independence, the 
additive decomposability and the principle of transfers. Section 3.4 applies ESDA on 
those indices to the European regions. It contains the measurement of income inequality 
within and between regions in the EU. In addition, it looks at whether the within-region 
income inequality constitutes the major portion of the income inequality in Europe. 
Finally, Section 3.5 compares the income per capita with income inequality within a 
region.
3.2 Defining and Measuring Regional Development
This section analyses regional development and consists of three subsections. The first 
subsection focuses on income per capita, while the second discusses GDP per capita. 
Both subsections place an emphasis on the treatment of spatial effects. The third 
subsection shows the correlation between these approaches.
3.2.1 Income Per Capita
Information on the average income (income per capita) of the European regions is 
collected by the regionalised microeconomic variable ‘ Total net personal income 
(detailed, NC, total year prior to the survey)\ which is extracted from the ECHP 
dataset. Two basic characteristics of this variable are that it is lagged variable and is 
measured in national currency. Personal income data are not comparable over time,
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because they are not in constant prices. They are adjusted to the same price level using 
the Harmonised Indices of Consumer Prices (HICPs).30 Furthermore, income data must 
be comparable across countries and regions. Thus, they also converted into euros.31 
Data on income is collected not only for each individual in the household so as to 
measure income per capita for the population as a whole, but also for each normally 
working (15+ hours/week) individual32 in the household in order to measure income per 
capita for normally working people.
3.2.1.1 Income Per Capita for the Population as a Whole
A first ‘feel’ for personal income data can be obtained by histograms. Figure 3.1 
illustrates the income distribution in Europe in 1996, 1998 and 2000, for individuals 
whose personal income is not zero and is also smaller than 99 per cent of the total 
income distribution. Hence the income distributions below exclude persons who have 
no income from any source and the very rich. Each histogram also overlays a normal 
distribution for a comparable performance. The histograms show that income 
distribution in Europe changed slightly between 1996 and 2000. Among only the very 
low income levels between 1996 and 1998, income distribution moved to the right, 
showing some improvement at the lower levels of income. However, the density of 
income distribution at very low income levels is still very high, because individuals who 
are unemployed or inactive are included in the analysis. In 1998 and 2000, the European 
income distribution hit its highest point when the total personal income was 5,000 
euros; while, in 1996 the European distribution reached a peak at around 1,000 euros. In 
2000, between 1,000 and 10,000 euros the sample income density increases 
considerably and reaches a peak when income per capita is 5,000 euros, and then falls 
dramatically until it reaches a plateau between 7,000 and 10,000 euros. For all 
histograms, when the total net personal income is 10,000 euros, the European income 
distribution meets the normal distribution at the highest point. Therefore, when income
30 According to the Eurostat’ documentation ‘HICPs are designed fo r  international comparisons of 
consumer price inflation. They are used in the assessment o f inflation convergence as required under 
Article 121 o f  the Treaty o f  Amsterdam (Article 109j o f the Treaty o f European Union)'. 
[http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int (Eurostat, Statistical Office o f the European Communities, Unit C5: Prices, 
L-2920 Luxembourg)].
31 Taking into account that the income variable is lagged one, for example, the personal income of Wave 
3 (which corresponds to 1996) is divided by the 1995 relevant euro/ECU exchange rate.
32 It is extracted from the variable ‘Main activity status-Self defined (regrouped)\
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per capita is larger than 10,000 Euro, the European income distribution follows the 
normal distribution.
Figure 3.1: Histogram of the European Income Distribution in 1996, 1998 and 2000
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In order to gain a more accurate picture of the European income distribution, income is 
decomposed according to its sources. The main sources of personal income are 
collected from the variable ‘Main sources o f  personal income\ which is extracted from 
the ECHP dataset. According to this variable, the main sources of personal income are:
• person has no income from any source (code = 0);
• wages and salaries (code = 1);
• income from self employment or farming (code = 2);
• pensions (code = 3);
• unemployment and redundancy benefits (code = 4);
• any other social benefits or grants (code = 5); and
• private income (code = 6).
Figure 3.2 shows the fluctuation in the mean and the standard deviation of the European 
income distribution according to sources of personal income for the years 1995 to 2000. 
According to the figure, the mean of wages and pensions increased slightly, while their 
standard deviation remained constant. The evolution of personal income per capita 
coming from self employment or farming remains the same. In contrast, there is a 
considerable variation in standard deviation, which reaches the highest point in 1999. 
Between 1995 and 2000, the evolution of both the mean and the standard deviation of 
the unemployment and social benefits remained constant. The evolution of private 
income remained the same, while its standard deviation, which started from a high value 
in 1995, reached its lowest point in 1996, and has risen steadily since 1998 to remain 
the same since 2000. The standard deviations of income coming from self employment 
and of private income are much higher than their average values. The figure also shows 
the percentage of the European income distribution per source of personal income. 
Income from salaries represents the largest percentage.
The data on income per capita are spatial data and specifically irregular lattice data, 
because the size of each region differs. The average income of a region has the 
properties of spatially aggregated data.
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Figure 3.2: Evolution of the European Income Distribution According to Main Source of Personal 
Income
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An initial step o f  ESDA is to map income per capita in order to gain a spatial view  o f  
the data and, among other aims, to see whether incomes per capita are randomly 
distributed over space or there are similarities between regions. Figure 3.3 shows the 
spatial distribution o f  income per capita in the EU in 1996, 1998 and 2000. From 1996 
to 2000, the wealthier regions were lie de France, Luxembourg, Belgium and Denmark. 
There are striking disparities in income per capita among different parts o f  Europe, 
particularly between the northern and the southern regions. Income per capita is 
typically half o f  the EU average in the southern periphery, stretching from Greece to 
Southern Italy (Sicilia, Sud, Campania and Abruzzo-M olise), western Spain (Canarias, 
Sur, Centro and Noroeste) and Portugal, over the period 1996-2000. The economic 
conditions o f surrounding regions seem to influence the economic development 
perspectives o f this region. Baumont et al. (2003) argued that a poor region surrounded 
by poor regions will remain in that state o f  economic development, whereas a poor 
region surrounded by richer regions has a greater probability that it will reach a higher 
state o f  economic development. Another important feature displayed this figure is the 
high average income in city-regions. The higher the urbanisation level o f  a region, the 
higher its income per capita. This figure represents the distribution o f  income per capita 
without any information about the existence and extent o f  spatial autocorrelation.
II
97  9 8  99
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However, it illustrates the ‘unevenness’ in income per capita, which appears to be 
concentrated in particular areas. This may indicate a positive spatial autocorrelation 
phenomenon.
Figure 3.3: Spatial Distribution of Income Per Capita for the Population as a Whole (IMN) in 1996, 
1998 and 2000
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A better picture o f  income per capita within regions can be obtained by using the 
univatiate boxplot technique. The boxplots for income per capita in European regions 
between 1995 and 2000 are shown in Figure 3.4. The median income increased 
gradually from 1995 to 2000. The distributions o f  income per capita are fairly compact, 
because the whiskers are, in fact, the extreme values. The interquartile range is longer in 
2000 than from 1995 to 1999. Furthermore, the variation in the whiskers is greater in 
1999 and 2000 than in 1996, 1997 and 1998. The European distribution o f  income per 
capita accepts the normality in 1995 and 1996, but rejects it over the period 1997— 
2000.33 The ratio o f  skewness to standard error indicates a right tail in 1995 and a left 
tail in 1996. Looking behind the boxplots, Luxemburg has the highest average income 
among the European regions. In contrast, Portuguese, Greek and Spanish regions 
register the lowest income per capita. For example, the income per capita o f the Greek 
regions is approximately one third that o f Luxemburg. The variation in average income 
among the United Kingdom regions is greater than that found in the remaining 
European regions.
Figure 3.4: Boxplot for Income Per Capita for the Population as a Whole (IMN)
Income per capita (IMN)
300001-----------------------------------------------------
It
IMN 95 IMN
*02 *02 *02 *02
IMN_97 IMN_98 M N .99 IMN_00
IMN (exclude regions listwise)
300001
S i
94 04 94 94 M 04
IMN_95 IMN_96 MN.97 !MN_98 MN.99 MN_00
A spatial autocorrelation for income per capita identifies the relationship behind the 
similarity o f  income per capita and spatial proximity. Considering three different spatial 
weights schemes, different trends in the distribution o f  income per capita exist over 
space. First, constructing the rook first order contiguity spatial weights for income per 
capita, Moran’s I statistic (Moran, 1950) is positive and statistically significant, which 
suggests that the null hypothesis o f  no spatial autocorrelation should be rejected (Table
33 The ratio of skewness to standard error is 0.40 in 1995, -1.00 in 1996, -2.66 in 1997, -2.29 in 1998, - 
2.32 in 1999 and -2.05 in 2000.
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3.1). The distribution o f  income per capita is, indeed, clustered throughout the period o f  
study. The rich were concentrated in particular European regions over the period 1995— 
2000. Spatial dependence analysis also shows that the bivariate Moran’s I statistic 
between a region’s income per capita in 1998 and the neighbouring regions’ income per 
capita in 1996 (which is the space-time correlation o f  income per capita in 1998) is 
0.6149. Second, the short evolution o f  the standardised values o f  Moran’s I statistics 
when I consider the 3-nearest neighbours weights schemes is similar to that o f  the rook 
first order contiguity. Third, the spatial autocorrelation o f  the threshold distance 
schemes is lower than for the previous schemes. Briefly, Moran’s I statistics for any 
spatial weights schemes disprove the hypothesis that income per capita is randomly 
distributed over space. Moran’s I statistics lead to the same results for the sign (positive) 
and significance o f  global spatial dependence, highlighting the robustness o f  the results, 
with regard to the choice o f the spatial weights matrix. However, the standardised 
values o f  the spatial autocorrelation and the space-time correlation appear to be very 
high, indicating a spatial scale problem (Ertur and Le Gallo, 2003: 64).
Table 3.1: Moran’s I for Income Per Capita of the Population as a Whole (IMN)
13 countries (E[l]=-0 0099)
rook first o rder contiguity 3 -n ea re s t neighbours threshold  d is tance
M oran 's I M ean Sd Z-value M oran's I Mean Sd Z-value M oran's I Mean Sd Z-value
Spatial au to­
correlation
1995
1996 0.6605 -0.0106 0.0739 9.0812 0.7830 -0 .0050 0.0768 10.2604 0.4288 -0.0107 0.0224 19.6205
1997 0.6565 -0 .0103 0.0747 8 9264 0 .8024 -0.0069 0.0719 11.2559 0.4699 -0 .0110 0.0225 21.3733
1998 0.6499 -0 .0079 0.0765 8.5987 0.7968 -0 .0092 0.0742 10.8625 0.4602 -0.0111 0.0213 22.1268
1999 0.6644 -0.0151 0.0750 9.0600 0.8100 -0.0093 0.0705 11.6213 0.4669 -0.0104 0 .0220 21.6955
2000 0.7027 -0 .0040 0.0757 9.3355 0.8345 -0.0115 0.0739 11.4479 0.4736 -0 .0093 0.0221 21.8507
S pace-tim e
correlation
1998 0.6149 -0.0081 0.0733 8.4993 0.7358 -0.0081 0.0698 10.6576 0.4267 -0 .0095 0.0217 20.1014
2000 0.6535 -0.0086 0.0736 8.9959 0.7846 -0.0083 0.0726 10.9215 0.4580 -0 .0098 0.0214 21.8598
Excluded S E  (E[l]=-0.0108)
rook first o rder contiguity 3 -n eare st neighbours threshold  d is tan ce
M oran 's I Mean Sd Z-value M oran's I Mean Sd Z-value M oran's I Mean Sd Z-value
Spatial au to ­
correlation
1995 0.6713 -0 .0048 0.0755 8.9550 0.7646 -0.0131 0.0784 9.9196 0.3506 -0.0120 0.0223 16.2601
1996 0.6513 -0 .0113 0.0750 8.8347 0.7641 -0.0135 0.0753 10.3267 0.3934 -0.0114 0.0226 17.9115
1997 0.6629 -0.0104 0.0719 9.3644 0.7981 -0 .0118 0.0768 10.5456 0.4695 -0.0106 0.0229 20.9651
1998 0.6578 -0 .0079 0.0778 8.5566 0.7983 -0.0074 0.0785 10.2637 0.4597 -0.0101 0.0227 20.6960
1999 0.6751 -0 .0053 0.0762 8.9291 0.8134 -0.0096 0.0761 10.8147 0 .4712 -0.0089 0.0238 20.1723
2000 0.7145 -0.0091 0.0758 9.5462 0.8387 -0.0058 0.0784 10.7717 0.4834 -0 .0109 0 .0226 21.8717
S pace-tim e
correlation
1998 0.6193 -0 .0108 0.0758 8.3127 0.7338 -0.0088 0.0699 10.6237 0 .4146 -0 .0106 0.0224 18.9821
2000 0.6620 -0.0091 0.0756 8.8770 0.7866 -0.0152 0 .0736 10.8940 0.4595 -0 .0110 0.0221 21.2896
N ote: All s tatis tics are sign ifican t at p = 0 .001 ; E[I): theoretical m ean; M ean: observed  m ean
The use o f  LISA allows one to assess the regional structure o f spatial autocorrelation 
(Anselin, 1995a). Figure 3.5 demonstrates the income per capita cluster maps for 1996, 
1998 and 2000 for three spatial weights schemes. Both the rook first order contiguity 
and the 3-nearest neighbours weights schemes show that clusters o f  poorer regions were 
found in the southern periphery and did not change between 1996 and 2000. By
8 0
contrast, the number and the size of richer clusters declined over time. Income is 
concentrated in specific areas, which are characterised by their financial and business 
services and are the centres of public administration, such as London, Paris and 
Luxembourg. In 1996, for example, the income per capita was well above average in the 
more central areas stretching from eastern France (Bassin Parisien, Centre-Est and 
Mediterranee) through Belgium and Germany. Activity in those regions is concerned 
with services and manufacturing. In 1996, the income per capita of manufacturing 
regions declined and, in 2000, it declined even more. The cluster of the southern United 
Kingdom is characterised by a high level of urbanisation. To sum up, the choice of the 
weights matrix is crucial in ESDA so as to identify the spatial clusters.
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Figure 3.5: C luster  M a p  for Income P er  Capita  for the Population  as a Whole (IMN) in 1996, 1998
and  2000
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All the nine cluster maps show a strong north-south divide and reveal the presence o f  
spatial heterogeneity in the form at least two spatial clusters o f rich and poor regions. 
The geographical distributions o f  the European regions firstly exhibit an income 
polarisation pattern between rich regions in the north and poor regions in the south. This 
evidence can, in fact, be linked to several results for the NEG theories, and to the 
possibility o f  multiple spatial equilibria (Krugman, 1991a) and the club convergence 
theories o f  Azariadis and Drazen (1990) and Durlauf and Johnson (1995) (Baumont et 
al., 2003). Secondly, the results clearly show the persistence o f  income disparities
82
among the European regions over time, following a pattern of an urban-rural divide. To 
sum up, spatial dependence and spatial heterogeneity are inevitable features of regional 
income per capita variation analysis.
3.2.1.2 Income Per Capita for Normally Working People
Figure 3.6 illustrates the income distribution in Europe in 1996, 1998 and 2000, for 
normally working people whose personal income is not zero and is also smaller than 99 
per cent of total income distribution. Each histogram, once again, overlays a normal 
distribution to show comparable performance. The histograms show that the income 
distribution in Europe among those people normally in work has changed slightly 
between 1996 and 2000. The density of income distribution at the very low income 
levels for normally working people is lower than for the whole of the population. At the 
very low income levels, income distribution moved somewhat to the right between 1996 
and 1998, marking an improvement in the economic position of the low income strata 
and a decrease in income inequality. Income distribution in Europe for this population 
reaches a peak when income is approximately 12,000 euros and then it follows the 
normal distribution.
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Figure 3.6: Histogram of the Income Distribution in Europe among Normally Working People in 
1996, 1998 and 2000
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Once more, in order to gain a more accurate picture o f  the income distribution in 
Europe, income is decomposed according to its sources. Figure 3.7 shows the short 
evolution o f  income distribution for normally working people according to the main
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sources o f  personal income. The evolution o f  income per capita in Europe and its 
sources remains the same. However, the amount o f  private income per capita increased 
considerably between 1999 and 2000. There is a considerable variation in standard 
deviation o f  wages and private income. Finally, income from salaries accounts for the 
highest percentage (78 per cent) o f  personal income. That percentage is far higher than 
the respective percentage for the whole o f  the population (45 per cent).
Figure 3.7: The Evolution of the Income Distribution in Europe Among Normally Working People 
per Main Sources of Personal Income
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Figure 3.8 shows the geographical distribution o f  income per capita among people 
normally in work in 1996, 1998 and 2000. The distribution is clustered throughout the 
period under study. There are striking disparities in income per capita between different 
parts o f  Europe, not so much between the northern and southern regions, but in 
particular between the core and the periphery. Another important feature is that income 
per capita among normally working people is higher in city-regions.
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Figure 3.8: S patia l D istribu tion  of Incom e P er C ap ita  fo r N orm ally W ork ing  People (NM N) in
1996, 1998 and 2000
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The boxplots for the income per capita o f  normally working people in the European 
regions between 1995 and 2000 are shown in Figure 3.9. The median increased 
gradually from 1995 to 2000, as it did for the income per capita o f  the whole 
population. However, the distribution o f  income per capita among normally working 
people is less compact than for the whole population. Luxemburg and lie de France are
8 6
outliers at the upper end o f  the distributions, while the Portuguese regions (Centro, 
Algarve, Madeira and Alentejo) are outliers at the lower end o f  the distributions in 
1998. The interquartile range is greater in 2000 than from 1995 to 1999, as it is for 
income per capita for the whole o f  the population as well. The distributions accept 
normality over the period 1996-2000, but reject it in 1995. In 1995 and 1996, the ratio 
o f skewness to standard error is positive which indicates a right tail, whereas from 1997 
to 2000 that ratio is negative which indicates a left tail.34
Figure 3.9: Boxplot for Income Per Capita of Normally Working People (NMN)
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PT15.PT3 and PT14 (lower end) and FR1 and LU (upper end) in 1998; LU (upper end) in 1999
NMN (exclude regions listwise): LU (upper end) in 1995; LU, FR1 (upper end) in 1996; LU (upper end) in 1997; LU (upper end) in 1998; 
LU (upper end) in 1999 (see Appendix A l l ) .
The spatial dependence for income per capita o f  normally working people shows that 
income in a particular region is likely to contribute to output gains in adjoining regions 
(Table 3.2). The distribution o f  income per capita is by nature clustered over the whole 
period. The univariate and bivariate Moran’s I statistics computed using the rook first 
order contiguity, the 3-nearest neighbours and the threshold distance weights matrices 
are high and statistically significant. As for income per capita for the whole o f  the 
population, the standardised values o f  the statistics remain approximately the same 
between 1995 and 2000, indicating a global tendency towards geographical clustering 
o f similar regions in terms o f income per capita. If the average income o f  one region 
increases, all regions benefit from the spillovers which are summarised in a spatial 
weights matrix. For instance, if  one region attracts highly-educated workers whose 
wages are high, all remaining regions may benefit from that attraction. Another example
34 The ratio of skewness to standard error is 2.20 in 1995, 0.74 in 1996, -1.92 in 1997, -1.05 in 1998, - 
1.45 in 1999 an d -1.63 in 2000.
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is that public infrastructure investments may increase the home market effects o f  a 
region and, thus, the wages, which, in turn, may change the competitive and 
comparative advantages o f  all regions. The speed o f diffusion is influenced by the 
region-specific characteristics and the availability o f  normally working people in 
neighbouring regions.
Table 3.2: Moran’s I for Income Per Capita of Normally Working People (NMN)
13 countries (E[l]=-0.0099)
rook first o rder contiguity 3 -n ea re st neighbours threshold  d is tan ce
M oran 's I M ean Sd Z-value M oran's I Mean Sd Z-value M oran's I M ean Sd Z-value
Spatial auto­
correlation
1995
1996 0.6314 -0 .0090 0.0730 8.7726 0.7545 -0.0105 0.0732 10.4508 0.3392 -0 .0116 0.0213 16.4695
1997 0.6080 -0.0092 0.0741 8.3293 0.7679 -0.0084 0.0760 10.2145 0.4361 -0.0091 0.0231 19.2727
1998 0.5868 -0 .0053 0.0745 7.9477 0.7433 -0.0094 0.0740 10.1716 0.4095 -0 .0099 0.0221 18.9774
1999 0.6119 -0 .0082 0.0747 8.3012 0.7618 -0 .0079 0.0728 10.5728 0.4310 -0 .0102 0.0231 19.0996
2000 0.6668 -0.0159 0.0733 9.3138 0.8003 -0 .0129 0.0729 11.1550 0.4590 -0.0093 0.0221 21.1900
S pace-tim e
correlation
1998 0.5586 -0 0113 0.0701 8.1298 0.6892 -0.0113 0.0693 10.1082 0.3551 -0.0094 0.0221 16.4932
2000 0.5828 -0 .0066 0.0730 8.0740 0.7216 -0.0106 0.0715 10.2406 0.4185 -0 .0086 0.0212 20.1462
Excluded SE (E[l]=-0.0108)
rook first o rder contiguity 3 -n eare st neighbours threshold  d is tan ce
M oran's I M ean Sd Z-value M oran’s I Mean Sd Z-value M oran’s I Mean S d Z-value
Spatial auto­
correlation
1995 0.6365 -0.0065 0.0746 8.6193 0.7237 -0.0122 0.0743 9.9044 0.2747 -0.0111 0.0234 12.2137
1996 0.6304 -0.0106 0.0743 8.6272 0.7545 -0.0167 0.0754 10.2281 0.3221 -0 .0106 0.0244 13.6352
1997 0.6149 -0.0083 0.0768 8.1146 0 .7745 -0.0107 0.0756 10.3862 0.4420 -0.0106 0.0227 19.9383
1998 0 .5929 -0.0093 0.0777 7 7 5 0 3 0 7522 -0.0085 0.0771 9.8664 0.4150 -0.0098 0.0231 18.3896
1999 0.6215 -0 .0092 0.0762 8 2769 0 .7719 -0 .0108 0.0748 10.4639 0.4404 -0 .0107 0.0224 20.1384
2000 0.6770 -0 .0109 0.0775 8.8761 0.8096 -0.0098 0.0770 10.6416 0.4707 -0.0107 0.0224 21.4911
S pace-tim e
correlation
1998 0.5648 -0.0093 0 0698 8 2249 0 .6987 -0.0104 0 0 7 3 8 9 6084 0.3530 -0 .0096 0.0223 16.2601
2000 0.5901 -0.0142 0.0735 8.2218 0.7305 -0.0067 0.0746 9.8820 0.4241 -0 .0106 0.0217 20.0323
Note: All statistics are significant at p=0.001; E[I]: theoretical mean; Mean: observed mean
It can be seen that most European regions are characterised by positive spatial 
association. The study o f  the geographical distribution o f income per capita in Europe 
over the period 1995-2000 using cluster maps highlights the importance o f spatial 
interactions and geographical location in income distribution issues. Since economic 
activities are not randomly distributed in space, income per capita remains 
geographically concentrated. The estimation and the occurrence o f  interregional 
externalities depend on the choice o f  the weights matrix. Figure 3.10 illustrates the 
cluster map for the income per capita o f  normally working people in 1996, 1998 and 
2000 using three weights matrices. The cluster maps o f  both the rook first order 
contiguity and the 3-nearest neighbours weights schemes highlight the core-periphery 
pattern. Core regions (north-east France, Belgium, Luxemburg and north-west 
Germany) with a relatively high income per capita are and remain located close to other 
core regions with a relatively high income per capita. Conversely, periphery regions 
(Portugal, western Spain, southern Italy and Greece) with a relatively low income per 
capita tend to be in the pull o f  other core regions with a relatively low income per
capita. Taking into account the threshold distance weights schemes, the core clusters are 
further expanded including, for instance, southern British and Swedish regions. Finally, 
the economic surroundings of a European region seem to influence the economic 
development perspectives of that region. A poor normally working person who lives in 
a low income per capita region which is surrounded by other poor regions will probably 
remain at that stage of income levels; whereas a rich person who lives in a region which 
is surrounded by richer regions should remain at a high income level. Hence local 
economic externalities influence regional economic development.
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Figure 3.10: C luster M ap of Incom e P er C ap ita  o f N orm ally W ork ing  People (NM N) in 1996, 1998
and 2000
(1) LISA Cluster Map (
Not Significant 
■  High-High
 I Low-Low
I  Low-High 
______ High-Low
Rook first order contiguity 3-nearest neighbours 
1996
Threshold distance
The cluster maps highlight a certain level o f  spatial heterogeneity hidden within the 
global spatial dependence pattern. One source o f  spatial heterogeneity is the 
urbanisation level within a region, which seems to be negatively correlated with the 
income per capita o f  normally working people. The role o f  cities in regional 
development is emphasised. The second spatial regime is the core-periphery pattern. 
The development o f  new growth theory, cumulative causation theories and NEG have 
made major contributions to the understanding o f  the core-periphery pattern. Both
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spatial regimes show that the locations of income activities for working people are 
spatially clustered according to certain agglomerated and cumulative processes.
Table 3.3 shows that the linear relationship between the income per capita of the whole 
population and the income per capita of normally working people is positive, 
statistically significant and very high.
Table 3.3: Pearson Correlation between the Income Per Capita of the Whole Population (IMN) and 
the Income Per Capita of Normally Working People (NMN)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
0.957 0.955 0.968 0.967 0.976 0.984
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**
94 94 94 94 94 94
0.950 0.963 0.963 0.973 0.981
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**
102 102 102 102 102
Note: ** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
3.2.2 GDP Per Capita
GDP per capita is measured using data extracted from the Eurostat’s Regio database and 
is calculated in terms of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)35 to take account of differences 
in price levels. GDP per capita is the standard measure of the size and performance of a 
regional economy. It is designed to measure the total output in a particular region, 
including services (European Commission, 1999). More specifically, GDP is the total 
output of goods and services for final use produced by a regional economy, by both 
residents and non-residents, regardless of the allocation to domestic and foreign 
claims.36 The range of the GDP per capita time-series analysis covers the period from 
1995 to 2002.
There are some mismatches between the regional division in the ECHP and the 
Eurostat’s Regio databank. For instance, the Eurostat’s Regio database does not provide 
economic data for the region of ‘Rheinland-Pfalz+Saarland’ (dex), but for the German 
regions of Rheinland-Pfalz (deb) and Saarland (dec). Hence, the GDP per capita of 
‘Rheinland-Pfalz+Saarland’ is approximately the average GDP per capita of Rheinland-
35 According to the Eurostat’ documentation ‘PPP is a currency conversion rate that converts economic 
indicators expressed in a national currency to an artificial common currency that equalises the 
purchasing power o f  different national currencies. In other words, PPP is both a price deflator and a  
currency converter; it eliminates the differences in price levels between countries in the process o f  
conversion to an artificial common currency, called Purchasing Power Standard^ 
(http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/).
36 www.undp.org/hdr2001/ - United Nations Development Programme.
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Pfalz and Saarland weighted by their population size. This is expressed in the following 
form.
GDPPC(dex) = — pop{— ) -.-GDPPC{deb) + — pop(defr)-— GDPPC(dec) 
pop{deb + dec) pop(deb + dec)
Other merged regions are Nord Ovest (itl), Nord Est (it3), Centro (it5), Abruzzo-Molise 
(it7), Sud (it9), Cornwall, Devon (uk62), Clwyd, Dyfed, Gwynedd, Powys (uk91) and 
Gwent, Mid-South-West Glamorgan (uk92), which are displayed in Appendix A 1.1.
GDP per capita, like income per capita, are spatially aggregated data and the 
‘modifiable areal unit problem’ and the problem of spatial autocorrelation and 
heterogeneity may be encountered. Additionally, GDP per capita is a seasonally
on
adjusting variable. The ‘smoothing’ procedures (or the ‘manipulation’ of data) used by 
government agencies often build autocorrelation into series that might otherwise be 
non-autocorrelated (Greene, 2003).
Considering first ESDA, I map the data in order to get a visual picture and to see 
whether macroeconomic data are randomly distributed over the EU or whether there are 
similarities among regions. Figure 3.11 shows the spatial distribution of regional GDP 
per capita in the EU in 1996, 1998 and 2000. It demonstrates that there are disparities in 
economic performance between different regions of Europe. GDP per capita is 
approximately two-thirds of the EU average in the Cohesion countries. It is well above 
average in the more central areas of Europe, including northern Italy (Nord Ovest, 
Lombardia, Nord Est and Emilia-Romagna), Austria (Ostosterreich and Westosterreich) 
and western Germany (Baden-Wurttemberg, Bayern and Hessen), in 1998 and 2000. By 
contrast, the clusters of poorer regions seem to be in the southern periphery of Europe, 
stretching from Greece through southern Italy and south-western Spain and Portugal. 
However, the scale of disparities across the Union depends on the type of region and the 
specific problems encountered in particular countries, which go beyond the simple core- 
periphery distinction (European Commission, 1999). Generally speaking, regional 
disparities have not changed dramatically from 1995 to 2002.
37 Gujarati (2003) refers to interpolation and extrapolation as sources o f ‘manipulation’ o f data.
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F igure 3.11: Spatia l D istribu tion  of G DP P er C ap ita  (G D PPC ) in 1996, 1998 and  2000
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Figure 3.12 displays the univariate boxplot for GDP per capita within European regions 
from 1995 to 2000. It shows that the outliers and extreme cases are city-regions, which 
are subject to many externalities (Anas et al., 1998). Bruxelles-capitale, which is the 
centre for European public administration, was an extreme case between 1995 and 2000. 
Luxembourg, which is also a centre for European economic and monetary policy 
decisions, Hamburg and Greater London, in which inner London constitutes one o f  the
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world’s financial, economic and business centres, are all outliers. One problem 
encountered in measuring GDP per capita in city-regions is that they are underbounded 
regions, which are smaller than their Functional Urban Regions (FURs) (Cheshire and 
Hay, 1988). The administrative definition of cities in Europe bears no constant relation 
to any functional definition (Cheshire and Hay, 1988: 15). The administrative definition 
of cities (i.e. NUTS) does not capture the economic sphere of influence of a city. 
Conversely, ‘FURs are functional in that their boundaries are determined on the basis 
o f economic relationships rather than history or political divisions' (Cheshire and Hay, 
1988: 15). The bigger the city, the smaller the spatial units chosen, the greater the 
measurement bias is likely to be (Cheshire and Hay, 1988: 18). For instance, the Greater 
London area is considerably smaller than the FUR of London (Cheshire and Hay, 1988: 
18). The size of the region matters for spatial analysis. The fact that central cities are 
likely to provide public services that benefit populations living in the rest of the 
metropolitan area but working, studying or shopping in the central city (Greene et al., 
1974) is not observable in large city-regions. The interdependencies between central 
cities and their suburbs are not captured. This figure also shows that the difference 
between the first and third quartiles and the median rose gradually. The growth rates of 
Bruxelles-capitale, Hamburg and Greater London were found to have increased by 
following the growth rates of the median, while the growth rate of Luxemburg was 
higher. Moreover, the distributions are skewed, although much of that skewness is due 
to the extreme value and outliers in the higher end of the distributions. The European 
distribution of GDP per capita rejects the normality over 1995-2000.38 The ratio of 
skewness to standard error is positive and greater than two, which indicates a long right 
tail.
38 The ratio o f skewness to standard error is 5.73 in 1995, 5.82 in 1996, 5.65 in 1997, 5.92 in 1998, 6.25 
in 1999 and 5.73 in 2000.
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F igure 3.12: Boxplot for G DP P er C ap ita  (G D PPC )
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Note: extreme cases and outliers are sorted in descending order: BE1, DE6, LU, FRl and UK55 in 1995, 1996 and 1997; BE1, DE6, LU, 
UK55 and FRl in 1998; BE1, LU, DE6, UK55 and FRl in 1999 and 2000 (see Appendix Al l).
Similar to the construction o f the spatial weights matrices for income per capita, the 
rook first order contiguity, the 3-nearest neighbours and the threshold distance band 
spatial weights schemes are used in order to create the weights matrices for GDP per 
capita (Table 3.4). For instance, Moran’s I statistic computed using the contiguity 
weights schemes is 0.2515 in 1995. It shows that there is a low positive spatial 
autocorrelation o f  GDP per capita. Due to the low  value o f  the Moran’s I statistic, it 
would appear that GDP per capita is more randomly distributed over space than income 
per capita (either for the whole o f the population or for normally working people). 
Considering the bivariate measure o f  spatial correlation, I examined whether a region’s 
GDP per capita in a given year is correlated with the lagged GDP per capita in 
neighbouring regions. The space-time correlation is 0.2310 in 1998 and 0.2069 in 2000. 
This may be due to the fact that common regional activities in neighbouring regions (i.e. 
public infrastructures) and common policies across neighbouring regions (i.e. structural 
funds) affect all regions lagged. Moran’s I statistic computed using the 3-nearest 
neighbours and the threshold distance is 0.3175 and 0.1429, respectively, for 1995. The 
standardised values o f  Moran’s I statistics remain approximately the same for the period 
between 1995 and 2000.
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T able 3.4: M o ran ’s I for G DP P er C ap ita  (G D PPC )
13 countries (E[l]=-0.0099)
rook first o rder contiguity 3 -n eare st neighbours threshold  d is ta n ce
M oran's I Mean Sd Z-value M oran's I Mean Sd Z-value M oran's I Mean Sd Z-value
Spatial au to ­
correlation
1995 0.2515 -0 .0060 0.0734 3.5082 0.3175 -0.0103 0.0693 4.7302 0.1429 -0.0102 0 .0225 6.8044
1996 0.2428 -0 .0114 0.0709 3.5853 0.3053 -0.0055 0.0705 4.4085 0.1426 -0.0101 0 .0214 7.1355
1997 0.2264 -0 .0092 0.0728 3.2363 0.2823 -0.0097 0.0732 3.9891 0.1322 -0.0098 0 .0227 6.2555
1998 0.2174 -0 .0088 0.0739 3.0609 0.2731 -0.0118 0.0773 3.6856 0.1120 -0.0108 0 .0229 5.3624
1999 0.2025 -0 .0095 0.0720 2.9444 0.2478 -0.0100 0.0708 3.6412 0.0963 -0 .0083 0 .0232 4.5086
2000 0.1981 -0.0094 0.0738 2.8117 0.2370 -0.0097 0.0729 3.3841 0.0853 -0.0105 0 .0219 4.3744
S pace-tim e
correlation
1998 0.2310 -0.0126 0.0727 3.3508 0.2890 -0.0091 0.0729 4.0892 0.1268 -0.0102 0 .0212 6.4623
2000 0.2069 -0 .0092 0.0733 2 9482 0.2547 -0.0082 0.0698 3.7665 0.0978 -0.0101 0 .0229 4.7118
Note: Statistics are significant at the 1% level, except for the space-time correlation for 2000 for the rook first order contiguity, which is 
significant at the 5% level; E[I]: theoretical mean; Mean: observed mean.
The next step is local spatial autocorrelation analysis. The use o f  LISA allows one to 
examine whether there are local spatial clusters o f  high or low GDP per capita and 
which regions contribute more to the global spatial autocorrelation. Figure 3.13 displays 
the cluster maps for output per capita in 1996, 1998 and 2000, which, in particular, 
show the local variations in spatial autocorrelation o f  GDP per capita. According to the 
rook first order contiguity scheme, the German region o f  Hessen is the centre o f  a 
cluster o f  high output in 1996, while Kentriki Ellada and the Portuguese regions o f  
Centro and Norte are the centres o f  a cluster o f  low  output in 1996, 1998 and 2000. 
Additionally, a ‘new ’ poor cluster emerged in 2000 around the east German regions o f  
Sachsen-Anhalt and Brandenburg. The diminishing number o f  rich clusters over time 
most probably depicts that the output per head o f  poorer regions converges towards the 
EU average. The 3-nearest neighbours weights schemes show that in 1996, 1998 and 
2000, Greece, the Italian region o f  Sud, the Spanish region o f  Noroeste and the 
Portuguese region o f  Norte are clusters for low GDP per capita. Conversely, lie de 
France, Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire are clusters for high GDP per capita. Finally, 
considering the threshold distance band, many European regions seem to be sources for 
rich clusters extending from northern Italy to western Germany, Denmark and southern 
Sweden. Another cluster includes the southern United Kingdom, eastern Germany, the 
French regions o f  Est and Mediterrenee and Central England, include regions in which 
low GDP per capita is surrounded by areas o f  high per capita GDP. These regions 
contribute to the negative spatial autocorrelation.
96
Figure 3.13: C lu ster M ap for GD P P er C ap ita  (G D PPC ) in 1996, 1998 and 2000
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The spatial distribution o f GDP per capita exhibits two persistent polarisation patterns: 
(a) between the rich regions in the north and the poor regions in the south; and (b) 
between the rich regions in urban areas and the poor regions in rural settings. This 
evidence can be linked to several regional economic development theories such as the 
club convergence theories, the cumulative causation theories and the NEG, assuming 
that natural resources are randomly distributed over the EU. Both the urban-rural divide 
and the EU north-south divide should be taken into account in the European regional 
economic process. The economic development o f  the suburbs is positively related to the
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development of the central city. For instance, Voith (1998) found that the positive effect 
of the central city on its suburbs increases with the size of the central city.
3.2.3 The Relationship between Income Per Capita and GDP Per Capita
The relationship between income per capita for the whole population and GDP per 
capita is explored through a comparison of their boxplots, the spatial distribution of 
Income per capitathe rate ----------- -------— , the Pearson correlation and the bivariate measures of
GDP per capita
spatial association.
First, Figure 3.14, which shows the boxplots for income per capita and GDP per capita, 
is derived from Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.12. That figure shows that GDP per capita is 
higher than income per capita over the period 1995-2000. Put into context, this is not 
surprising, since GDP takes into account externalities to physical and human capital 
(Temple, 1999) and invisible public policies, such as public infrastructure policies, 
which are not accounted for in income measures. The descriptive statistic analysis also 
shows that GDP per capita distributions are more skewed than those for income per 
capita, particularly for 1999 and 2000. However, the lower end of the distributions 
remained the same between 1996 and 2000.
GDP is a measure of aggregate income on a macro level, through it excludes transfers of 
income from individuals, companies and government in the form, for example, of social 
benefits (European Commission, 1999). A region that has a low level of production 
might have a relatively high level of income due to large social security transfers, but it 
would still be a less favoured region (European Commission, 2004: 25-26).
There are certain problems encountered in the use of GDP per capita as a measure of 
income per capita within regions. In city-regions, for example, commuting by people 
resident in other regions adds to the local workforce and GDP. The city-region’s GDP 
per capita as a measure of income per capita is, therefore, overstated, while that of 
neighbouring regions is understated (European Commission, 1999). Consequently, the 
urbanisation degree of a region is likely to be a crucial factor in the distinction between 
income per capita and GDP per capita.
39 Since the variables are measured on the same scale and are recorded using the same units (averages), 
their distributions are compared without any method o f standardisation.
98
Additional problems encountered in the use of GDP per capita as a measure of income 
per capita within regions are the following:40
• GDP counts work that does not produce a net change or that results from 
repairing harm, such as a natural disaster (i.e. an earthquake).
• Cross-border trade within companies (i.e. to escape high taxation) distorts the 
GDP. Examples include the German division of Ebay that evades German tax by 
doing business in Switzerland.
• If a region does not spend, but saves and invests in other regions, its GDP will 
decline in comparison to a region that spends borrowed money.
Another problem encountered in using GDP per capita as a measure of the size and 
performance of a regional economy is that GDP does not include deductions for 
depreciation of physical capital or depletion and degradation of natural resources.41
Generally, GDP per capita is a measure of production where it is generated, while 
income per capita concerns a population in their place of residence. Therefore, income 
per capita is a ‘better’ indicator of regional performance. Income per capita might also 
be a ‘better’ proxy for standard of living in a regional economy.
40 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GDP.
41 www.undp.org/hdr2001/ —  United Nations Development Programme.
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Figure 3.14: Boxplot for Income Per Capita of the Population as a Whole (IMN) and GDP Per 
Capita (GDPPC)
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Note: extreme cases and outliers are sorted in descending order: BE1, DE6, LU, FR1 and UK55 in 1995, 1996 and 1997; BE1, DE6, LU, 
UK55 and FR1 in 1998; BE1, LU, DE6, UK55 and FR1 in 1999 and 2000 (see Appendix Al l).
Second, the spatial distribution o f  income per capita over GDP per capita within a 
region is presented using a choropleth map. Figure 3.15 is a special case o f  a quartile 
map, in which the outliers are shaded differently (Anselin, 1994). The higher the rate, 
the lower the differences between GDP and income per capita. This rate is expected to 
be lower than one. However, it is higher than one for Kent in 1998, and for Kent, Essex, 
Lancashire and Clwyd, Dyfed, Gwynedd and Powys in 2000. In those regions, GDP per 
capita is probably lower than income per capita due to the low investments in public 
infrastructure or to the large social security transfers. As is shown in the figure, Spain, 
Greece, Italy, Ireland and eastern Germany register higher differences than the 
remaining European regions. In Cohesion countries, GDP per capita is much higher 
than income per capita, probably due to the impact o f  Structural Funds. The differences 
increased slightly between 1996 and 2000 in all but the United Kingdom regions.
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F igure 3.15: Spatia l D istribu tion  o f Incom e P er cap ita  fo r the Population  as a W hole (IIVIN) over
G D P P er C ap ita  (G D P PC ) in 1996, 1998 an d  2000
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Third, the short evolution o f  the Pearson correlation between income per capita and 
GDP per capita from 1995 to 2000 registers a slight decrease. For example, the Pearson 
correlation is 0.645 in 1996, 0.621 in 1998 and 0.536 in 2000.42
Fourth, the bivariate measure o f  spatial correlation is explored. This measure relates 
GDP per capita in a region to income per capita in neighbouring regions, and vice versa. 
The correlation between a region’s income per capita and the GDP per capita o f  
neighbouring regions is 0.219 for 1996; 0.212 for 1998; and 0.183 for 2000 (for the 
rook first order contiguity spatial weights matrix). Conversely, the correlation between a 
region’s GDP per capita and the income per capita o f  neighbouring regions is 0.272 for 
1996; 0.238 for 1998; and 0.193 for 2000. To sum up, although the correlation between
42 These correlations are significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) with standard error 0.000.
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GDP per capita and income per capita is high, income per capita is a ‘better’ indicator 
of regional performance.
3.3 Defining Income Inequality
This section provides a definition of income inequality and an indication of how 
inequality is measured. Two fundamental issues encountered in measuring income 
inequality are connected to the units of analysis and the weighting of units (or lack of it) 
by their population size. The answers depend on the research design and the research 
question. First, the basic units used to measure income inequalities might be either 
individuals or territorial units, which mean groups of individuals such as regions or 
countries. Sala-i-Martin (2003) states that it is admissible to use territorial units when 
one sets out to test theories or to examine government policies that relate to countries or 
regions, while it is relevant to use individuals when one is interested in the welfare of 
people. It has already been stated that this research investigates the evolution of income 
inequalities within regions in the EU and focuses on the welfare of people. Therefore, in 
accordance with Sala-i-Martin, it is appropriate to use individuals as basic units to 
measure income inequalities. Second, in the case of groups of individuals, one crucial 
issue is whether one should weight regions by their population size. Firebaugh (2003) 
argues that if the goal is to test a theory of how regional economies work — so each 
region can be viewed as a separate realisation of certain underlying economic processes 
— then each region would be weighted the same; whereas, if the goal is to calculate the 
average disproportionality of individuals’ income ratios there is no reason why 
individuals in large regions should carry less weight than individuals in small regions. 
Consequently, this research is based on weighted inequality indices in order to 
decompose, for example, the generalised entropy indices. When the basic units are 
individuals, they are the same size, so they are weighted equally.
This section examines income inequality and consists of three subsections.1 The first 
subsection looks at income inequality as average disproportionality, the second analyses 
the criteria for evaluating income inequality and the last describes the four most well- 
known indicators.
3.3.1 Inequality as Average Disproportionality
Although the term income inequality is widely used, there is sometimes confusion over 
what the term ‘inequality’ exactly means. Before examining the definition of income
inequality, it is important to stress first that inequality is not synonymous with inequity, 
which explicitly invokes norms; and second that inequality is based on ratios and not on 
gaps (Firebaugh, 2003). Moreover, it is important to distinguish between income 
inequality and poverty. Poverty is the fraction of the distribution of income that lies 
below a commonly accepted poverty line (Cowell, 1995; Sala-i-Martin, 2002). 
Ravallion (1997a; 1997b), Ravallion and Chen (2003) and Justino et al. (2004) have 
shown that a large number of individuals remain poor, not because they live in poor 
regions (i.e. countries) but because high levels of income inequality create exclusion 
and persistent poverty among certain population groups.
In the literature on inequality, it is conceptualised as the average disproportionality. 
Inequality concerns a ‘disproportionate share’, which means a share that is bigger or 
smaller than the average share of all basic units. The challenge of income inequality 
literature is to comprehend how to aggregate those basic unit disproportionalities to 
obtain a measure of overall income inequality. Since each region has a different 
distribution of income, an index of income inequality that is comparable across regions 
has to be compiled. The index should be fundamentally based on the principle that 
income inequality increases as the income ratios increasingly deviate from 1.0. Hence, 
the task in hand is to devise summary measures of income inequality that distinguish 
more inequality from less inequality (Firebaugh, 2003). I express income inequality 
indices in a general form as disproportionality functions.
Consider a population of basic units i e {1,2,..., N ) , where each unit is associated with a
N
unique value of the measured income y  such that ^ j y i = Y . Thus y t is income share,
/=i
that is unit / ‘s total income (individual or group of individuals) as a proportion of the 
total income for the entire population. I define the income ratio rt as the ratio of y t to
— — 1 N Y
the average Y ( Y = — = — )
r,=y,/r
By definition, equality exists when income is equally distributed across all units. 
Inequality is zero when and only when = 1.0 for all of i ; otherwise, inequality is
greater than zero. When the basic units are individuals, the units are the same size, so 
they are weighted equally. Income inequality remains constant when income grows at 
the same rate for every person over time. In contrast, income gaps widen among people
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when income changes at the same rate for all persons. Firebaugh (2003: 73) points out 
that since we live in a world where the average income has been doubling every half 
century or less, the gap between richer and poorer nations naturally will widen (as well 
as the gap between richer and poorer persons), irrespective of any change in the degree 
of income inequality across nations (as well as across individuals).
Conceptualising inequality as the average disproportionality across all basic units 
implies that the degree of income inequality depends on the average distance of the 
income ratios rt from 1.0. Income inequality is unaffected by proportional increases or 
decreases. Inequality indices /  can be expressed in a common form
where /  denotes the disproportionality or distance function which captures the 
mathematical functions for determining deviations of income ratios from 1.0.
In the general case, where units differ in size, as is the case when basic units denote 
regions and thus population varies across regions, an inequality index is
/ = E a / w >
/
where p { denotes population share and defines as n j  N .
Generally,
fl IN  for unweighted index 
1 wi for weighted index
If the basic units are individuals, the unweighted index equalises the weighted index. 
The inequality index is expressed in a common form as a function of income ratios r,
and population shares /?,. If, for example, the population share is constant, inequality
indices differ only because they employ different distance functions of the income 
ratios. A region’s contribution in terms of income inequality depends on the region’s 
income ratio and population share, while an individual’s contribution to income 
inequality depends only on his/her income ratio. It follows that the evolution of a 
region’s contribution to change in interregional inequality is determined by the change 
in both the region’s income ratio and the region’s population share, whereas the
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evolution of inequality using individuals as basic units depends on the change in 
individual’s income ratio alone .
Income inequality can occur at different levels of aggregation. For example, the income 
inequality for Europe may vary across individuals, across regions and across nations. 
Equality at a higher level of aggregation does not necessarily imply equality at a lower 
level (Firebaugh, 2003). What is true on a certain spatial scale is not necessarily true on 
another that incurs the ‘ecological fallacy’ and the ‘modifiable areal unit problem’ 
(Fujita and Thisse, 2002). From a methodological standpoint, most quantitative research 
purporting to support the income inequality research is potentially compromised by a 
problem that is known as ‘ecological bias’, which arises when correlations identified in 
aggregated data differ from the underlying correlations that would be observed if one 
were examining individual data (Eberstadt and Satel, 2004: 14).
3.3,2 Criteria fo r  Evaluating Income Inequality
Cowell and Amiel (1999) argue that, in economic terms, the question ‘what is 
inequality?’ is transformed into the question ‘how are inequality comparisons to be 
made?’. They stress that the meaning of income inequality comparisons depends 
critically upon the axiomatic basis that is specified for the inequality comparison rule. 
The four principles of crucial importance are: the principle of income scale 
independence, the principle of population size independence, the principle of 
decomposability and the principle of transfer (Allison, 1978; Cowell, 1995; Cowell and 
Amiel, 1999; Firebaugh, 2003). All these principles are criteria that must be satisfied by 
inequality measures (Cowell, 1995: 54).
Scale or mean independence: If all incomes double for a fixed population, the average 
income is also doubled, but the income ratio remains the same. The relative differences 
among units have not been changed. Thus income inequality is scale or mean 
independent when income is increased or reduced at the same rate for everyone. Cowell 
(1995: 36) states, ‘the measured inequality o f the slices o f the cake should not depend 
on the size o f the cake\ A measure should be robust to the chosen income scale. Hence 
a measure is scale invariant when it responds to relative rather than to absolute 
differences (Blau, 1977a; Allison, 1978).
Population size independence’. If one measures the inequality of a particular economy 
with n persons and then merges it with another group of n persons, which has the same 
level of measured inequality, the resulting income inequality measure should remain the
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same. Cowell (1995: 36) emphasises that ‘... inequality o f the cake distribution should 
not depend on the number o f cake-receivers\
Additive decomposability: If everyone in the population is sorted into mutually 
exclusive groups, such as population subgroups (i.e. nations or regions) or factor 
components (i.e. age groups or urbanisation level), I construct an additively 
decomposable index in which the index value for all inequality is a weighted sum of the 
within-group index value and the between-group index value (Firebaugh, 2003: 79). 
The between-group component of inequality is found simply by assuming that everyone 
within a group receives that group’s mean income (i.e. the region’s mean income),43 and 
the within-group inequality is a weighted average of inequality in each subgroup 
although the weights do not necessarily add up to one (Cowell, 1995: 151).
Principle o f transfers: The transfer principle states that for any given income 
distribution, if one takes a small amount of income from one person and gives it to a 
richer person then income inequality must increase. This principle was originally 
introduced by Pigou (1912) and Dalton (1920) and is known as Pigou-Dalton condition. 
However, there are significant differences in sensitivity to transfers at different points 
on the scale (Atkinson, 1970). An index is, for example, equally sensitive to transfers at 
all income levels, when a transfer of £100 from a person earning £5,000 to another 
earning £6,000 has the same impact as a transfer of the same amount from a person 
earning £50,000 to another earning £51,000 (Allison, 1978). In both cases the distance 
between the two people’s income level is the same (£51,000-£50,000 = £6,000- 
£5,000). However, income transfers at higher levels of income are less significant than 
the same transfer at lower levels of income (Firebaugh, 2003: 80). For instance, £1,000 
means more to a poor person than it does to a rich one. Thus, income increases at the 
lower end of the scale produce greater welfare benefits than do income increases at the 
upper end of the income distribution (Firebaugh, 1999: 1619). The sensitivity to 
transfers is linked to the welfare principle. Income inequality satisfies the welfare 
principle when it is more sensitive to transfers among lower incomes and less sensitive 
to transfers among the recipients of the top incomes (Allison, 1978).
43 Hence, the between-group component o f inequality is independent o f redistribution within any o f the 
groups (Cowell, 1995: 151).
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3.3.3 Inequality Indices
There are several indices for measuring income inequalities. Different indices yield 
somewhat different estimates of income inequality, because they use a different distance 
function. The four most well-known indicators of income inequality are: the relative 
mean deviation index, the Gini index, the generalised entropy index and the Atkinson 
index.
3.3.3.1 The Relative Mean Deviation Index
The relative mean deviation index ( RMD) is defined as
rm d = Y,Pi M l
/
The disproportionality function of the relative mean deviation index is
When the basic units are individuals, its minimum value is 0 for perfect equality and its
/
maximum value is 2
V
1 -  | for perfect inequality. The upper limit of the relative mean
deviation index approaches 2 as N increases.
The relative mean deviation index is independent of income scale and population size, 
but does not obey the principle of transfers, since a rich-to-poor transfer may leave 
income inequality unchanged rather than reducing it (Cowell, 1995). According to 
Schwartz and Winship (1979), the relative mean deviation index may be used to 
measure the degree of segregation, in which case it is known as an index of 
dissimilarity.
3.3.3.2 Gini Index
Following Cowell (1995), the Gini index (G or GINI) or the Gini coefficient is 
computed as follows
The Gini index is one-half of the average distance between the income ratios for all 
pairs of individuals. Two individuals are randomly selected with replacement from the 
entire population; one-half of the distance between the individuals’ income ratios is 
calculated, the process is repeated M times, and the average taken (Firebaugh, 2003). 
Each individual has the probability 1 IN  of being selected. The above index is an 
unweighted index. When the basic units are individuals, it is also a weighted index. The
N - 1Gini index varies from 0 for perfect equality t o   for perfect inequality. The upper
N
limit of the Gini index approaches 1.0 as N  increases.
Shankar and Shah (2003), following Kakwani and World Bank (1980), computed the 
weighted Gini index Gw as
G » = - ^ ' L ' L \ y i - y j \ p lP i or
G» = 4 zZ k -o h -P ;Z i J
One way of viewing the Gini index is in terms of a Lorenz curve (Sen, 1997; Sen and 
Foster, 1997). It can help one to explain the concept more clearly (Lui, 1997). I arrange 
the population in ascending order of income and calculate the accumulated income 
share for each observation. Then, I plot individuals as shown in Figure 3.16, with the 
population share as the horizontal axis and the cumulative income share as the vertical 
axis (Lui, 1997).
Figure 3.16: The Lorenz Curve
Income
share
0 1
Population share
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Generally speaking, a more shallow curve reflects greater income inequality. The Gini 
coefficient is also defined as
_ Area(A)
Area(A) + Area(B)
For perfectly equal income distribution, there would be no area between the 45 degree 
line and the Lorenz curve (Area(A) = 0), while for complete inequality, the Lorenz 
curve would coincide with the straight lines at the lower and right boundaries of the 
curve ( Area(B) = 0).
Following Allison (1978), the Gini index for grouped data is
/
where q, is the proportion of the total population in units poorer than unit / and Q, is 
the proportion of the total population in units richer than unit /.
The disproportionality function of the Gini index is 
f ( r l) = rl(ql - Q , )
The Gini index is an appropriate specification of what Blau (1977a; 1977b) 
conceptualises as inequality. He argues that inequality is a fundamental characteristic of 
all graduated social parameters and it is defined as the average status between any two 
pairs relative to the average status.
The Gini index is the most popular measure of income inequality. However, it has some 
limitations. Although it satisfies the principle of transfers (Cowell, 1995), it is not 
consistent with the welfare principle that income transfers are more consequential 
among the poor than among the rich (Firebaugh, 2003). In addition, it is not additively 
decomposable (Bourguignon, 1979). From technical point of view, it is harder to 
calculate than most other measures. One underpinning characteristic of the Gini index is 
that it provides non-redundant information about income inequality, because it is 
relatively more sensitive to change around the median of the income distribution and 
less sensitive to transfers among the very rich or the very poor (Allison, 1978; 
Firebaugh, 2003). Hence the Gini forms are acceptable to test theories regarding the 
relationship between national income inequalities and economic growth such as 
political economy models.
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3.3.3.3 The Generalised Entropy Index
The generalised entropy index (G E ) is defined as
where a is a sensitive parameter which measures the weight given to distances among 
values taken by y  at different parts of the distribution of y  (Brtilhart and Traeger, 
2005).
The distance function of the generalised entropy index is 
/ ( 0  = —
The generalised entropy index is decomposable by population subgroups. I define an 
exhaustive partition of the population of basic units / e {1,2,..., N] into mutually 
exclusive subgroups of basic units j  e {1,2,...,Z}, such as regions. This index can be 
decomposed additively as:
GE(a) = GEb(a) + GEw(a),
where GEb (a) and GEW (a) stand for the between-subgroups and the within-subgroups 
of the generalised entropy index, respectively.
1. The Theil Index
The case where a = 1 yields the Theil index (T  or GE\) of inequality (Theil, 1967; 
Brtilhart and Traeger, 2005). The Theil index is defined as
r  = 2 » g W 44 or
/
7’ = £ j v 1° g ( x / p ,)
/
The disproportionality function of the Theil index is defined by the following 
expression
44 The Theil index can be defined using logarithms to any base. I use the natural logarithm for simplicity 
throughout my empirical research.
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f ( r i) = ri \og(ri)
The Theil minimum value is 0 for perfect equality and its maximum value is logN.
Consider the following two-level hierarchical structure of the EU: region-individual. 
Using the mutually exclusive subgroups of basic units, the overall level of income 
inequality can be measured using the following Theil index
T = 'E 'Z P jirj i l°Z(rji'>’
j  i
where p jt denotes population share, defined as nJt/ N  (where nJt is the weight of 
individual i in region j  and N  is the total population of all individuals such that 
N  = ^  N Jt), and rJt is the income ratio of individual i in region j .
j
Thus, the Theil index (i.e. country inequality) can be decomposed additively as
T='Z,p/i log(r/)+Z ^ //y or
j  j
T = H,yj  IosCv>1 p , ) + ' Z y JTj ,
j  j
where y£ p j rj \o%(rJ) and ^ P / jTj are the measures of between-region and the
j  j
within-region inequality, respectively. The between-regions component in the inequality 
identity is a population-weighted component that assumes that everyone within a region 
receives that region’s mean income. This component shows the degree to which the 
levels of income converge with one another. The within-regions component in the 
inequality identity is a weighted average for each individual, where the weights add up 
to one. This component emphasises the disparities within regions.
Following Akita (2003), I decompose the overall income inequality of the Theil index 
into three components. Now, consider the following hierarchical structure of the EU: 
country-region-individual. It is an extension of the two-level Theil decomposition 
method. This method is analogous to a two-stage nested design in the analysis of 
variance (Montgomery, 1984; Akita, 2003). In this case, the regions j  e {1,2,..., L) are 
mutually exclusive subgroups of countries k e {1,2,..., M }. The Theil index (i.e. EU 
inequality) is defined as
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T = Y,Y,YjPmr¥ log(rw)»
k j  i
where p kji denotes population share, defined as nkji / N  (where nkji is the weight of 
individual i in region j  in country k and N  is the total population of all individuals 
such that N  = Z Z Z ^ w )’ and rm is the income ratio of individual i in region j  in
k j  i
country k .
The Theil index can be decomposed additively as 
^ = Z Z  Pnrvrv + I f t ' i 7't + Z M  *og(^) or
k j  k k
T=Z Z + Z + Z y*los0v1 p*)
k j  k k
where 2 2  Pkj rkjTkj is the within-region income inequality, ^ PkrkTk is the between-
k j  k
region and the within-country income inequality and p krk log(^) is the between-
k
country income inequality (or the European income inequality using countries as basic 
units). The within country inequality is a weighted average of inequality in each region 
and the component weights add up to one.
The Theil index satisfies all the criteria of income inequality indices. It is income scale 
and population size invariant, additively decomposable and satisfies both the principle 
of transfers and the welfare principle. The relative sensitivities of the Theil index to 
population change and income change hold for within-region income as well as for the 
between-region inequalities (Firebaugh, 1999). Change depends on the ratio of incomes. 
Allison (1978) observes, for example, that transferring £100 from a person earning 
£5,000 to a person earning £6,000 has approximately the same effect on the Theil index 
as a transfer of the same amount from a person earning £50,000 to another earning 
£60,000.45 He summarises that the lower the level of income, the more sensitive the 
Theil index is to transfers.
45 This is because in Theil index transfer i —> /  is — = l o g
NY
V
\ y>j
(Cowell, 1995: 140).
112
2. The Squared Coefficient o f Variation
Variance (VAR) is the most common statistical measure of dispersion for a distribution. 
The distance concept of variance is that of absolute differences. Variance is defined as
This index is sensitive to extreme observations. Additionally, the variance is not scale 
independent. Conversely, the squared coefficient of variation (SCV  or GE2)  is scale 
independent, because it concentrates on relative variation. In a generalised entropy 
index, when the parameter a -  2 , this index yields the squared coefficient of variation 
index (Sala-i-Martin, 2002; Brtilhart and Traeger, 2005).
The squared coefficient of variation is obtained by dividing the variance by the squared 
mean Y . It is given by the following expression
The squared coefficient of variation varies from 0 for perfect equality to N  -1  for 
perfect inequality.
3.33,4 The Atkinson Index
The Atkinson (1970) index (A) is defined as
v a r ^ p^ - y )2
s c r  = 5 > , ( r ( - o 2 46
The disproportionality function of the squared coefficient of variation is
f ( r i )  -  ( r i ~ 1 )2
46 More explicitly,
^ P X n X - x f
i
X 2
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where the parameter s  ( s  > 0) denotes the relative sensitivity of the Atkinson index to 
transfers at different points in the income distribution.
Thus, the larger the parameter s , the greater the weight given to the lower end of the 
income distribution (Firebaugh, 1999: 1619). To put this in a slightly different way, as 
the parameter rises, the Atkinson index becomes more sensitive to transfers among 
those on lower incomes and less sensitive to transfers among the top income recipients 
(Allison, 1978). The distance concept of the Atkinson index is measured in terms of the 
difference in marginal social utilities (Cowell, 1995). The Atkinson index is 
independent of income scale and population size and the between-group and within- 
group components do not add up exactly to the total inequality (Cowell, 1995). Finally,
- e /
the Atkinson index varies from 0 for perfect equality to 1 - N  /]~£. The upper limit of 
the Atkinson index approaches 1.0 as N increases.
3.4 Measuring Income Inequality within and between 
Regions in Europe
This section concerns the measurement of income inequality at different spatial levels 
(European, country and regional) and using different units of analysis, which means at 
different levels of spatial resolution (country, region, individual). It also looks at the 
spatial distribution of income inequality in order to examine whether income inequality 
tends to be geographically clustered. Income inequality is measured by the regionalised 
microeconomic variable ‘ Total net personal income (detailed, NC, total year prior to 
the surveyf which is extracted from the ECHP dataset. The section consists of three 
subsections. The first and second subsections describe the income inequality indices 
used within European regions for the whole of the population and for normally working 
people, respectively. They also exhibit the linear correlation among inequality indices 
and illustrate the spatial dependence analysis. The third subsection decomposes the 
European income inequality by population sub-groups in order to find the percentage of 
European income inequality that can explained in terms of between-region and the 
within-region income inequality.
3.4.1 Within-region Income Inequality fo r the Population as a Whole
Income inequality within regions is measured by the relative mean deviation index 
( IRMD), the Gini index ( IGINI), the generalised entropy index for two different
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parameters ( IGE\ when a = 1, and IGE2 when a - 2 )  and the Atkinson index for 
three parameters (Z4025 when e = 0.25, IA050 when e = 0.50 and £ = 0.75 when 
IA01S). The initial step of ESDA is to map income inequality indices in order to see 
whether they are randomly distributed over the EU or whether there are similarities 
between regions. The values from the income inequality indices are divided into six 
categories according to Jenk’s classification. The next step is to use the univariate 
boxplot technique in order to show the shape of the inequality distribution, its central 
value and the variability. The Pearson correlation index is also presented as a way to 
measure the lineal correlation among indices. Finally, the role of spatial effects is 
described.
Mapping the Gini coefficient (Figure 3.17), it is shown that there are prominent 
differences in income inequality within regions between different parts of Europe, 
predominantly between the northern and southern areas of Europe. Income inequality is 
greater in the southern periphery, extending from Greece to southern Italy (Lazio, 
Sicilia, Sud, Campania and Sardinia) and western Spain (Canarias, Sur, Centro and 
Noroeste) over the period 1996-2000. By contrast, northern Europe (Sweden, Denmark 
and the southern United Kingdom) has the lowest level of income inequality, with the 
exception of Ireland. The findings show that the between-region and within-country 
income inequalities are lower than the between-country inequalities. Nevertheless, 
income inequality within German regions is lower in the east (Mecklenburg- 
Vorpommern, Brandenburg, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt and Thuringen) than in the west, 
demonstrating a German east-west divide. Additionally, the results show an Italian 
north-south divide. Italian income inequality is higher in the south than in the north. 
Looking at 1996, for example, it is clear that income inequality was higher in the 
southern periphery than in central Europe, which, in turn, was higher than in northern 
Europe (Denmark and Sweden). Looking at 1998 and 2000, income inequality appears 
to have been more randomly distributed in central Europe. To sum up, the spatial 
distributions presented here show that there are disparities in income inequality within 
regions between different parts of Europe, particularly between the south, the centre and 
the north of Europe.
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The geographical distributions o f  other measures o f  inequality such as the relative mean 
deviation index, the Theil index, the squared coefficient o f  variation and the Atkinson 
index yield similar results.47
Figure 3.17: Spatial Distribution of the Gini Coefficient on Income (IGINI) in 1996, 1998 and 2000
IGINI_96: Gini coefficient on income for the population as a whole in 1996
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IGINI_00: Gini coefficient on income for the population as a whole in 2000
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47 The results will be provided on request.
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Looking at the univariate boxplot for the Gini coefficient (Figure 3.18), Sicilia 
represents the upper outlier in 1997 and 2000, while Mellestra Norrland and Norra 
Mellansverige, and Ovre Norrland are the lower outliers in 1998 and 2000, respectively. 
Furthermore, the whisker and box length are wider in 1996, whereas they are narrower 
in 2000. Generally, the distribution of the Gini coefficient is quite compact, accepts the 
normality assumption and indicates a right tail between 1995 and 1999 and a left tail in 
2000.48 Analysing the boxplot for the Theil index, only Sicilia differs from the median 
by more than the interquartile range times 1.5 in the higher end of the distribution, in 
1997 and 2000. In 1996, 1998 and 2000 the distribution is fairly compact, because the 
whiskers are in fact the extreme values. Conversely, exploring the boxplot for the 
squared coefficient of variation, the distribution is skewed, but much of the skewness is 
due to the outliers and the extreme values in the higher end of the distribution, such as 
lie de France and Vlaams Gewest. Although many European regions are among the 
outliers from the upper edge of the box, none of the values is more than 1.5 box lengths 
from the lower edge of the box. In all boxplots, the mean is greater than the median, 
because the mean is ‘pulled’ towards the longest tail of the distribution. The univariate 
boxplot of the relative mean deviation index for the European regions between 1996 and 
2000 shows that there are many outliers. The northern Italian regions Campania, Sud, 
Sicilia and Sardinia, the Greek region Voreia Ellada (in 1998) and the Spanish region 
Centro (in 2000) are the outliers from the upper edge of the boxplot, while the Swedish 
regions Norra Mellansverige, Mellersta Norrland and Ovre Norrland (in 1998 and 2000) 
are the outliers from the lower edge. Additionally, the differences between the two 
whiskers decreased slightly from 1996 to 2000. Finally, the boxplots of the Atkinson 
index demonstrate that, from 1996 to 1998, the distribution was fairly compact, and, in 
1999 and 2000, Sicilia was the upper outlier.
Income inequality distributions are comparable only when they are measured on the 
same scale. All indices have been standardised to have zero mean and unit variance 
Representing the boxplots for the standardised income inequality indices in 1998, for 
example (Figure 3.18), it is shown that they are quite similar to one another except for 
the squared coefficient of variation. In 1998, the normality assumption is accepted for
48 The ratio o f skewness to standard error is 1.81 in 1995, 1.88 in 1996, 0.70 in 1997, 0.01 in 1998, 0.05 
in 1999 and -0.05 in 2000.
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the Gini and the relative mean deviation index, and is rejected for the generalised 
entropy indices and the Atkinson index.49
49 The ratio o f skewness to standard error is 0.08 for the Gini coefficient, 2.23 for the Theil index, 7.09 
for the squared coefficient o f variation, 1.44 for the relative mean deviation index and 2.90 for the 
Atkinson index for 1998.
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Figure 3.18: Boxplot for Income Inequality  Indices
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Note: extreme cases and outliers are sorted in descending order:
IGINI: ITA (upper end) in 1997; SE07 (lower end) in 1998; ITA (upper end) and SE09 and SE08 (lower end) in 2000. 
IGE1: ITA (upper end) in 1997 and 2000.
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IGE2: BE1, ES4 and ESI (upper end) in 1995; IE (upper end) in 1996; BE1 and GR3 (upper end) in 1997; FR1, BE2, UK55, BE1 and GR1 
(upper end) in 1998; BE2, BE1, ES3, UK55 and UK92 (upper end) in 1999; UK91, BE2, BE1, DE3 and UK55 (upper end) in 2000.
IRMD: ITA and ITB (upper end) in 1995; ITA, ITB and IT8 (upper end) in 1996; ITA, ITB, IT8 and IT9 (upper end) in 1997; ITA, ITB, IT8, 
IT9, GR2 and GR1 (upper end) and SE08, SEOA, SE06 and SE07 (lower end) in 1998; ITA, ITB and IT8 (upper end) in 1999; ITA, ITB, 
IT8, IT9, GR2, GR1 and ES4 (upper end) and SE06, SE07, SE09 and SE08 (lower end) in 2000.
IA050: ITA (upper end) in 1999 and 2000 (see Appendix A1.1).
The generalised entropy index is measured where a=l (Theil index) and a=2 (squared 
coefficient of variation). The Pearson correlation between the Theil index and the 
squared coefficient of variation has been calculated, both before and after omitting for 
extreme cases, which can cause misleading results. The Pearson correlation is 0.834 for 
1995; 0.913 for 1996; 0.876 for 1997; 0.840 for 1998 (0.745 without the extreme 
cases)50; 0.817 for 1999 (it is 0.558 without the extreme cases); and 0.726 for 2000.51 
Thus the Theil index and the squared coefficient of variation are highly correlated.
The Atkinson index is measured where £ = 0.25, e -  0.50 and s  = 0.75 in order to 
investigate the sensitivity to transfers at different points in the distribution of income. 
These indices show almost perfectly linear correlation. For 1995, for example, the 
Pearson correlation between the Atkinson index where s  -  0.25 and that index where 
e = 0.50 is equal to 0.996, and the correlation between the Atkinson index where 
e = 0.25 and that index where £ = 0.75 is 0.977; while, for 2000, the above correlations 
are 0.995 and 0.977, respectively. This clearly shows that as the difference between 
parameters increases, the Pearson correlation decreases. Additionally, the Pearson 
correlation, for 1995, where £ = 0.50 and £ = 0.75 is 0.990. Thus, when the parameter 
increases by 0.25, the correlations are higher among the Atkinson indices when they 
become more sensitive to transfers among top income recipients than among the 
Atkinson indices when they become less sensitive to transfers among lower incomes. 
This seems to show that income transfers among wealthy people are economically more 
significant than transfers among less wealthy people. Table 3.5 shows the evolution of 
the Pearson correlation of the Atkinson index when the difference in sensitivity 
parameter is constant ( A£ = 0.25). This table demonstrates that the gap between the 
correlation between changes at a low level of parameter (from 0.25 to 0.50) and the 
correlation between changes at a high level of parameter (from 0.50 to 0.75) remained 
almost constant.
50 It is due to the extreme squared coefficient o f variation o f Vlaams Gewest.
51 They are significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) with the standard error 0.000.
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Table 3.5: Pearson Correlation of the Atkinson index where As =  0.25
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
(1)
IA025-IA050
0.996
(0.000)**
94
0.997
(0.000)**
94
0.996
(0.000)**
94
0.995
(0.000)**
94
0.994
(0.000)**
94
0.995
(0.000)**
94
(2)
IA050-IA075
0.990
(0.000)**
94
0.992
(0.000)**
102
0.991
(0.000)**
102
0.992
(0.000)**
102
0.992
(0.000)**
102
0.992
(0.000)**
102
Difference
0 -2 )
0.006 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.003
Note: ** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Table 3.6 illustrates the Pearson correlation among inequality indices for 1998. 
Generally, the correlations are high. However, the correlations between the squared 
coefficient of variation and the remaining indices have the lowest values. Excluding the 
squared coefficient of variation, the correlations are up to 0.934.
Table 3.6: Pearson Correlations among Income Inequality Indices for 1998
IA025 IA050 IA075 1GEI IGE2 IGINI IRMD
1A025 1 0.995
(0.000)**
102
0.977
(0.000)**
102
0.994
(0.000)**
102
0.786
(0.000)**
102
0.975
(0.000)**
102
0.979
(0.000)**
102
IA050 1 0.992
(0.000)**
102
0.979
(0.000)**
102
0.736
(0.000)**
102
0.959
(0.000)**
102
0.969
(0.000)**
102
IA075 1 0.952
(0.000)**
102
0.686
(0.000)**
102
0.934
(0.000)**
102
0.941
(0.000)**
102
IGE1 1 0.840
(0.000)**
102
0.980
(0.000)**
102
0.975
(0.000)**
102
1GE2 1 0.793
(0.000)**
102
0.754
(0.000)**
102
IGINI 1 0.991
(0.000)**
102
IRMD 1
Note: ** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Looking behind the boxplots, the descriptive statistical analysis shows that income 
inequality is lower in city-regions. For instance, although Spain has a high level of 
income inequality level, the Comunidad de Madrid has a lower level inequality than the 
remainder of Spain.
Due to the high correlation among income inequality indices, only the spatial 
dependence analysis for the Gini coefficient is explored. The univariate and bivariate 
Moran’s I statistics computed using any spatial weights matrix are positive and 
statistically significant, highlighting the robustness of the results (Table 3.7). Once 
more, the standardised values of the statistics are approximately the same throughout 
the period between 1995 and 2000. This indicates a significant global tendency towards 
a geographical clustering of regions that are similar in terms of income inequality for 
the population as a whole.
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Table 3.7: M o ra n ’s I for the Gini Coefficient on Income for the Whole Population (IGINI)
13 countries (E[l]=-0.0099)
rook first o rder contiguity 3 -n eare st neighbours threshold  d is tance
M oran 's I M ean Sd Z-value M oran's I Mean Sd Z-value M oran's I M ean Sd Z-value
Spatial au to­
correlation
1995
1996 0.7179 -0.0085 0.0745 9.7503 0.8151 -0.0066 0.0751 10.9414 0.4303 -0 .0103 0.0217 20.3041
1997 0.7093 -0.0072 0.0761 9.4152 0.8067 -0.0128 0.0720 11.3819 0.4301 -0.0101 0.0221 19.9186
1998 0.7182 -0 .0133 0.0758 9.6504 0.7942 -0.0131 0.0740 10.9095 0.4186 -0 .0108 0.0214 20.0654
1999 0.6743 -0.0063 0.0734 9.2725 0.7512 -0.0091 0.0744 10.2191 0.4041 -0 .0092 0.0219 18.8721
2000 0.6733 -0 .0127 0.0756 9.0741 0.7492 -0 .0069 0.0741 10.2038 0.4143 -0.0087 0.0217 19.4931
S pace-tim e
correlation
1998 0.7120 -0.0062 0.0729 9.8519 0.8043 -0.0122 0.0703 11.6145 0.4273 -0 .0095 0.0218 20.0367
2000 0.6906 -0 .0126 0.0715 9.8350 0.7763 -0.0094 0.0718 10.9429 0.4156 -0 .0093 0.0206 20.6262
Excluded SE (E[l]=-0.0108)
rook first o rder contiguity 3 -n eare st neighbours th reshold  d istance
M oran 's I Mean Sd Z-value M oran's I Mean Sd Z-value M oran's I Mean Sd Z-value
Spatial au to­
correlation
1995 0.6332 -0.0085 0.0761 8.4323 0.7367 -0.0112 0.0807 9.2677 0.3395 -0.0104 0.0232 15.0819
1996 0.6405 -0 .0102 0.0738 8.8171 0.7556 -0.0076 0.0770 9.9117 0.3513 -0.0114 0.0229 15.8384
1997 0.6252 -0 .0118 0.0745 8.5503 0.7457 -0.0067 0.0754 9.9788 0.3425 -0 .0113 0.0215 16.4558
1998 0.6173 -0 .0117 0.0760 8.2763 0.7176 -0.0135 0.0753 9.7092 0.3193 -0 .0116 0.0219 15.1096
1999 0.5761 -0 .0114 0.0754 7.7918 0.6998 -0.0044 0.0765 9.2052 0.3206 -0 .0102 0.0225 14.7022
2000 0.5684 -0.0093 0.0776 7.4446 0.6959 -0.0087 0.0785 8.9758 0.3279 -0.0114 0.0222 15.2838
S pace-tim e
correlation
1998 0.6227 -0 .0064 0.0759 8.2885 0.7361 -0.0098 0.0744 10.0255 0.3389 -0.0097 0.0220 15.8455
2000 0.5849 -0.0097 0.0746 7.9705 0.6992 -0.0083 0.0749 9.4459 0.3209 -0 .0093 0.0225 14.6756
N ote: All statistics are sign ifican t at p= 0.001; E[I]: theoretical m ean; M ean: observed m ean
Local spatial autocorrelation analysis shows that there are clusters o f  high income 
inequality in southern Europe (Greece, southern Italy, Spain and Portugal), while 
clusters o f  low income inequality can be found in northern Europe (Sweden, 
Brandenburg and Mecklenburg) (Figure 3.19). Moreover, those clusters did not change 
between 1996 and 2000. For the distance band weights schemes, clusters o f  low income 
inequality expanded further to include Denmark, northern and eastern United Kingdom  
and the French region Est. Although Spain and Portugal represent clusters o f  high 
income inequality, the regions o f Lisboa and Madrid are not in 1996 and 1998 for the 
rook first order contiguity, showing that income inequality is lower in city-regions.
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Figure 3.19: C lus ter  M ap  for the Gini Coefficient on Income (IGINI) in 1996, 1998 and 2000
Rook first order contiguity 3-nearest neighbours Threshold distance
1996 1996 1996
1998 1998 1998
2000 2000 2000
(1) LISA Cluster Map
Not Significant 
■  High-High 
I  Low-Low 
B i  Low-High 
B  High-Low
The results emphasise a certain kind o f  spatial heterogeneity hidden within the global 
spatial autocorrelation pattern. The spatial effects may perform differently between rural 
and urban areas and between the northern and southern European regions. First, income 
inequality seems to be lower in agglomerated areas, and second, the north-south divide 
in the European income inequality distribution may not be visible without spatial 
economic analysis. Homogeneity is higher within the northern and southern regions o f  
the EU than it is between them. Considering the short evolution o f  income inequality 
within regions, it is shown that inequality has not been changed. The persistence o f
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inequalities is clearly shown. European regions tend, over time, to maintain their 
relative positions in terms of income inequality, because the level of intradistributional 
mobility is low (Ezcurra and Pascual, 2005). Families from the very poor and very 
wealthy communities exhibit greater intergenerational income persistence than families 
living in middle-income communities (Cooper, 1998). To sum up, income inequality in 
each region depends not only on its own persistent characteristics, but also on those of 
the regions that form the neighbourhood to which it belongs and particularly within 
agglomerated and rural areas rather than between them, as well as within southern and 
northern areas rather than between them.
3.4.2 Within-region Income Inequality among those People Normally in 
Work
Income inequality among normally working people within regions is measured by the 
relative mean deviation index ( NRMD), the Gini index ( NGINI), the generalised 
entropy index for two different parameters (NGE1 when a = 1, and NGE2 when 
a - 2 )  and the Atkinson index for three parameters ( NA025 where £ = 0.25, NA050 
where £ = 0.50, and NA015 where £ = 0.75), as with income inequality for the 
population as a whole.
Figure 3.20 shows the geographical distribution of income inequality for normally 
working people in 1996, 1998 and 2000.52 As in Figure 3.17, there are differences in 
income inequality between different parts of Europe. Considering either the population 
as a whole or for normally working people, income inequality is higher in the south than 
in the north. Greece, the Portuguese regions of Norte, Centro and Lisboa and the 
Spanish regions of Noroeste and Centro have the highest levels of income inequality. A 
low percentage of Greek, Portuguese and Spanish workers gain employment in high 
added value jobs. Income inequality among normally working people is higher in the 
Mediterranean countries.
52 The spatial distributions o f the Theil index, the squared coefficient o f variation, the relative mean 
deviation index and the Atkinson index are provided upon request.
F ig ire  3.20: Spatial D istribution  of the Gini Coefficient on Income for Norm ally  W ork ing  People
(NCINI) in 1996, 1998 and  2000
NGNI_96: Gini coefficient on income for normally working people in 1996
0.1891 -0 .2 4 1 0  
0 .2 4 1 0 -0 .3 0 0 4  
0 .3 0 0 4 -0 .3 3 7 7  
0.3377  - 0 .3740  
0 .3 7 4 0 -0 .4 2 2 5  
0 .4 2 2 5 -0 .4 9 7 9  
N o  d a t a
NGNI_98: Gini coefficient on income for normally working people in 1998
0 .1 8 9 9 -0 .2 3 6 1
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j I 0 .3005  - 0 .3376  
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■ 1  0 .4028 - 0 .4680  
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NGIMI_00: Gini coefficient on income for normally working people in 2000
0 .1 7 5 6 -0 .2 4 2 7
0 .2 4 2 7 -0 .2 9 6 5  
0.2965 - 0 .3266  
0 .3 2 6 6 -0 .3 5 0 1  
0.3501 -0 .3 9 4 9  
■ I  0 .3949  - 0 .4339  
| N o  d a t a
Figure 3.21 clearly displays that the boxplots for all income inequality indices for 
nom ally working people are less compact than the respective boxplots for income 
inecuality indices for the population as a whole. There are many more outliers in Figure 
3.21 than in Figure 3.18. Testing the normality assumption, the distribution o f  the Gini
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coefficient, for example, accepts normality in 1996, 1998 and 2000, while it indicates 
long right tail in 1995 and 1997 and a long left tail in 1999.53
53 The ratio of skewness to standard error is 2.23 in 1995, -0.04 in 1996, 2.32 in 1997, -1.75 in 1998, 
1.19 in 1999 and -2.10 in 2000.
F igure  3.21: Boxplot for Income Inequality Indices for Normally  W ork ing  People
Gini coefficient (NGINI)
NGINI 95 NGN 96 NGN 97 NGN.96 NGINI 99 NGN_00
Theil index (NGE1)
NGE1 95 NGE1 96 NGE1 97 NGE1 98 NGE1 99 NGE1 00
Squared coefficient of variation (NGE2) Relative mean deviation index (NRMD)
NGE2.95 NGE2.96 NGE2.97 NGE2.96 NGE2.99 NGE2.00
■
M^MD 95 NRMD 96 NRMD 97 NRMD 98 NRKO 99 00
Atkinson index (NA050)
“1“  n ° 0
E T  - r  - r  -4-
Standardized (Zscore) inequality indexes in 1998
M toe 10? KB *0? 100
NA050 95 NA050 96 NA050 97 NA050 98 NA050 99 NA050 00
KB 100 102 KB 100
Zscora(NGN_98) Z»coro(NGE2_98) Zscor«(NA050_98)
Zscore(NGE1_98) Z»core(NRNO_98)
Gini coefficient (exclude regions listwise)
NGIM_S5 NGM_96 NGN_97 NGW98 NGINI_99 NGIM_X
Note: extreme cases and outliers are sorted in descending order:
NGINI: ESI and GR2 (upper end) in 1995; ESI, GR2, GR1 and PT12 (upper end), DE5, SE05, SE03, SE07, SE02, SE06 and SE08 (lower 
end) in 1996; GR2 and GR1 (upper end), SE03, SE07, SE06, SE02 and SE08 (lower end) in 1997; SE03, SE07, SE06 and SE08 (lower end) 
in 1998; GR2 (upper end), SE05, SE03, SE07, SE06 and SE08 (lower end) in 1999; and SE07, SE06, SE03 and SE08 (lower end) in 2000
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NGE1: E SI, GR2, G R I, PT12 and UK32 (upper end) in 1995; E SI, GR2, GR1, U K 32, PT12, ES7, ES4 and PT15 (upper end) in 1996; GR2 
and GRI (upper end) in 1997; GRI and UK55 (upper end) in 1998; BE2, U K 92, UK55 and GR2 (upper end) in 1999; and UK91 and UK55 
(upper end) in 2000.
NGE2: E SI, DE3, U K 32, IE, U K 84 and GRI (upper end) in 1995; UK32, FR1, IE, E S I, G R I, GR2, UK63 and PT12 (upper end) in 1996; 
FR I, GR3, IE, UK55, UK63 and UK82 (upper end) in 1997; FR1, BE2, U K 55, U K 57, G R I, IE, ATI and UK82 (upper end) in 1998; BE2, 
U K 92, UK55, FRI, U K 5I, ES7 and UK54 (upper end) in 1999; U K 91, DE3, BE2, U K 55, SE01 and PT 11 (upper end) in 2000  
NRMD: GR2 and ESI (upper end) in 1995; GR2, ESI and GRI (upper end), SE03, SE07, SE02, SE06 and SE08 (low er end) in 1996; GR2 
(upper end), SE05, SE03, SE02, SE06, SE07 and SE08 in 1997; GR2 (upper end) and DEK, SE04, SE02, SE05, SE03, SE07, SE06 and 
SE08 (low er end) in 1998; GR2, G R I, PT13 and ESI (upper end), DEK, SE04, SE02, SE05, SE07, SE03, SE06 and SE08 (low er end) in 
1999; and SE07, SE06, SE03 and SE08 (low er end) in 2000.
N A 050. GR2 and ESI (upper end) in 1995; GR2, G R I, E S I, P T 11, ES7, GR4 and PT12 (upper end) in 1996; GR2 and GRI (upper end) in 
1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000.
Zscore in 1998: SE03, SE 07, SE06 and SE08 (low er end) for NGINI; GR2 and GRI (upper end) for NGE1; U K 82, A T I, IE, G R I, UK57, 
U K 55, BE2 and FRI (upper end) for NGE2; GR2 (upper end), and DK, SE 04, SE02, SE05, SE03, SE07, SE06 and SE08 (low er end) for 
NRM D; and GRI and GR2 (upper end) for N A 050.
NGINI (exclude regions listw ise): ESI and GR2 (upper end) in 1995; E S I, GR2, GRI and PT12 (upper end), DE5, (low er end) in 1996; 
GR2, G R I, P T 11 (upper end) in 1997; GR 2, G R I, FRI and PT13 (upper end), U K A 4 and DK (low er end), in 1999; and DK (low er end) in 
2000 (see Appendix A 1 .1).
No matter what the spatial weights matrix, Moran’s I statistics show a positive spatial 
autocorrelation (Table 3.8). This demonstrates the robustness o f  the results with regard 
to the choice o f  the spatial weights matrix. A examination o f  the evolution o f  Moran’s I 
test statistic between 1995 and 2000 shows that the standardised values o f  the statistic 
remain approximately the same over the whole period. It indicates a significant global 
trend towards spatial clustering o f  similar regions in terms o f  income inequality among 
normally working people.
Table 3.8: Moran’s I for the Gini Coefficient on Income for Normally Working People (NGINI)
13 coun tries (E[l]=-0.0099)
rook first o rder contiguity 3 -n ea re s t ne ighbours threshold  d is tan ce
M oran 's I Mean Sd Z-value M oran's I Mean Sd Z-value M oran's I Mean Sd Z-value
Spatial au to ­
correlation
1995
1996 0.7372 -0.0089 0.0740 10.0824 0.7605 -0.0091 0.0724 10.6298 0.4133 -0.0102 0.0211 20.0711
1997 0.7494 -0.0094 0.0712 10.6573 0.7436 -0 .0145 0.0746 10.1622 0.4077 -0.0096 0.0229 18.2227
1998 0.7215 -0.0111 0.0743 9.8600 0.7219 -0.0084 0.0716 10.1997 0.3720 -0.0106 0.0220 17.3909
1999 0.5768 -0.0092 0.0762 7.6903 0.5767 -0 .0059 0.0717 8.1255 0.3232 -0.0109 0 .0232 14.4009
2000 0.6503 -0.0069 0.0725 9.0648 0.6080 -0.0121 0.0718 8.6365 0.3289 -0.0097 0 .0222 15.2523
S pace-tim e
correlation
1998 0.7274 -0.0084 0.0706 10.4221 0.7387 -0.0081 0.0690 10.8232 0.3907 -0.0099 0.0214 18.7196
2000 0.6610 -0.0087 0.0741 9.0378 0.6726 -0.0084 0.0730 9.3288 0.3567 -0 .0093 0 .0219 16.7123
Excluded SE (E[l]=-0.0108)
rook first o rder contiguity 3 -n ea re s t ne ighbours threshold  d is tan ce
M oran's I Mean S d Z-value M oran's I Mean Sd Z-value M oran's I M ean S d Z-value
Spatial au to ­
correlation
1995 0.5389 -0.0074 0.0755 7.2358 0.6105 -0.0089 0 .0769 8.0546 0.2588 -0.0113 0 .0227 11.8987
1996 0.6028 -0.0094 0.0774 7.9096 0.6615 -0 .0120 0.0746 9 .0282 0.2892 -0.0103 0.0235 12.7447
1997 0.6108 -0.0097 0.0771 8.0480 0 .6540 -0.0149 0.0785 8.5210 0.2839 -0.0098 0 0227 12.9383
1998 0.5318 -0 .0080 0.0767 7.0378 0 .5729 -0.0141 0 .0773 7 .5938 0.2025 -0.0109 0 .0223 9.5695
1999 0.3565 -0.0096 0.0787 4.6518 0.4553 -0.0067 0 .0755 6 .1192 0.1891 -0.0114 0 .0222 9.0315
2000 0.4703 -0 .0108 0.0756 6.3638 0 .5062 -0.0094 0.0773 6.6701 0.2028 -0 .0115 0.0221 9.6968
S pace-tim e
correlation
1998 0.5660 -0 .0085 0.0727 7.9023 0 .6179 -0.0081 0.0691 9 .0593 0.2443 -0.0093 0.0212 11.9623
2000 0.4675 -0.0070 0.0724 6.5539 0 .5257 -0.0063 0.0718 7.4095 0 .2014 -0.0099 0.0205 10.3073
Note: All statistics are significant at p=0.001; E[I]: theoretical mean; Mean: observed mean.
Figure 3.22 displays the cluster map for the Gini index on income for normally working 
people in 1996, 1998 and 2000. Clusters o f  regions with high levels o f  income 
inequality are found across Greece, Portugal and Spain, while clusters o f  regions with 
low levels o f income inequality are found in northern Germany (i.e. in Brandenburg and
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in Schleswing-Holstein) and in Sweden. Finally, this figure is quite similar to Figure 
3.19. However, the latter does not include the Italian high-high cluster.
Figure 3.22: C lus ter  M ap for the Gini Coefficient on Income for Normally  W ork ing  People
(NGINI) in 1996, 1998 and  2000
Rook first order contiguity 3-nearest neighbours Threshold distance
1996 1996 1996
&
1998 1998 1998
2000 2000 2000
(1) LISA Cluster Map
Not Significant 
■  High-High 
I  Low-Low 
I  Low-High 
High-Low
Once again, the results highlight two forms o f  spatial heterogeneity: the EU north-south 
divide and the urban-rural divide. Income inequality is higher in the south and in rural 
areas both for the population as a whole and for those people normally in work.
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Finally, the correlation between income inequality (Gini coefficient) for the population 
as a whole and income inequality among people normally in work is very high and 
statistically significant (Table 3.9).
Table 3.9: Pearson Correlation between Income inequality for the Population as a Whole (IGINI) 
and Income Inequality for Normally Working People (NGINI)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
0.667 0.711 0.730 0.671 0.701 0.688
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**
94 94 94 94 94 94
0.798 0.813 0.786 0.794 0.793
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**
102 102 102 102 102
Note: ** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
3.4.3 Within-region Income Inequality fo r  the Whole Population as a 
Component o f  European Income Inequality
In this subsection, income inequality within regions is regarded as component of the 
European income inequality. Hence, this subsection calculates the level of European 
inequality and uses the two-stage nested Theil decomposition method to explore 
individual level income data for the EU.
The income inequality in Europe is measured using the following indices: the relative 
mean deviation index, the Gini index, the generalised entropy indices and the Atkinson 
index. Figure 3.23 shows the short evolution of European income inequality from 1996 
to 2000. More specifically, the variation in the Atkinson indices, the Theil index, the 
Gini coefficient and the relative mean deviation index remains the same. The fluctuation 
in the squared coefficient of variation indicates a different trend. There was a 
considerable increase between 1997 and 1999 with a peak of 0.754. After this, the 
coefficient fell sharply by 0.112. This figure also shows the Lorenz curves for 1996 and 
2000.
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Figure 3.23: The Evolution o f ln c o m e  Inequality  in Europe
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Consider the hierarchical structure o f  the EU: country-region-individual. Figure 3.24  
shows that the between-region component is a weighted average o f  the within-region 
income inequalities. This method uses the individual as the underlying unit o f  analysis 
to measure European income inequality, rather than a spatial unit. Hence, this method 
applies interpersonal income inequality. The study period for the analysis runs from 
1996 to 2000. Owing to the short period o f  time covered in the analysis, it is impossible 
to analyse in greater detail the changes in European income inequality over time.
I3 l
F igure  3.24: Three-level H ierarchical S truc tu re :  C o u n try -R eg ion -Ind iv idua l
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Figure 3.25 illustrates the contribution o f the within-region inequalities, as well as those 
o f  between-region and the between-country inequalities to the overall level o f  income 
inequality in Europe. More explicitly, the decomposition o f  the overall income 
inequality in Europe reveals that the contribution o f  all components to overall inequality 
was quite stable between 1996 and 2000. In 1996, for example, 80.23 per cent o f  the 
overall inequality was due to the within-region component. The between-region and 
between-country components accounted for, respectively, 7.07 per cent and 12.70 per 
cent. In 2000, the overall income inequality was 77.97 per cent, 8.97 per cent and 13.06 
per cent due to the within-region, between-region and between-country components, 
respectively. Hence, the within-region component accounts for a large proportion o f  all 
European income inequality. Additionally, the analysis indicates that the between- 
country component was much more significant than the between-region component, 
accounting for about 19.77 per cent in 1996 and 22.03 per cent o f  overall inequality. 
Both between-region and between-country inequality o f  the EU remained stable at a 
very low level, indicating that interregional and international migration is very low. In 
general, inequalities based on an average level o f  income distribution (i.e. national 
income distribution) are much lower than inequalities based on total net personal
132
income, indicating that relatively high inequalities exist among individuals within each 
region.
Figure 3.25: Three-level Income Decomposition by Theil Index for the EU from 1996 to 2000
□  betw een countries ■  betw een regions □  within regions
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To sum up, the within-region inequalities are much more prominent than the between- 
region and between-country inequalities. This observation suggests that policy-makers 
should pay more attention to within-region inequalities rather than between-region and 
between-country inequalities in order to formulate better welfare policies.
3.5 Correlation between Income Per Capita and Income 
Inequality
The linear correlation between income per capita and income inequality for the 
population as a whole and for normally working people is measured using the Pearson 
coefficient. Table 3.10 shows that the correlation between income per capita and income 
inequality is negative and statistically significant. The higher the regional per capita 
income, the lower the inequality level within that region, and vice versa. This negative 
correlation is higher when income inequality is measured using the Atkinson index and 
is lower when it is measured using the squared coefficient o f  variation. Apart from the 
correlation between income per capita and the squared coefficient o f  variation, the 
negative relationship between income per capita and any other inequality index has not 
changed between 1996 and 2000. Finally, the Pearson correlations for the population as 
a whole are higher than the respective Pearson correlations for normally working 
people.
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Table 3.10: Pearson Correlation between Income per Capita and Income Inequality
PEARSON CORRELATION: Income per capita for the whole of the population (IMN) and income inequality for the whole of the 
population
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
IA025 -0.600
(0.000)**
94
-0.654
(0.000)**
94
-0.758
(0.000)**
94
-0.698
(0.000)**
94
-0.687
(0.000)**
94
-0.733
(0.000)**
94
-0.685
(0.000)**
102
-0.753
(0.000)**
102
-0.685
(0.000)**
102
-0.666
(0.000)**
102
-0.710
(0.000)**
102
IA050 -0.592
(0.000)**
94
-0.644
(0.000)**
94
-0.768
(0.000)**
94
-0.721
(0.000)**
94
-0.718
(0.000)**
94
-0.765
(0.000)**
94
-0.677
(0.000)**
102
-0.765
(0.000)**
102
-0.710
(0.000)**
102
-0.699
(0.000)**
102
-0.744
(0.000)**
102
IA075 -0.559
(0.000)**
94
-0.613
(0.000)**
94
-0.772
(0.000)**
94
-0.732
(0.000)**
94
-0.736
(0.000)**
94
-0.793
(0.000)**
94
-0.650
(0.000)**
102
-0.769
(0.000)**
102
-0.721
(0.000)**
102
-0.718
(0.000)**
102
-0.773
(0.000)**
102
IGE1 -0.595
(0.000)**
94
-0.655
(0.000)**
94
-0.742
(0.000)**
94
-0.658
(0.000)**
94
-0.634
(0.000)**
94
-0.690
(0.000)**
94
-0.686
(0.000)**
102
-0.736
(0.000)**
102
-0.647
(0.000)**
102
-0.614
(0.000)**
102
-0.665
(0.000)**
102
IGE2 -0.374 
(0.000)* ♦ 
94
-0.535
(0.000)**
94
-0.512
(0.000)**
94
-0.194
(0.061)
94
-0.063
(0.547)
94
-0.265
(0.010)**
94
-0.578
(0.000)**
102
-0.529
(0.000)**
102
-0.221
(0.025)*
102
-0.081
(0.417)
102
-0.259
(0.009)**
102
IGINI -0.609
(0.000)**
94
-0.654
(0.000)**
94
-0.730
(0.000)**
94
-0.676
(0.000)**
94
-0.661
(0.000)**
94
-0.686
(0.000)**
94
-0.679
(0.000)**
102
-0.703
(0.000)**
102
-0.635
(0.000)**
102
-0.615
(0.000)**
102
-0.637
(0.000)**
102
IRMD -0.639
(0.000)**
94
-0.681
(0.000)**
94
-0.740
(0.000)**
94
-0.703
(0.000)**
94
-0.690
(0.000)**
94
-0.700
(0.000)**
94
-0.705
(0.000)**
102
-0.718
(0.000)**
102
-0.669
(0.000)**
102
-0.650
(0.000)**
102
-0.659
(0.000)**
102
PEARSON CORRELATION: Income xt capita for normally working people (NMN) and income inequality for normally working people
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
NA025 -0.567
(0.000)**
94
-0.571
(0.000)**
94
-0.574
(O.OOO)**
102
-0.640
(0.000)**
94
-0.593
(0.000)**
102
-0.481
(0.000)**
94
-0.441
(0.000)**
102
-0.443
(0.000)**
94
-0.397
(0.000)**
102
-0.470
(0.000)**
94
-0.422
(0.000)**
102
NA050 -0.634
(0.000)**
94
-0.627
(0.000)**
94
-0.627
(0.000)**
102
-0.715
(0.000)**
94
-0.669
(0.000)**
102
-0.613
(0.000)**
94
-0.563
(0.000)**
102
-0.593
(0.000)**
94
-0.537
(0.000)**
102
-0.606
(0.000)**
94
-0.549
(0.000)**
102
NA075 -0.685
(0.000)**
94
-0.669
(0.000)**
94
-0.671
(0.000)**
102
-0.777
(0.000)**
94
-0.743
(0.000)**
102
-0.726
(0.000)**
94
-0.683
(0.000)**
102
-0.721
(0.000)**
94
-0.674
(0.000)**
102
-0.723
(0.000)**
94
-0.673
(0.000)**
102
NGE1 -0.491
(0.000)**
-0.503
(0.000)**
-0.558
(0.000)**
-0.337
(0.001)**
-0.283
(0.006)**
-0.331
(0.001)**
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94 94 94 94 94 94
-0.514 -0.516 -0.318 -0.256 -0.297
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.001)** (0.000)** (0.002**
102 102 102 102 102
NGE2 -0.169 -0.182 -0.214 0.138 0.143 0.036
(0.103) (0.079) (0.038)* (0.183) (0.170) (0.734)
94 94 94 94 94 94
-0.223 -0.216 0.123 0.142 0.056
(0.024)* (0.029)* (0.218) (0.155) (0.575)
102 102 102 102 102
NGINI -0.502 -0.522 -0.514 -0.387 -0.365 -0.345
(0.000)+* (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)*+ (0.001 )♦♦
94 94 94 94 94 94
-0.509 -0.443 -0.328 -0.302 -0.292
(0.000)+* (0.000)** (0.001)*+ (0.002)** (0.003)**
102 102 102 102 102
NRMD -0.503 -0.517 -0.457 -0.356 -0.331 -0.286
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)*+ (0.001)+* (0.005)**
94 94 94 94 94 94
-0.504 -0.397 -0.303 -0.275 -0.246
(0.000)** (0.000)++ (0.002)** (0.005)** (0.013)*
102 102 102 102 102
Note: ** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); * correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
3.6 Conclusions
This chapter has illustrated the following underpinning outcomes. The spatial 
distribution of income per capita and income inequality is not uniform, but rather it is 
characterised by asymmetries. The application of global and local spatial association 
tests facilitates the detection of income patterns across European regions. The spatial 
interaction patterns and structures are represented by the spatial weights matrices. 
Global and local statistics lead to the same results for spatial autocorrelation and space­
time correlation, highlighting the robustness of the results with regard to the choice of 
the spatial weights matrix. Global tests show that pecuniary and technological 
externalities spill over the barriers of regional economies. The diffusion of technology is 
likely to be higher among regions that are geographically close to one another as 
compared to economies that are geographically more distant (Vaya et al. 2004). The 
income inequality (resp. income per capita) in any given region seems to depend on the 
initial income inequality (resp. initial income per capita) in that region, as well as on a 
weighted average of initial income inequality (resp. initial income per capita) in 
neighbouring regions. Local tests show that income disparities are determined by 
region-specific characteristics such as location. There are striking disparities in income 
per capita and inequalities between different parts of Europe, particularly between the 
northern and the southern regions of Europe, while GDP per capita seems to be more 
randomly distributed over space. There are clusters of high income inequality and low 
income per capita in southern Europe (Greece, southern Italy and Spain), while there are
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clusters of low income inequality and high income per capita in northern Europe 
(Germany, Belgium, Sweden and Denmark). The economic surroundings of a region 
seem to have a bearing on its economic development perspectives. For instance, a poor 
southern region surrounded by other poor regions will stay in that state of economic 
development, whereas a poor northern region surrounded by richer regions has a greater 
probability of achieving a more advanced state of economic development. Hence, the 
prevalence of interregional externalities can create poverty traps. The clusters of the 
poorest European regions in southern Europe may create a great disadvantage for those 
regions. Furthermore, the results reveal a second spatial regime: the urban-rural 
polarisation. Hence spatial dependence performs differently according to level of 
urbanisation. The higher the degree of urbanisation of a region (i.e. city-regions), the 
lower the income inequality within the region, and the higher the income per capita. The 
diffusion of technology generated by the southern city-regions is likely to alleviate the 
poverty trap that has been created by the EU north-south pattern. A city-region with 
high income per capita and low income inequality is likely to enhance the economic 
perspectives of the neighbouring poor regions. Nevertheless, the EU north-south pattern 
seems to be stronger than EU urban-rural pattern. For instance, in most cluster maps the 
Comunidad de Madrid region (city-region) performs as spatial outlier, because it is 
surrounded by regions with low income per capita and high income inequality levels. 
Finally, the within-region component of income inequality constitutes the major portion 
of the European inequality, while the between-region component is small in 
comparison.
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4 Chapter Four. An Analysis of European Educational 
Distribution: Educational Attainment and Inequality
4.1 Introduction
This chapter concerns the exploration and analysis of educational distribution in terms 
of educational attainment and inequality. Spatial effects are also taken into 
consideration. The chapter sets out to investigate more closely the space-time dynamics 
behind the distributions of the average education level and inequality in education 
within regions in order to show that spatial autocorrelation and spatial heterogeneity are, 
indeed, required features in an analysis of distribution in European education. Human 
capital is expected to be geographically autocorrelated due to certain processes that 
connect different regions, such as educational externalities and national institutional 
differences. Knowledge diffusion may be particularly important in measuring regional 
disparities, because it directly affects regional interactions which are summarised in 
spatial weights matrices. This chapter examines the way that human capital is spatially 
distributed in the EU and the way in which spatial patterns have probably changed over 
the period of study (1995-2000). It emphasises the magnitude of geographical spillover 
effects in labour market and highlights the underlying human capital diffusion process.
This chapter is organised in three subsequent sections. In Section 4.2, definitions and 
measurements of educational attainment are presented. Two proxies of educational 
stock are used: the average education level completed and the average age at which the 
highest education level was completed. Section 4.3, in turn, is concerned with the 
definitions and measurements of educational inequality, which is conceptualised as 
average disproportionality. Next, the within-region educational inequality as a 
component of the educational inequality in Europe is analysed following the two-level 
Theil decomposition method proposed by Akita (2003). Section 4.4 looks at the 
relationship between the average educational attainment and inequality in educational 
distributions.
4.2 Defining and Measuring Educational Attainment
A first issue is how to define, measure and compare skills, knowledge and competences 
over time and across regions. This section explores the formal definition and
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measurement of two proxies for educational attainment. More specifically, the first 
subsection focuses on the recent definitions of human capital stock and considers a 
more formal approach to measure that stock, highlighting its pros and cons. The second 
subsection looks at the first proxy for educational attainment, which is defined as the 
average education level completed, while the third analyses the average age at which the 
highest education level was completed, which is the second proxy for educational 
attainment. Both subsections place an emphasis on spatial effects. The fourth subsection 
reveals the relationship between these proxies.
4.2.1 Formal Definition o f  Educational A ttainment
As mentioned earlier in this study, educational attainment can be defined in terms of 
various human attributes, such as the knowledge, skills and competences embodied in 
individuals that are relevant to economic activity (Centre for Educational Research and 
Innovation and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1998). 
Broadly speaking, measurements of educational attainment could be classified into two 
basic categories.
The first category describes the educational attainment of the population within a 
society in terms of the percentage who have successfully completed various levels of 
formal education as defined by the International Standard Classification of Education 
(Centre for Educational Research and Innovation and Organisation for Economic Co­
operation and Development, 1998). The term ‘level’ is defined in relation to the years of 
study and the age associated with an educational cycle. These indicators show how 
many people have completed each level of initial education. A related measure is the 
average number of years of schooling completed. It assumes that a year of education 
will add a constant quantity to the human capital stock, whether undertaken by a 
primary school child or a post-graduate student. Recent studies measuring human 
capital stock in terms of the percentage who have gained upper-secondary and tertiary 
level qualifications or the estimated average number of years spent in completed 
episodes of primary, secondary and tertiary education include the work of Ram (1990), 
Barro (1991), Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), Gemmell (1996), Pritchett (1996), Temple 
(1999) and Ciccone (2004), among others.
The second category offers a relatively novel approach to the measurement of skills and 
competences consistent with International Adult Literacy Survey. In this assessment of 
human capital stock, adults are tested on three literacy scales (prose, document and
138
quantitative) and assigned to one of five levels of literacy on each scale. The levels 
represent the varying degrees of complexity in the components of literacy skills needed 
in different situations. The literacy scores reflect the degree to which adults develop or 
lose skills initially acquired at school. Fewer studies have placed an emphasis on the 
measurement of the quality of educational attainment (i.e. scores in internationally 
comparable examinations, talent in engineering, percentage performing at each of five 
levels of measured literacy in three domains), those which have include the works of 
Murphy et al. (1991), Tallman and Wang (1994), Hanushek and Kimko (2000) and 
Barro (2001).
This analysis focuses on the educational attainment of individuals as a measurement of 
human capital stock, rather than the more complex relationships which combine both 
the quantity and the quality of human capital endowments within regions. Besides, the 
measurement of human capital stock has been strongly guided by what it is possible to 
measure, rather than by what it is desirable to measure (Centre for Educational Research 
and Innovation and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1998: 
89). In this study, two proxies for educational achievement are presented, which are 
aggregate indicators of formal education based on the ECHP survey. This, however, 
implies ‘aggregation biases’ of various sorts and the imposition of restrictions, such as 
homogeneity within regions (Sianesi and Van Reenen, 2003). Consequently, some 
variations in human capital are likely to be lost. Inferences at the individual level are 
made using aggregate data for a region.
The first proxy for educational attainment is the average (of the highest) education level 
completed. It considers three grades: less than the second stage of the secondary 
education level, the second stage of the secondary education level, and a recognised 
third education level. Individuals are classified into any one of the three educational 
categories, which are mutually exclusive. This proxy is collected via the regionalised 
microeconomic variable ‘Highest level o f general or higher education completed’, 
which is extracted from the ECHP dataset. The three levels of the formal education are 
defined by the International Standard Classification of Education and permit 
international comparisons. This proxy is based upon two crucial assumptions. The first 
assumption is that an increment in education level completed, undertaken either by a 
primary or by a secondary student, adds a constant quantity to human capital stock. The 
second assumption is that acquisition of postgraduate degrees will not add any quantity 
to human capital stock, because both graduate and postgraduate degrees belong to the
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same category (‘recognised third level education’). This proxy has been defined by 
Psacharopoulos and Arriagada (1986) and Ram (1990). The average education level 
completed is given by the following index:
E M N ^ L jS j ,
j
where j  e {1,2,3} are the educational categories, Lj is the proportion of the respondents 
who fall in the j th category and 5 . ,  at the risk of some oversimplification, denotes an 
assessment of each category. More specifically, S', = 2 for recognised third level 
education completed, S 2 = 1 for second stage of secondary education level completed, 
and S3 = 0 for less than second stage of secondary education level completed.54
This proxy, in practice, cannot be compared across European countries with different 
requirements for completing any given formal educational level. When comparing 
educational attainment across countries, there is no consistent definition of what a 
particular level means in terms of knowledge, competences and skills (Centre for 
Educational Research and Innovation and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 1998). The completion of a given level may be associated with somewhat 
different lengths of study in different regions.55 The duration of some upper secondary 
and tertiary programmes differ. For instance, there are many short programmes at upper 
secondary level in France (Centre for Educational Research and Innovation and 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1998). The education 
systems and structures of each country vary in terms of resources, duration and the 
preparation of entering students (Sianesi and Van Reenen, 2003). For example, the 
requirements in terms of the knowledge and skills that must be met in order to pass 
courses or be awarded particular grades vary widely among countries. Thus, national 
data on educational attainment are hardly comparable, due to the significant differences 
in education systems, structures and traditions (Rodriguez-Pose and Vilalta-Bufi, 20Q5).
54 Although the availability o f educational categories is very limited (three categories only) and the 
concept o f ‘education level’ is broad due to differences in national education systems, this assessment is 
likely to correspond to the numbers o f years of schooling, because if  the first stage o f secondary 
education level is a base year, the number o f years o f the second stage o f secondary education level is, for 
most European countries, half the number o f years required for a recognised third education level. In 
other words, the minimum duration required to complete the second stage degree o f secondary education 
is three years, the same number o f years required for a first university degree (Bachelor degree).
55 However, the Bologna protocol will reduce the problem o f comparability in the future.
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This proxy measures the amount of education undertaken and certifies, within the 
different context of each European country’s education system, acquisition of certain 
types of knowledge and skill. However, this proxy ignores learning on courses that do 
not lead to a recognised qualification, such as enterprise-based or on-the-job training 
programmes. Finally, the completion of a level of education certifies certain knowledge 
and skills without taking into account the time required for completion.
The second proxy for educational attainment is the average age of individuals at which 
the highest grade was completed. It is collected by the microeconomic variable ‘Age at 
which the highest level o f general or higher education was completed*, which also is 
extracted from the ECHP dataset. This proxy assumes that a year of education will add 
a constant quantity to human capital stock, whether undertaken by a secondary or 
tertiary school student. Hence a year of education is a constant unit, regardless of level. 
Furthermore, when assessing the impact of an additional year of education, it is 
assumed that one year of, for instance, secondary schooling is equivalent to a year at the 
same grade in other regions and countries. The second proxy is defined as
1 N
AMN = — V  AGE: ,
where i e {1,2,...,//} are individuals and AGE, is the age of the ith individual when the
highest education level was completed. This proxy is likely to correspond to differences 
in duration of studies, but only when there is not any formal period of educational 
inactivity, such as study leave or a gap year. One potential drawback is that this method 
may add periods of short term unemployment and economic inactivity to human capital 
endowments. This proxy is likely to add training periods to human capital stock, but 
only when these have been completed before the highest education level was reached. 
Hence, it is likely to consider a ‘wider’ definition of human capital investment, 
encompassing experience, leaming-by-doing and on-the-job training. Through the 
measurement o f human capital stock in terms of average age it is possible to develop 
indirect measures of the value placed on skills in the workplace and of the benefits to 
individuals of work-related training. The main point is that the use of age at highest 
qualification to measure human capital includes any activity prior to final qualification, 
some of which may be spent building human capital and some not.
The ideal measures of human capital would be in terms of the output of education, but 
due to the difficulties of obtaining such measures, input measures tend to be used
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instead (Sianesi and Van Reenen, 2003: 168). The proxies for educational stock 
outlined here are measured in terms of the input of formal education without 
considering the output of knowledge, skills and competences embodied in individuals, 
and, for the most part, without taking on board a wider definition of human capital 
investment encompassing experience and leaming-by-doing (Sianesi and Van Reenen, 
2003). Completion of educational levels is only broadly associated with certain forms of 
economically-relevant knowledge, skills and competence and does not look at the 
human capital stock attributed directly. A certificate of tertiary education, for example, 
registers the fact that a student has passed certain courses and exams, but does not 
certify that he or she has spent a certain amount of time studying (Centre for 
Educational Research and Innovation and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 1998: 82). Hence, such measures of regional differences in educational 
attainment cannot explain differences in adult literacy performance. In other words, they 
do not measure how much in practice such attributes are worth in economic terms.
Neither proxy takes into account the fact that skills are lost through disuse. They ignore 
the depreciation of human capital. The depreciation of skills is often associated with 
unemployment and economic inactivity. A person’s qualifications are kept for life, 
while the qualities required to gain them may depreciate over time (Centre for 
Educational Research and Innovation and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 1998: 82). The study carried out by the Centre for Educational Research 
and Innovation and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (1998) 
shows that, firstly, in some countries many less-educated people have a high level 
literacy, while in others many better-educated ones have a low level of literacy; and 
secondly, the same level of education yields, on average, very different literacy 
outcomes. According to that study, direct skill measures provide a more accurate 
measure of human capital stock, because they better reflect learning, training and skill 
attrition throughout life. Nevertheless, measuring adult skills directly gives only a 
partial picture of the attributes relevant to economic activity, whereas it does not take 
into account the depreciation of skills during adulthood.
To sum up, the proxies analysed are more measurements of the quantity and availability 
of a region’s human resources (input measures), rather than measurements of the quality 
of human capital endowments (output measures). In this study, the quality of education 
is not taken into consideration. However, in measuring the quantity of education, one 
only gains a crude idea of skill differences (Hanushek and Kimko, 2000).
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4.2.2 Average Education Level Completed
This subsection considers educational attainment in terms of the average education level 
completed. It regards human capital stock as a quantitative variable and investigates 
ESDA on human capital endowment within European regions. However, a preliminary 
analysis of national educational attainment is obtained, exploring human capital as a 
qualitative variable.
According to the International Standard Classification of Education, the educational 
attainment of the respondents within Europe is explored in terms of the percentage of 
people who have only completed the primary (or the first stage of secondary education), 
and those who have completed the secondary or the tertiary education level. Between 
1995 and 2000, 48 per cent of European respondents who had completed formal 
education were found to hold a secondary education level diploma and 17 per cent of 
them had also completed tertiary education. Figure 4.1 displays the recent evolution of 
educational attainment by country, along with the formal education level completed. 
The results show that the Portuguese and then Spanish citizens are the least educated in 
Europe, whereas Denmark, Sweden and Belgium have the highest and also the most 
equally distributed human capital endowments. Danish, Swedish and Belgian citizens 
may have, for example, a higher level of aspiration and have put more effort into their 
career (Hansen, 2001). They may have maximised their economic welfare by investing 
a larger amount in human capital (Becker and Chiswick, 1966). Hansen (2001), 
however, notes that the fact that a higher level of education has been attained by a large 
proportion of the Swedish and British population is likely to lead to inflation in the 
value of educational credentials. According to Figure 4.1, Italy, Portugal and Austria 
have the smallest percentage of highly-educated people. Ireland and Luxembourg’s 
segmented distribution of educational achievement follows the European distribution. 
The percentage (47 per cent) of British who have completed only primary education is 
high and is close to the percentage (42 per cent) of them who hold a certificate of higher 
education (tertiary). This demonstrates a polarisation of educational attainment, which 
means an increase in the homogeneity within groups of education levels, but also an 
increase in the distance between groups. The distance between the primary and the 
tertiary education level completed is likely to represent the gap between an individual’s 
lifetime of effort in their career or a lifetime of economic opportunities. Between 1995 
and 2000, the component of human capital stock at different education levels remained 
almost the same for secondary education and increased slightly for higher education
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(14.6 per cent in 1996, 17.9 per cent in 1998 and 19.8 per cent in 2000). Nevertheless, 
the cross-country differences in terms o f  the percentage at each education level 
completed are significant.
Figure 4.1: Percentage of Respondents with Primary, Secondary or Tertiary Education Level 
Completed by European Country in 1996, 1998 and 2000
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Assessing each educational level (as described above, by awarding a score o f  0 for first 
stage o f  secondary education level completed; 1 for second stage o f  secondary 
education level completed; and 2 for recognised third education level completed), 
human capital stock is transformed into a quantitative variable. On calculating the 
average education level completed o f  all European citizens, it was found that 
educational attainment in Europe has increased somewhat. For instance, it increased 
from 0.5 in 1996 to 0.7 in 2000.
Mapping the average education level completed enables one to establish whether 
educational attainment within regions is randomly distributed over the EU or whether 
there are similarities between regions. Figure 4.2 shows the spatial distribution o f the 
average education level completed within regions in 1996, 1998 and 2000. There are
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striking disparities in human capital endowments between different regions of Europe. 
In Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece, the average education level completed is lower 
than anywhere else in the Union. Educational attainment is approximately half of the 
EU average in those countries. It is well above average in northern Europe, including 
the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium and Germany. Northern regions with 
relatively high human capital endowment are and remain localised close to other regions 
with relatively high human capital endowments, while southern regions with relatively 
low human capital endowments are and remain localised close to other regions with 
relatively low human capital endowments.
The disparities in educational attainment appear to be higher at a national level than at a 
subnational one, because the guidelines for education systems and structures are, as a 
general rule, set nationally (Rodriguez-Pose and Vilalta-Bufi, 2005: 552). European 
regions have to comply with national guidelines and curricula (Rodriguez-Pose and 
Vilalta-Bufi, 2005: 552). Most institutions, even private or religious schools, are under 
the control of national governments and usually funded by government expenditures. 
For instance, university fees are generally set nationally. Nevertheless, within the 
United Kingdom and Germany there are striking regional disparities, demonstrating 
human capital segregation. More specifically, in the United Kingdom educational 
attainment measured as the average education level completed is highly concentrated in 
southern (Bedfordshire, Hertfordshire, Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire, 
Essex, Hampshire, Isle of Wight and Kent) and northern (Scottish) regions; and in 
Germany, human capital endowment is higher in the north-eastern regions of the former 
East Germany (Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Berlin, Sachsen, Sachsen- 
Anhalt and Thuringen). German regions are likely to have some form of power over a 
devolved education system, as is illustrated by the subnational disparities in educational 
attainment. Moreover, the German public schools are subject to state, and not federal, 
laws, which is why there are considerable differences between states.56 The regional 
disparities in Britain and Germany may be linked to the spatial level of analysis, since 
the aggregation level in the United Kingdom and Germany is NUTS II. However, data 
that are close together in space (i.e. NUTS II) are more often alike than those that are 
relatively far apart (i.e. NUTS I) (Cressie, 1993). The regions in NUTS I level may be 
too large and the unobserved heterogeneity may create an ecological fallacy. The British
56 vyrww.watzmann.net
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and German disparities are also probably from the result of boundary mismatching 
between NUTS II and the actual market boundaries over which economic processes 
operate.
Considering the urbanisation level, human capital endowment is higher in city-regions 
(Greater London, lie de France, Region de Bruxelles) than elsewhere. These cities are 
likely to attract highly-qualified migrants in search of better working prospects. Many 
people move to core cities in search of better educational opportunities, employment, 
further career prospects and higher standards of living. The higher education institutions 
are generally located in cities. The local provision of higher education institutions may 
itself contribute to a growth in the local stock of human capital (Bennett et al., 1995). 
Educational stock has important effects on the structure of the local economy, either city 
or region. However, the existence of highly-qualified institutions in a region or city is 
not sufficient to ensure a high human capital endowment. The ability of the higher 
education infrastructure to increase the stock of human capital within a regional market 
depends on the ability of the region to attract, as well as to retain, high quality students 
and workers (McCann and Sheppard, 2001). The institutions in the major European 
cities seem to attract students of sufficient learning ability and the urban labour market 
may retain them once they have graduated. This outcome depends on the previous 
migration history of the individual (Davanzo, 1976) and on their personal 
unemployment (Davanzo, 1978) (McCann and Sheppard, 2001: 137). Highly-educated 
workers are more likely to make the necessary moves required in order to achieve 
higher promotion. Furthermore, they are prone to migrate more as a way to achieve 
greater employment returns. These findings are consistent with those of Fingleton 
(2003), who noted that, although there are undoubtedly variations due to differences in 
national education systems, structures and traditions, it is revealing that regions with 
high levels of educational attainment are those urbanised, non-peripheral regions which 
one would consider to be the productive core of Europe (Fingleton, 2003: 12). He also 
observed that ‘regions specialised in high value added manufacturing, research and 
development and service activities will also have workforces with commensurate skills' 
(Fingleton, 2003: 13).
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Figure 4.2: Spatial D istribution of Average Education Level C om pleted  (EM N) in 1996, 1998 and
2000
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Figure 4.3 displays the univariate boxplot for the average education level completed 
within European regions from 1995 to 2000. Although the segments o f  education are 
unequally distributed over space, there are no outliers. This is a sign o f  the compactness 
o f  the European distribution o f educational attainment. The median remained constant 
between 1995 and 1997, and between 1998 and 2000 (0.89 in 1998, 0.87 in 1999 and
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0.90 in 2000), but increased significantly (by 0.19) from 0.70 in 1997 to 0.89 in 1998. 
The average had the same evolution. Furthermore, the interquartile range increased 
from 1997 to 1998, indicating increased variability in the average education level 
completed. The interquartile range and the variations in the whiskers are somewhat 
longer for 1999, inducating that human capital endowments cover a larger spectrum. 
Finally, the distribution o f  the average education level completed in Europe accepts 
normality over the period 1995-1999, but rejects it in 2000. The ratio o f  skewness to 
standard error is negative which indicates a left tail.57
Figure 4.3: Boxplot for Average Education Level Completed (EMN)
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Short trends in the evolution o f human capital disparities across the EU can be captured 
not only by distribution maps and boxplots, but also by simple statistical measures o f  
spatial dependence, such as Moran’s I test statistic. Constructing the rook first order 
contiguity spatial weights matrix for average education level completed, Moran’s I 
global spatial autocorrelation statistics are high (Table 4.1). These statistics show that 
there is a high positive spatial autocorrelation o f  human capital endowment. 
Considering the space-time correlation, it is shown that the Moran’s I statistic between a 
region’s human capital endowment in 1998 and neighbouring regions’ endowment in 
1996 (which is the space-time correlation o f  human capital stock in 1996) is 0.5547, 
when Sweden is excluded, and the space-time correlation in 1996 is 0.6896. Both space­
time correlation statistics show a positive spatial correlation. Moran’s I statistics 
computed using the 3-nearest neighbours spatial weights matrix are also high. Finally, 
the threshold distance schemes also show a positive spatial autocorrelation, but it is
57 The ratio of skewness to standard error is -0.63 in 1995, -0.91 in 1996, -1.69 in 1997, -1.78 in 1998, - 
1.20 in 1999 and -2.13 in 2000.
148
lower than those registered using the other schemes. For instance, the spatial 
autocorrelation in 1999 is just 0.3802, when all countries are included. However, the 
standardised values o f  the Moran’s I statistic appear to be very high, possibly indicating, 
once again, a spatial scale problem (Ertur and Le Gallo, 2003: 64). The evolution o f  
Moran’s I test statistic over the period 1995-2000 shows that the standardised values o f  
the statistic remain approximately the same over the whole period. This indicates a 
significant global tendency towards geographical clustering o f  similar regions in terms 
o f  average education level completed. The application o f  Moran’s I statistics lead to the 
same results for the sign (positive) and significance o f global spatial dependence, 
highlighting the robustness o f the results, with regard to the choice o f  the spatial 
weights matrix.
Table 4.1: Moran’s I for Average Education Level Completed (EMN)
13 countries (E[l]=-0.0099)
rook first o rder contiguity 3 -n eare st neighbours threshold  d is tance
M oran's I M ean Sd Z-value M oran's I Mean Sd Z-value M oran's I Mean Sd Z-value
Spatial au to ­
correlation
1995
1996
1997 0 .6175 -0.0084 0.0776 8.0657 0.7617 -0.0119 0.0754 10.2599 0 4139 -0.0091 0.0225 18.8000
1998 0 .7313 -0.0107 0.0727 10 2063 0.8250 -0.0102 0.0747 11.1807 0.4080 -0.0096 0.0217 19.2442
1999 0.7503 -0.0088 0.0790 9.6089 0.8002 -0.0118 0.0747 10.8701 0.3802 -0.0088 0.0226 17.2124
2000 0.6900 -0.0039 0.0746 9.3016 0.7752 -0.0104 0.0751 10.4607 0.3968 -0.0114 0.0215 18.9860
S pace-tim e
correlation
1998
2000 0.6896 -0 .0103 0.0725 9.6538 0.7793 -0.0106 0.0741 10.6599 0.3963 -0.0110 0.0212 19.2123
Excluded SE (E[l]=-0.0108)
rook first o rder contiguity 3 -n eare st neighbours threshold d istance
M oran's 1 Mean Sd Z-value M oran's I M ean Sd Z-value M oran's I Mean Sd Z-value
Spatial au to­
correlation
1995 0.6109 -0.0082 0.0756 8.1892 0.7466 -0.0093 0.0768 9 8424 0.3491 -0.0115 0.0226 15.9558
1996 0.6119 -0 .0079 0.0746 8.3083 0.7433 -0.0101 0.0751 10.0320 0.3577 -0.0105 0.0225 16.3644
1997 0.6085 -0.0068 0.0768 8.0117 0.7384 -0.0080 0.0762 9.7953 0.3619 -0.0126 0.0225 16.6444
1998 0.7419 -0.0081 0.0772 9.7150 0.8297 -0.0072 0.0768 10.8971 0.4061 -0.0110 0.0211 19.7678
1999 0.7607 -0.0112 0.0773 9.9858 0.8039 -0.0147 0.0749 10.9292 0.3770 -0.0118 0.0219 17.7534
2000 0.7009 -0.0093 0.0775 9.1639 0.7776 -0.0062 0.0809 9.6885 0.3837 -0.0098 0.0234 16.8162
S pace-tim e
correlation
1998 0.5547 -0.0061 0.0676 8.2959 0.6534 -0.0100 0.0709 9.3568 0.3396 -0.0085 0.0219 15.8950
2000 0.7029 -0.0131 0.0716 10.0000 0.7850 -0.0063 0.0729 10.8546 0.3933 -0.0119 0.0217 18.6728
Note: All statistics are significant at p=0.001; E[I]: theoretical mean; Mean: observed mean.
The use o f  the Moran’s I statistic does not allow one to assess the regional structure o f  
human capital spatial autocorrelation. LISA are used to test the assumption o f  a random 
distribution by comparing the human capital values for each specific region with the 
values in the neighbouring regions (Ertur and Le Gallo, 2003). Figure 4.4 illustrates the 
cluster maps for average education level completed in 1996, 1998 and 2000, at three 
weighting schemes. They show the local variation o f  educational attainment in spatial 
autocorrelation. Different trends in human capital distribution exist across regions in the 
EU. The weighting schemes o f  the first order contiguity and the 3-nearest neighbours 
show that clusters o f  regions with poor human capital endowments are found across
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Italy, in southern France (in Sud-Ouest and Centre-Est considering the first order 
contiguity schemes, and in Mediterranee for the 3-nearest neighbours schemes) in 2000, 
in Portugal and in Spain. Conversely, two clusters of regions with a high human capital 
stock can be found in southern England and in eastern Germany (Berlin, Brandenburg 
and Sachsen-Anhalt). The distance band weights schemes reveal more expanded 
clusters. For instance, the high-level of education cluster in the United Kingdom 
includes all regions in 1998 and 2000. Furthermore, many regions in Central Europe are 
spatial outliers, such as northern Italy in 1996, and French regions of Bassin Parisien, 
Nord - Pas-de-Calais, Est and Centre-Est in 1998 and 2000. Finally, this figure confirms 
the fact that the average education level completed is higher in northern Europe. A 
cluster of rich human capital regions (the north) is distinguished from a cluster of poor 
human capital regions (the south).
150
Figure  4.4: C luster  M ap  for Average Education Level Com pleted  (EM N) in 1996, 1998 and 2000
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Generally speaking, the results reveal the persistence o f  human capital disparities 
among the European regions over time following the patterns o f  urban-rural and north- 
south polarisation. This reveals two forms o f  spatial heterogeneity. In other words, the 
findings show that economic behaviour is not stable over space. The spatial regimes can 
be linked to several findings in regional development theories, such as the NEG and the 
cumulative causation theories, which emphasise the role o f  human capital spillovers in 
mechanisms o f  human capital accumulation. If one northern region acts to attract human 
capital, all northern regions benefit from the spillovers. Nevertheless, the spatial 
clustering is likely to correspond to national institutional differences. This benefit is
lower for southern regions but it does exist due to the spatial multiplier effects (Anselin, 
2003c). Therefore, spatial autocorrelation and spatial heterogeneity are unavoidable 
features of human capital variation analysis.
4.2.3 Average Age at which the Highest Education Level was Completed
In this subsection, ESDA on the within-region average age of respondents when the 
highest level of education was completed is analysed.
The European micro-approach of this proxy for educational attainment is illustrated by 
the following histograms for 1996, 1998 and 2000 (Figure 4.5). All histograms have 
two peaks; one at age 15 and another at age 19. This generally corresponds to the age of 
completion of the first and the second stage of secondary level education. Another 
smaller peak is found at age 13: the age at which most people have completed the 
primary school. After the age of 19, the European age distribution follows the normal 
distribution. On comparing the histograms, it is found that the peak at age 15 is lower 
for 1998 than for 1996, inducating that more people chose to continue their studies. 
Most respondents had completed their highest level of general or higher education by 
the time they were between 15 and 20 years old.
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Figure 4.5: Histogram of Age of Respondents when their Highest Education Level was Completed
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Figure 4.6 shows the regional pattern of educational attainment. Although the number 
of regions included in 1998 and 2000 was not satisfactory because there were no data 
for France, human capital endowment is seen to differ among countries and regions. 
The geographical distribution of European human capital endowment is expected to be 
highly clustered. German and Danish citizens were found to have completed their 
formal studies at an older age than any other European citizen. Dig a little deeper, and 
one will find that in Germany’s schools, for instance, attendance is compulsory for all 
children of ages 7 to 18. For at least nine years of this period, they must attend a full­
time school, and then they can choose either to continue in full-time education or to
f  o
attend a vocational school part-time. Taking into account the variable ‘Age when full­
time education was stopped’,59 most German regions and some British ones (i.e. 
Berkshire, Dorset and Greater London, in 2000) register the highest average age when 
full-time education ceased, highlighting the high human capital endowment in those 
regions. Furthermore, the difference between the average age when the highest grade 
was completed and the average age when the full time education was stopped is higher 
in German regions (i.e. Sachsen, Brandenburg, Sachsen-Anhalt and Berlin, in 2000). 
The findings do not support the idea that the high human capital stock in Germany 
might be due to the large proportion of part-time students. The duration of studies in 
German institutions is among the longest in Europe. For instance, the nominal duration 
of studying physics is 5 years.60 The spatial distribution of the average age seems to be 
randomly distributed across the United Kingdom regions, while in Italy and Germany it 
seems to be concentrated in particular areas. In Italy, there is a north-south divide, 
whereby high human capital endowments are concentrated in the north and, in 
Germany, human capital is concentrated in the eastern region. Portugal and Greece have 
the lowest average age on completing education in Europe. To sum up, Europe is 
characterised by huge disparities in the average age at which the highest level of 
education was completed.
58 www.watzmann.net
59 This variable is available for the period from 1998 to 2001.
60 www.zhr.rwth-aachen.de
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F igure  4.6: Spatial Distribution of Average Age at which the Highest Education Level was
Com pleted  (AMN) in 1996, 1998 and 2000
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AMN 98: Average age at which the highest education level was completed in 1998
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AMN 00: Average age at which the highest education level was completed in 2000
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The univariate boxplot for the average age o f  individuals when the highest grade was 
completed (Figure 4.7) shows that German regions and Denmark are outliers and 
extreme cases. More particularly, the educational attainment o f  Berlin, Brandenburg, 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Sachsen is double the EU average. The distributions are 
skewed and much o f  the skewness is due to the outliers and extreme regions in the
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upper end o f  the distributions. The skewness is higher in 2000, indicating that people 
continue their studies at higher education levels. Nevertheless, the median and the box 
length remained the same between 1995 and 1997, and between 1998 and 2000.61 The 
average increased slightly from 18.25 in 1995 to 18.81 in 2000. Finally, the distribution 
o f  this proxy for educational attainment rejects the normality assumption, because the 
ratio o f  skewness to its standard error is greater than +2, which indicates a long right 
tail.62
Figure 4.7: Boxplot for Average Age at which the Highest Education Level was Completed (AMN)
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DE4, DEG, DEE, DE5, DE9, DEA, DE7, DEF, DE2, DEX, DE6, DK and DEI in 1998, DED, DE3, DE8, DE4, DEE, DEG, DEF, DEA, 
DE5, DE7, DE9, DE2, D EX, DEK and DE6 in 1999, D ED, DE3, DE8, DE4, DEE, DE5, DEG, DEA, DEF, DE2, DE9, D EX, DE7, DE6, 
DEK and DEI in 2000 (see Appendix A 1.1).
On the one hand, Moran’s I statistics computed using the rook first order contiguity 
spatial weights schemes and the 3-nearest neighbours schemes are very high (Table 
4.2). Thus, measuring educational attainment in terms o f  the average age at which the 
highest education level was completed has a significant positive spatial autocorrelation. 
The standardised values o f  the Moran’s I statistic remained almost constant over the 
whole period o f  study. The stock o f  human capital endowment in a particular region 
may contribute to output gains in adjoining regions (Lall and Yilmaz, 2001). To put this 
in a slightly different way, Moran’s I test statistics are likely to highlight, on the one 
hand, the importance o f external economies that cross the weak regional boundaries 
(Vaya et al., 2004) and, on the other hand, the institutional differences between
61 The median is 17.54 for 1995, 17.51 for 1996, 17.53 for 1997, 17.87 for 1998, 17.85 for 1999 and 
17.73 for 2000.
62 The ratio of skewness to standard error is 5.49 for 1995, 5.43 for 1996, 5.54 for 1997, 5.36 for 1998, 
5.12 for 1999 and 5.44 for 2000.
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countries that mean regions within countries are similar. Considering the space-time 
correlation, a region’s human capital endowment in 1998 is correlated with that o f  its 
neighbouring regions in 1996 (Moran’s I = 0.8026, based on the first order contiguity 
weights). On the other hand, constructing the threshold distance schemes, the global 
spatial autocorrelation is very low. For instance, Moran’s I is 0.2464 in 1997.
Table 4.2: Moran’s I for Average Age at which the Highest Education Level was Completed (AMN)
Excluded SE  LU (E[l]=-0.0109)
rook first o rder contiguity 3 -n eare st neighbours threshold d is tan ce
M oran 's I Mean Sd Z-value M oran's I Mean Sd Z-value M oran 's I Mean Sd Z-value
Spatial au to ­
correlation
1995 0.7812 -0.0083 0 .0764 10.3338 0.8378 -0.0145 0 .0725 11.7559 0.2465 -0.0105 0.0223 11.5247
1996 0.7770 -0.0124 0.0763 10.3460 0.8313 -0.0120 0.0773 10.9094 0.2486 -0.0104 0.0238 10.8824
1997 0.7872 -0.0140 0.0723 11.0816 0.8365 -0.0126 0.0763 11.1284 0.2464 -0.0105 0.0231 11.1212
1998
1999
2000
S pace-tim e
correlation
1998
2000
Excluded SE LU FR (E[l]=-0.0119)
rook first o rder contiguity 3 -n eare st neighbours threshold  d is tan ce
M oran 's I Mean Sd Z-value M oran’s  I Mean Sd Z-value M oran 's I Mean Sd Z-value
Spatial au to­
correlation
1995 0.8040 -0.0120 0.0795 10.2642 0.8759 -0.0116 0.0807 10.9975 0.2912 -0.0122 0.0245 12.3837
1996 0.8005 -0 .0082 0 .0800 10.1088 0.8686 -0.0133 0.0802 10.9963 0.2923 -0.0128 0.0255 11.9647
1997 0.8093 -0.0125 0.0804 10.2214 0.8723 -0.0133 0.0806 10.9876 0.2885 -0.0120 0.0270 11.1296
1998 0.8212 -0.0105 0.0822 10.1180 0 .8983 -0 .0122 0.0793 11 4817 0.2462 -0.0111 0.0256 10.0508
1999 0 8114 -0.0108 0.0809 10.1632 0 .8899 -0.0093 0 0789 11.3967 0 2457 -0.0114 0.0250 10.2840
2000 0.8203 -0 .0110 0.0819 10.1502 0.8971 -0.0122 0.0801 11.3521 0.2447 -0.0115 0 .0269 9.5242
S pace-tim e
correlation
1998 0.8026 -0 .0139 0.0802 10.1808 0.8717 -0.0118 0.0776 11 3853 0.2613 -0.0124 0.0252 10.8611
2000 0.8228 -0.0092 0.0785 10.5987 0.8985 -0.0085 0.0822 11.0341 0.2474 -0.0106 0.0289 8 .9273
Note: All statistics are sign ifican t at p = 0 .001 ; E[I]: theoretical m ean. M ean observed m ean
Figure 4.8 illustrates the choropleth maps for educational achievement using three 
spatial weights schemes. The maps based on the first order contiguity weights and the 3- 
nearest neighbours schemes are quite similar. Low human capital endowment is 
concentrated in Greece (mainly in Voreia Ellada) and in Lazio (in 1998), while 
Germany is characterised by high human capital stock. Considering the 3-nearest 
neighbours spatial schemes, Noroeste is the ‘core’ o f  another cluster o f  low human 
capital endowment. The spatial distribution o f  educational endowment remained almost 
the same. The distance band schemes reveal expanded poor clusters including Portugal, 
Spain, western France, Greece and the western United Kingdom and, also, an expanded 
rich cluster including Germany and Denmark. Between the two clusters, there is a low- 
high cluster stretching from eastern France to Italy, in which low endowment regions 
are surrounded by high endowment ones.
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Figure 4.8: C lus ter  M ap  for Average Age at which the Highest Education Level was Completed
(AMN) in 1996, 1998 and  2000
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Once again, the results reveal the persistence o f  human capital disparities among 
European regions over time, following the patterns o f  urban-rural and north-south 
polarisation. The variation in human capital endowment is influenced by region specific 
characteristics and the availability o f  highly-educated labour in neighbouring southern 
or northern regions. However, the pattern here is less intense than when one considers 
educational attainment in terms o f  the average education level completed.
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4,2.4 The Relationship between the Two Proxies fo r  Educational 
Attainment
The relationship between the average education level completed and the average age at 
which the highest education level was completed is explored through cross-tabulation 
analysis, the comparison of their boxplots (standardised distributions), the Pearson 
correlation and the bivariate measures of spatial association.
First, the relationship between the age of respondents when the highest education level 
was attained and the three levels of formal education is analysed using a cross­
tabulation analysis. A categorical variable with six educational categories (age bands) is 
created. As stated earlier, the completion of a given educational level can be associated 
with somewhat different lengths of study in different countries and thus different age 
bands. Additionally, comparing educational attainment across countries, there is no 
consistent definition of either what a particular level means in terms of knowledge and 
skills or what a particular age band means in terms of education level completed. The 
duration of educational (i.e. tertiary) programmes by educational category (i.e. type of 
degree) differs among countries. For instance, the minimum period of registration for 
Bachelor students in Economics is three years full-time in the United Kingdom, while it 
is four years full-time in Greece. Additionally, the duration, for example, of tertiary 
programmes differs within countries. In Greece, the minimum period of registration for 
undergraduate students fluctuates from four (i.e. for those studying Economics) to six 
years (i.e. studying Medicine). The educational categories possibly eliminate the 
requirements that some knowledge and skill be demonstrated in order to pass courses 
and gain grades. Nor do the educational categories distinguish students by full-time or 
part-time registration. Therefore, in order to check the sensitivity of the results, a second 
categorical variable (age band) is created, which is lagged by one year of the first 
categorical variable. Generally speaking, in the first categorical variable, the educational 
categories denote:
• less than 13 (or less than 12): no education level completed;
• 13-15 (or 12-14): primary education completed;
• 16-18 (or 15-17): less than the second stage of secondary education level
completed;
• 19-22 (or 18-21): the second stage of secondary education level completed;
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• 23-30 (or 22-29): tertiary education level completed;
• Over 30 (or over 29): other education level completed.
Table 4.3 shows that the higher the age of respondents, the higher the education level 
completed. Considering the first age band, 45.95 per cent, 45.03 per cent and 44.15 per 
cent of respondents who had completed less than the second stage of secondary 
education level in 1996, 1998 and 2000, respectively, completed their formal studies 
when they were between 13 and 15 years old. Taking into account the second age band, 
45.57 per cent, 47.02 per cent and 47.10 per cent of respondents who had completed 
less than the second stage of secondary education level in 1996, 1998 and 2000, 
respectively, completed their studies when they were between 12 and 14 years old. The 
largest portion of respondents who had completed the second stage of secondary 
education belonged to the age band 16-18 (i.e. 50.10 per cent in 1996) or 18-21 (i.e. 
63.54 per cent in 1996). Finally, according to the first age band, 43.32 per cent, 45.08 
per cent and 45.70 per cent of European citizens who had acquired a recognised third 
education level in 1996, 1998 and 2000, respectively, completed their formal studies 
when they were between 23-30 years of age. Considering the second age band, the 
largest portion were between 22-29 years old (i.e. 52.86 per cent in 1996).
Table 4.3: Percentage of Respondents by Age Bands and Levels of'Formal Education in 1996, 1998 
and 2000
1996 1 998 2 0 0 0
less than
second stage second stage recognised 
of secondary of secondary third 
education education education 
level level level 
completed completed completed
less than
second stage second stage recognised  
of secondary of secondary third 
education education education 
level level level 
completed completed completed
less than
second stage second stage recognised 
of secondary of secondary third 
education education education 
level level level 
completed completed completed
<13 2 7 .3 9 0 .17 0 .03 30 .05 0 .0 7 0.01 32 .06 0 .13 0.01
13-15 4 5 .9 5 2 .02 1.51 4 5 .0 3 0 .9 3 2 .1 5 4 4 .1 5 1 .19 2.38
16-18 19.31 5 0 .10 9.91 17 .46 4 5 .2 2 11 .44 17 .49 4 5 .0 2 11 .74
19-22 3 .22 35 .46 3 7 .3 2 3.34 3 7 .7 5 3 1 .3 8 2.61 38.21 2 9 .7 7
23-30 1 .84 7.51 4 3 .3 2 1.70 9 .7 4 4 5 .0 8 1.64 9 .56 4 5 .7 9
30> 2 .2 8 4 .7 5 7 .9 0 2 .42 6 .3 0 9 .92 2 .04 5 .89 10.31
<12 13 .95 0 .08 0 .02 14 .40 0 .0 2 0.01 15 .56 0 .04 0.01
12-14. 4 5 .5 7 0 .75 0 .40 4 7 .0 2 0 .2 3 0 .44 4 7 .1 0 0.36 0.40
15-17 2 9 .7 5 2 0 .1 6 6 .24 2 7 .88 13 .42 8 .52 28.21 12 .77 9 .59
18-21 6 .1 9 6 3 .5 4 3 0 .5 7 6.11 6 6 .6 2 25.11 5 .07 6 7 .9 8 2 3 .50
22-29 2 .0 0 10 .00 5 2 .8 6 1.89 12 .42 5 3 .6 6 1.73 11 .99 53 .90
29> 2 .5 5 5 .47 9.91 2 .69 7 .3 0 12 .27 2.32 6 .8 6 12 .60
Second, considering the univariate boxplots of proxies for educational attainment 
(Figure 4.9), the median gap between the two proxies becomes even higher from one 
time period to the next. This probably depicts the decreasing correlation between the 
two proxies through time for regions that are close to the European average.
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Additionally, the distributions for the average education level completed are more 
skewed than those for the average age at which the highest education level was attained, 
due to the outliers and extreme values. In 2000, the distribution o f  the average age is 
skewed on the left.
Figure 4.9: Boxplot for Standardised (Zscore) Average Education Level Completed (EMN) and 
Average Age at which the Highest Education Level was Completed (AMN)
m m
N » 94 93 94 93 102 93 102 85 102 85 102 85
T k  q . ^q» ~ q . Nq. \  q . ^ q .  %  ^ q .  Nq.\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \
Nt%> ^
Note: extreme cases and outliers are sorted in descending order: DE3, DED, DE8, DE4, DEE, DEG, DK, DE9, DEA, D E5, D E7, DEF, DEG 
and DEX in 1995, DE3, DED, DE8, DE4, DEE, DEG, DK, DE9, DEA, DEF, DEF, DE2, DE5, DE6 and DEX in 1996; DE3, DED, DE8, 
DE4, DEE, DEG, DEF, DEK, DE9, D E5, D EA, DE7, DE2 and DEX in 1997; D E3, DED, DE8, DE4, DEG, DEE, DE5, DE9, DEA, DE7, 
DEF, DE2, DEX, DE6, DK and DEI in 1998, D ED, DE3, DE8, DE4, DEE, DEG, DEF, D EA, DE5, DE7, DE9, DE2, D EX, DEK and DE6 
in 1999; DED, DE3, DE8, DE4, DEE, DE5, DEG, D EA, DEF, DE2, DE9, DEX, D E7, DE6, DEK and DEI in 2000 (see Appendix A l l).
Third, on measuring the Pearson index, a positive linear correlation is shown. This 
correlation is higher between 1995 and 1997 than for 1997 and 1998 (Table 4.4).
Table 4.4: Pearson correlation between two proxies for educational attainment
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
EM N-AM N 0.730
(0.000)**
85
0.711
(0  000)**
93
0 .710
(0.000)**
85
0.695
(0 .000)**
93
0.692
(0.000)**
85
0.672
(0,000)**
93
0.298
(0 .000)**
85
0.269
(0 .013)*
85
0.453
(0 .000)**
85
Note: ** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); * correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
Fourth, the correlation between the average education level completed within a region 
and the average age at which the highest education level was completed in neighbouring 
regions, and vice versa, are explored. In 1996, for instance, the bivariate Moran’s I 
statistic between the average education level completed within a region and the average 
age o f neighbouring regions is 0.4534, while that between the average age within a
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region and the average education level completed of neighbouring regions is 0.4918, for 
the first order contiguity spatial weights schemes, 0.5428 and 0.5457, respectively, for 
the 3-nearest neighbours weights schemes, and 0.2129 and 0.2140, respectively, for the 
threshold distance band weights schemes. No matter what proxy for educational 
attainment is used, geographical location is important in accounting for the human 
capital performance of the regions due to the spatial interactions that occur between 
regions. The spatial distribution of education stock seems to be far from random.
4.3 Defining and Measuring Educational Inequality
This section explores the formal definition and measurement of the two proxies for 
educational inequality. The first subsection focuses on the recent definitions of 
educational inequality; the second explores inequality in terms of education level 
completed; and the third analyses inequality in terms of the age at which the highest 
education level was completed. The second and the third subsections also place an 
emphasis on the role of spatial effects. The fourth subsection represents the within- 
region educational inequality as major component of the educational inequality in 
Europe, and the fifth examines the relationship between the two proxies.
4,3.1 A Formal Definition o f  Educational Inequality
The ‘relative’ measures of educational inequality have been used in many studies before 
(Marin and Psacharopoulos, 1976; Winegarden, 1979; Ram, 1990). In the work of Ram 
(1990), for example, educational inequality is represented by the standard deviation of 
the educational distribution for each observation. However, more recent studies use 
‘relative’ measures of educational inequality (i.e. Comia et al., 2001; Thomas et al., 
2001; Castello and Domenech, 2002; De Gregorio and Lee, 2002). Castello and 
Domenech (2002), for instance, taking school attainment levels, computed the Gini 
coefficient. Thomas et al. (2001) measure inequalities in educational attainment using 
the education Gini and Theil indices.
In this study, educational inequality is measured using the formula of income inequality 
indices: the relative mean deviation index, the Gini coefficient, the generalised entropy 
index and the Atkinson index. As in the measures of educational attainment, two 
proxies for educational inequality are presented.
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The first proxy is inequality in education level completed. It is collected using the same 
variable used to measure the average education level completed (‘Highest level o f  
general or higher education completed?). The Theil index takes as its minimum value 
(0 )  when the entire population is concentrated in a single educational category, while it 
takes as its maximum one (logN )  when the entire population belongs to the category of 
less than the second stage of secondary education level completed ( S 3), except for one 
person alone, who has a recognised tertiary level qualification.
The second proxy is inequality in the age at which the highest education level was 
completed and is collected using the same variable used to measure the average age at 
which the highest grade was completed (‘Age at which the highest level o f general or 
higher education was completed’).64 Educational inequality is zero when and only when
63 Consider a population o f individuals i e {1,2,..., A^}, where each person is associated with a unique 
value o f the measured formal education level completed. It has been assumed that
T = i
0 fo r less than second stage o f  secondary education level completed
1 fo r  second stage o f secondary education level completed such that
2 for recognised third education level completed
=  Y 63. I define the education level completed ratio r, as the ratio o f y , to the average Y
i =1
— 1 N Y —(Y  =  ri =  • By definition, educational equality exists when any education level
completed is equally distributed across all persons (all persons hold the same higher degree). Hence,
educational inequality is zero when and only when rt =  1 .0  for all i ; otherwise, inequality is greater
than zero. Conceptualising inequality in the education level completed as the average disproportionality 
across all persons implies that the degree o f inequality depends on the average distance o f the education
level completed ratios rt from 1.0. Educational inequality is unaffected by proportional increases or
1 N
decreases. Inequality indices ( E I N E Q ) can be expressed in a common form E IN E Q  =  —  /  , f  (Pi)»
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................NVt ■ ■ '
where /  denotes the disproportionality or distance function which captures the mathematical functions 
for determining deviations o f education level completed ratios from 1.0. For instance, using the formula 
of income Theil entropy index ( G E \ ), inequality in education level completed is defined as
N
E G E \ =  log(./Vz,) , where z ; is the human capital share, that is individual i ‘s higher education
/ = !
level completed as a proportion o f total human capital for the entire regional population.
1 N
64 This index ( A I N E Q ) can be expressed in the form A IN E Q  =  — where f  denotes the
distance function which captures the mathematical functions for determining deviations o f ratios o f age at 
which the highest education level was completed from 1.0. Using, once again, the formula o f income
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all people have completed their highest education level at the same age; otherwise, 
inequality is greater than zero.
4.3.2 Inequality in Education Level Completed
Inequality in the education level completed is measured by the Gini index ( EGINI), the 
relative mean deviation index ( ERMD ), the generalised entropy index for two different 
parameters (EGE\ when a = 1, and EGE2 when a = 2 ) and the Atkinson index for 
one parameter only (£4050 when e = 0.50).
Considering the geographical distribution of the Gini coefficient on education level 
completed in 1996, 1998 and 2000 (Figure 4.10), there are striking differences in 
educational inequality within regions between different parts of the EU. Inequality in 
human capital endowments is higher in southern Europe — extending from Greece to 
Italy, Spain and Portugal — than it is in the northern periphery. The within-region 
human capital inequality is typically half of the EU average in Germany, Denmark and 
Sweden. The EU north-south divide indicates that regional economies within the 
southern group seem to interact more with one another than those outside.
The short trends in the evolution of inequality in the education level completed 
demonstrate that inequality remained almost constant, except in France and Italy, where 
it increased even further in 1998 and 2000.
Considering the urbanisation level of each region, educational inequality is lower in the 
northern metropolitan areas such as London, Paris, Hamburg and Brussels, as well as in 
metropolitan areas in the south, such as Madrid, Lisbon and Athens. Additionally, 
inequality is lower in the metropolises than in the remainder of the respective countries. 
Highly-educated workers from rural areas are likely to move to core cities in order to 
achieve promotion and greater employment returns. The urban market seems able to 
attract and retain high quality students and workers. Better educated people move to 
large cities in search of employment and higher standards of living. Individuals with 
higher levels of human capital tend to be migrate more. The northern metropolitan areas
Theil entropy index (GE\ ), inequality in age at which the highest education level was completed is 
defined as AGEl = log(j}) •
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acquire the most-educated segment of the EU population. Therefore, urbanisation seems 
to generate new requirements for the development of higher education.
To sum up, the EU north-south divide and the degree of urbanisation seem to have an 
effect on educational inequality. The geographical distributions of other measures of 
inequality such as the relative mean deviation index, the Theil index, the squared 
coefficient of variation and the Atkinson index yield similar results.65
65 The results are provided upon request.
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F igure  4.10: The Spatial D istribution of  the Gini Coefficient on Education Level C om pleted
(EG IN I)  in 1996,1998 and  2000
EGINI_96: Gini coefficient on
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EGINI_98: Gini coefficient on education level completed in 1998
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EGINI_00: Gini coefficient on education level completed in 2000
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Figure 4.11, which presents the univariate boxplots o f  the Gini coefficient on education 
level completed, shows that the Portuguese regions o f  Norte, Centro, Alentejo and 
Algarve are outliers from the upper edge o f  the box, while levels o f  educational 
inequality within Sachsen and Thuringen are between 1.5 and 3 box lengths from the 
lower edge. The univariate boxplots o f  the generalised entropy indices (the Theil index
education level completed in 1996
16 6
and the squared coefficient of variation) reveal many outliers and extreme regions. For 
instance, A9ores, Madeira, Centro (PT), Alentejo and Algavre emerge as extreme 
regions using the Theil index for 1995. The Portuguese regions are either outliers or 
extreme cases. Considering the squared coefficient of variation, there are many extreme 
regions. Their value is very high and they represent the Portuguese regions alone. The 
Spanish region of Centro is also an outlier over the period 1995-1998. The distributions 
of the relative mean deviation index are less skewed, because two regions are outliers 
(A9ores and Alentejo) in 1998 only. The distributions of the Atkinson index are 
compact as well. Madeira and A9ores are outlying observations at the higher end of the 
distribution in 1995 and 1996, respectively; and Hamburg, Brandenburg, Sachsen and 
Sachsen-Anhalt are outlying regions in the lower end of the distribution. Final, for all 
educational inequality indices, the median and the average decreased considerably from 
1997 to 1998. For instance, the mean and the average of the Gini coefficient decreased 
by 0.07 and 0.13, respectively.
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Figure 4.11: Boxplot for Inequality Indices on Education Level Com pleted
Gini coefficient (EGINI)
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Note: extreme cases and outliers are sorted in descending order:
EGINI: PT3, PT2, PT15 and PT14 (upper end); DE4, DEE, DED and DEG (lower end) in I995; PT2, PT3, PT12, PT14, PT15 and PTl 1 
(upper end), DED and DEG (lower end) in 1996; PTl 4 and PT12 (upper end) in 1998
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EGE1: PT3, PT2, PT15, PT14 and PTl 1 (upper end) in 1995; PT2, PT3, PT12, PT14, PT15 and PTl 1 (upper end) in 1996; PT2, PT3, PT14, 
P T l2, PTl 5 and PTl 1 (upper end) in 1997; PT14, PT2, PT12, PT15, PT3 and PTl 1 (upper end) in 1998; PT2, PT14, PT12, PT3 and PT15 
(upper end) in 1999; PT2, PT14, PT15, PT12 and PT3 (upper end) in 2000.
EGE2: PT3, PT2, PT15, PT14, PT12, PTl 1, PT13 and ES4 (upper end) in 1995; PT2, PT3, PT12, PT14, PT15, PTl 1, PT13 and ES4 (upper 
end) in 1996; PT2, PT3, PT14, PT12, PT15, PTl 1, PT13 and ES4 (upper end) in 1997; PT14, PT2, PT12, PT15, PT3, PTl 1, ES4 and PT13 
(upper end) in 1998; PT2, PTl 4, PT12, PT3, PT15 and PTl 1 (upper end) in 1999; PT2, PT14, PTl 5, PTl 2, PT3, PT11 (upper end) in 2000. 
ERMD: PTl 4 and PT2 (upper end) in 1998.
EA050: PT3 (upper end); DE4, DED and DEG (lower end) in 1995; PT2 (upper end) in 1996.
EGINI (exclude regions listwise): PT3, PT2, PTl 5 and PTl 4 (upper end); DE4, DEE, DED and DEG (lower end) in 1995; PT2, PT3, P T l2, 
PTl4, PTl 5 and PTl 1 (upper end); DED and DEG (lower end) in 1996; PT2, PT3, P T l4, PTl 2, PTl 5 and PTl 1 (upper end); DED (lower 
end) in 1997 (see Appendix A 1.1).
The distributions of educational inequality indices are comparable only when they are 
measured on the same scale. Considering the boxplots of the standardised educational 
inequality indices in 1998 (Figure 4.11), the distributions of the Gini coefficient, the 
relative mean deviation index and the Atkinson index are quite similar to one another 
and are the most compact. The normality assumption is rejected for all distributions, 
because the ratio of skewness to their standard error is greater than +2, which indicates 
a long right tail.66 Table 4.5 shows the Pearson correlation of the above indices for 
1998. Correlations are high and up to 0.861. They are also significant at the 0.01 level 
(2-tailed) and at the first three decimals.
Table 4.5: Pearson Correlations among Inequality Indices for Education Level Completed in 1998
EGINI EGE1 EGE2 ERMD EA050
EGINI 1 0.966
(0.000)**
102
0.867
(0.000)**
102
0.985
(0.000)**
102
0.990
(0.000)**
102
EGE1 1 0.963
(0.000)**
102
0.971
(0.000)**
102
0.965
(0.000)**
102
EGE2 1 0.874
(0.000)**
102
0.861
(0.000)**
102
ERMD 1 0.996
(0.000)**
102
EA050 1
Note: ** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
The next step is to identify global and local spatial autocorrelation so as to characterise 
the pattern in the location of inequalities in educational attainment in the EU and the 
way that this pattern has probably changed over the period 1995-2000. Due to the high 
correlation among the inequality indices for education level completed, I only present 
the spatial autocorrelation analysis for the Gini coefficient. First of all, the Moran’s I 
statistics computed using the rook first order contiguity spatial weights matrices over 
the period 1995-2000 show a significant positive spatial autocorrelation (Table 4.6). 
This is likely to test theory of the interregional interaction through educational
66 The ratio of skewness to standard error is 2.97 for the Gini coefficient, 7.48 for the Theil index, 12.41 
for the squared coefficient o f variation, 3.47 for the relative mean deviation index and 3.64 for the 
Atkinson index.
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externalities. The space-time correlations are also high. For instance, the Moran’s I 
statistic between the within-region inequality in 2000 and the inequality o f  neighbouring 
regions in 1998 is 0.6809. Taking into account the 3-nearest neighbours spatial weights 
schemes, Moran’s I statistics are high over the period 1995-2000. Finally, the Moran’s I 
statistics based on the distance band are much lower than the previous schemes, but 
remain significant. The trends in the evolution o f  the standardised Moran’s I statistics 
are quite similar. They show a significant global tendency toward the spatial clustering 
o f  similar regions in terms o f  educational inequality.
Table 4.6: Moran’s I for the Gini Coefficient on Education Level Completed (EGINI)
13 countries (E[l]=-0.0099)
rook first o rder contiguity 3 -n eare st ne ighbours threshold d is tan ce
M oran 's I Mean Sd Z-value M oran 's I Mean Sd Z-value M oran's I Mean Sd Z-value
Spatial au to ­
correlation
1995
1996
1997 0.6906 -0.0050 0.0741 9 3873 0.7983 -0 .0089 0.0744 10.8495 0.4686 -0.0097 0.0228 20.9781
1998 0.7063 -0.0090 0.0748 9.5628 0.8217 -0.0076 0.0721 11.5021 0 .4643 -0.0101 0 .0219 21.6621
1999 0.7224 -0.0104 0.0741 9.8893 0.7619 -0.0078 0.0742 10.3733 0.3943 -0.0107 0.0216 18.7500
2000 0.7195 -0 .0100 0.0777 9.3887 0.7803 -0.0069 0.0743 10.5949 0.4212 -0.0094 0 .0223 19.3094
Space-tim e
correlation
1998
2000 0.6809 -0 .0070 0.0736 9.3465 0.7716 -0.0084 0.0702 11.1111 0.4301 -0.0102 0.0213 20.6714
Excluded S E  (E[l]=-0.0108)
rook first o rder contiguity 3 -n eare st ne ighbours threshold  d is tan ce
M oran 's I M ean Sd Z-value M oran 's I Mean Sd Z-value M oran's I M ean Sd Z-value
Spatial au to ­
correlation
1995 0.7229 -0.0102 0.0769 9.5332 0.8223 -0.0125 0.0767 10.8840 0.3889 -0.0100 0.0223 17.8879
1996 0.6995 -0.0101 0.0749 9.4740 0.7913 -0.0121 0 0789 10.1825 0.3783 -0.0111 0.0235 16.5702
1997 0.6764 -0.0107 0.0740 9.2851 0.7730 -0.0102 0.0745 10.5128 0.3892 -0.0115 0.0227 17.6520
1998 0.7124 -0.0098 0.0756 9.5529 0.8195 -0.0123 0.0782 10 6368 0.4370 -0 0110 0.0229 19.5633
1999 0.7257 -0.0088 0.0726 10.1171 0.7535 -0.0092 0.0766 9.9569 0.3558 -0.0119 0.0225 16.3422
2000 0.7204 -0.0069 0.0719 10.1154 0 7692 -0.0135 0.0771 10.1518 0.3632 -0.0107 0.0217 17.2304
S pace-tim e
correlation
1998 0.5713 -0.0070 0.0661 8.7489 0.6689 -0.0096 0.0717 9.4630 0.3566 -0.0084 0.0210 17.3810
2000 0 6843 -0.0068 0.0758 9.1174 0.7653 -0 0075 0.0750 10.3040 0.3922 -0.0102 0.0220 18.2909
Note: All statistics are sign ifican t at p=0.001; E[I]: theoretical m ean; M ean: observed  m ean.
Once again, LISA is required in order to compare the human capital inequality values 
for each specific region with the values for the neighbouring regions. Figure 4.12 
depicts the cluster map for the Gini coefficient on educational inequality in 1996, 1998 
and 2000 at three weights schemes. The cluster maps o f  the first order contiguity 
scheme and the 3-nearest neighbours scheme are quite similar. Portugal and Spain 
include clusters o f  regions with high educational inequality, while Germany and 
Denmark include clusters with low human capital inequality. In 2000, both types o f  
clusters have expanded further to include some western French regions (i.e. Sud-Ouest) 
into the high inequality human capital cluster and some Swedish regions (i.e. Ostra 
Mellansverige) into the low inequality cluster. Considering the distance band weights 
schemes, the clusters are evenly spread out and also are separated by a buffer zone
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which includes at least the regions o f  Bassin Parisien, Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Est, Centre- 
Est, Nord Ovest and Lombardia in 1998 and 2000.
F igure  4.12: C lus te r  M ap  for the  Gini Coefficient on Education Level Com pleted  (EG IN I) in 1996,
1998 and 2000
Rook first order contiguity 3-nearest neighbours Threshold distance
1996 1996 1996
1998 1998 1998
2000 2000 2000
(1) LISA Cluster Map
Not Significant 
■  High-High 
I  Low-Low 
1 Low-High 
1 High-Low
The cluster maps highlight some spatial heterogeneity hidden within the global spatial 
autocorrelation pattern. This may indicate the coexistence o f  two distinct spatial 
regimes. Firstly, urbanisation seems to be negatively correlated with human capital 
inequality, because it is lower in the metropolises. Secondly, there is empirical evidence 
o f  an EU north-south divide. Homogeneity is higher among the northern regions o f  the 
EU, as well as among the southern ones, but not between regions in the north and south.
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Although all regions benefit from the diffusion of human capital that results from spatial 
multiplier effects, that diffusion seems to be easier within groups of closely related 
economies (Vaya et al., 2004). The responses to changes in educational inequality over 
the period 1995-2000 remained almost constant, demonstrating the persistence of 
inequality and its dynamic process.
4.3.3 Inequality in the Age at which the Highest Education Level was 
Completed
The spatial distribution of educational inequality within regions when it is measured in 
terms of inequality in the age at which the highest education level was completed seems 
to be different from that of inequality in education level completed. In both cases, 
however, the geographical distribution appears to be far from random or equal. 
According to Figure 4.13, the Gini coefficient is almost double the EU average in 
northern Italy (Nord Ovest, Lombardia, Nord Est and Emilia-Romagna), in southern 
Portugal (Lisboa, Alentejo and Algarve) and in the German regions of Brandenburg and 
Sachsen. Another important characteristic shown in this figure is the within-country 
disparities of the Gini coefficient. In Portugal, Spain, Italy and Germany, regional 
disparities fluctuate at high Gini coefficient levels, while in the United Kingdom and 
France the coefficient remains low. The above argument highlights the importance of 
the within-country disparities in inequalities on considering a broader concept of human 
capital, which is likely to encompass experience, leaming-by-doing and on-the-job 
training from a more positive viewpoint, and unemployment and economic inactivity 
period from the negative viewpoint. The geographical distributions of other measures of 
inequality such as the relative mean deviation index, the Theil index, the squared 
coefficient of variation and the Atkinson index yield similar results.67 To sum up, 
educational inequality seems to be concentrated in particular regions of the EU.
67 The results are provided upon request.
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Figure 4.13: Spatial D istribution of the Gini Coefficient on Age a t  which the Highest Education
Level was Completed (AGINI) in 1996, 1998 and 2000
AGINI_96: Gini coefficient on age at which the highest education level was completed in 1996
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AGINI_98: Gini coefficient on age at which the highest education level was completed in 1998
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Once again, the boxplot for inequality in human capital will reveal more about the data 
(Figure 4.14). All distributions referring to the age at which the highest education level 
was attained are fairly compact, because the whiskers are, in fact, the extreme values. 
Furthermore, the interquartile range seems to be constant between 1995 and 1997, and 
between 1998 and 2000.
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Figure 4.14: Boxplot for Inequality Indices on Age at which the Highest Education Level was
Completed
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The boxplots of standardised education inequality indices for 1998 (Figure 4.14) 
demonstrate that the distributions of the Gini coefficient and the relative mean deviation 
index exhibit the greatest difference between the first and third quartiles. Additionally, 
they are similar to one another in terms of their compactness. The normality assumption 
is accepted for the Gini coefficient, the relative mean deviation and the Atkinson 
distribution, because the ratio of skewness to their standard error is greater than -2 and 
less than +2, but it is rejected for the generalised entropy indices (the Theil index and 
the squared coefficient of variation).68 Table 4.7 shows the Pearson correlation among 
these indices for 1998. The correlations are high and up to 0.94. They are also 
significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) and to the first three decimals.
Table 4.7: Pearson Correlations among Inequality Indices on Age at which the Highest Grade was 
Completed in 1998
AGINI AGE1 AGE2 ARMD AA050
AGINl 1 0.980
(0.000)**
85
0.962
(0.000)**
85
0.992
(0.000)**
85
0.966
(0.000)**
85
AGE1 1 0.996
(0.000)**
85
0.966
(0.000)**
85
0.970
(0.000)**
85
AGE2 1 0.944
(0.000)**
85
0.959
(0.000)**
85
ARMD 1 0.948
(0.000)**
85
AA050 1
Note: ** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
To avoid repetition, I present only the spatial autocorrelations analysis for the Gini 
coefficient, because all human capital inequality indices are highly correlated with one 
another. The Moran’s I statistic for the rook first order contiguity spatial weights 
schemes over the period 1995-2000 shows a positive spatial autocorrelation (Table 4.8). 
The space-time statistics are also high. For instance, the Moran’s I statistic between an 
example of within-region inequality in 2000 and inequality in neighbouring regions in 
1998 is 0.7280, which depicts the space-time correlation in 1998, while the univariate 
Moran’s I statistic for 2000 is 0.7150. Constructing the 3-nearest neighbours spatial
68 The ratio o f skewness to standard error is 0.31 for the Gini coefficient, 2.02 for the Theil index, 2.36 
for the squared coefficient o f variation, 0.32 for the relative mean deviation index and 1.88 for the 
Atkinson index. In view o f the sensitivity o f the Atkinson index to income, once again, this index should 
become more sensitive to ‘transfers’ among people who completed their highest formal studies when they 
were young and less sensitive to ‘transfers’ among people who completed their studies when they were 
older. Additionally, at higher values the sensitivity parameters o f the Atkinson index (i.e. £  =  1 and 
£  =  2 ) fit better to the normal distribution because the ratio o f skewness to standard error is lower (i.e., 
AA100= 1.72 and AA200=1.42, respectively).
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weights schemes, the univariate and bivariate Moran’s I statistic (the spatial 
autocorrelation and the space-time correlation, respectively) are high. Finally, the 
Moran’s I statistics based on the distance band are much lower than the former schemes.
Table 4.8: Moran’s I for the Gini Coefficient on Age at which the Highest Education Level was 
Completed (AGINI)
Excluded SE  LU (E[l]=-0.0109)
rook first o rder contiguity 3 -n eare st ne ighbours threshold  d is tan ce
M oran's I Mean Sd Z-value M oran 's I M ean Sd Z-value M oran's I Mean Sd Z-value
Spatial au to ­
correlation
1995 0.7366 -0 0071 0 0761 9.7727 0 7902 -0.0091 0.0797 10.0289 0.3872 -0.0115 0.0233 17.1116
1996 0.7385 -0 0097 0 0741 10.0972 0.7913 -0.0111 0 .0817 9 8213 0.3845 -0.0136 0.0214 18.6028
1997 0 7319 -0.0079 0.0777 9.5212 0.7827 -0.0091 0 .0813 9 7392 0.3807 -0.0102 0 .0236 16.5636
1998
1999
2000
S pace-tim e
correlation
1998
2000
Excluded S E  LU FR (E[l]=-0.0119)
rook first order contiguity 3 -n eare st neighbours threshold  d is tan ce
M oran's I M ean Sd Z-value M oran 's I Mean Sd Z-value M oran's I Mean Sd Z-value
Spatial au to ­
correlation
1995 0.7743 -0.0083 0.0832 9.4063 0.8516 -0 .0117 0 .0800 10.7913 0.4541 -0 .0115 0.0269 17.3086
1996 0.7774 -0.0121 0.0834 9.4664 0 .8532 -0.0101 0.0801 10.7778 0.4519 -0.0132 0.0263 17.6844
1997 0.7701 -0.0115 0.0805 9.7093 0 .8436 -0.0161 0.0784 10 9656 0.4477 -0.0103 0.0266 17.2180
1998 0.7557 -0.0154 0.0813 9.4846 0.8440 -0 0087 0.0799 10.6721 0.4098 -0 .0132 0.0255 16.5882
1999 0.7565 -0.0130 0.0820 9.3841 0 8393 -0 .0099 0.0784 10.8316 0.4070 -0.0106 0.0261 16.0000
2000 0.7150 -0.0108 0.0807 8.9938 0.8026 -0 .0110 0.0772 10.5389 0.3527 -0.0121 0.0263 13.8707
S pace-tim e
correlation
1998 0.7696 -0.0109 0.0783 9.9681 0.8527 -0.0102 0.0795 10.8541 0.4184 -0.0113 0.0256 16 7852
2000 0.7280 -0.0042 0.0814 8.9951 0.8089 -0.0143 0.0769 10.7048 0 3766 -0.0107 0.0256 15.1289
Note: All statistics are significant at p=0.001; E[I]: theoretical mean; Mean: observed mean.
Figure 4.15 displays the cluster maps for inequality in age at which the highest 
education level was completed in 1996, 1998 and 2000, at three weights schemes. They 
confirm the local variation in the spatial autocorrelation. Inequality in human capital is 
concentrated in particular areas o f  Europe. The regions with relatively high levels o f  
educational inequality (respectively low) are more often located close to other regions 
with a relatively high degree educational inequality (respectively high) rather than their 
location being purely random. Different trends in inequality distribution exist over the 
EU space. The weights schemes o f  the first order contiguity and the 3-nearest 
neighbours show that clusters o f  regions with high educational inequality are found in 
central and northern Italy (Nord Ovest, Lombardia, Emilia-Romagna and Centro), in 
southern Portugal (Lisboa, Alentejo and Algavre) and in eastern Germany 
(Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Sachsen). Additionally, the southern 
Portugal cluster extends further for the distance band schemes to include southern 
Spanish regions. In contrast, most British regions are clusters with low human capital 
inequality. The distance band weights schemes create larger clusters than the previous
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schemes. Furthermore, Noroeste, Noreste, Niedersachsen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, 
Rheinland-Pfalz and Saarland are spatial outliers over the period 1996-2000.
Figure 4.15: Cluster Map for the Gini Coefficient on Age at which the Highest Education Level was 
Completed (AGINI) in 1996, 1998 and 2000
Rook first order contiguity 3-nearest neighbours Threshold distance
1996 1996 1996
1998 1998
A
1998
2000 2000 2000
(1) LISA Cluster Map (
Not Significant 
■  High-High 
I  Low-Low 
H i  Low-High 
High-Low
Considering the inequality in the age at which the highest education level was 
completed, the maps and the boxplots reveal one key source o f  spatial heterogeneity, 
which is the degree o f  urbanisation. This seems to be negatively correlated with 
educational inequality. The figures show an increase in the homogeneity within urban 
centres and within rural areas. Spatial autocorrelation seems to favour the diffusion o f  
human capital activities from one urban centre to another or from the inner to the outer 
city, rather than from the urban centre to the periphery. Nevertheless, the distance 
between these groups remained the same, highlighting the stagnation o f  the polarisation
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or stratification process, on the one hand, and the persistence of educational inequality, 
on the other. Hence the existence of autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and persistence 
highlights the need for space-time analysis of educational inequality.
4.3.4 Within-region Educational Inequality as a Component o f the 
Educational Inequality in Europe
In this subsection, educational inequality within regions is considered as a component of 
European educational inequality, through the use of the two-stage nested Theil 
decomposition method to explore individual-level human capital data (both for the 
highest education level completed and for the age at which the highest education level 
was completed) for the EU.
Educational inequality is measured using the relative mean deviation index, the Theil 
index, the squared coefficient of variation, the Gini coefficient and the Atkinson index. 
The short evolution of both proxies for educational inequality in Europe is presented in 
Figure 4.16. It also illustrates the Lorenz curve, which shows that educational inequality 
was higher in 1996 than in 2000.
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Figure 4.16: The Evolution of E uropean  H um an  Capita l Inequality
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First, with regard to the highest education level completed, inequality in Europe fell 
considerably from 1997 to 1998. Second, with regard to the age at which the highest 
education level was completed, the educational inequality in Europe remained the same 
not only from 1995 to 1997, but also from 1998 to 2000.
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Figure 4.17: Three-level Human Capital Decomposition by Theil Index for the EU from 1996 to 
2000
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Figure 4.17 shows the results from the application o f  the two-stage nested Theil 
decomposition method for inequality in education level completed and for inequality in 
the age at which the highest education level was completed. The contribution o f  the 
three components —  inequality between-countries, between-regions and within-regions 
—  to overall human capital inequality in Europe was pretty much the same between 
1996 and 2000. In 1996, for instance, 89.64 per cent o f  the overall inequality in 
education level completed and 89.71 per cent o f  the overall inequality in age at which 
the highest education level was completed was due to the within-region component. The 
between-region and between-country components o f  inequality in the education level 
completed accounted for 5.34 per cent and 5.02 per cent, respectively; and those 
components o f inequality in the age a which the highest grade was completed comprised
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0.65 per cent and 9.64 per cent. The within-region component of educational inequality 
constitutes the major portion of the educational inequality in Europe. Furthermore, the 
between-region component of inequality in the age at which the highest education level 
was reached represents a very minor portion of the educational inequality in Europe. It 
is likely to involve country-specific factors, such as national educational policies and 
guidelines, which have a common effect on all regions within national borders. The 
inequalities based on individual human capital data are much higher than the 
inequalities based on aggregated data (i.e. national educational inequality). This figure 
provides arguments for an influence of national factors as national policies or 
legislation. Country-specific factors are likely to have a common effect on all regions 
within national borders. Once again, policy-makers should pay more attention to the 
within-region educational inequalities than to the between-region and between-country 
inequalities, because the within-region inequalities are far more prominent than the 
other components. This may lead to the formulation of better welfare policies.
4.3.5 The Relationship between the Two Proxies fo r  Educational 
Inequality
The relationship between inequality in the education level completed and inequality in 
the age at which the highest education level was completed is investigated by the 
comparison of their boxplots, the Pearson correlation index and the bivariate Moran’s I 
statistic.
First, on a comparison of the univariate boxplots of proxies for educational inequality 
(Figure 4.18), it is found that the distributions of both proxies are quite compact. 
However, the difference between the two whiskers of distributions for inequality in the 
education level completed is approximately triple that of inequality in age. Furthermore, 
the minimum value of the distribution for inequality in the education level completed is 
the maximum one for the other proxy for educational inequality.
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Figure 4.18: Boxplot for the Gini Coefficient on Education Level Completed (EGIN1) and Gini 
Coefficient on Age at which the Highest Education Level was Completed (AGINI)
1.0 '
.8 '
.6 '
4«
.2 ■
0.0 ,
N
Note: extreme cases and outliers are sorted in descending order: EGINI: PT3, PT2, PT15 and PT14 (upper end); DE4, DEE, DED and DEG 
(lower end) in 1995; PT2, PT3, PT12, PT14, PT15 and PT11 (upper end); DED and DEG (lower end) in 1996; PT14 and PT12 (upper end) 
in 1998 (see Appendix A 1.1).
Second, measuring the Pearson correlation index, a positive linear correlation is noted 
for 1998, 1999 and 2000 (Table 4.9).
Table 4.9: Pearson Correlation between Two Proxies for the Gini Coefficient on Education
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
EGINI-AGINI 0.053 0.062 0.090 0.456 0.443 0.261
(0.627) (0.576) (0.412) (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.016)*
85 85 85 85 85 85
0.069 0.073 0.104
(0.510) (0.486) (0.319)
93 93 93
Note: ** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); * correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Third, the correlation between the Gini coefficient on the education level completed in a 
region and the Gini coefficient on the age at which the highest education level was 
completed in neighbouring regions, and vice versa, are explored. In 1996, for instance, 
the bivariate Moran’s I statistic is not significant either. Conversely, in 1998, for which 
the Pearson correlation has the highest value, the bivariate Moran’s I statistic between 
inequality in education level completed in a region and inequality in age in 
neighbouring regions is 0.3712, while that between inequality in age in one region and 
inequality in education level completed in neighbouring regions is 0.3843 for first order 
contiguity spatial weights schemes, 0.4663 and 0.4323, respectively, for 3-nearest
II
= 94 93 94 93 102 93 102 85 102 85 102 85
EGINI_95 EGINI_96 EGINI_97 EGINI_98 EGINI_99 EGINI_00
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182
neighbours weights schemes, and 0.2742 and 0.2797, respectively, for threshold 
distance band weights schemes. These statistics are significant at the 0.001 level.
4.4 Correlation between Educational Attainment and 
Educational Inequality
In this subsection, the correlation between educational attainment and educational 
inequality is explored, considering both proxies.
Table 4.10 illustrates the Pearson correlations between the average educational 
attainment and inequality in the education level completed. The relationship is negative 
and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The higher the educational attainment, the 
lower the educational inequality, and vice versa. Education seems to be one of the most 
powerful instruments known for reducing educational inequality. An increase in 
opportunities to acquire higher education is likely to reduce the educational inequality, 
as more people are able to improve their socioeconomic circumstances. Educational 
expansion seems to offer more educational opportunities and numerous favourable 
chances to both advantaged and disadvantaged groups.
Table 4.10: Pearson Correlation between Average Education Level Completed (EMN) and
Inequality in Education Level Completed
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
EGINI -0.899 -0.869 -0.892 -0.900 -0.902 -0.880
(0.000)**
94
(0.000)**
94
(0.000)**
94
(0.000)**
94
(0.000)**
94
(0.000)**
94
-0.901 -0.9 -0.902 -0.882
(0.000)**
102
(0.000)**
102
(0.000)**
102
(0.000)**
102
EGE1 -0.898 -0.876 -0.890 -0.853 -0.866 -0.877
(0.000)**
94
(0.000)**
94
(0.000)**
94
(0.000)** 
94
(0.000)**
94
(0.000)**
94
-0.898 -0.854 -0.866 -0.879
(0.000)**
102
(0.000)**
102
(0.000)**
102
(0.000)**
102
EGE2 -0.785 -0.771 -0.781 -0.766 -0.791 -0.811
(0.000)* ♦ 
94
(0.000)**
94
(0.000)* ♦ 
94
(0.000)**
94
(0.000)**
94
(0.000)**
94
-0.784 -0.769 -0.794 -0.815
(0.000)**
102
(0.000)**
102
(0.000)**
102
(0.000)**
102
ERMD -0.904 -0.876 -0.894 -0.856 -0.858 -0.855
(0.000)**
94
(0.000)**
94
(0.000)**
94
(0.000)**
94
(0.000)**
94
(0.000)**
94
-0.902 -0.849 -0.852 -0.853
(0.000)**
102
(0.000)**
102
(0.000)**
102
(0.000)**
102
EA050 -0.907 -0.879 -0.896 -0.869 -0.871 -0.860
(0.000)**
94
(0.000)**
94
(0.000)**
94
(0.000)**
94
(0.000)**
94
(0.000)**
94
-0.905 -0.865 -0.868 -0.862
(0.000)**
102
(0.000)**
102
(0.000)**
102
(0.000)**
102
N ote: ** co rre la tion  is s ign ifican t a t the 0.01 level (2 -tailed).
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Table 4.11 shows the Pearson correlations between average educational attainment and 
inequality in the age at which the highest education level was completed. This 
relationship is positive but not statistically significant for the squared coefficient of 
variation over the period 1995-2000 and for the Theil and the Atkinson indices for the 
period between 1995 and 1997. This is probably because occupations that require high 
levels of investment in human capital are beyond the reach of most poor people, who 
choose instead to work for others (Baneijee and Newman, 1991, 1993). Another 
possible explanation is that the poor require relatively higher returns in order to increase 
their expenditure on education, so they invest smaller shares of their income in 
education than the rich do (Ceroni, 2001). Those measures that encompass experience, 
learning by doing and on-the-job training may positively affect educational inequality, 
such opportunities are likely to be offered to the already advantaged groups. For 
instance, people with more work experience may be more informed and make better 
choices than those with little experience.
Table 4.11: Pearson Correlation between the Average Age at which the Highest Education Level 
was Completed (AMN) and Inequality in the Age at which the Highest Education Level was
Completed
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
AGINI 0.240 0.238 0.251 0.360 0.356 0.351
(0.027)* (0.028)* (0.020)* (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)**
85 85 85 85 85 85
0.267 0.263 0.275
(0.010)** (0.011)* (0.008)**
93 93 93
AGEI 0.125 0.130 0.140 0.265 0.257 0.243
(0.254) (0.236) (0.200) (0.014)* (0.017)* (0.025)*
85 85 85 85 85 85
0.165 0.166 0.174
(0.114) (0.112) (0.095)
93 93 93
AGE2 0.064 0.071 0.077
(0.559) (0.517) (0.481)
85 85 85
0.110 0.113 0.117 0.207 0.210 0.177
(0.294) (0.283) (0.265) (0.058) (0.053) (0.105)
93 93 93 85 85 85
ARMD 0.261 0.265 0.282 0.389 0.375 0.364
(0.016)* (0.014)* (0.009)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.001)**
85 85 85 85 85 85
0.288 0.290 0.305
(0.005)** (0.005)** (0.003)**
93 93 93
AA050 0.147 0.151 0.163 0.285 0.273 0.268
(0.179) (0.168) (0.136) (0.008)** (0.012)* (0.013)*
85 85 85 85 85 85
0.184 0.185 0.195
(0.077) (0.077) (0.062)
93 93 93
Note: ** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); * correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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4.5 Conclusion
The European regions differ with regard to the average educational attainment and 
inequality in human capital. The geographical distribution of educational attainment and 
inequality is not uniform. It is characterised by significant positive global spatial 
autocorrelation and space-time correlation. The evolution of education within a region is 
closely related to its evolution in neighbouring regions (denoting spatial 
autocorrelation). The spatial evolution of education affects the dynamic evolution of 
human capital through geographical distances and proximity (showing space-time 
correlation). For instance, a region surrounded by highly-educated economies can 
achieve a higher educational stock. The reverse is also true. The use of Moran’s I 
statistics leads to the same results for the sign (positive) and significance of global 
spatial dependence, highlighting the robustness of the results with regard to the choice 
of the spatial weights matrix. Since labour is a mobile production factor, public 
infrastructure investments in one region can draw production away from other regions 
or provide access to adjacent regions that were not previously accessible (Lall and 
Yilmaz, 2001). Regional variations in educational attainment and inequality are likely to 
reveal regional variations in the average attainment and inequality in skills, efforts, 
opportunities, knowledge and aspiration, on the one hand; and national institutional 
differences, on the other. The application of the global and local spatial association tests 
leads to the detection of educational patterns in the territory of the EU, which have not 
changed dramatically throughout the whole period of study, denoting a persistence in 
patterns of of educational attainment and inequality in specific regions. Human capital 
is an important factor in shaping regional interactions. Regional disparities in education 
are influenced by region- and nation-specific characteristics and the availability of 
highly-educated people in neighbouring regions.
The ESDA on education emphasises some kind of spatial heterogeneity hidden within 
the spatial autocorrelation pattern. The spatial effects perform differently according to 
two regimes: the urbanisation pattern and the European north-south divide. There are 
systematic differences between urban and rural European regions and between northern 
and southern European regions. Because of the spatial interactions between regions, 
geographical location (urban or rural and north or south) is important in accounting for 
the human capital performance of regions. Regions are geographically correlated due to 
certain processes, which connect different areas, such educational diffusion and the 
existence of national institutions. Vaya et al. (2004: 433) point out that externalities spill
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over the barriers of regional economies, in a process that resembles the cross economy 
interactions outlined in Lucas (1988; 1993). They also emphasise that there are spatial 
limits to the spread of externalities and that the diffusion of skills and knowledge will 
always be easier within groups of closely related economies (‘clubs’). Economies 
within a group (i.e. the group of northern European countries) interact more with one 
another than with those outside the group. The diffusion of human capital seems to be 
stronger between regions of the same economy than the diffusion between national 
economies. The analysis shows that educational policies should account for the 
spillover effects with adjoining regions. The prevalence of interregional educational 
externalities may have created a ‘human capital poverty trap’, based on geographical 
location.
Finally, the within-region component of educational inequality constitutes the major 
portion of European educational inequality, while the between-region component 
represents the minor portion.
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5 Chapter Five. The Income-Education Relationship 
and Regional Economic Growth
5.1 Introduction
The contribution of this chapter is to analyse the relationship between income and 
educational distributions through the examination of the parametric models of 
lognormal and gamma distributions, cross-tabulation analysis and the comparison of the 
within-region income and educational inequalities.69 This chapter also explores the 
spatial autocorrelation and spatial heterogeneity of regional economic growth. The core 
methodology used is descriptive analysis.
This chapter consists of two sections and proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 examines the 
relationship between income and educational distribution. It firstly tests whether the 
income and educational distributions in Europe follow the lognormal and gamma 
distributions. Then, it examines the evolution of the income-education relationship 
using cross-tabulation analysis. Finally, it looks at the within-region inequalities as 
components of the European inequalities. Section 5.3 displays ESDA on regional 
economic growth. The last section offers some conclusions.
5.2 The Relationship between Income and Educational 
Distribution
5,2.1 Lognormal and Gamma distributions
Both lognormal and gamma distributions have been used in the study of income 
distribution (i.e. Aitchison and Brown, 1957; Salem and Mount, 1974). In this 
subsection, the income and educational distributions for Europe are tested for whether 
they follow the lognormal and gamma distributions. The hypothesis is that both 
distributions follow the lognormal and gamma ones, because, in accordance with the 
theoretical background, income and education are positively correlated.
(1) The general form of the lognormal density function is
69 This chapter deals only with income distribution for the population as a whole, due to the minor 
differences between distributions for the population as a whole and for normally working people.
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f ( x ; n , c r )  =
X G 42n
exp
2<j
X—  ( \ n ( x ) - f i ) 2 , 0 < x < o o , a > 0 ,
Where the estimated parameters are f i  and g  (Gamulka, 2001). 
(2) The gamma density function is
f ( x ; a , G )  =
o T ( a )
- >  f  f x \ \
exp , x  >  0 , cr >  0, a  > 0
where the estimated parameters are a  and cr (Gamulka, 2001).
The analysis performed here provides the Maximum Likelihood (ML) and the optimal
70B-robust estimator (OBRE) testing ground for hypothesis. The OBRE estimation of 
these parametric models is less efficient than the ML estimation, but it is also less 
sensitive to data errors (Gamulka, 2001). In practical terms, more weight is given to the 
bulk of the data, less to the tails (Gamulka, 2001). For OBRE, the ‘robustness constant’ 
c  is equal to 3.71 Table 5.1 displays the estimated parameters and the standard errors of 
the lognormal and gamma distributions over the period 1995-2000.
The findings show that the lognormal distribution fits that of the individual income data 
much better than the gamma distribution, because the standard error on the parameter cr 
for gamma distribution is very high. Besides, the lognormal curve is the better 
approximation for the lower range of incomes (Aitchison and Brown, 1957). 
Nevertheless, both proxies for educational distributions fit individual data. The 
estimated parameters are likely to indicate a correlation between income and human 
capital, but this correlation seems not to be perfect, since their parameters are not close 
to one another.
Table 5.1: Lognormal and Gamma Distributions
Lognormal distribution Gamma distribution
M G a G
Distribution of income for the whole of 7.6885 3.3124 0.3166 33292.4
the population (0.0040) (0.0028) (0.0004) (84.2211)
8.8204 1.7620 □ □
(0.0022) (0.0016)
Distribution of education level 0.4024 0.4386 5.2278 0.3158
completed (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0081) (0.0005)
0.4024 0.4634 4.6878 0.3546
70 See Hampel et al. (1986).
71 The bigger the value of c , the less robust and more efficient OBRE is; in the limiting case c  — oo , 
OBRE becomes identical with ML (Gamulka, 2001).
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(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0077) (0.0006)
Distribution of age at which the highest 2.8358 0.3075 9.8980 1.8129
education level was completed (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0183) (0.0034)
2.8120 0.2880 12.4156 1.3862
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0248) (0.0028)
Note: The standard errors are in parenthesis. The OBRE estimations are in italics (therelative precision is 0.001 and the max iteration is 20). 
□: The estimated CL = 0.3166 is out of the range covered by the algorithm.
5.2.2 The Income-Education Relationship: A Cross-tabulation Analysis
According to the literature, income and human capital are expected to be positively 
correlated. Figure 5.1 shows the relationship between the individual’s total net personal 
income and his/her educational attainment. The higher the level of education completed 
by the individual, the higher his/her total income. One should bear in mind that the 
income-education relationship is lagged. An individual’s educational level makes a 
difference to their income. First of all, people who hold a recognised qualification at the 
tertiary education level have a higher income in general than people who have 
completed the second stage of secondary level education, who, in turn, have a higher 
income in general than people who have completed less than the second stage of 
secondary level education. Secondly, similar results are demonstrated when I consider 
the age of the respondents on completion of their highest education level. A categorical 
variable with six educational categories (age bands) has been created. The findings 
show that the higher the age-related educational categories, the higher the income per 
capita, for all but the last category. To sum up, the cross-tabulation analysis illustrates 
the positive correlation between income and education.
(1) From education to income’. The findings are likely to demonstrate that an 
individual’s success in the educational arena seems to be the predominant factor 
influencing his/her eventual occupational attainment and rewards, and thus his/her 
income levels (Ainsworth and Roscigno, 2005). People generally require higher 
education in order to get better paid jobs. Better-educated people are also more 
productive, because they are socialised in ways to increase their productivity and to 
improve their economic standing by making effective social networks. People who 
remain in school, are likely to acquire some specific traits that increase their 
productivity. Additionally, they are likely to have a higher level of aspiration and, 
therefore, to put more effort into their career in order to secure high-wage jobs (Hansen, 
2001). Education, therefore, seems to be central to occupations and incomes. Those who 
are otherwise able, but lack appropriate credentials are likely to be excluded from high- 
wage jobs. Once people have obtained the necessary credentials, they are more likely to
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secure a well-paid job. Education enables individuals to improve their economic 
circumstances, because it offers credentials that signal underlying abilities, preferences 
and privileges (Hannum and Buchmann, 2005). Education usually offers plenty of 
economic opportunities to both advantaged and disadvantaged groups. The potential of 
education for reducing income inequality seems to be associated with abilities, choices, 
preferences and the level of aspiration, because these factors enable individuals to 
improve their economic status. One should also keep in mind that individuals differ not 
only with regard to their potential skills and preferences, but also with regard to their 
inherited wealth, which crucially determines whether they can afford to invest in human 
capital. Income is, therefore, likely to be an indirect source of one’s academic 
credentials. Each person wants to maximise his/her economic welfare by investing an 
appropriate amount in human capital (Becker and Chiswick, 1966). Consequently, 
income seems to be a function of an individual’s ability, education and other legitimate 
training.
(2) From income to education'. An individual’s income level seems to be a crucial factor 
in his/her educational choices and opportunities. Although the European capital market 
is not so perfect that anyone may borrow for their education against their expected 
future earnings, the imperfect information about individual abilities and the imperfect 
enforcement of educational loans does not appear to greatly restrict the option of 
borrowing for education, because most people rely heavily on their own sources of 
finance to invest in education, while at the same time the cost of human capital is 
relatively low (Alesina and Perotti, 1994). Rich people often inherit a large initial sum 
and do not need to borrow in order to gain better access to education. Nevertheless, a 
few European citizens (or families) face credit constraints that prevent them from 
continuing to a profitable level education level, although primary and secondary 
education is compulsory and the tuition fees for tertiary education are relatively low. 
One should also bear in mind that human capital may serve as collateral in some 
European countries (i.e. the United Kingdom), although it is not possible to expropriate. 
Another explanation for the income-education relationship is that the process of 
development alters the demand for and supply of different types of labour, the returns to 
and allocations of occupations and, hence, the educational choices (Banerjee and 
Newman, 1993).
Consequently, education in Europe is correlated with economic status, measured in 
terms of income, because it reflects an individual’s lifetime economic opportunities.
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Education exerts an influence on the demand for and supply o f  skilled labour, and hence 
on the relative wages (Tinbergen, 1975). The differences in income across individuals 
may reflect the differences in educational opportunities (Johnson 2002).
Figure 5.1: Income Per Capita (t-1) and Educational Categories (t) from 1996 to 2001
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5.2.3 Comparing the Within-region Income Inequality with the Within- 
region Educational Inequality as Components o f European Inequality
Figure 5.2 illustrates the percentage o f  the within-region, between-region (but within 
country) and between-country inequality components o f  European income and 
educational inequality. The within-region income and educational inequality 
components represent the major portion o f  European inequality. The inequalities that 
are based on the average level o f  a distribution (the between-region and between- 
country components) are much lower than inequalities that are measured at the
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individual level (the within-region component). Thus, relatively high inequalities exist 
among the individuals within each European region.
Comparing inequalities based on the average level of a distribution, the findings 
indicate that the between-country component accounts for a larger portion of the overall 
inequlity than the between-region component. This most probably is an indication that 
national policies (i.e. tax policies, trade reforms, educational policies) outweigh regional 
ones (i.e. public infrastructure policies).
The between-region component of income inequality is larger than the between-region 
component of inequality in education level completed, which in turn is larger than the 
between-region component of inequality in the age at which the highest level of 
education is completed. In 1998, for example, 7.54 per cent, 3.55 per cent and 0.52 per 
cent of the overall inequality was due to the between-region income, education level 
completed and age inequality components, respectively. This is most probably due to 
the fact that since national educational policies and guidelines have a common affect on 
all regions within national borders, they may halt any increase in the between-region 
income inequality, because people do not need to migrate for educational reasons (at 
least at primary and secondary education level). Thus, national educational policies 
seem to affect not only the spatial distribution of human capital, but also the spatial 
distribution of income.
The two-stage decomposition analysis indicates that the between-region component, 
which is the sum of the between-country and between-region components, is almost the 
same for both proxies for educational inequality, accounting for about ten per cent of 
the overall European inequality. Hence, there is a small disparity in educational 
inequality between the regions of the EU. This is possibly a reflection of the relatively 
low levels of interregional migration across different educational groups.
To sum up, policy-makers should place more emphasis on the within-region inequalities 
in income and education than on the between-region and between-country inequalities, 
because the former components account for the major portion of the EU inequality.
192
Figure 5.2: Three-level Income and Educational Decomposition by Theil Index for the EU from 
1996 to 2000.
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5.3 Regional Economic Growth
Regional economic growth ( GGR2Ijt) in region i and in year t is defined as
Gj. — G: , 2
GGR2I it = ---------- 1— , where Git denotes GDP per capita.
G.J-2
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The first step of the descriptive analysis is to map the macroeconomic data in order to 
see whether regional economic growth is randomly distributed over the EU, or whether 
there are similarities between regions. Figure 5.3 shows the spatial distribution of 
economic growth in 1998, 2000 and 2002.
(1) In 1998: In the United Kingdom, Portugal and Spain, urban areas have a higher 
growth rate than peripheral and rural areas. The GDP per capita of rural areas diverges 
from the national average. In the United Kingdom, for instance, the regions around 
Greater London (Berkshire, Gloucestershire, Leicestershire and Bedfordshire) not only 
have the highest growth in Britain, but also belong to the list of the ten highest growth 
regions in Europe. This most probably reflects either the trickling down of economic 
development or, according to the NEG, the establishment of centrifugal forces in the 
growth process. The forces arising from product market and factor market competition 
such as the bidding up of local land and wage costs (Martin, 1999c: 68) outweigh those 
emanating from the home market and price index effect. Furthermore, closer integration 
in the EU combined with lower costs in London’s neighbouring regions have tended to 
favour some diffusion of development. Cornwall, Lincolnshire, Cleveland, Humberside 
and Lancashire feature in the list of the ten lowest growth regions. In the United 
Kingdom, there is a north-south divide in the growth process. In Spain, the growth 
process is relatively buoyant in Comunidad de Madrid, but it is low in its neighbouring 
region (Centro). In this case, the centripetal forces may outweigh the centrifugal forces. 
The case of Madrid is appealing, because the large market and the high GDP per capita 
allow the producers to economise on the trade costs. The Spanish capital region’s access 
to major markets is not impeded by large trade costs. These tend to reward its factors 
with higher wages and high economic growth.
(2) In 2000: Regional economic growth has changed slightly. The list of the ten highest 
growth regions includes the southern Swedish regions (Stockholm, Sydsverige and 
Vastsverige). Growth seems to be more randomly distributed in 2000 than in 1998. Irish 
economic growth in 2000, as in 1998, is among the highest in the EU. It is described in 
the literature as the ‘Irish economic model’. Many reasons have been suggested for 
Ireland’s success such as the low corporation tax rate, the large multinational presence, 
the high proportion of the population of working age and increased participation in the
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labour market especially by females, among others. The combination of these factors 
can help explain the impressive Irish growth rates.
(3) In 2002: Regional economic growth has changed dramatically. There are striking 
disparities in growth performance between the central and the peripheral regions. The 
growth rate in Greece, Spain and Ireland, and in the less economically advanced British 
regions, is double the EU average. This most probably indicates some convergence in 
the EU. According to the European Commission (2004), convergence has been driven 
by the tighter European integration. In cohesion countries, the Structural Funds, the 
supply-side improvements and the shift into higher value-added sectors may all have 
played an important role in the convergence process. Growth seems to be randomly 
distributed in the British regions, while in Spain and in Greece it is evenly distributed. 
Finally, the process of catching up in three of the four Cohesion countries (Spain, 
Greece and Portugal) stems not only from growth in the relatively rich urban areas 
(particularly capital cities), but also from growth in the poorer regions.
Urbanisation seems to be a crucial factor in regional economic growth performance. 
The regions with the lowest growth rate are generally rural areas. According to the 
European Commission (2004), the urban areas are concentrated in or near the rich 
central part of the EU, reflecting the association of cities. In many peripheral parts, 
notably in Scotland, Ireland, Greece and Sweden, urban areas are relatively small and 
scattered, while rural areas predominate. The growth rate in urban areas is higher than 
that in rural areas, because towns and cities tend not only to be centres of prosperity, 
creativity, culture and innovation in the EU, but also communication hubs (European 
Commission, 2004). The major urban centres are also characterised by services. 
Companies, headquarters, research activity, education and centres of decision-making 
are concentrated in cities. Each city has a different degree of specialisation. Capital 
cities in Scandinavia, for example, are specialised in new technology. An analysis of the 
cooperation networks between towns and cities indicates the existence of a strong 
network of major ‘metropoles’ in the centre of Europe, including London, Paris 
Frankfurt, Amsterdam and Milan (European Commission, 2004: 28). Nevertheless, the 
main problems facing the EU, such as unemployment, are for the most part concentrated 
and accentuated in urban areas. For example, London has some of the most deprived 
areas in the EU. Urban areas can have a low-skilled workforce and can form islands of
72 www.ersi.ie.
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poverty within a prosperous region (European Commission, 2004). Rural areas contain 
a wealth of natural resources, habitats and strong cultural traditions and important 
tourist locations, on the one hand, yet on the other hand they are overdependent on 
resource-based activities, particularly in agriculture, which means that they are 
vulnerable to the restructuring and rationalisation of such sectors, and they also have 
low levels of output and income (European Commission, 2004). Finally, considering 
simultaneously the spatial distribution of GDP per capita, any divergence process within 
a country stems more from growth in relatively rich urban regions rather than from any 
activities in poorer regions.
Figure 5.3 also shows that latitude does not matter for growth. The levels of growth in 
northern and southern areas do not seem to have evolved differently.
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Figure 5.3: Spatial Distribution o f  Regional Economic G row th  (GG R 2I)  in 1998, 2000 and  2002
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Figure 5.4 shows the boxplot for regional economic growth. In 1998, the peripheral 
regions o f  Ireland and Madeira, Berkshire and Luxemburg are outliers at the upper end 
o f the distribution. In 2000, the outliers at the upper end o f  the distribution are the 
peripheral regions o f  Ireland, Madeira, A ^ res  and Luxemburg, while the British region 
o f  Cumbria is an outlier at the lower end o f  the distribution. In 2002, the distribution o f  
growth is the most compact. The growth rates o f  most European regions are between the
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first and third quartile. Average regional growth in the EU increased between 1998 and 
2000 by 0.229 per cent, while it decreased between 2000 and 2002 by 0.376, as a result 
o f  the short EU depression. The boxplot is likely to show some convergence in the EU.
Figure 5.4: Boxplot for Regional Economic Growth in 1998 (GGR2I 96), 2000 (GGR2I 98) and 
2002 (G G R 2I00)
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Note: extreme cases and outliers are sorted in descending order:
IE, LU, PT3, UK52 (upper end) in 1998; IE, LU, PT3, PT2 (lowerend) and UK12 (upper end) in 2000 (see Appendix Al l).
An examination o f  spatial effects highlights the possible importance o f  spatial 
interactions and geographical location for regional economic performance. The spatial 
autocorrelation for regional economic growth shows the relationship between similarity 
o f growth and spatial proximity. This is displayed in Table 5.2. Due to the low  Moran’s 
I statistic for regional economic growth, it seems to be randomly distributed over space. 
This reinforces the view  that latitude and institutions do not matter for growth.
Table 5.2: Moran’s I for Regional Economic Growth (GGR2I)
13 coun tries (E[l]=-0.0099)
rook first o rder contiguity 3 -n ea re st neighbours threshold  d is tan ce
M oran's I Mean Sd Z-value M oran's I M ean Sd Z-value M oran's I M ean Sd Z-value
Spatial au to ­
correlation
1998 0.2571 -0.0164 0.0725 3.7724 0.3027 -0.0065 0.0741 4.1727 0.1494 -0 .0108 0.0222 7.2162
2000 0.2118 -0.0084 0.0748 2 9439 0.2166 -0.0097 0.0753 3.0053 0.1654 -0 .0099 0 .0234 7.4915
2002 0.5941 -0.0097 0.0735 8 2150 0.6445 -0.0081 0.0730 8 9397 0.3191 -0.0101 0.0226 14.5664
S pace-tim e
correlation
2000 0.0829 -0 0063 0.0601 1 4842 0.1566 -0 .0046 0.0585 2.7556 0.1273 -0 .0050 0 .0188 7.0372
2002 0.0098 0 0000 0.0546 0.1795 0.0436 -0 .0039 0.0566 0.8392 0.0622 -0 .0009 0.0177 3.5650
Note: Space-time correlation in 2000 (rook first order contiguity), in 2002 (rook first order contiguity) and in 2002 (3-nearest neighbours) is 
not statistically significant; E[I]: theoretical mean; Mean: observed mean.
Figure 5.5 shows the cluster maps for regional economic growth in 1998, 2000 and 
2002. They illustrate the local variations in spatial autocorrelation o f  regional growth.
102 102 102
GGR2I 96 GGR2I_98 GGR2I_00
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According to the rook first order contiguity spatial weights matrix, the north-eastern 
European regions (the Swedish regions of Mellersta-Norrland and Vastsverige, 
Denmark, and the German regions of Niedersachsen, Mecklenburg and Brandenburg) 
formed a cluster of low growth rate regions. In 2002, this cluster expanded southward to 
include Hessen, Baden-Wurttemberg, Austria and northern Italy. In 1998, clusters of 
high economic growth include the relatively advanced economic regions of the southern 
United Kingdom, indicating some divergence, while in 2000 and 2002 the rich clusters 
include the less economically advanced regions of Alentejo and Greece indicating some 
convergence in the EU. While the cluster maps of the first order contiguity schemes and 
the 3-nearest neighbours schemes are quite similar, the clusters created by the threshold 
distance weights schemes are more spread out. To conclude, spatial autocorrelation 
analysis indicates some convergence in the EU, because regional economic growth is 
higher in the less economically advanced regions than it is in the mostly prosperous 
ones. However, poor regions are still beset by weaknesses which limit competitiveness 
(European Commission, 2004).
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F igure  5.5: C lus ter  M ap  for Regional Economic G row th  (G G R 2I)  in 1998, 2000 and 2002
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The above analysis suggests some forms o f  spatial heterogeneity. Urbanisation and 
country location seem to be underpinning factors behind regional economic growth. 
Although most regions are experiencing at least some convergence, their performance 
varies. Thus the pace at which the growth process occurs varies. Urbanised regions have 
performed differently than rural ones. Poor European regions seem to grow faster than 
rich ones. Although the income per capita o f  poorer regions is converging towards the 
EU average, they are not likely actually catch up due to differences in socioeconomic 
structures. Standard and augmented economic growth theories provide plenty o f
2 0 0
explanations of the convergence (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956; Mankiw et al., 1992; Jones 
1997, 1998). Concerning the heterogeneity across regions with regard to educational 
attainments, human capital investments, local government spending, urbanisation level 
and so on, European regions are likely to converge to different steady-states, because 
there are institutional and structural barriers to the transmission and absorption of 
technology across the European regions. Despite the narrowing of disparities, large 
differences remain. European regions seem to approach their own, but unique and 
globally stable, steady-state equilibrium.
5.4 Conclusion
The preliminary analysis shows that income distribution, educational distribution and 
regional economic growth evolve together.
First, this chapter has illustrated how income distribution is likely to replicate 
educational distribution. Both distributions follow the lognormal distribution, 
highlighting their high correlation. On the one hand, education enables individuals to 
improve their socioeconomic circumstances and, on the other, an individual’s income 
level seems to be a crucial factor in his/her educational choices and opportunities. 
Regional variations in education are likely to show regional variations in skills, efforts, 
opportunities, social networks, knowledge, aspiration and national institutions, and thus 
regional variations in income, and vice versa. While both the within-region income 
inequality and the within-region educational inequality explain the major portion of the 
EU inequality, the between-region component of income inequality is larger than the 
between-region component of educational inequality.
Second, growth seems to depend on the initial level of growth (denoting the dynamic 
effects), as well as on a weighted average of initial regional growth in the neighbouring 
regions (denoting the spatial effects). Thus economic growth in each region depends not 
only on its own socioeconomic characteristics, but also on those of the regions that form 
the neighbourhood to which it belongs (Chua, 1993). Urbanisation and regional location 
seem to be underpinning factors behind regional economic growth, while latitude and 
institutions (the welfare stare, religion and family structure) are not. Growth rates vary 
from region to region in a way that suggests some convergence in the EU.
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6 Chapter Six. The Determinants of Income and 
Educational Inequality
6.1 Introduction
The processes that create inequalities are not well understood, especially at a regional 
level. While the relationship between income and educational distribution has been an 
issue of considerable interest in the economic, sociological and political literature, there 
are few studies that developed linkages with different proxies for income and 
educational inequalities (i.e. Checchi, 2000; Heshmati, 2004; Justino et al., 2004). The 
analysis performed here represents an attempt to fill this gap. Hence, this chapter 
explores the determinants of income and educational inequality for the regions of the 
EU. The methodology is based on the estimation of both static and dynamic models. To 
evaluate the robustness of the results, a number of alternative specifications are tested.
The aim of this chapter is to analyse how microeconomic changes in human capital 
distribution affect income inequality and also how microeconomic changes in income 
distribution affect human capital inequality. Both distributions are measured in terms of 
their average and inequality. The contribution of this chapter is that it brings together 
knowledge from diverse disciplines and promotes interdisciplinary research on the 
determinants of income and educational inequalities. Although the general literature on 
inequalities is vast, the impact of income inequalities on educational inequalities, and 
vice versa, remains debated. This chapter also synthesises the available evidence from a 
range of economic, sociological and political studies. A mix of different theoretical 
models is needed to explain the potential patterns.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 6.2 presents some theoretical 
considerations with regard to the impact of labour related variables, urbanisation, 
geography and institutions on inequalities. The selection of the determinants of 
inequalities draws on the theory, past studies and the ESDA on inequalities. The large, 
and sometimes persistent, gaps in inequalities reflect both differences in labour market 
performance and in regional specific characteristics such as location and institutions. 
This section also provides a brief descriptive analysis, mapping the above variables. The 
regression analysis of income inequality both for the population as a whole and for 
normally working people is presented in Section 6.3, while the estimations of various 
specification educational inequality models are presented in Section 6.4. Rooted in the
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theoretical literature review, Sections 6.3 and 6.4 are based on the critical assumption 
that both types of inequality are affected by the same determinants. Both sections 
provide a simple framework for understanding the differences in income and 
educational inequalities across EU regions and over time. The final section concludes 
with some policy recommendations.
6.2 The Determinants of Inequalities
This section introduces the theoretical background on the determinants of inequalities 
that are to be used in the regression analysis. I briefly discuss the pros and cons of the 
explanatory variables and offer a descriptive analysis of regional level disparities in the 
EU. The first subsection considers the labour-related time-variant variables, which are 
population ageing, access to work, unemployment and inactivity. The second subsection 
highlights the role of time-invariant variables such as urbanisation, latitude, the welfare 
state, religion and family structure.
6.2.1 Labour Related Variables
6.2.1.1 Population Ageing
The impact of population ageing on inequality is ambiguous. On the one hand, an 
increase in the number of elderly and retired people, whose income is lower than the 
mature working age cohort, should lead to a rise in inequality (Estudillo, 1997). 
Additionally, as people get older, their lack of educational opportunities diversifies their 
income and human capital distribution (Motonishi, 2006). Their low chances of 
educational expansion at that time leave them with little opportunity to improve their 
economic circumstances. The elderly and the retired obtained the necessary credentials 
when they were young, the opportunities to acquire higher education do not usually 
increase as they get older. On the other hand, regions with a very young population will 
tend to have a lower rate of participation in the labour force, leading to high income and 
human capital inequalities. Young people in work will earn less in the labour market 
that rewards seniority, increasing inequality within a society (Higgins and Williamson, 
1999). Finally, regions with a mature working age cohort tend to have lower inequality. 
These people do not face credit constraints that prevent them from increasing their level 
of education (Dur et al., 2004). The high education level of mature working age people 
may act as a determinant in improving their socioeconomic status and increasing their 
occupational outcomes.
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Figure 6.1 shows the spatial distribution o f  population ageing, which is measured as the 
average age o f  respondents using ECHP survey data and is denoted by AGE  . Kentriki 
Ellada, the Italian region o f  Emilia-Romagna, the French Sud-Ouest and Mediterranee, 
the Portuguese Centro, Lisboa, Alentejo and Algarve, the British Surrey and Dorset, and 
the Swedish Smaland med oama and Norra Mellansverige are the regions with the most 
elderly populations in the EU, while the Spanish Sur region, the Italian Campania, Sud, 
Sicilia and Sardegna and the British regions o f  Bedfordshire, Oxfordshire and 
Derbyshire have the youngest populations. Large urban areas, such as London, Paris 
and Madrid, have a lower average age than their respective national average, due to the 
increasing concentration o f  young adults in these regions. Young people move to core 
cities in search o f better opportunities and a higher standard o f  living. The causes 
behind the cross-regional variation in European ageing are the variation in the cost o f  
having children (i.e. these costs are greater in societies with a high female participation 
in the labour market), the variation in female employment status (i.e. working women 
tend to have fewer children than women who do not work) and the variation in family 
policies (Rodriguez-Pose, 2002).73
Figure 6.1: Spatial Distribution of Population Ageing
AGE: average age of respondents (1995-2000)
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73 For instance, the greatest effort to promote fertility has taken place in Sweden, while Ireland and 
Mediterranean countries have been less prone to try to increase the birth rate through family policies 
(Rodriguez-Pose, 2002: 83).
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6.2.1.2 Access to Work
The effect of access to work on income and human capital distribution seems to be 
straightforward. Greater access to work is likely to lead to less income and educational 
inequality. Both theoretical and empirical evidence has been presented in support of this 
direction in the relationship. It is worth noting that access to work does not necessarily 
mean full-time work, but also might indicate atypical employment such as part-time 
work, temporary or limited-contract work, self-employment and the informal or shadow 
economy (i.e. family work, illegal forms of economic transactions). According to 
Rodriguez-Pose (2002), there is an age and gender divide in atypical employment 
forms, because the number of women working part-time is higher than that of men, 
whose part-time employment is concentrated among the young and the over 55s, while 
self-employment is basically a male phenomenon. He also states that atypical forms of 
employment not only determine income inequalities, but also affect educational 
inequalities, because people with lower skills are being relegated to these forms of 
employment and condemned to lower salaries. There is no fair access to jobs for all, 
because there is no fair employment European regulation. The concern is whether the 
differences in access to work for different age groups and the gender divide in 
employment can be justified by inter-group differences in worker attributes, or whether 
these differences are the result of employment discrimination and unfair access to work 
(Borooah, 1999). For instance, Catholics in Northern Ireland were excluded from a 
range of industrial jobs (Smith and Chambers, 1991). Discriminating employers, by 
indulging their taste for discrimination, may not only earn a lower level of profits within 
a region, but also create a higher level of income inequality. To sum up, it is expected 
that there is a trade-off between inequalities and work access, either due to the 
availability of full-time work or due to patterns in atypical employment.
The percentage of normally working respondents (LFSTOCK) represents the first 
(micro) proxy for access to work. The source of this variable is the ECHP dataset. This 
proxy is constructed from the variable ‘Main activity status — Self-defined 
(regrouped)'. Each person belongs to one of the following categories: (1) normally 
working (15+ hours/week); (2) unemployed; and (3) inactive. Figure 6.2 shows the 
geographical distribution of the percentage of normally working people within 
European regions. Sweden, Denmark, Greater London and its neighbours (i.e. 
Oxfordshire and Bedfordshire), Bayern and the Portuguese Norte have the highest 
percentage of normally working people in the EU. In contrast, the citizens of Spain
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(Noroeste, Centro and Sur) and southern Italy (Campania, Sud, Sicilia and Sardegna) 
seem to have the lowest access to work opportunities. However, the employment rate is 
higher in the north than in the south (European Commission 1999). European citizens 
do not all have the same opportunities to engage in paid work, but rather there are 
considerable differences in people’s access to work.
Figure 6.2: Spatial Distribution of Micro Proxy for Work Access
LFSTOCK: percentage of normally working respondents (1995-2000)
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The second (macro) proxy for access to work is the percentage o f economic activity rate 
for total population (ECACRA), taken from the Eurostat’s Regio dataset. Figure 6.3 
shows the spatial distribution o f  this proxy. It is similar to the distribution o f  the micro 
proxy. More specifically, there is an EU north-south divide, as the economic activity 
rate is higher in northern countries (Sweden, Denmark and Germany) than in southern 
ones (Greece, Italy, Spain). In addition, large urban areas exhibit higher economic 
activity rates than their respective national averages. One explanation for the relatively 
higher economic activity rates in large urban centres compared to other areas in the EU 
is probably related to the higher level o f  atypical employment in urban areas as 
compared to rural ones. For instance, students who simultaneously work part time are 
more often found in cities than in rural areas, because most universities are located in 
urban areas. Another explanation is that cities attract highly-qualified migrants in search 
o f better working prospects. People move to urban areas in search o f  better educational 
opportunities, better employment and further career prospects.
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F igure 6.3: Spatia l D istribu tion  o f  M acro  P roxy for W ork  Access
ECACRA: percentage of economic activity rate of total population (1995-2000)
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Men and women do not have the same opportunities to engage in paid work. Women 
have limited access to the labour market. There are considerable differences in m en’s 
and wom en’s access to work. The causes o f  gender inequality in the EU labour market 
are quite complex, with a variety o f  political, administrative and legislative responses 
implicated (Barnes et al., 2005). Women have more responsibilities for care-giving and 
household tasks than their male partners. Many women, particularly those who are 
heads o f households with young children, are either unemployed or limited in their 
employment opportunities for reasons that include inflexible working conditions and 
arrangements, inadequate sharing o f  family responsibility and a lack o f  sufficient 
services such as child care.74 Many women stop working altogether after their having 
their first child, while others return to the labour market as part-time workers or when 
their child or children are o f  school age (Rodriguez-Pose, 2002: 80). The cultural 
barriers, including the persistence o f  informal networks from which women are 
excluded, also prevent them from achieving equal participation in the labour market 
(Court, 1995). Additionally, the effect o f  wom en’s individual characteristics which  
shape their access to labour market may depend on the sociopolitical structure, such as 
the male dominated hierarchy o f  the political economy and the existing ideologies on 
gender (Coleman, 1991). According to Barnes et al. (2005: 171), gender inequalities at 
the regional level may reveal the predominance o f  women in part-time work, wom en’s 
under-representation in sectors such as engineering and wom en’s child-minding
74 www.iisd.ca/4wcw/dpa-045.html
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responsibilities. High unemployment may discourage the participation o f  women in the 
labour market, so driving down the supply o f  labour (European Commission, 1999). 
Finally, high inactivity can be seen as an indicator o f  an unused pool o f  labour, 
particularly in the case o f  women (European Commission, 1999). Therefore, it is 
important to distinguish the fem ale’s work access effect from the total population’s 
work access effect.
Women’s access to work is measured as a percentage o f  the female economic activity 
rate (ECACRF), extracted from the Eurostat’s dataset. Figure 6.4 illustrates the 
geographical distribution o f  fem ales’ work access. Sweden and Oxfordshire have the 
highest female participation in the labour market. The rate in Denmark, East Germany, 
lie de France and southern England is also high. The opportunity costs o f  child-bearing 
are greater in these societies (Rodriguez-Pose, 2002). On the contrary, Centro in Spain 
and southern Italy (Abruzzo-M olise, Campania, Sud, Sicilia and Sardegna) have the 
lowest rates o f  fenale economic activity. The female labour force participation rate 
increased between 1995 and 2000. This is most probably the result o f  the increasing 
flexibility within labour markets. Women are more able to access work opportunities. 
Women may have been more likely to have combined family responsibilities with paid 
employment in 2000 than in 1995.
Figure 6.4: Spatial Distribution of Female Work Access
ECACRF: percentage of female's economic activity rate (1995-2000)
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6.2.1.3 Unemployment and Inactivity
Unemployment and inactivity are expected to be positively associated with income and 
educational inequality. Increases in unemployment and inactivity aggravate the relative
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position of low-income groups, because marginal workers with the relatively low skills 
are at the bottom of the income distribution and their jobs are at greater risk during an 
economic downturn (Mocan, 1999). Additionally, unemployment insurance, welfare 
benefits and other forms of income support are usually not enough to offset the loss in 
income due to transitory unemployment. In other words, the income received through 
government transfer payments is lower than the income earned through employment.
The effect of unemployment and inactivity on income inequality also might reflect the 
inflexibility of the European labour market. European labour conditions, such as the 
degree of centralisation in wage bargaining, the existence of a minimum wage, the 
differences among countries with regard to recruitment and dismissal legislation and the 
differences among the European countries concerning unemployment benefit, job- 
creation policies and vocational training programmes (Ayala et al., 2002) are all 
important factors in accounting for the differences observed in income inequality across 
European regions. Labour market flexibility is responsible for changes in 
unemployment levels in western Europe and also has been linked to the reforms of 
specific labour market laws and of the welfare state (Rodriguez-Pose, 2002: 128).
From a broader perspective, the high level of structural unemployment which 
characterises most European societies is likely to cause a loss of current output and 
fiscal burden, a loss of freedom and social exclusion, skill loss and long-run damage, 
psychological harm, ill health, loss of motivation and organisational inflexibility, among 
other effects, which, in turn, increase income inequality (Sen and Foster, 1997).
It is widely acknowledged that individuals choose the optimal level of educational 
attainment by means of a marginal benefit-cost calculus, comparing the benefits derived 
from additional schooling to the costs incurred (Becker, 1964). Students from poorer 
backgrounds might not be able to choose the optimal level of educational attainment 
because of a lack of resources, low budget and low labour market information. First, 
students whose parents are unemployed or inactive (and thus have a low budget) are 
less likely to maximise their economic welfare by investing an appropriate amount in 
human capital. Second, students are not well informed about the nature and the 
prospects of the different education levels. In a market system, decisions are left to 
parents, at least for early education (Barr, 2004). However, parents with little education 
may have less information than better-educated parents about school choice and they 
may be less able to make use of any information that they do have (Ludwig, 1999; Barr,
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2004). Therefore, children and teenagers from more affluent families have more 
accurate labour market information than children from unemployed and poor families.
More widespread access to education means that the better prepared are kept out of the 
labour market, leading to more youth unemployment (Rodriguez-Pose, 2002). Less- 
educated people have limited access to the labour market and are unlikely to find work 
even if there is an increase in the labour demand, because they do not possess the skills, 
or are in some way unsuitable, for the jobs on offer (European Commission, 1999).
The structure of the labour market is one of the underlying factors behind inequalities in 
the EU. Therefore, one key point of the analysis is to clarify whether unemployment 
and inactivity can explain part of the variation in income and educational inequality that 
cannot be explained by other determinants of inequality.
One the one hand, the underlying factor behind national and sub-national variations in 
inequalities due to a variation in unemployment might be differences in the regulation 
of European labour markets (Rodriguez-Pose, 2002). On the other hand, the regional 
unemployment differential across the EU may be explained by a non-regulatory 
framework. The main reason behind the persistence of regional unemployment in the 
EU is the mismatch between the educational supply and the labour demand, 
highlighting the employability of European workers (Rodriguez-Pose, 2002). The 
matching of the labour demand and supply in any region depends on the strength of its 
economic base and on the job content of growth (European Commission, 1999).
The unemployment and inactivity levels within a European region are measured using 
the variable ‘Main activity status -  Self-defined (regrouped)' (ECHP dataset). UNEM 
denotes the percentage of unemployed respondents and INACTIVE is the percentage of 
inactive ones.
Figure 6.5 shows the geographical distribution of unemployment. It shows the spatial 
mismatch between the labour demand and labour supply, The Spanish region of Sur and 
the Italian regions Campania, Sud, Sicilia and Sardegna suffer from relatively high 
unemployment. The percentage of unemployed people in the Spanish region of Centro, 
the French Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the Italian Abruzzo-Molise and eastern Germany 
(Berlin, Brandenburg, Sachsen, Anhalt, Thuringen and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern) is 
also high. In these regions, there is a high percentage of people whose skills are either 
inadequate or are no longer demanded. Interregional differences in employment 
opportunities are concentrated among young people. High unemployment may
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discourage the participation o f  young people in the labour market and is likely to push 
them to continue their studies in order to gain more skills and knowledge. This drives 
down the supply o f  labour, at least in the short run. In the Spain o f  early 1990s, for 
instance, the level o f  education o f  the unemployed population was higher than that o f  
the employed population, because more young people kept out o f  the labour market in 
order to continue their studies (Rodriguez-Pose, 1998). Moreover, persistently high 
unemployment in the EU has probably created a serious problem o f  marginalisation and 
social exclusion (Rodriguez-Pose, 2002: 118).
Low unemployment, by contrast, is found in Britain, in the Italian Nord-Est, in the 
Austrian Westosterreich and in the Portuguese regions o f  Norte and Centro. These 
regions display the highest rate o f  participation and activity in the EU. In these regions, 
demand matches labour supply and has kept pace with changes in it between 1995 and 
2000. According to Rodriguez-Pose (2002: 118), long-term unemployment tends to be 
less o f  a problem in countries with more flexible (the United Kingdom) or more 
regulated (Scandinavia) labour markets. In Britain, for instance, labour market 
flexibility has been associated with the economic liberalism o f  the Thatcherite years. 
Britain has witnessed a high growth in part-time work on the part o f  mothers, as it 
means that more time can be devoted to childcare. Additionally, in the United Kingdom, 
the large differentials in income and employment conditions foster a substantial 
migratory flow from low income and high unemployment regions towards high income 
and low unemployment regions (Faini, 2003). Finally, in Europe, high unemployment 
regions tend to coincide with low income per capita and high income inequality regions.
Figure 6.5: Spatial Distribution of Unemployment
UNEM: percentage of unemployed respondents (1995-2000)
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Figure 6.6 shows the spatial distribution o f  inactivity. This seems to be one o f  the main 
economic, social and political problems for the EU. Inactivity is higher in the south and 
lower in the north, representing an EU north-south divide. Greece and Spain have the 
largest inactive population in percentage terms, while eastern Germany and Denmark 
exhibit the lowest levels o f  inactivity. This is likely to illustrate the family structure o f  a 
country, because, according to the ECHP documentation, all members o f a household 
are interviewed. More specifically, Sweden has the smallest average household size 
(2.2), while Spain and Greece are anong the largest (3.8 and 3.3, respectively) 
(Berthoud and Iacovou, 2004).
One o f the most striking features o f  labour markets is the low percentage o f  activity in 
many European regions, especially in those where unemployment is high. However, the 
percentage o f  inactive east German respondents is relatively low, while the percentage 
o f unemployed respondents in that same region is high.
Figure 6.6: Spatial Distribution of Inactivity
INACTIVE: percentage of inactive respondents (1995-2000)
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6.2.1.4 Summary Statistics
The transformed dataset with the percentage, standard deviation and minimum and 
maximum value for each o f  the labour related variable is displayed in Table 6 .1.75 The 
descriptive statistics show that the dataset is unbalanced, which is amenable to
75 Appendix A6.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the ECHP quantitative and qualitative variables.
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estimation methods that manage the heterogeneity bias. This table shows the following 
evolutions.76
• Population ageing has increased slightly between 1996 and 2000.
• Work access has increased to some extent between 1997 and 2000.
• Unemployment has decreased between 1995 and 2000.
• Inactivity has not changed between 1995 and 2000.
• W omen’s work access has increased between 1995 and 2000.
Table 6.1: Summary Statistics of Time-variant Variables
Variable Year Source Obs % Std. Dev. Min (%) Max (%)
AGE 1995 ECHP 94 45.19 2.29 39.76 51.39
2000 102 45.96 1.86 42.32 51.35
1995-00 596 45.40 1.95 39.76 51.61
LFSTOCK 1995 ECHP 94 52.27 0.07 33.59 67.78
2000 102 53.79 0.07 36.56 67.55
1995-00 596 52.78 0.07 31.20 72.88
ECACRA 1995 Eurostat 65 54.90 7.47 42.00 74.80
2000 94 57.89 6.61 42.90 74.50
1995-00 525 57.10 6.85 41.50 74.80
UNEM 1995 ECHP 94 5.80 0.03 0.00 16.54
2000 102 4.46 0.03 0.59 14.85
1995-00 596 5.28 0.03 0.00 16.54
INACTIVE 1995 ECHP 94 41 92 0.06 29.21 55.49
2000 102 41.74 0.06 29.53 5542
1995-00 596 41.94 006 27.12 56.72
ECACRF 1995 Eurostat 65 44.78 10.82 24.00 72.20
2000 94 49.15 9.14 26.70 72.90
1995-00 525 47.79 9.52 23.40 72.90
Source: ECHP dataset and Eurostat’s Regio dataset
6.2.2 Other Variables
The analysis performed here is focused on the role o f  urbanisation, geography and 
institutions.
6.2.2.1 Urbanisation
The economic theory has ambiguous predictions about the likely effects o f  urbanisation 
on income inequalities. Kuznets (1955) speculated that income inequality in developing
76 The values from 1996-1999 are provided on request.
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societies is typically higher in urban than in rural areas, highlighting the positive 
association between income inequality and urbanisation. On the positive relationship, 
Haworth et al. (1978) pointed out that the principal beneficiaries of increasing 
urbanisation will be those individuals who possess ‘monopoly’ advantages in the 
marketplaces, and thus, the benefits from increasing urbanisation will be unequally 
distributed and cause income inequality to rise. To this end, Nord (1980) stressed that as 
large cities, and thus urbanisation, attract both highly paid professional workers and 
many displaced workers and immigrants, the changing occupational and wage structure 
is likely to worsen inequality.
Considering the negative relationship between urbanisation and inequality, Freeh and 
Bums (1971) and Bums (1975) argue that the functioning of capital markets will 
improve as city size increases, so that investment in human capital will rise and the 
average rate of return will be depressed to reduce inequality. Yorukoglu (2002), based 
on simulation results using Lucas’ (2001) model, shows that the declining inequality of 
productivity across locations of cities due to suburbanisation can account for a 
substantial portion of the decrease in income inequality. The formation of cities has 
created positive externalities that increase the economic chances and opportunities of 
poor people. Low income inequalities and the urban agglomeration of socioeconomic 
activities seem to be mutually self-reinforcing processes. Lower income inequality, 
through higher economic opportunities, spurs the urban agglomeration of economic 
activities, which in turn leads to a lower cost of innovation, higher investments and 
lower income inequality, so that a circular causation between income inequality and 
urbanisation sets in. Urbanisation, on the one hand, and inequality, on the other, are 
parallel processes. Additionally, city sizes and human capital levels vary across city- 
types. For instance, cities specialising in financial, business, or diversified services are 
significantly larger (like London) than traditional manufacturing cities. The former type 
have much greater levels of educational attainment than the latter.
Taking into consideration the most recent empirical studies, Nielsen and Alderson 
(1997) examined the determinants of income inequality in approximately 3,100 counties 
of the United States in 1970, 1980 and 1990 and found a positive effect of urbanisation 
on inequality. Partridge et al. (1996) also show that a positive metropolitan-inequality 
relationship is expected if a prevalence of service-producing industries (i.e. financial 
services) with a bimodal wage distribution are centred in metropolitan areas. 
Additionally, Estudillo (1997) argued that income distribution within the urban
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population is wider than that of the rural population because of the heterogeneity of the 
urban group. Bourguignon and Morrisson (1998) and Motonishi (2006) find that the 
household share of agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, as a proxy of the 
urbanisation ratio, also positively affects income inequality. This means that income 
distribution between the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors can explain a part of 
the total income distribution. Hence, they are concerned about the impact of economic 
dualism on income inequality.
There is less empirical evidence on the effect of urbanisation on educational inequality. 
The relationship between urbanisation and educational inequality is addressed through 
the relationship between urbanisation and income inequality, and vice versa. Glaeser 
(1999), for instance, has suggested that urbanisation influences the wages, and thus 
incomes, of different workers in different ways as a result of learning, knowledge and 
skills. He points out that urban density may be negatively associated with wage 
dispersion, because low-skilled workers may have more to gain through learning than 
high-skilled workers. Wheeler (2004) has also offered some evidence on this 
relationship.
Information about labour markets has an impact on urban-rural differences in 
educational inequality. People who live in low-income rural areas have usually less 
accurate information about labour market institutions than people in high-income urban 
areas. There is no horizontal equity in education between urban and rural citizens, 
because the problem of lacking information is greater for individuals in lower 
socioeconomic and rural groups as information is costly to acquire (i.e. due to distance). 
Since information has a positive influence on educational attainment (Ludwig, 1999), 
and educational attainment and educational inequality are negatively correlated, low- 
income rural areas have not only low educational attainment, but also high educational 
inequality.
The levels of income and educational inequality in urban and rural areas have evolved 
differently. Therefore, the process of explaining income and educational inequality 
differences across regions of different densities is quite complex.
Urbanisation within a region is measured as the percentage of respondents who live in a 
densely populated area (URBANDPAV) , taken from the ECHP data survey. This 
variable is treated as time-invariant, because the availability of data is time limited 
(1999 and 2000). Unfortunately, there are only data available for Austria, Belgium,
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Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and the United Kingdom, corresponding to 63 
regions.
6.2.2.2 Geographical Variables such as Latitude
The ESDA on income and educational inequality (Chapters 3 and 4, respectively) has 
addressed latitude as a major determinant of inequalities, underpinning the EU north- 
south divide and the regional polarisation in the EU. Inequality has evolved differently 
in northern and southern areas. More specifically, high inequality clusters are mainly in 
the south, while low inequality clusters centre on the north. Latitude, which is regarded 
as a characteristic of the ‘first’ nature of geography (physical geography), seems to be 
an important source of differences in income and human capital. It is likely to play an 
important role in shaping the European distribution of income and educational. Past 
studies of the relationships between regional economic activity and geography have 
been hampered by using dummies to classify the location of each region (i.e. Baumont 
et al., 2003; Fischer and Stirbock, 2006; Monastiriotis, 2006). However, the allocation 
of some regions to the north-south regime is arbitrary and should be tested according to 
alternative definitions of ‘north’ and ‘south’. So as to avoid the arbitrary regional 
allocation and partly as a result of the identified limitations of the existing literature in 
examining the impact of latitude on inequalities and on economic activity in general 
(i.e. Gallup et al., 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Mitchener and McLean, 2003; Woods, 
2004; Olsson, 2005), the analysis performed here is an attempt to fill this gap. Adam 
Smith made a notable hypothesis that the physical geography of a region can influence 
its economic performance. Mitchener and McLean (2003), for example, have found that 
latitude accounts for a low proportion of the differences in productivity levels in the 
United States. However, Woods (2004) shows that latitude is a key analytical concept in 
understanding the spatial aspects that effect economic development.
Latitude is a good proxy for the effects of a region’s climate on its level of productive 
efficiency (Mitchener and McLean, 2003). Climatic variation affects productivity for 
three reasons. First, disease ecology, agronomic processes and soil fertility can be 
influenced by climate and may, in turn, alter productivity (Mitchener and McLean, 
2003). For example, temperate climates favour productivity and thus inequalities and 
economic growth. Second, good weather is an amenity. For instance, cities with better 
weather than that of their countries in general have systematically higher rates of urban 
population growth (Cheshire and Magrini, 2006). Third, changes in the occupational
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and wage structure are not independent of weather. For instance, income inequality is 
higher in the Mediterranean countries which have many tourist resorts (i.e. the Greek 
islands) that offer part-time jobs, especially in the summer and for women and young 
people.
It is worth noting that classifying regions according to the north-south regime may lead 
to theoretical considerations based on the ‘second’ nature of geography (the geography 
of distance between economic agents) such as the NEG and the club convergence 
theories. Thus, while latitude is a variable of physical geography, the analytical 
concepts that are crucial in understanding the relationship between latitude and 
inequalities may not be a matter of the ‘first’ nature of geography. The analysis 
performed here goes beyond the distinction between the ‘first’ and the ‘second’ nature 
of geography. However, most existing studies which consider latitude clearly as a 
variable of physical geography are implemented at the national level. Gallup et al. 
(1999) and Sachs et al. (2001), for instance, have found that nations in tropical climate 
zones generally suffer from higher rates of infectious diseases and lower levels of 
agricultural productivity than do nations in temperate zones. To sum up, latitude is 
likely to account for a high proportion of the differences in regional inequality levels.
6.2.23 Some Institutional Variables
The variables explored here organise regions into categories that are hypothesised to 
have some underlying similarity with regard to institutions, such as welfare regimes, 
religion and family structure. The welfare state, religion and family structure approach 
allows the examination of cross-national and cross-regional differences without 
focusing on the idiosyncrasies of single countries and regions. The goal here is to 
investigate the effects of more general institutional and cultural arrangements (DiPrete 
and McManus, 2000; Stier et al., 2001). This approach is more concise than using 
country-dummies.
(1) The Welfare State
The mechanisms through which income and human capital inequalities are reproduced 
vary across the welfare states. The objectives of the welfare states are economic 
efficiency, social justice (equity) and administrative feasibility (Barr, 2004). The 
welfare state comprises both cash benefits (i.e. income) and benefits in kind (i.e. 
education) (Barr, 2004). Although the level of welfare is reflected in areas such as 
power, industrialisation and capitalist contradictions, social expenditure can be
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considered a good proxy of a state’s commitment to welfare (Esping-Andersen, 1990). 
Following the work of Esping-Andersen (1990), Ferrera (1996) and Berthoud and 
Iacovou (2004), four categories of welfare state are used: social-democratic (Sweden, 
Denmark), liberal (United Kingdom, Ireland), corporatist or conservatism 
(Luxembourg, Belgium, France, Germany, Austria) and ‘residual’ or ‘southern’ 
(Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece) (Figure 6.7). This classical categorisation focuses on the 
relationship between the state and the market with respect to the provision of income 
and services and considers the effects of welfare states on social stratification and 
socioeconomic inequalities (Geist, 2005: 25). The hypothesis here is that a country’s 
welfare policy as measured through its social expenditures has a significant effect on 
income redistribution and, thus, on income inequalities.
Although the boundaries of the welfare states are not well defined, the above 
classification assumes that a country belongs to only one welfare state regime. In 
reality, there is no single pure case, because the Scandinavian countries, for instance, 
may be predominantly social-democratic, but they are not free of liberal elements 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990: 28). More specifically, the social-democratic and the 
corporatist regimes have well-developed welfare states and offer a more state provision 
for income and services than do liberal regimes (Orloff, 1996). However, the social- 
democratic regimes are ‘universalistic and egalitarian’ (Orloff, 1993) and it is the 
individual that is placed at the centre, as benefits and taxes are mainly individually 
based (Svallfors, 2004), while the conservative regimes seek to maintain status 
differences and the role of the family is emphasised. In the liberal welfare states the 
market is the prime source of resources and interests (Svallfors, 2004) and like the 
social-democratic states, these states focus on the individual. The liberal welfare states 
are the most market-oriented ones. In Britain, for instance, there is no national form of 
income-related social insurance, but a universal child benefit and public health care are 
provided free of charge (Svallfors, 2004: 122). Finally, in the ‘residual’ welfare states, 
the share of national income devoted to social purposes is very low; the level of benefits 
is meagre and covers the minority of population (Sainsbury, 1991). It is important that 
the impact of EU social policy on the development of the ‘residual’ welfare states 
should be taken into account, because Portugal, Spain and Greece all benefit from 
structural and cohesion funds (Guillen and Alvarez, 2004; Guillen, 2005).
The welfare regime shapes women’s access to work, because the patterns of division of 
household labour vary across welfare state regimes. The social-democratic regimes
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encourage wom en’s participation in the labour market. The availability o f  public care 
services to families has an influence on wom en’s life choices by enabling them to have 
both children and careers (Esping-Andersen, 2002). In the Swedish case, for instance, 
domestic role-sharing between men and women is encouraged (Geist, 2005). In liberal 
regimes, ‘gender equality is not as actively pursued as it is in the social-dem ocratic  
regimes' (Geist, 2005: 26). Conservative regimes, by contrast, support traditional 
gender roles. Women are encouraged to stay at home while the children are small. 
Women are encouraged to do more housework than men, even when this means a 
reduction or modification o f  their labour force participation. In Germany, for instance, 
women are discouraged from participating full-time in the labour market, a move that is 
clearly demonstrated by the shortage o f  public day care and the fact that family 
supplements and tax deductions are used to support men’s income, as it is he that is seen 
as the family provider (Sundstrom, 2002). Additionally, conservative regimes are 
influenced by the social policy o f  the Catholic Church (Geist, 2005: 26). The family and 
the Catholic Church are responsible for solving social problems, and the conservative 
welfare state intervenes only if  those institutions have failed (Borchorst, 1994). 
Therefore, the welfare state, and in some cases the religion, can create a framework that 
is more conducive to specific arrangements o f  domestic labour (Geist, 2005: 26).
Thus, welfare state regimes not only represent different types o f  relationship between 
the state and the labour market, but also the different ways that highly developed 
societies address income and human capital inequalities.
Figure 6.7: Spatial Distribution of Welfare State Types
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(2) Religion
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Going back to Weber (1922), religion, as an aspect of social life and culture, distributes 
social rewards and shapes life chances. Religion concerns ‘non-market’ activities and 
institutions (Iannaccone, 1992). It affects the economic attitudes and activities of 
individuals, groups (i.e. the members of a household) and societies (i.e. regions). 
Religion may also influence not only individual earnings and the rate of return on 
human capital as has already been examined by many scholars (Greeley, 1976; Tomes, 
1983, 1984, 1985; Iannaccone, 1992, 1998a, 1998b), but also levels of income and 
human capital inequality. The religious affiliation of European regions is classified into 
four Christian categories:77 mainly Protestant (Sweden, Denmark, Northern Germany, 
Scotland); mainly Catholic (France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Italy, 
Austria, southern Germany, Belgium); mainly Anglican (England); and mainly 
Orthodox (Greece) (Figure 6.8). Cross-region differences in the impact of income and 
human capital distribution on religious belief may explain the cross-region variation in 
the inequality-religion connection. On comparing the spatial distribution of inequalities 
(both income and human capital) with the distribution of religions, it appears that the 
relationship between inequality and religious affiliation fluctuates highly across regions.
Might different Christian religions affect regional economic welfare differently? Which 
religions exert the strongest influence? Although the relationship between religion and 
inequality is tremendously complex, it is hypothesised that regions with the same 
religion have close social links, leading to similar income and human capital inequality 
levels within-groups of religion, but different inequality levels between-groups of 
religion. Nevertheless, there are some significant differences even within each religion 
category. For instance, the boundaries that separate fundamentalist Protestants from 
mainstream Protestants remain sharp. Fundamentalist Protestant women enter marriage 
at a younger age and display a lower level of attachment to the labour market when 
young children are present in the home than women of mainstream Protestant affiliation 
(Lehrer, 1995), increasing the probability of greater inequalities. Moreover, 
fundamentalist parents are willing to invest fewer funds in the education of their 
children, increasing the intergenerational inequality (Lehrer, 1995).
77 Sources: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook;
http://commons.wikimidia.Org/wiki/Image:Europe_religion_map_de.png;
http://csi-int.org/world_map_europa_religion.php
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In the analysis performed here, I examined whether the religion in which individuals are 
brought up influences their income and their education. Various channels through which 
religion may influence the level of income and education have already been considered, 
such as marriage and divorce, fertility and childrearing (Iannaccone, 1998a, 1998b). 
Religious also leads to differences in earnings, education and the female employment 
(Lehrer, 1996, 1999). According to Keister (2003), religion affects wealth ownership by 
shaping demographic behaviours, identifying which goals should be valued and 
contributing to social contacts that provide information and opportunities. Additionally, 
religion influences the processes that create wealth and educational inequalities through 
attitudes towards work (Heath et al., 1995), family traditions and cultures (Tomes, 
1983; Swidler, 1986), the creation and implementation of public institutions such as 
blue laws and prohibition (Fairbanks, 1977) and the party competition (Hutcheson and 
Taylor, 1973). Therefore, religion plays a significant role in the creation of both the 
private and public institutions that affect inequalities. The magnitude of the differences 
among Christian religious groups in the determination of income and human capital 
inequalities is used as a control variable in the analysis.
Religion may be an important determinant of how people think about inequalities 
(Feagin, 1975). Protestants and Catholics hold the strongest individualistic beliefs, 
which locate the causes of low income and human capital stock in the people 
themselves (i.e. lack of ability, lack of effort), but are weakest in terms of structuralist 
beliefs, which locate the causes of low income in the social and economic system (i.e. 
lack of jobs, discrimination) (Hunt, 2002). It is not only the religious affiliation, but also 
the education level completed that determines beliefs and how people think about the 
causality effects underlying the various types of inequality. More highly-educated 
people tend to favour individualistic explanations, while the beliefs of less highly- 
educated persons are typically structuralist (Hunt, 2002).
The religious affiliation of European regions is mainly Christianity. Christianity 
encourages laissez-faire capitalism and economic development, but according to the 
secularisation hypothesis, economic development reduces religious participation and 
beliefs (McCleary and Barro, 2006). Economic development increases the value of time 
and implies a rising opportunity cost of participating in time-intensive activities, such as 
religious services (McCleary and Barro, 2006: 152). Thus, higher regional economic 
development and more intensive competition are likely to reduce attendance of formal 
religious activities. However, it is often believed that Catholicism is less conducive to
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econom ic development than Protestantism (Grier, 1997: 48). With respect to education, 
on the one hand, highly-educated people are more scientific and are more inclined to 
reject beliefs that posit supernatural forces (McCleary and Barro, 2006: 151), while, on 
the other hand, educational attainment increases the returns from networks and other 
forms o f  social capital including religious services (Sacerdote and Glaeser, 2001). 
Education both increases the returns to social connection and reduces the extent o f  
religious belief (Sacerdote and Glaeser, 2001). For example, less-educated people are 
more likely to believe in miracles, heaven and devils.
To sum up, it is expected that religion plays no small role in income and human capital 
inequalities.
Figure 6.8: Spatial Distribution of Religion
(3) Family Structure
The concept to family structure that I use in this analysis refers to the household size. 
Since all persons within a household are interviewed, the household size, which differs 
across regions, might be a significant explanatory variable in inequalities. Following the 
work o f  Berthoud and Iacovou (2004), three groups o f  countries in the study o f  living 
arrangement are used: Nordic (Sweden, Denmark), North/Central (UK, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, France, Germany, Austria) and Southern/Catholic (Ireland, Portugal, 
Spain, Italy, Greece) (Figure 6.9). The hypothesis is that a country’s family structure 
plays a significant role in income and human capital inequality.
Broadly speaking, there are three different living arrangements:
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1. Living with unrelated individuals: This type of household means sharing living 
quarters with unrelated persons (i.e. students) and does not imply sexual 
relations between housemates.78 In this case, householders tend to choose 
housemates with incomes similar to their own and with the same educational 
level (Leppel, 1987). This implies that the intra-household income and human 
capital inequality is very low.
2. Living alone (i.e. unmarried, widowed and divorced): In this case, individual 
inequalities coincide with household inequalities.
3. Living with related individuals: In societies where the husband is expected to 
support the wife who usually serves as full-time homemaker, the husband’s 
wage must be large enough to support two adults (Leppel, 1987). Additionally, 
the husband’s pension entitlement covers his wife. In this case, the intra­
household income inequality is high and it is even higher when the husband 
must support children. One should bear in mind that inequality index for 
households is always lower than for individuals because of income pooling and 
intra-family transfers. Fertility is one of the most significant determinants of 
family structure. In these societies, marriage is usually delayed until the man is 
in a sufficiently strong financial position (Leppel, 1987). In societies where 
women are labour force participants, the spouse shares the living expenses and 
the intra-household income inequality is low. The ‘living with related 
individuals’ household also includes householders living with siblings. With 
regard to education, the larger the household size, the higher the intra-household 
educational inequality as rich people have usually less children than poor 
people. A particular case in this type of household is the single-parent family. 
Many scholars (McLanahan, 1985; Sandefur et al., 1992; Sandefur and Wells, 
1999) have all pointed out that individuals who grow up in a single-parent 
family are less likely to graduate from high school than those who grow up in a 
family with both original parents. Studies show that the family relations and 
climate influence the educational attainment. Elder (1965: 83), for instance, 
showed that:
78 People live together rather than apart, because the cost per person o f a given standard o f living is 
lower.
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‘educational attainment is negatively related to the degree o f  parental 
dominance in adolescence... high educational attainment is most prevelant 
among persons who report democratic relations with their parents and 
egalitarian relations between mother and father... parent-youth relations 
have a greater effect on educational attainment than conjugal role patterns’.
Therefore, in regions where most people live with related individuals, individual
inequality is higher than household inequality and is even higher when the wife is not a
participant in the workforce and there are many children. In regions, by contrast, where
most people live alone or with unrelated persons, there is not much difference between
individual and household inequality. Additionally, people living in larger and younger
households are typically poorer, while a larger household size may make at least some
members better off; for example, it may offer greater security in old age (Lanjouw and
Ravallion, 1995: 1415).
It has been demonstrated that marriage, divorce, fertility and childrearing influence the 
level o f  religious beliefs, activities, affiliation and participation. Religion can be a 
significant defining trait o f a family (Keister, 2003: 176). For instance, a religion where 
fertility is relatively low decreases the household size. Additionally, the welfare state 
indirectly determines the household size because, for instance, a socialist welfare state 
supports female participation in the labour market.
Figure 6.9: Spatial Distribution of Family Structure
FAMILY STRUCTURE
|  North/Central 
| | Nordic
3 ]  Southern/Catholic 
]  No data
6.3 Regression Results for Income Inequality
This section explores the determinants o f  income inequality. Static and dynamic 
approaches allow us to assess whether a number o f  determinants are instrumental in
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explaining the variation in income inequality and to identify the influences that persist 
or wane.
The first subsection explores the determinants of income inequality for the population 
as a whole
IGE\jt = /?,' IMNit + J32' EducAtt it + p f  Educlneqit + p A' xu + uit
with i denoting regions (i = l,...,N )  and t time (t = 1,...,6).79 IGE\it is income 
inequality for the population as a whole, IMNit is income per capita for the population 
as a whole, EducAttit is educational attainment (either average education level 
completed (EMNit) or average age at which the highest education level was completed 
(AMNU)), Educlneqit is educational inequality (either inequality in education level 
completed (EGE\it) or inequality in the age at which the highest education level was 
completed (.AGE\it)), xit is a vector of control variables, p i 4 are coefficients and uit 
is the composite error.
Table 6.2 shows the code and definition of control variables.
Table 6.2: Control Variables
a/a Variable Definition
1 AGE Population ageing
2 LFSTOCK Work access (micro approach)
3 ECACRA Work access (macro approach)
4 UNEM Unemployment
5 INACTIVE Inactivity
6 ECACRF Female’s work access
7 URBANDPAV Urbanisation (time-invariant)
8 LAT Latitude (time-invariant)
9 Welfare state
DWSSOC Socialism (social-democratic)
DWSLEB Liberal
DWSCORP Corporatist (conservatism)
DWSRES Residual (‘southern’)
10 Religion
DRLPROT Mainly Protestant
DRLCATH Mainly Catholic
DRLORTH Mainly Orthodox
DRLANGL Mainly Anglicans
11 Family structure
DFNORD . . . Nordic (Scandinavian)........................................................
DFNC North/Central
DFSC Southern/Catholic
The second subsection explores the determinants of income inequality for normally 
working people.
NGE\it = ' NMNit + P f  EducAtt „ + P f  Educlneqit + P f x it +ujt
79 t = \ denotes 1 9 9 5 , t = 6 denotes 2000.
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where NGE\it is income inequality for normally working people and NMNit is income
per capita for normally working people. This equation does not include the control 
variables 2-5 (work access, unemployment and inactivity) listed in Table 6.2, because 
the dependent variable concerns working people.
More specifically, in Table 6.3-Table 6.10 Regression 1 shows the linear impact of 
income per capita on income inequality. Regression 2 displays the introduction of 
human capital distribution measured by educational attainment and educational 
inequality. Regression 3 tests for the influence of the population ageing.
Considering the determinants of income inequality fo r  the population as a whole (Table 
6.3-Table 6.6), two different proxies for access to work are included in Regressions 4 
and 5. The addition of unemployment and inactivity, as well as of women’s access to 
work, is explored in Regressions 6 and 7. The next step of static analysis is the 
introduction of quantitative and qualitative time-invariant variables (Regressions 8-12). 
Regressions 8 and 9 represent a preliminary test for the urban-rural and the EU north- 
south patterns, which have been identified in ESDA. These patterns are tested using the 
following quantitative explanatory variables: urbanisation and latitude. Finally, welfare- 
state, religion and family-structure dummies (qualitative variables) are added in 
Regressions 10, 11 and 12, respectively.
On considering the determinants of income inequality for normally working people 
(Table 6.7-Table 6.10), work access of the total population, unemployment and 
inactivity are excluded from the analysis. Hence, Regression 4 of both static and 
dynamic models estimates the impact of women’s work access on income inequality. 
Regressions 5 and 6 of the static models introduce urbanisation and latitude as 
explanatory variables, respectively. The above-mentioned dummies are included in 
Regressions 7, 8 and 9.
6.3.1 Income Inequality fo r  the Population as a Whole
6.3.1.1 Independent Educational Variable: Education Level Completed
(a) Static model
In all the regressions of income inequality for the population as a whole, the p-values of 
Breusch and Pagan’s Lagrange multiplier test strongly reject the validity of the pooled 
OLS models, and the p-values of Hausman’s test reject the GLS estimator as an
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appropriate alternative to the FEs estimator. Although the distinction between FEs and 
REs models is an erroneous interpretation (Greene, 2003), according to the specification 
tests, the FEs models are the most appropriate. Finally, there is not much difference 
between the significance of the homoskedasticity and the heteroskedasticity consistent 
covariance matrix estimator. Thus, the determinants of income inequality are not 
sensitive to the model specification of the error term. Table 6.3 displays the FEs 
regression results, while the OLS and REs results are displayed in Appendices A6.3 and 
A6.11, respectively.
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Table 6.3: FEs: Dependent Variable is IGE1 and Independent Variables are EMN and EGE1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1MN -0.0001
(0.0011)
(0.0013)
0.0016
(0.0014)
(0.0016)
0.0026
(0.0014)*
(0.0017)
0.0033
(0.0014)**
(0.0017)*
0.0029
(0.0016)*
(0.0017)*
0.0046
(0.0016)***
(0.0017)***
0.0039
(0.0016)**
(0.0018)**
0.0110
(0.0025)***
(0.0027)***
0.0111
(0.0019)***
(0.0021)***
EMN 0.0396
(0.0305)
(0.0316)
0.0394
(0.0303)
(0.0318)
0.0466
(0.0301)
(0.0309)
0.0018
(0.0306)
(0.0293)
0.0136
(0.0298)
(0.0276)
0.0101
(0.0305)
(0.0285)
0.0222
(0.0396)
(0.0415)
0.0103
(0.0314)
(0.0277)
EGE1 0.0723
(0.0230)***
(0.0231)***
0.0732
(0.0229)***
(0.0232)***
0.0685
(0.0227)***
(0.0223)***
0.0313
(0.0224)
(0.0197)
0.0330
(0.0218)
(0.0184)*
0.0361
(0.0222)
(0.0188)*
0.0831
(0.0302)***
(0.0374)**
0.0424
(0.0211)**
(0.0163)***
AGE -0.0057
(0.0022)**
(0.0024)**
-0.0059
(0.0022)***
(0.0026)**
-0.0082
(0.0022)***
(0.0025)***
-0.0053
(0.0022)**
(0.0025)**
-0.0073
(0.0022)***
(0.0024)***
-0.0073
(0.0027)***
(0.0026)***
-0.0030
(0.0022)
(0.0023)
LFSTOCK -0.2765
(0.0837)***
(0.0981)***
ECACRA -0.0089
(0.0014)***
(0.0016)***
UNEM 0.5541
(0.1404)***
(0.1515)***
0.4594
(0.2069)**
(0.2305)**
0.3783
(0.1378)***
(0.1511)**
INACTIV
E
0.0084
(0.0933)
(0.1080)
ECACRF -0.0068
(0.0012)***
(0.0013)***
-0.0079
(0.0012)***
(0.0013)***
-0.0020
(0.0017)
(0.0017)
-0.0042
(0.0012)***
(0.0014)***
YR96*UR
BANDPA
V
-0.0290
(0.0148)*
(0.0151)*
YR97*UR
BANDPA
V
-0.0453
(0.0150)***
(0.0136)***
YR98*UR
BANDPA
V
-0.0136
(0.0163)
(0.0147)
YR99*UR
BANDPA
V
-0.0374
(0.0174)**
(0.0170)**
YR00*UR
BANDPA
V
-0.0743
(0.0184)***
(0.0171)***
YR96*LA
T
-0.0002
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
YR97*LA
T
-0.0005
(0.0001)***
(0.0001)***
YR98*LA
T
-0.0003 
(0.0001 )♦♦* 
(0.0001)***
YR99*LA
T
-0.0006
(0.0001)***
(0.0001)***
YR00*LA
T
-0.0009
(0.0001)***
(0.0002)***
CONSTA
NT
0.3821
(0.0121)***
(0.0151)***
0.2787
(0.0382)***
(0.0396)***
0.5255
(0.1022)***
(0.1072)***
0.6732
(0.1106)***
(0.1220)***
1.2128
(0.1333)***
(0.1438)***
0.8348
(0.1195)***
(0.1213)***
1.0108
(0.1153)***
(0.1182)***
0.6300
(0.1611)***
(0.1640)***
0.5593
(0.1288)***
(0.1337)***
ADJ R-SQ 0.0000 0.0313 0.0445 0.0654 0.1343 0.1743 0.1432 0.2704 0.2601
OBS. 604 596 596 . .596 . . .513 . . .5 1 3 513 299 513
LM TEST 
(p-value)
916.46
(0.0000)
715.20
(0.0000)
645.03
(0.0000)
634.09
(0.0000)
715.68
(0.0000)
676.43
(0.0000)
630.60
(0.0000)
322.72
(0.0000)
694.28
(0.0000)
HAUSMA 
N TEST 
(p-value)
71.46
(0.0000)
289.07
(0.0000)
35.86
(0.0000)
87.27
(0.0000)
46.71
(0.0000)
54.24
(0.0000)
73.32
(0.0000)
Note: (*), (**), and (***) indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (*), (**), and (***) denote the significance of the 
White (1980) estimator. LM TEST is the Lagrange Multiplier test for the random effects model based on the OLS residuals (Breusch and 
Pagan, 1980). HAUSMAN TEST is the Hausman (1978) test for fixed or random effects.
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In Regression 1, the impact of income per capita (IMN) on income inequality (IGE\) 
is analysed. This equation is unconditioned by any other effects. The relationship 
between income per capita and inequality is negative, but it is not statistically 
significant. The adjusted R-squared shows that income per capita does not explain any 
variation in income inequality in the sample. In terms of goodness-of-fit, it is likely to 
indicate a poor unconditioned model. In the FEs conditional regressions (Regressions 
3-9) income per capita is positively correlated with income inequality. The higher the 
income per capita, the higher the inequality within a region. A few people can be 
transferred to higher levels of skills, while the remainder have to wait their turn (Lydall, 
1979). Regional economic development seems to increase the occupational choices and 
the earning opportunities of rich people. In all the regressions, however, the coefficients 
on income per capita are very low. For instance, Regression 4 shows that an increase of 
one per cent in income per capita is associated with, on average, about 0.0033 per cent 
more income inequality, as measured by the Theil index. The findings also indicate that 
the effect of income per capita on inequality is robust as it is not sensitive to the model 
specification.
The next step in the analysis is the introduction of human capital distribution, as 
measured by educational attainment (EMN) and educational inequality (EGEY). 
Regressions 2-9 indicate that regional educational achievement probably has no 
influence on the resulting income distribution, because the coefficients on educational 
attainment are not statistically significant. Thus, it is not clear whether higher 
educational attainment increases the occupational choices and the earning opportunities 
of the population as a whole so as to make societies more egalitarian. Additionally, it is 
not clear whether education serves to facilitate numerous favourable chances for 
individuals, because it reflects abilities, choices and preferences (Hannum and 
Buchmann, 2005). The insignificant correlation between income inequality and 
educational attainment also says nothing about the balance between the ‘wage 
compression’ effect and the ‘composition’ effect (Knight and Sabot, 1983). Education 
does not seem to expose all economic agents to a common shift factor that affects each 
individual’s income. The empirical results, nonetheless, show that a highly unequal 
distribution of education level completed is associated with higher income inequality. 
This relationship is robust and statistically significant (Regressions 2-4 and 6-9). A 
larger share of highly-educated workers within a region may signal to employers that 
those with less education have less ability, which may also lead to a larger wage
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differential between highly-educated and less-educated workers and thus to higher 
inc ome inequality. An increase in the levels of education of the highly-educated people 
tends to increase income inequality as the imperfect competition for positions requiring 
advanced educational credentials raises the wages of educated people even more. 
Another explanation is that the demand for unskilled labour is growing at a slower rate 
than the demand for skilled labour. Hence, the positive relationship seems to indicate 
the responsiveness of the EU labour market to differences in qualifications and skills.
The remaining regressions include the control variables described earlier. Regressions 
3-9 test for the influence of the average age of respondents (AGE) . The fact that age 
matters for income inequality is hardly surprising, as regions with a younger population 
will also tend to have a lower rate of participation in the labour force and young people 
in work will earn less in a labour market that rewards seniority, increasing the inequality 
levels within a society (Higgins and Williamson, 1999). As the European population 
gets older, income inequality decreases, because the elderly and retired people whose 
income is higher than the mature working age cohort have obtained the necessary 
credentials when they were younger and they usually do not intend to acquire higher 
education so as to improve their economic circumstances even more. Hence population 
ageing seems to matter for income inequality.
In order to capture the economic activity characteristics of the regions, the percentage of 
normally working respondents (LFSTOCK), and the economic activity rate of the total 
population (ECACRA) are included in Regressions 4 and 5, respectively. As expected, 
both variables are negatively associated with income inequality and are statistically 
significant. The higher the level of economic activity of a region, the lower the income 
inequality, reflecting that one of the main factors determining income inequality is 
access to work.
This point is further confirmed by the introduction of unemployment ( UNEM ) and 
inactivity levels ( INACTIVE) within a region, as well as the participation in labour 
market by sex ( ECACRF) in Regressions 6 and 7, respectively. The results indicate 
that high unemployment is associated with higher income inequality. Increases in 
unemployment aggravate the relative position of low-income groups, because marginal 
workers with the relatively low skills are at the bottom of the income distribution and 
their jobs are at greater risk during an economic downturn (Mocan, 1999). Additionally, 
unemployment insurance, welfare benefits and other forms of income support are not
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enough to offset the loss in income due to the transitory unemployment. European 
labour conditions, such as the degree of centralisation in wage bargaining, the existence 
of a minimum wage, the differences among countries with regard to recruitment and 
dismissal legislation and the differences among the European countries concerning 
unemployment benefits, job-creation policies and vocational training programmes 
(Ayala et al., 2002), represent an important factor in determining the differences 
observed in income inequality across European regions. The coefficients on the female 
economic activity rate in all regressions are negative and significant. The impact of the 
increase in women’s access to work has been to lessen the trend toward greater income 
inequality caused by aspects of social change during the period of analysis (Ryscavage 
et al., 1992). The fact that income inequality among normally working people declined 
slightly throughout the period of study is most probably a reflection of the greater 
flexibility of working conditions and arrangements for women, the more adequate 
sharing of family responsibility and the more adequate childcare services. Both men and 
women seem to have more equal opportunities to engage in paid work, showing a 
greater degree of gender egalitarianism in the EU labour market.
In Regressions 8 and 9 I introduce a year dummy variable for urbanisation 
(URBANDPAV) and latitude (LAT) ,  respectively, in order to see whether the effects of 
urbanisation and latitude on income inequality have changed over the period 1995— 
2000. The effect of urbanisation and latitude is lower in 2000 (Regressions 8 and 9, 
respectively). The OLS (Appendix A6.3) and REs (Appendix A 6 .ll) results show the 
negative correlation between urbanisation and inequality. Considering Kuznets’ 
assumption that urbanisation is a measure of economic development, the negative 
relationship highlights the fact that European societies are located in the declining 
segment of the Kuznets curve. However, this disproves Estudillo’s (1997) hypothesis 
that the heterogeneity of urban areas enhances, rather than lowers, inequality. 
Urbanisation increases perfect competition and eliminates monopoly power in the 
marketplaces, so that the benefits from increasing urbanisation will be a more equally 
distributed level of income. Highly-urbanised regions seem not only to be more 
economically prosperous — the correlation between income per capita and urbanisation 
is positive (0.46) — but also to have less inequality, as a consequence of the negative 
relationship between income per capita and inequality. Notably, the OLS and REs 
results show that the latitude variable has the ‘right’ sign and is significant. This result 
suggests that latitude may be a significant determinant of regional income performance. 
The northern regions exhibit the lowest income inequality levels. On the one hand, an
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analysis involving latitude is likely to highlight the EU north-south divide in terms of 
income inequality. On the other hand, bearing in mind that latitude is a good proxy for 
the effect of a region’s climate on its level of productive efficiency, it is likely to 
account for a large proportion of the differences in regional inequality levels. Climate in 
part determines job structure and productivity. For example, tourist resorts tend to 
favour part-time jobs and low-skilled occupations. The demand for unqualified workers 
is higher in southern Europe than in central and northern Europe. In consequence, their 
wages are low and their employment is often precarious and part time.
Finally, the impact of the qualitative explanatory variables on income inequality 
(Regressions 10-12) is presented in Appendices A6.3 (OLS results) and A 6.ll (REs 
results). The FEs estimator is not provided because there is no within-group variation in 
the dummy variables.
In Regression 10, the omitted category is social-democratic welfare states. The 
regression results show that all welfare regimes are important determinants of income 
inequality. Social-democratic welfare states, which in theory promote a higher standard 
of equality, indeed have lower levels of income inequality than corporatist welfare 
states, in which private insurance and occupational benefits play a truly marginal role 
and corporatism displaces the market as a provider of welfare (Esping-Andersen, 1990). 
In addition, social-democratic welfare states are more egalitarian than corporatist ones 
because, in the former, the welfare state minimises dependence on the family and allows 
women greater freedom to choose work rather than to stay at home, while in the latter 
state intervention is more modest and comes into effect mainly when the family’s 
capacity to service its members becomes exhausted (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The 
‘southern’ (or ‘residual’) welfare states have the most inegalitarian societies.
Regression 11 introduces religion as an explanatory variable. Mainly Protestant regions, 
which are the base category, have a lower level of income inequality than Catholic ones. 
Orthodox regions have the most inegalitarian societies. Finally, it is interesting to note 
that all categories of family structure and living arrangements affect income inequality 
significantly (Regression 12). Regions with a Nordic family structure have the most 
egalitarian societies and Southern/Catholic regions have the highest inequality.
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•  81Considering the standardised coefficients for the above regressions (Appendix A6.2), 
women’s access to work explains the largest variation in income inequality. The impact 
of both approaches to economic activity (work access of total population) on income 
inequality is high. In contrast, population ageing, unemployment and urbanisation 
explain only a relatively small part of the total variation in income inequality.
(b) Dynamic Model
Table 6.4 presents the long-run results for the dynamic income inequality for the whole 
of the population equations (Arellano-Bond estimator). The first column of each model 
specification assumes that the explanatory variables are strictly exogenous. The last two 
columns show the GMM results for the same model specification regarding whether the 
explanatory variables are predetermined (column b) or endogenous (column c). The 
short-run parameters and the specification tests (the tests regarding serial correlation 
and the Sargan tests)82 are presented in Appendix A6.19.
81 The standardised coefficient is the standard deviation change in the dependent variable caused by one 
standard deviation change in each explanatory variable.
82 If the explanatory variables, on the one hand, are strictly exogenous, the specification tests are 
satisfactory. More specifically, the tests regarding serial correlation reject the absence o f first-order, but 
not second-order serial correlation in both the homoskedastic and robust case. The Sargan test statistics of 
overidentifying restrictions do not indicate correlation between the instruments and the error term. If the 
explanatory variables, on the other hand, are predetermined, the specification tests are not satisfactory . 
The null hypothesis o f no first-order autocorrelation in the differenced residuals is rejected but the null 
hypothesis o f no second-order autocorrelation is not rejected, except for equation 6b (homoskedastic 
case). Additionally, the Sargan tests indicate misspecification due to the correlation between the 
instruments and the error term o f the first-differenced equation. Finally, if the explanatory variables are 
assumed to be endogenous, my estimates perform well based on the specification tests. The test statistics 
o f overidentifying restrictions do not indicate misspecification, except for equations 2c, 3c and 4c . The 
tests for serial correlation, once again, reject the absence o f first-order serial correlation in both the 
homoskedastic and robust estimator o f the variance-covariance matrix o f the parameter estimates, but not 
the second-order serial correlation, except for equation 6c (homoskedastic case). Taking into account the 
specification tests applied to the estimated dynamic models, equation 6c (homoskedastic case), where the 
explanatory variables are endogenous, is the most appropriate. It is worth noting that the presence o f first- 
order autocorrelation in the differenced residuals does not imply that the estimates are inconsistent, but 
the presence of second-order autocorrelation would imply that the estimates are inconsistent (Arellano 
and Bond, 1991).
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Table 6.4: Long Run GMM: Dependent Variable is IGE1 and Independent Variables are EMN and EGE1
REGRESSION (1) REGRESSION (2) REGRESSION (3) REGRESSION (4)
(a) X„
strictly
exogenous
O’) * , ,
predetermine
d
(O X,, 
endogenous
(a) Xu 
strictly 
exogenous
O’) * „
predetermine
d
(O Xu 
endogenous
(a) Xit
strictly
exogenous
O’) * „
predetermine
d
(O X„ 
endogenous
o o
strictly
exogenous
(b) Xu
predetermine
d
(0  x lt
endogenous
IMN 0.0331
(0.0137)**
(0.0143)**
0.0266
(0.0200)
(0.0189)
0.0377
(0.0136)***
(0.0151)**
0.0654
(0.0890)
(0.1038)
0.0314
(0.0134)**
(0.0183)*
0.0239
(0.0096)**
(0.0126)*
0.0749
(0.1272)
(0.1489)
0.0344
(0.0128)***
(0.0180)*
0.0248
(0.0093)***
(0.0121)**
0.5001
(9.4502)
(10.4434)
0.0372
(0.0121)***
(0.0163)**
0.0211
(0.0102)**
(0.0108)*
EMN -0.3781
(0.9759)
(1.1395)
0.0577
(0.1948)
(0.2269)
0.3018
(0.1555)*
(0.1692)*
-0.5019
(1.4055)
(1.6554)
0.0399
(0.1813)
(0.2137)
0.2899
(0.1518)*
(0.1641)*
-5.8878
(116.8038)
(129.5313)
0.0378
(0.1533)
(0.1723)
0.3042
(0.1474)**
(0.1593)*
EGE1 -0.1317
(0.5449)
(0.5273)
0.0912
(0.1180)
(0.0819)
0.1705
(0.1015)*
(0.0861)**
-0.2153
(0.8028)
(0.8323)
0.0957
(0.1102)
(0.0831)
0.1660
(0.0997)*
(0.0874)*
-2.4249
(49.2962)
(54.5765)
0.1218
(0.0920)
(0.0742)
0.1963
(0.0944)**
(0.0934)**
AGE 0.1000
(0.2066)
(0.2464)
0.0121
(0.0144)
(0.0169)
0.0127
(0.0105)
(0.0138)
0.9354
(18.2349)
(20.2553)
0.0085
(0.0126)
(0.0150)
0.0119 
(0.0101) 
(0.0126)
LFSTOCK 36.9702
(726.0782)
(800.2190)
0.0195
(0.6375)
(0.7831)
-0.1129
(0.7628)
(0.8953)
ECACRA
UNEM
INACTIVE
ECACRF
OBS. 400 392 392 392
REGRESSION (5) REGRESSION (6) REGRESSION (7)
IMN 0.0151
(0.0124)
(0.0133)
0.0133 
(0.0101) 
(0.0099) .
0.0086
(0.0135)
(0.0157)
0.0144
(0.0187)
(0.0200)
0.0140
(0.0080)*
(0.0070)**
0.0097
(0.0103)
(0.0103)
0.0104
(0.0179)
(0.0201)
0.0173
(0.0126)
(0.0131)
0.0118
(0.0115)
(0.0124)
EMN -0.1077
(0.1761)
(0.2117)
-0.1321
(0.1340)
(0.1844)
-0.2919
(0.2186)
(0.2773)
-0.1380
(0.2748)
(0.3289)
-0.0312
(0.1025)
(0.1304)
-0.0252
(0.1437)
(0.1815)
-0.1475
(0.2644)
(0.3172)
-0.1382
(0.1610)
(0.1864)
-0.2431
(0.1802)
(0.2386)
EGE1 -0.0531
(0.1159)
(0.1206)
0.0199 
(0.0831) . 
(0.0964)
-0.1783
(0.1534)
(0.1612)
-0.0581
(0.1769)
(0.1908)
0.0447
(0.0649)
(0.0750)
-0.0261
(0.1000)
(0.1073)
-0.0698
(0.1718)
(0.1833)
0.0031
(0.0997)
(0.1060)
-0.1144
(0.1225)
(0.1661)
AGE 0.0186
(0.0182)
(0.0238)
-0.0107
(0.0108)
(0.0132)
-0.0014
(0.0150)
(0.0200)
0.0239
(0.0287)
(0.0349)
-0.0014
(0.0089)
(0.0102)
0.0147
(0.0121)
(0.0160)
0.0313
(0.0308)
(0.0355)
0.0021
(0.0148)
(0.0176)
0.0165
(0.0151)
(0.0192)
LFSTOCK
ECACRA -0.0332
(0.0119)***
(0.0145)**
-0.0223
(0.0071)***
(0.0085)***
-0.0345
(0.0108)***
(0.0123)***
UNEM -1.7372
(1.8359)
(2.1020)
0.6224
(0.6127)
(0.7629)
1.9000
(0.9162)**
(0.8548)**
INACTIVE -1.5061
(1.2721)
(1.4377)
-0.9230
(0.9194)
(1.0003)
-2.2723
(1.2988)*
(1.7279)
ECACRF -0.0396
(0.0226)*
(0.0285)
-0.0168
(0.0052)***
(0.0062)***
-0.0175
(0.0074)**
(0.0072)**
-0.0383
(0.0200)*
(0.0247)
-0.0230
(0.0088)***
(0.0101)**
-0.0384
(0.0111)***
(0.0137)***
OBS. 325 325 325
Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (*), (**) and (***) denote the significance of the White (1980) estimator.
Generally speaking, the exogenous, predetermined and endogenous parameters are similar 
to one another, denoting the robustness of the dynamic results. First, all of the equations 
(Appendix A6.19) reject that the lagged income inequality coefficient is zero. The 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is higher when the explanatory variables are 
assumed to be exogenous, except for Regression 1, and lower when the explanatory 
variables are endogenous, except for Regression 5. Additionally, the coefficients on the 
lagged dependent variable are statistically significant at the one per cent level in most 
equations. One finding expected was that income inequality in the current period depends 
on income inequality in the previous period. The rationale for this result is simple, because 
income inequality does not change very quickly over one year and job mobility is rather 
low. People do not change jobs for psychological, technological and institutional reasons 
(Gujarati, 2003).
Regression 1 indicates that income inequality {IGEX) increases in the long-run as income 
per capita {IMN) increases, thus leading to a positive correlation between the two 
variables. The coefficients are also statistically significant in most equations. For instance, 
if the strictly exogenous income is increased by one per cent, income inequality will rise by 
0.0331 per cent in the long-run. This disproves the theory relating to the declining segment 
of the Kuznets curve, but is likely to accept Lydall’s (1979) hypothesis that only a limited 
number of people can be transferred to higher levels of skills, while the remainder have to 
wait their turn. This result is consistent with the FEs conditional regressions.
The findings also indicate that income inequality in a region declines over time as the 
human capital variables (educational attainment {EMN) and educational inequality 
{EGE\)) decline, but only when they are assumed to be endogenous. According to the 
estimated value and assuming, for example, that human capital variables are endogenous, a 
one per cent increase in coefficient on educational attainment would lead in the long-run to 
a 0.3018 per cent increase in income inequality (Regression 2). The effects of educational 
attainment and educational inequality obtained after full adjustment of income inequality 
are positive and statistically significant only when education is endogenous (equations 2c, 
3c and 4c). The combined positive impact of educational attainment and inequality on 
income inequality implies that, although educational expansion facilitates numerous 
favourable chances for individuals, the returns are higher for the rich than for the poor and
235
rich people have more opportunities to engage in higher paid jobs. Additionally, the 
positive relationship between income and educational inequality highlights the 
responsiveness of the EU labour market to differences in qualifications and skills. 
Education is likely to raise the individual’s marginal product in the future and therefore 
his/her future income (Barr, 2004: 296).
The long-run effect of the population ageing {AGE) variable on inequality is in most 
equations positive, which may reflect that with greater longevity, there will be a growing 
number of elderly people and since their income is lower than that of younger people, an 
increasing number of elderly people should lead to a rise in the number of households with 
a low income (Estudillo, 1997: 68), but this variable is not statistically significant. 
Regression 4 (equations 4a and 4b) shows that the labour force stock {LFSTOCK) has a 
positive effect on income inequality, but it is not statistically significant either. 
Nevertheless, the impact of the economic activity rate {ECACRA) has the expected sign 
(negative) and is statistically significant at the one per cent level (Regression 5). High 
unemployment {UNEM) is associated with higher inequality in the long-run only when 
unemployment is endogenous. This outcome is consistent with the outcome of the static 
regression models, denoting the robustness of the relationship between unemployment and 
inequality. The dynamic models are likely to allow testing of whether changes in short-term 
(cyclical) and long-term (structural) unemployment influence changes in income inequality. 
The short-run and long-run impact of unemployment on inequality has the ‘right’ sign with 
respect to the literature and the static regression analysis. Finally, the impact of women’s 
access to work {ECACRF) on income inequality is negative and statistically significant, no 
matter what the explanatory variables are assumed to be.
Equation 6c is the most appropriate, taking into account the specification tests. In this 
equation, unemployment and female participation in the labour force are the most 
significant factors in determining income inequality within European regions. More 
specifically, the higher the unemployment level, the higher the income inequality and the 
higher the female participation, the lower the income inequality.
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6.3.1.2 Independent Educational Variable: Age at which the Highest Education Level 
was Completed
(a) Static Model
The p-values of Breusch and Pagan’s Lagrange multiplier test and of Hausman’s one 
favour the FEs model as the most appropriate model to determine the impact of average age 
at which the highest education level was completed and inequality in that age on income 
inequality for the population as a whole (IGEX). The FEs results of the study are displayed 
in Table 6.5, while the OLS and REs results are presented in Appendices A6.4 and A6.12, 
respectively.
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Table 6.5: FEs: Dependent Variable is IGE1 and Independent Variables are AMN and AGE1
0 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
IMN -0.0001
(0.0011)
(0.0013)
-0.0003
(0.0011)
(0.0014)
0.0006
(0.0012)
(0.0015)
0.0020
(0.0012)*
(0.0015)
0.0011
(0.0015)
(0.0015)
0.0029
(0.0015)*
(0.0016)*
0.0022
(0.0015)
(0.0016)
0.0091
(0.0023)***
(0.0025)***
0.0098
(0.0019)***
(0.0020)***
AMN -0.0112
(0.0044)**
(0.0044)**
-0.0112
(0.0043)**
(0.0046)+*
-0.0093
(0.0043)**
(0.0040)**
-0.0072
(0.0039)*
(0.0047)
-0.0040
(0.0039)
(0.0044)
-0.0062
(0.0039)
(0.0042)
0.0226
(0.0094)**
(0.0109)**
0.0087
(0.0044)*
(0.0047)*
AGE1 1.4693
(0.3724)***
(0.4841)***
1.5020
(0.3705)***
(0.4680)***
1.4598
(0.3653)***
(0.4410)***
1.3965
(0.3422)***
(0.4248)***
1.2346
(0.3412)***
(0.3611)***
1.4129
(0.3448)***
(0.3934)***
0.5245
(0.3875)
(0.2393)**
0.8790
(0.3311)***
(0.3020)+**
AGE -0.0057
(0.0023)**
(0.0024)**
-0.0058
(0.0023)**
(0.0026)**
-0.0080
(0.0023)***
(0.0023)***
-0.0053
(0.0023)**
(0.0023)**
-0.0072
(0.0023)***
(0.0023)***
-0.0039
(0.0028)
(0.0025)
-0.0016
(0.0023)
(0.0022)
LFSTOCK -0.3229
(0.0866)***
(0.0935)***
ECACRA -0.0104
(0.0015)***
(0.0016)***
UNEM 0.5126
(0.1481)***
(0.1591)***
0.4417
(0.2068)**
(0.2368)*
0.3798
(0.1446)***
(0.1598)**
INACTIV
E
0.0902
(0.0970)
(0.1043)
ECACRF -0.0075
(0.0013)***
(0.0014)***
-0.0085
(0.0013)***
(0.0013)***
-0.0036
(0.0017)**
(0.0015)**
-0.0050
(0.0013)***
(0.0014)***
YR96*UR
BANDPA
V
-0.0234
(0.0146)
(0.0155)
YR97*UR
BANDPA
V
-0.0354
(0.0144)**
(0.0133)***
YR98*UR
BANDPA
V
-0.0332
(0.0149)**
(0.0144)**
YR99*UR
BANDPA
V
-0.0570
(0.0160)***
(0.0161)***
YR00*UR
BANDPA
V
-0.0875
(0.0180)***
(0.0174)***
YR96*LA
T
-0.0001
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
YR97*LA
T
-0.0004
(0.0001)***
(0.0001)**+
YR98*LA
T
-0.0004
(0.0001)***
(0.0001)***
YR99*LA
T
-0.0007
(0.0001)***
(0.0001)+**
YR00*LA
T
-0.0010
(0.0002)***
(0.0002)***
CONSTA
NT
0.3821
(0.0121)***
(0.0151)**+
0.5439
(0.0752)***
(0.0751)***
0.7922
(0.1254)***
(0.1245)***
0.9168
(0.1281)***
(0.1311)***
1.4160
(0.1394)***
(0.1414)***
0.9532
(0.1339)***
(0.1324)***
1.1178
(0.1273)***
(0.1294)***
0.2456
(0.2261)
(0.2558)
0.4011
(0.1635)**
(0.1579)**
ADJ R-SQ 0.0000 0.0380 0.0511 0.0804 0.1819 0.2024 0.1781 0.2741 0.2836
OBS. 604 534 534 534 455 455 455 299 455
LM TEST 
(p-value)
916.46
(0.0000)
896.69
(0.0000)
866.57
(0.0000)
730.49
(0.0000)
629.46
(0.0000)
573.75
(0.0000)
543.18
(0.0000)
338.04
(0.0000)
514.93
(0.0000)
HAUSMA 
N TEST 
(p-value)
71.46
(0.0000)
18.77
(0.0003)
19.70
(0.0006)
72.33
(0.0000)
22.33
(0.0005)
25.97
(0.0002)
19.95
(0.0028)
Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (*), (**) and (***) denotes the significance of the White 
(1980) estimator. LM TEST is the Lagrange Multiplier test for the random effects model based on the OLS residuals (Breusch and Pagan, 1980). 
HAUSMAN TEST is the Hausman (1978) test for fixed or random effects.
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Regression 1, which shows the unconditional and insignificant impact of income per capita 
(IMN) on income inequality has already been presented in Table 6.3. The addition of 
human capital variables and of population ageing (Regressions 2 and 3) does not change the 
estimated insignificant effect of the income per capita variable. However, adding the 
percentage of normally working respondents (Regression 4), the unemployment and the 
female economic activity rate (Regression 6), and the urbanisation level within a region 
(Regression 8), the impact of income per capita on income inequality is positive. Thus, the 
income per capita impact seems to be sensitive to the model specification and to the 
inclusion of different control variables. The regression results also reveal that while the 
relationship between the average age of respondents when the highest education level was 
completed (AMN) and income inequality is negative in Regressions 2-5, it is positive in 
Regressions 8 and 9, in which the urbanisation and latitude variables are included. On the 
one hand, the negative coefficient shows that individuals are more equal, because they face 
more identical opportunity sets. Earlier work experience is likely to be catalytic in the 
decision to increase their education to a more highly profitable level. On the other hand, the 
addition of the city-rural pattern variable and of the EU north-south pattern variable 
changes the sign of the coefficient on educational attainment. On including pattern 
variables, the higher the educational achievement, the higher the income inequality. The 
positive correlation shows that the European expansion of educational opportunity enables 
the poor to improve their economic circumstances by getting higher education level even if 
this is at an older age. Therefore, the impact of educational attainment on income inequality 
is not clear, because the coefficient does not keep the same sign on the inclusion of 
different control variables.
As expected, inequality in the age at which the highest education level was completed 
(AGE 1) has a positive relationship with income inequality, highlighting the responsiveness 
of the EU labour market to differences in qualifications and skills. If educational 
achievement has a negative impact on income inequality, while educational inequality has a 
positive one (Regressions 2-9), education may facilitate graduate favourable chances and 
graduate occupational outcomes for each strata. Education offers credentials that signal 
underlying abilities, preferences and privileges for all individuals, but the returns on these 
credentials depend upon the existing socioeconomic background. The returns on highly-
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educated people’s credentials are higher than on those of the less-educated. Both the 
average and inequality human capital variables play an important role in improving the 
absolute economic standing of people, as better-educated citizens are more productive. The 
results show that government expenditures on education contribute to a more equal income 
distribution, and that the EU labour market is responsive to differences in requirements.
The next step is to experiment with a number of alternative static specifications, adding 
more determinants to the equations. The impact of population ageing (AGE) on income 
inequality is negative, statistically significant and robust (Regressions 3-7). The higher the 
age of respondents within a region, the lower the income inequality. The introduction of 
access to work variables in regression analysis shows that both the percentage of normally 
working respondents (LFSTOCK) and the economic activity rate of the population 
(ECACRA) have a negative effect on inequality (Regressions 4 and 5, respectively). This 
point is further confirmed by the introduction of unemployment (UNEM) and the female 
participation in labour market (ECACRF) (Regression 6), but not by the introduction of 
inactivity (UNEM) (Regression 7) in the FEs models. The high unemployment in the EU, 
between 1995 and 2000 has aggravated the relative position of low-income groups 
contributing to higher levels of inequality. Once more, the positive relationship between 
unemployment and inequality confirms the fact that income received through government 
transfer payments, such as unemployment insurance and welfare benefits, is lower than 
income from wages. Regressions 8 and 9, respectively, illustrate that the effects of 
urbanisation (URBANDPAV) and latitude (LAT) on inequality are less pronounced in 
2000 than in 1995. Moreover, according to the OLS and REs regressions, urbanisation is 
negatively associated with income inequality. Income inequality is higher in rural areas 
than in city-regions. Once again, the negative coefficient on the latitude variable 
demonstrates, among other things, the EU north-south divide in terms of income 
distribution.
Appendices A6.4 and A6.12 (Regressions 10-12) introduce the qualitative variables of 
religion, welfare state and family structure as explanatory ones. Orthodox regions, 
‘residual’ (or ‘southern’) welfare states and Southern/Catholic living arrangement regions 
are the most inegalitarian societies. According to the standardised coefficients for the above 
regressions (Appendix A6.2), the female economic activity rate and the access to work
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variables explain the largest variation in income inequality. The opposite results are 
obtained from the standardised coefficient on population ageing.
(b) Dynamic Model
Table 6.6 shows the long-run effects of human capital distribution on income inequality 
(IGEX) . The short-run coefficients and the specification tests83 are presented in Appendix 
A6.20.
Regression 1 has already been presented. Nevertheless, the coefficient on the lagged 
income inequality variable is higher when the average education level and inequality in 
education level completed are added in the model rather than the average age at which the 
highest level of education was completed and inequality in that age are added. Considering 
the long-run coefficients, the impact of income per capita for the whole of the population 
(IMN) on income inequality is positive, but sensitive to the inclusion of control variables 
(as in static models) and robust to the nature of the variables (if they are exogenous, 
predetermined or endogenous). More specifically, the relationship is positive for 
Regressions 1-5. While the relationship between the average age of respondents when the 
highest education level was completed (AMN) and income inequality is negative in most 
static model specifications, this relationship is positive in dynamic ones. On the contrary, 
both static and dynamic equations agree with the current belief that human capital 
inequality (AGEX) has a positive relationship with income inequality and both equations 
are robust to model specification. On examining the impact of the additional time-variant 
structural variables on income inequality, most of them are statistically insignificant. More 
specifically, the impact of the average age of respondents (AGE), the percentage of 
normally working respondents (LFSTOCK) , the percentage of unemployed respondents 
(UNEM) and the percentage of inactive respondents (INACTIVE) is not clear.
83 The estimates perform well based on the specification tests, since the test statistics of serial correlation and 
overidentifying restrictions (the Sargan tests) in most equations do not indicate misspecification. More 
specifically, the Sargan tests indicate correlation between the instruments and the error term o f the first- 
differenced equation in the equations lb, 2b, 2c, 3b, 3c, 6b and 6c. The null hypothesis o f no first-order 
autocorrelation in the differenced residuals is rejected, except for equations 2b, 3b, 4b, 6c (heteroskedastic 
case) and 4c (both homoskedastic and heteroskedastic case). There is no second-order autocorrelation in the 
first-differenced idiosyncratic errors in equations 5b, 5c and 6c (homoskedastic case). Hence, based on the 
specification tests, equation 6c (homoskedastic case) is the most appropriate.
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Nevertheless, the coefficient on the economic activity rate of total population (ECACRA) 
as a proxy for work access has the ‘right’ sign (negative). The higher the level of work 
access, the more egalitarian the income distribution, as more people have the chance to 
increase their economic and educational opportunities. Female participation in the labour 
force is negatively associated with income inequality no matter what the explanatory 
variables are assumed to be. Finally, the coefficients on the determinants keep the same 
sign regardless of their nature (whether they are exogenous, predetermined or endogenous).
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Table 6.6: Long Run GMM: Dependent Variable is IGE1 and Independent Variables are AMN and AGE1
REGRESSION (1) REGRESSION (2) REGRESSION (3) REGRESSION (4)
strictly
exogenous
( b ) * ,7
predetermine
d
(c) Xu 
endogenous
(a) Xu 
strictly 
exogenous
(b) xu
predetermine
d
( 0
endogenous
(a) Xu
strictly
exogenous
(b) xa
predetermine
d
W  * /i
endogenous
(a)
strictly
exogenous
o» *u
predetermine
d
(0  X„
endogenous
IMN 0.0331
(0.0137)**
(0.0143)**
0.0266 
(0.0200) . 
(0.0189)
0.0377
(0.0136)***
(0.0151)**
0.0248
(0.0070)***
(0.0087)***
0.0125
(0.0039)***
(0.0062)**
0.0174
(0.0067)***
(0.0090)*
0.0246
(0.0071)***
(0.0088)***
0.0131
(0.0038)***
(0.0060)**
0.0180
(0.0067)***
(0.0086)**
0.0247
(0.0081)***
(0.0100)**
0.0126
(0.0043)***
(0.0065)*
0.0162
(0.0072)**
(0.0098)
AMN 0.0277
(0.0227)
(0.0185)
0.0256
(0.0155)*
(0.0198)
0.0369
(0.0208)*
(0.0204)*
0.0314
(0.0241)
(0.0195)
0.0261
(0.0154)*
(0.0202)
0.0397
(0.0211)*
(0.0210)*
0.0330
(0.0273)
(0.0225)
0.0157
(0.0160)
(0.0208)
0.0344
(0.0209)*
(0.0258)
AGE I 3.6414
(1.8420)**
(2.1191)*
6.6508
(1.4811)***
(2.1363)***
5.4180
(2.5306)**
(3.1632)*
3.6686
(1.8873)*
(2.1901)*
6.5101
(1.4654)***
(2.0372)***
5.0946
(2.5422)**
(2.9857)*
3.9241
(2.1992)*
(2.5852)
7.5766
(1.7199)***
(2.6348)***
7.2504
(2.4242)***
(3.5045)**
AGE 0.0219
(0.0157)
(0.0208)
0.0064
(0.0065)
(0.0079)
0.0079
(0.0072)
(0.0080)
0.0248
(0.0189)
(0.0253)
0.0062
(0.0071)
(0.0089)
0.0082
(0.0080)
(0.0101)
LFSTOCK 0.2871
(0.5805)
(0.6464)
0.2330
(0.3822)
(0.5189)
1.1891
(0.6860)*
(0.9369)
ECACRA
UNEM
INACTIVE
ECACRF
OBS. 400 348 348 348
REGRESSION (5) REGRESSION (6) REGRESSION (7)
IMN 0.0116
(0.0070)*
(0.0064)*
0.0028
(0.0058)
(0.0057)
-0.0015
(0.0065)
(0.0067)
0.0118
(0.0090)
(0.0083)
0.0049
(0.0055)
(0.0056)
0.0051
(0.0056)
(0.0066)
0.0083
(0.0097)
(0.0099)
0.0031
(0.0070)
(0.0073)
0.0024
(0.0081)
(0.0085)
AMN 0.0150
(0.0148)
(0.0115)
0.0161 
(0.0145) . 
(0.0178)
0.0110
(0.0169)
(0.0171)
0.0145
(0.0189)
(0.0159)
0.0120
(0.0152)
(0.0206)
0.0198
(0.0162)
(0.0214)
0.0132
(0.0194)
(0.0146)
0.0035
(0.0163)
(0.0207)
0.0135
(0.0203)
(0.0218)
AGE1 2.1284
(1.1993)*
(1.3475)
4.1241
(1.2062)***
(1.5829)***
4.3813
(1.5494)***
(2.1376)**
2.8635
(1.6004)*
(1.8131)
4.9000
(1.1274)***
(1.6744)***
5.6793 
(1.2898)*** 
(2.1688)***
2.4790
(1.5943)
(1.6704)
4.0468
(1.5011)***
(1.6712)**
4.4379
(1.7489)**
(1.9617)**
AGE 0.0157
(0.0116)
(0.0156)
0.0081
(0.0073)
(0.0101)
0.0059
(0.0074)
(0.0090)
0.0172
(0.0147)
(0.0183)
0.0069
(0.0071)
(0.0083)
0.0033
(0.0066)
(0.0077)
0.0214
(0.0165)
(0.0204)
0.0100
(0.0095)
(0.0118)
0.0104
(0.0101)
(0.0122)
LFSTOCK
ECACRA -0.0208
(0.0061)***
(0.0077)***
-0.0192
(0.0063)**.*
(0.0083)**
-0.0232
(0.0080)***
(0.0099)**
UNEM -1.3094
(0.9382)
(1.0707)
-0.5564
(0.5167)
(0.8090)
-0.6557
(0.6377)
(1.0126)
INACTIVE -0.2754
(0.5540)
(0.5804)
0.5132
(0.5460)
(0.5268)
0.0327
(0.8473)
(0.9012)
ECACRF -0.0215
(0.0083)***
(0.0112)*
-0.0145
(0.0055)***
(0.0074)*
-0.0130
(0.0058)**
(0.0077)*
-0.0217
(0.0084)**
(0.0109)**
-0.0220
(0.0067)***
(0.0084)***
-0.0206
(0.0094)**
(0.0107)*
OBS. 285 285 285
Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (*), (**) and (***) denotes the significance of the White (1980) estimator.
6.3.2 Income Inequality for Normally Working People
6.3.2.1 Independent Educational Variable: Education Level Completed
(a) Static Model
The FEs models are the most appropriate so as to identify the determinants of income 
inequality for normally working people (NGE\) between 1995 and 2000. Table 6.7 
presents the FEs regression results, while the OLS and REs results are presented in 
Appendices A6.5 and A6.13, respectively.
The first step in the analysis is to examine the linear impact of income per capita among 
normally working people (NMN) on the respective income inequality (Regression 1). 
Income per capita is positively associated with income inequality. This relationship is 
statistically significant and robust. This behaviour disproves the theory relating to the 
declining segment of the Kuznets’ curve. Thus, a low percentage of workers is employed in 
high added-value jobs, while the remainder must wait their turn. The second step in the 
analysis is the introduction of educational attainment (EMN) and educational inequality 
(EGEX) (Regression 2). Once more, the impact of educational achievement on income 
inequality is not clear, as the coefficients on educational attainment are not statistically 
significant; while the results are consistent with the current belief that educational 
inequality is positively correlated with income inequality. The latter relationship is also 
robust. The more skewed the income distribution, the higher the population share excluded 
from schooling and the higher the human capital inequality (Checchi, 2000). Hence, a 
higher level of educational attainment through access to higher education institutions (i.e. 
universities) increases the occupational choices and the earning opportunities of rich people 
and not of the population as a whole. On the other hand, European workers who live in 
poverty cannot escape their condition through increased access to education, because the 
returns to education are greater for rich than for poor people. The positive relationship 
between income and educational inequality, is most probably a reflection of the 
responsiveness of the EU labour market to differences in qualifications and skills. The third 
step of analysis is the introduction of additional determinants to the equations so as to 
evaluate the robustness of the results. Regression 3 controls for the influence of the average 
age of respondents (AGE),  which is not statistically significant even on adding more
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determinants. Regression 4 shows the negative impact of female participation in the labour 
force (ECACRF) on inequalities. The fact that income inequality among normally working 
people declined slightly throughout the period of study is most likely a reflection of the 
greater flexibility in working conditions and arrangements for women, the more adequate 
sharing of family responsibility and the more adequate childcare services that are now 
available. Both men and women seem to have more equal opportunities to engage in paid 
work, showing a more gender egalitarian culture in the EU labour market. Finally, 
Regressions 5 and 6, respectively, show that the impact of urbanisation (URBANDPAV) 
and latitude (LAT) on inequalities was stronger in 2000 than in 1995. Nevertheless, the 
OLS and REs results (Appendices A6.5 and A6.3) illustrate the ambiguous impact of 
urbanisation on income inequalities among normally working people, contrary to the case 
of income inequalities for the population as a whole. The OLS and REs coefficients on 
latitude are negative and statistically significant at the one per cent level. Hence the greater 
the latitude, the lower the income inequality among working people. As was the case with 
income inequality among the population as a whole, income inequality among normally 
working people is higher in the Mediterranean countries, where many jobs are on a part- 
time basis.
As expected, income inequality is lower in social-democratic welfare states, in Protestant 
areas and in regions with Nordic family structures. The Swedish and Danish regions offer a 
clear example of this pattern. Additionally, considering the standardised coefficients, 
educational inequality and latitude explain a large part of the variation in income inequality 
among normally working people (Appendix A6.2).
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Table 6.7: FEs: Dependent Variable is NGE1 and Independent Variables are EMN and EGE1
0 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NMN 0.0014
(0.0008)*
(0.0013)
0.0022 
(0.0011)** 
(0.0015)
0.0023
(0.0011)**
(0.0016)
0.0020
(0.0012)
(0.0014)
0.0074
(0.0019)***
(0.0021)***
0.0046
(0.0014)***
(0.0016)***
EMN 0.0347
(0.0304)
(0.0292)
0.0349
(0.0304)
(0.0293)
0.0322
(0.0295)
(0.0254)
-0.0055
(0.0419)
(0.0330)
0.0250
(0.0325)
(0.0268)
EGE1 0.0545
(0.0233)**
(0.0169)***
0.0546
(0.0233)**
(0.0169)***
0.0326
(0.0220)
(0.0147)**
0.0596
(0.0319)*
(0.0219)***
0.0377
(0.0221)*
(0.0146)**
AGE -0.0006
(0.0022)
(0.0020)
-0.0017
(0.0021)
(0.0019)
- 0.0011
(0.0028)
(0.0024)
0.0000
(0.0023)
(0.0019)
ECACRF -0.0035
(0.0012)***
(0.0011)***
-0.0012
(0.0018)
(0.0016)
-0.0020
(0.0013)
(0.0013)
YR96*UR
BANDPA
V
-0.0101
(0.0155)
(0.0134)
YR97*UR
BANDPA
V
-0.0316
(0.0156)**
(0.0145)**
YR98*UR
BANDPA
V
0.0126
(0.0171)
(0.0157)
YR99*UR
BANDPA
V
-0.0129
(0.0180)
(0.0168)
YROO'UR
BANDPA
V
-0.0570
(0.0188)***
(0.0167)***
YR96*LA
T
0.0000
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
YR97*LA
T
-0.0002
(0.0001)
(0.0001)*
YR98*LA
T
0.0000
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
YR99*LA
T
-0.0002
(0.0001)
(0.0001)*
YROO*LA
T
-0.0004
(0.0001)***
(0.0001)***
CONSTA
NT
0.2019
(0.0127)***
(0.0186)***
0.1231
(0.0390)***
(0.0328)***
0.1486
(0.1035)
(0.0878)*
0.3855
(0.1096)***
(0.0841)***
0.1991
(0.1658)
(0.1255)
0.2071
(0.1320)
(0.1040)**
ADJ R-SQ 0.0057 0.0207 0.0209 0.0337 0.1556 0.0682
OBS. 604 596 596 513 299 513
LM TEST 
(p-value)
676.24
(0.0000)
555.86
(0.0000)
555.66
(0.0000)
557.12
(0.0000)
259.68
(0.0000)
538.47
(0.0000)
HAUSMA 
N TEST 
(p-value)
38.07
(0.0000)
34.03
(0.0000)
34.36
(0.0000)
14.72
(0.0116)
Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (*), (**) and (***) denotes the significance of the 
White (1980) estimator. LM TEST is the Lagrange Multiplier test for the random effects model based on the OLS residuals (Breusch and Pagan, 
1980). HAUSMAN TEST is the Hausman (1978) test for fixed or random effects.
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(b) Dynamic Model
Table 6.8 displays the long-run results for the income inequality for normally working
Q A
people (NGE\) equations. The validity of the models is confirmed by the test results 
reported in Appendix A6.21, which also presents the short-run results.
As expected, all the equations (in Appendix A6.21) reject that the lagged income inequality 
for working people parameter is zero, because a few workers change job within one year. 
Most people did the same job throughout the whole period of study for psychological, 
technological and institutional reasons. Analysing the long-run coefficients on the 
determinants of income variations of normally working people (Table 6.8), Regression 1 
shows that income per capita (NMN), once again, positively affects income inequality, but 
that impact is sensitive to the model specification in terms of the assumption of the 
determinants (whether they are exogenous, predetermined or endogenous). Only a limited 
number of people can transfer from the low levels of skill to higher ones so as to get higher 
rewards. The results also indicate that the long-run impact of human capital distribution on 
income inequality is not clear. Neither educational attainment (EMN) nor educational 
inequality (EGE\) are statistically significant, except for educational inequality in equation 
2b, where the explanatory variables are assumed to be predetermined. In this case, the 
higher the educational inequality, the higher the income inequality. Since both income and 
human capital inequalities have decreased slightly between 1995 and 2000, a more equal 
education may have achieved greater equality in economic opportunities and incomes, 
without challenging the European institutions and without requiring any major 
redistribution of capital. Regression 3 shows that the average age of respondents (AGE) 
has an ambiguous effect on income inequality, while Regression 4 displays the negative 
and significant relationship between female participation in labour force (ECACRF) and 
the distribution of income among normally working people.
84 The estimates perform well based on the specification tests. The Sargan tests do not reject the 
overidentifying restrictions, except for equations 2c and 3c. The tests for serial correlation reject the absence 
of first-order in all equations. The null hypothesis o f no second-order autocorrelation in the differenced 
residuals is rejected in equations la, lb, 2a, 2c, 3a, 3b, 3c (homoskedastic case) and 2b (both homoskedastic 
and heteroskedastic case). Based on specification tests, equations la, lb, 2a, 3a, 3b (homoskedastic case) and 
2b (both homoskedastic and heteroskedastic case) are the most appropriate models.
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Table 6.8: Long Run GMM: Dependent Variable is NGE1 and Independent Variables are EMN and EGE1
REGRESSION (1) REGRESSION (2) REGRESSION (3) REGRESSION (4)
(a) X„
strictly
exogenous
( b ) * „
predetermine
d
(O x u
endogenous
(a) Xu
strictly
exogenous
(b) X„
predetermine
d
(O x a
endogenous
(a) Xit
strictly
exogenous
(b) x u
predetermine
d
(c) X„ 
endogenous
(*) * „  
strictly 
exogenous
(b) x it
predetermine
d
(c) *u 
endogenous
NMN 0.0186
(0.0107)*
(0.0118)
-0.0408 
(0.0530) 
(0.0650) .
-0.1397
(0.2707)
(0.3017)
0.0277
(0.0301)
(0.0338)
0.0125
(0.0064)*
(0.0077)
0.0123
(0.0088)
(0.0098)
0.0256
(0.0293)
(0.0336)
0.0126
(0.0065)*
(0.0078)
0.0136
(0.0086)
(0.0096)
0.0066
(0.0080)
(0.0079)
0.0083
(0.0058)
(0.0057)
0.0052
(0.0076)
(0.0073)
EMN -0.3854
(0.6791)
(0.7199)
0.1074
(0.1253)
(0.1346)
0.2195
(0.1791)
(0.1865)
-0.4239
(0.7223)
(0.7517)
0.1031
(0.1249)
(0.1355)
0.2153
(0.1745)
(0.1786)
-0.0583
(0.1520)
(0.1689)
0.0116
(0.0913)
(0.1077)
0.0443
(0.1355)
(0.1522)
EGE1 -0.2789
(0.4984)
(0.4951)
0.1138
(0.0823)
(0.0671)*
0.1118
(0.1202)
(0.1136)
-0.3477
(0.5684)
(0.5574)
0.1028
(0.0839)
(0.0673)
0.1007
(0.1184)
(0.1074)
-0.0854
(0.1114)
(0.1153)
-0.0269
(0.0687)
(0.0699)
-0.0259
(0.1066)
(0.1087)
AGE 0.0487
(0.0651)
(0.0649)
0.0095
(0.0106)
(0.0106)
0.0113
(0.0111)
(0.0131)
0.0274
(0.0171)
(0.0203)
0.0151
(0.0093)
(0.0096)
0.0229
(0.0135)*
(0.0131)*
ECACRF -0.0232
(0.0091)**
(0.0127)*
-0.0159
(0.0052)***
(0.0062)**
-0.0145
(0.0082)*
(0.0094)
OBS. 400 392 392 325
Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (*), (**) and (***) denote the significance of the White (1980) estimator.
63.2.2 Independent Educational Variable: Age at which the Highest Education Level 
was Completed
(a) Static Model
The validity of the static models which explore the impact of average age at which the 
highest education level was completed and inequality in that age on income inequality for 
normally working people (NGE\) is confirmed by the test results presented in Table 6.9. 
Once more, the FEs models are the most appropriate. The OLS and REs results are 
displayed in Appendices A6.6 and A6.14, respectively.
The unconditional impact of the income per capita of normally working people (NMN) on 
the respective income inequality is positive and statistically significant at the ten per cent 
level, but only when disturbances are assumed to be homoskedastic. The addition of more 
determinants changes the estimated effect of income per capita, as the conditional impact of 
average income is statistically insignificant in Regressions 2-4, but statistically significant 
at the one per cent level in Regressions 5-6. Thus, the relationship between income per 
capita and income inequality is positive, but sensitive to the model specification. The 
positive impact of income per capita on income inequality is robust only when the proxy 
for human capital is the education level completed.
Regression 2 displays the estimated effect of human capital variables on inequality. On the 
one hand, the impact of the average age at which the highest education level was completed 
(AMN) is positive and statistically significant only when the variables for population 
ageing, women’s access to work and latitude are introduced into the model (Regression 6). 
Thus controlling for the above factors, the increasing proportion of the European 
population who attain education at an older age does not lead to inflation in the value of 
educational credentials, which, in turn, leads to a decrease in the salaries of highly-educated 
workers. Some of them have work experience and they are very realistic about their 
decisions. Educational attainment at an older age improves specific and general information 
about labour market institutions. However, improved information about the job market 
reduces the probable divergence between anticipated and actual returns to education 
(Rosen, 1994). On the other hand, the inequality in the age at which the highest education 
level was completed {AGEX) is positively associated with income inequality for normally
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working people. The higher the human capital inequality, the higher the income inequality. 
Although education opens up numerous favourable opportunities to individuals, those 
opportunities are greater for highly-educated workers than for less-educated workers. 
Increasing the educational preferences raises the individuals’ occupational outcomes 
according to their current economic status. In other words, the positive relationship between 
income and human capital inequality is likely to underscore the responsiveness of the EU 
labour market to differences in qualifications and skills.
The impact of population ageing (AGE) on income inequality is insignificant (Regressions 
3-6). Female participation in labour force (ECACRF) is negatively associated with income 
inequality. Although there are still differences in the opportunities open to men and women 
to engage in paid work, those differences appear to have declined between 1995 and 2000. 
The reduction in the causes of gender equality in the EU labour market is likely to have led 
to a decrease the observed income inequality throughout the period of study. For instance, 
many men have more responsibilities as caregivers and in household tasks in 2000 than 
they did in 1995. Regressions 5 and 6 show, once more, that the impact of urbanisation 
(URBANDPAV) and latitude (LAT) on income inequality is less in 2000 than in 1995. 
The OLS and REs results (Appendices A6.6 and A6.14) show that the relationship between 
urbanisation and inequality is unclear, while northern regions have lower levels of income 
inequality than southern areas.
In Regressions 7, 8 and 9 of Appendices A6.6, for the OLS results, and A6.14, for the FEs 
results, welfare state, religion and family structure dummies are added to the regressions. 
The addition of these dummies shows that income inequality is lower in social-democratic 
welfare states, in mainly Protestant regions and in regions with a small household size. 
Finally, the standardised coefficients demonstrate that educational achievement explains a 
major part of the variation in income inequality for normally working people (Appendix 
A6.2)................................................................................................ ..........................................
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Table 6.9: FEs: Dependent Variable is NGE1 and Independent Variables are AMN and AGE1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NMN 0.0014
(0.0008)*
(0.0013)
0.0009
(0.0009)
(0.0013)
0.0009
(0.0009)
(0.0014)
0.0011
(0.0011)
(0.0014)
0.0059
(0.0017)***
(0.0018)***
0.0042
(0.0014)***
(0.0016)**
AMN -0.0013
(0.0044)
(0.0039)
-0.0013
(0.0044)
(0.0039)
0.0023
(0.0039)
(0.0037)
0.0109
(0.0100)
(0.0123)
0.0098
(0.0047)**
(0.0043)**
AGE1 0.9458
(0.3805)**
(0.4328)**
0.9471
(0.3812)**
(0.4311)**
0.7779
(0.3452)**
(0.3349)**
0.6347
(0.4101)
(0.2761)**
0.5221
(0.3464)
(0.2855)*'
AGE -0.0002
(0.0024)
(0.0021)
- 0.0011
(0.0022)
(0.0019)
0.0012
(0.0029)
(0.0025)
0.0016
(0.0024)
(0.0019)
ECACRF -0.0044
(0.0013)***
(0.0012)***
-0.0019
(0.0018)
(0.0015)
-0.0029
(0.0014)**
(0.0014)**
YR96*UR
BANDPA
V
-0.0037
(0.0153)
(0.0132)
YR97*UR
BANDPA
V
-0.0213
(0.0152)
(0.0132)
YR98*UR
BANDPA
V
-0.0057
(0.0155)
(0.0137)
YR99*UR
BANDPA
V
-0.0314
(0.0164)*
(0.0145)**
YR00*UR
BANDPA
V
-0.0678
(0.0183)***
(0.0166)***
YR96*LA
T
0.0000
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
YR97*LA
T
-0.0001
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
YR98*LA
T
-0.0001
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
YR99*LA
T
-0.0003
(0.0001)**
(0.0001)**
YR00*LA
T
-0.0006
(0.0002)***
(0.0002)***
CONSTA
NT
0.2019
(0.0127)***
(0.0186)***
0.2034
(0.0769)***
(0.0702)***
0.2136
(0.1277)*
(0.1132)*
0.3886
(0.1215)***
(0.1088)***
-0.0169
(0.2381)
(0.2878)
0.0333
(0.1688)
(0.1466)
ADJ R-SQ 0.0057 0.0184 0.0184 0.0485 0.1506 0.0885
OBS. 604 534 534 455 299 455
LM TEST 
(p-value)
676.24
(0.0000)
502.19
(0.0000)
491.51
(0.0000)
428.00
(0.0000)
221.96
(0.0000)
388.29
(0.0000)
HAUSMA 
N TEST 
(p-value)
38.07
(0.0000)
9.93
(0.0192)
10.37
(0.0332)
16.94
(0.0046)
Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (*), (**) and (***) denote the significance of the White 
(1980) estimator. LM TEST is the Lagrange Multiplier test for the random effects model based on the OLS residuals (Breusch and Pagan, 1980). 
HAUSMAN TEST is the Hausman (1978) test for fixed or random effects.
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(b) Dynamic Model
Table 6.10 displays the long-run effects of the distribution of human capital, as measured 
by the age at which the highest education level was completed, on income inequality for 
normally working people (NGEY). The specification tests85 which were applied to the 
dynamic models and the short-run effects are reported in Appendix A6.22. It also shows the 
expected positive and statistically significant effect of the lagged income inequality on the 
current inequality.
Regressions 1-4 show the unconditional and conditional impact of income per capita of 
normally working people (NMN) on the respective income inequality. Income per capita is 
positively associated with income inequality only when the determinants are assumed to be 
strictly exogenous. The next step in the dynamic analysis is the introduction of human 
capital distribution as measured by the average age at which the highest education level was 
completed (AMN) and by inequality in the respective 2l%q(AGE\) . The long-run impact of 
human capital stock on inequality is ambiguous in most equations. The effect of this proxy 
for human capital inequality on income inequality is positive, but statistically significant 
only when the determinants are assumed to be predetermined. Regression 4 shows that 
population ageing (AGE) has a positive effect on inequality, while the same regression 
illustrates the negative sign of the coefficient for female participation in the labour force. 
As expected, the greater the access of women to work (ECACRF) , the lower the income 
inequality for normally working people.
85 The Sargan tests do not reject the overidentifying restrictions in all equations. The tests for serial 
correlation reject the absence o f first-order in all equations. The null hypothesis of no second-order 
autocorrelation in the differenced residuals is rejected in all homoskedastic cases expept for equations lc and 
4a. Based on specification tests, all homoskedastic equations except for equations lc  and 4a are the most 
appropriate models.
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Table 6.10: Long Run GMM: Dependent Variable is NGE1 and Independent Variables are AMN and AGE1
REGRESSION (1) REGRESSION (2) REGRESSION (3) REGRESSION (4)
(a) X,
strictly
exogenous
( b ) * „
predetermine
d
(c) Xu 
endogenous
(a) Xu
strictly
exogenous
(b) x a
predetermine
d
W  X«
endogenous
(a) Xu
strictly
exogenous
(b) x lt
predetermine
d
(c) Xu 
endogenous strictly
exogenous
(b) x it
predetermine
d
(c) Xa 
endogenous
NMN 0.0186
(0.0107)*
(0.0118)
-0.0408 
(0.0530) 
(0.0650) .
-0.1397
(0.2707)
(0.3017)
0.0150
(0.0064)**
(0.0074)**
0.0028
(0.0044)
(0.0049)
0.0019
(0.0080)
(0.0087)
0.0140
(0.0063)**
(0.0073)*
0.0034
(0.0041)
(0.0046)
0.0019
(0.0079)
(0.0083)
0.0049
(0.0050)
(0.0045)
-0.0026
(0.0035)
(0.0038)
-0.0043
(0.0039)
(0.0042)
AMN 0.0278
(0.0263)
(0.0234)
0.0387
(0.0247)
(0.0307)
0.0547
(0.0377)
(0.0450)
0.0348
(0.0275)
(0.0236)
0.0347
(0.0223)
(0.0290)
0.0549
(0.0375)
(0.0458)
0.0236
(0.0154)
(0.0139)*
0.0191
(0.0140)
(0.0183)
0.0208
(0.0166)
(0.0195)
AGE1 2.1955
(1.9126)
(1.8640)
5.1657
(2.1666)**
(2.3763)**
4.6384
(3.6902)
(2.9056)
1.8811
(1.9277)
(1.9190)
5.3301
(2.0089)***
(2.3419)**
4.1944
(3.7648)
(2.9322)
0.3161
(1.2229)
(1.0294)
2.5583
(1.1660)**
(1.2633)**
2.3469
(1.6795)
(1.6403)
AGE 0.0162
(0.0151)
(0.0159)
0.0083
(0.0089)
(0.0088)
0.0113
(0.0119)
(0.0119)
0.0185
(0.0106)*
(0.0135)
0.0115
(0.0070)*
(0.0087)
0.0104
(0.0078)
(0.0083)
ECACRF -0.0164
(0.0052)***
(0.0060)***
-0.0156
(0.0052)***
(0.0057)***
-0.0183
(0.0062)***
(0.0070)**
OBS. 400 348 348 285
Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (*), (**) and (***) denote the significance of the White (1980) estimator.
6.3.3 Conclusion
Table 6.11 displays the sign of the income per capita, educational attainment and 
educational inequality coefficients and the robustness of the results in income inequality 
(both for the whole of the population and for normally working people) model 
specifications (both the FEs models and the long-run GMM models). Considering the 
income distribution either for the population as a whole or for normally working people, the 
results are approximately the same (partial conclusion (1) versus partial conclusion (2)). 
Taking into account the specification tests applied to the estimated static and dynamic 
models, the relationship between income per capita and income inequality seems to be 
positive. If so, income per capita does not alleviate the inequality increase, refuting the 
theory that places it in the declining segment of the Kuznets curve. The results are also 
likely to concur with LydalPs (1979) hypothesis that only a limited number of people can 
be transferred to higher levels of skills and income, while the reminder have to wait their 
turn. Moreover, regional economic development seems not to increase the occupational 
choices and the earning opportunities of the population as a whole, but rather only those of 
rich people. While the impact of educational attainment on income inequality is not clear, 
educational inequality is associated with higher income inequality. It is human capital 
inequality that seems to matter. It is worth noting that the coefficients on educational 
inequality (both inequality in the education level completed and inequality in the age at 
which the highest education level was completed) are higher when the dependent variable 
is income inequality among the population as a whole rather than income inequality for 
normally working people. Moreover, the adjusted R-squared of the equations that include 
income inequality among the population as a whole are higher than that of the equations 
relating to normally working people. It is likely to depict that equations with income 
inequality for everyone indicates better FEs models in terms of a good fit.
Taking into account urbanisation, the increasing weight of the urban relative to the rural 
population means that income inequality among the population as a whole is decreasing 
(OLS and REs results). In contrast, the impact of urbanisation on income inequality among 
normally working people is not clear. Hence, the impact of urbanisation on income 
inequality is sensitive to the definition of income distribution. Additionally, considering the 
latitude variable, the results show that income inequality (both for the population as a
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whole and for normally working people) is lower in the north than in the south. Finally, 
considering institutions, the results show that the social-democratic welfare states, the 
mainly Protestant regions and those with Nordic family structures are among the most 
egalitarian. Thus, the detected patterns of ESDA have undergone preliminary tests in the 
static regression models.
Autoregressive models (short-run GMM regressions) highlight the persistence of income 
inequality, because income distribution does not change rapidly. Since the estimated 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is high and significant for all the dynamic 
specifications, the estimated long-run coefficients on the explanatory variables are less 
efficient and biased.
The results have important policy implications as they shed light on the ambiguous impact 
of income per capita on income inequality. They show that improving access to education, 
providing a higher quality of education and increasing educational attainment in general 
may have not any effect on income inequality. They also indicate that income and human 
capital inequality are connected, highlighting the responsiveness of the EU labour market to 
differences in qualifications and skills. Since both income and human capital inequalities 
have decreased slightly between 1995 and 2000, a more equal distribution of education may 
have helped towards a greater level of equality in economic opportunities and incomes, 
without challenging the European institutions and without requiring any major 
redistribution of capital. Better-educated people earn more than less-educated people. An 
individual who acquires more education is likely to become more productive. 
Microeconomic changes in human capital distribution as measured by inequality levels 
seem to be more important than those measured by average levels.
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Table 6.11: Determinants of Income Inequality
dependent variable
income inequality for all people income Inequality for normally working people
age at which the age at which the general
independent education level highest education partial education level highest education partial conclusi
variables completed level was conclusi completed level was conclusi on
completed on (1) completed on (2)
static dynamic static dynamic static dynamic static dynamic
Income per + + + + + + + + + + +
capita (rob) (rob) (non rob) (non rob) (non rob) (rob) (non rob) (non rob) (non rob) (non rob) (non rob)
educational not + not + not not not + + not not
attainmnet clear (non rob) clear (non rob) clear clear clear (non rob) (non rob) clear clear
educational + + + + + + + + + + +
inequality (rob) (non rob) (rob) (rob) (non rob) (rob) (non rob) (rob) (non rob) (non rob) (non rob)
Note: 'not clear' means either not statistically significant coefficients in all equations or coefficients do not keep the same sign; 'robustness' means 
sensitivity of coefficients in terms of additional explanatory variables.
6.4 Regression Results for Educational Inequality
This section explores the determinants of educational inequality with both static and 
dynamic analysis.
Educlneq„ = /?,1 EducAtth + J32' Incpcn + /?3' Inclneqit + /?4' xlt + w„
with i denoting regions (/ = l,...,iV) and / time {t = 1,...,6).86 Educlneq„ is educational 
inequality, EducAttjt is educational attainment, Incpcu is income per capita, Inclneqit is 
income inequality, xjt is a vector of control variables (Table 6.2), /?, 4 are coefficients and 
ujt is the composite error.
Following the rationale of income inequality regressions, in Table 6.12-Table 6.19 
Regression 1 shows the linear impact of educational attainment on educational inequality. 
Regression 2 shows the introduction of income distribution as measured by income per 
capita and income inequality. Regression 3 tests for the influence of population ageing. 
Regressions 4 and 5 show the impact of proxies for access to work on educational 
inequality. In Regressions 6 and 7 controls for unemployment and inactivity as well as a 
control for women’s access to work are included in the static and dynamic models. The
86 t = 1 denotes 1995,..., t = 6 denotes 2000.
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next step in the static analysis is the introduction of quantitative and qualitative time- 
invariant variables. Regressions 8 and 9 run a preliminary test for the urban-rural and the 
EU north-south patterns, respectively. Finally, welfare state, religion and family structure 
dummies are added in Regressions 10, 11 and 12, respectively.
The first subsection explores the determinants of inequality in the education level 
completed, while the second explores the determinants of inequality in the age at which the 
highest education level was completed.
6.4.1 Inequality in Education Level Completed
6.4.1.1 Independent Income Variable: Income o f the Population as a Whole
(a) Static Model
The OLS, FEs and REs models of inequality in the education level completed (EGEl) , 
when the explanatory variable is income distribution for the population as a whole, are 
estimated and appropriate tests are used. The statistical evidence is in favour of the FEs 
models, which are presented in Table 6.12. Appendices A6.7 and A6.15 display the OLS 
and REs models, respectively.
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Table 6.12: FEs: Dependent Variable is EGE1 and Independent Variables are IMN and IGE1
0 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
EMN -1.0761
(0.0251)***
(0.0225)***
-1.0985
(0.0325)***
(0.0376)***
-1.0976
(0.0326)***
(0.0375)***
-1.0913
(0.0333)***
(0.0373)***
-1.1416
(0.0366)***
(0.0443)***
-1.1385
(0.0371)***
(0.0445)***
-1.1389
(0.0375)***
(0.0437)***
-0.8831
(0.0618)***
(0.0477)***
-1.1879
(0.0435)***
(0.0561)***
IMN 0.0038
(0.0027)
(0.0024)
0.0033
(0.0028)
(0.0025)
0.0037
(0.0028)
(0.0026)
0.0051
(0.0036)
(0.0031)*
0.0055
(0.0037)
(0.0030)*
0.0053
(0.0037)
(0.0031)*
0.0011
(0.0055)
(0.0058)
0.0008
(0.0046)
(0.0038)
IGE1 0.2725
(0.0867)***
(0.0786)***
0.2793
(0.0873)***
(0.0811)***
0.2669
(0.0884)***
(0.0810)***
0.1499
(0.1073)
(0.0888)*
0.1674
(0.1106)
(0.0868)*
0.1769
(0.1086)
(0.0865)**
0.3792
(0.1377)***
(0.1113)***
0.2306
(0.1148)**
(0.0862)***
AGE 0.0030
(0.0043)
(0.0040)
0.0028
(0.0043)
(0.0040)
0.0031
(0.0048)
(0.0047)
0.0047
(0.0049)
(0.0048)
0.0041
(0.0049)
(0.0052)
0.0126
(0.0059)**
(0.0051)**
0.0002
(0.0051)
(0.0048)
LFSTOCK -0.1518
(0.1668)
(0.1389)
ECACRA -0.0101
(0.0032)***
(0.0033)***
UNEM 0.1448
(0.3222)
(0.2614)
0.2673
(0.4462)
(0.4685)
0.3434
(0.3238)
(0.2801)
INACTIV
E
0.0354
(0.2066)
(0.2098)
ECACRF -0.0058
(0.0028)**
(0.0028)**
-0.0060
(0.0028)**
(0.0026)**
-0.0090
(0.0036)**
(0.0037)**
-0.0083
(0.0029)***
(0.0030)***
YR96*UR
BANDPA
V
-0.0041
(0.0318)
(0.0449)
YR97*UR
BANDPA
V
-0.0056
(0.0326)
(0.0394)
YR98*UR
BANDPA
V
-0.0787
(0.0345)**
(0.0372)**
YR99*UR
BANDPA
V
-0.0736
(0.0371)**
(0.0415)*
YR00*UR
BANDPA
V
-0.0885
(0.0403)**
(0.0487)*
YR96*LA
T
-0.0001
(0.0003)
(0.0003)
YR97*LA
T
0.0001
(0.0003)
(0.0002)
YR98*LA
T
0.0003
(0.0003)
(0.0002)
YR99*LA
T
0.0009
(0.0003)***
(0.0003)***
YR00*LA
T
0.0006
(0.0003)*
(0.0003)*
CONSTA
NT
1.5964
(0.0189)***
(0.0176)***
1.4659
(0.0415)***
(0.0315)***
1.3335
(0,1959)***
(0.1842)***
1.4187
(0.2171)***
(0.2171)***
1.9332
(0.3052)***
(0.2898)***
1.5403 
(0.2746)*** 
(0.2647)*** ■
1.5688 
(0.2670)*** 
(0.2274)*** ■
1.1844
(0.3466)***
(0.3073)***
1.9025
(0.2923)***
(0.2845)***
ADJ R-SQ 0.7888 0.7940 0.7942 0.7945 0.7623 0.7596 0.7595 0.8377 0.7696
OBS. 596 596 596 596 513 513 513 299 513
LM TEST 
(p-value)
1134.37
(0.0000)
1047.57
(0.0000)
1066.42
(0.0000)
942.76
(0.0000)
780.79
(0.0000)
784.54
(0.0000)
781.83
(0.0000)
477.54
(0.0000)
798.16
(0.0000)
HAUSMA 
N TEST 
(p-value)
23.91
(0.0000)
79.28
(0.0000)
166.81
(0.0000)
99.03
(0.0000)
523.31
(0.0000)
69.25
(0.0000)
37.63
(0.0000)
Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (*), (**) and (***) denote the significance of the White 
(1980) estimator. LM TEST is the Lagrange Multiplier test for the random effects model based on the OLS residuals (Breusch and Pagan, 1980). 
HAUSMAN TEST is the Hausman (1978) test for fixed or random effects.
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Regression 1 examines the pure educational attainment (EMN) effect on educational 
inequality. There is a strong negative relationship between average level of education 
attainment and inequality in the education level completed. The coefficient on educational 
attainment is statistically significant at the one per cent level. The R-squared is 0.7888. It 
shows that educational attainment explains a large variation in educational inequality in the 
sample. In terms of the goodness-of-fit, it is likely to indicate a good unconditioned model. 
Including the other elements of the model does not change this result. Educational 
attainment plays a prominent role and appears robust to the inclusion of additional 
influences. Education seems to be one of the most powerful instruments known for 
reducing educational inequality. One reason for this may be that the increased opportunities 
to acquire higher education enable more people to improve their socioeconomic 
circumstances. Another reason may be that educational expansion and free primary and 
secondary education have offered educational opportunities and numerous favourable 
chances to both advantaged and disadvantaged groups. The latter enjoy more favourable 
opportunities than the former. The negative connection between educational achievement 
and educational inequality also highlights egalitarianism, because the members of society 
become better off at a different speed. Individuals are more equal if they face more 
identical educational opportunity sets.
The income per capita of the population as a whole (IMN) and income inequality among 
the whole of the population (IGEX) variables, which are both indicators of income 
distribution, are added to the model (Regression 2). The impact of income per capita on 
educational inequality is positive, but it is not statistically significant in Regressions 2-4 
and 8-9. This impact is positive and statistically significant at the ten per cent level in 
Regressions 5-7 for the heteroskedastic error term. The findings indicate the sensitivity of 
the regression results to various specifications of the FEs models and to the inclusion of 
different control variables. This outcome could indicate that an increase in the income per 
capita of a region raises the educational opportunities of the highest strata, which implies 
greater educational inequality. In brief, the positive income per capita-educational 
inequality relationship is contrary to Saint-Paul and Verdier’s (1993) hypothesis that the 
higher the income levels of the rich (as a result of the high income per capita of the 
population as a whole), the higher the rate of taxation, the greater the expenditure on public
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education programmes, the higher the public investment in human capital and, therefore, 
the greater the educational opportunities of the lowest strata. Although public education 
programmes constitute the major portion of European education programmes, they are not 
sufficiently effective to lessen the inequality in education level completed. The coefficients 
on income inequality, on the other hand, are significant, have the expected sign and are 
fairly constant throughout the different specifications. The greater the income inequality, 
the greater the human capital inequality. The most likely explanation is that rich people 
have higher educational opportunities than the poor. However, the most highly regarded 
institutions provide higher human capital returns. Rich people have better job chances and 
greater opportunities to take their education to an otherwise more profitable level, should it 
be necessary. Additionally, a further increase in income inequality may lead to a self- 
perpetuating poverty trap that may in turn increase the population share excluded from 
schooling. Due to the causality effects, the positive impact of income inequality on 
educational inequality is likely to be reflected in the responsiveness of the EU labour 
market to differences in qualifications and skills.
The next step in the regression analysis is to examine the robustness of the empirical results 
by adding a number of other determinants in Regression 2. The impact of these additional 
factors is also examined. Regression 3 tests for the influence of population ageing (AGE) . 
The impact of the average age of respondents on human capital inequality seems to be 
ambiguous, because it is statistically significant in Regression 8 only. This regression 
shows that an increase in the number of elderly and probably retired people leads to a rise 
in human capital inequality. This finding refutes Motonishi’s (2006) argument that as 
people get older, they have a lack of educational opportunities. A somewhat different view 
has been put forward by Dur et al. (2004) who stress that the mature working age cohort do 
not face credit constraints that prevent them from taking up studies at the higher education 
level. The percentage of normally working respondents (LFSTOCK) has no clear effect 
(Regression 4). However, the coefficient for the economic activity rate of the population as 
a whole (ECACRA) is significant at the one per cent level and has the expected sign. The 
greater the access to work, the lower the educational inequality (Regression 5). Greater 
regional access to work (either full-time work or atypical employment) implies higher 
regional earnings which, in turn, increase the possibility of entering higher education. 
Although people with lower skills are being relegated to these forms of employment and
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condemned to lower salaries (Rodrfguez-Pose, 2002), they have the opportunity to 
supplement their education level in order to improve their socioeconomic status. The 
coefficients on unemployment (UNEM) and inactivity (INACTIVE) are not statistically 
significant (Regressions 6 and 7, respectively). These variables cannot account for the 
variation in the regional human capital inequality level. On the other hand, Regressions 6-9 
show a negative connection between women’s access to work (ECACRF) and educational 
inequality. It supports the view that increasing women’s access to the labour market — 
through more adequate childcare services, more flexible working conditions and more 
sharing of family responsibilities — implies greater opportunities to engage in paid work.
In Regressions 8 and 9 I introduce a year dummy variable for urbanisation 
(URBANDPAV) and latitude (LAT) , respectively, in order to see whether the effects of 
urbanisation and latitude have changed over the period 1995-2000. The effect of 
urbanisation was lower in 2000, while the effect of latitude is higher in 1999. The OLS and 
REs results of these regressions (Appendices A6.7 and A6.15) test for the EU urban-rural 
and EU north-south patterns. The coefficient on urbanisation is positive, but the coefficient 
on latitude is negative.
Due to the high value of the adjusted R-squared in all the specification FEs models, a 
significant proportion of cross-regional and over time variations in inequality in the 
education level completed have already been explained.
Regressions 10 and 11 (Appendices A6.7 and A6.15) show that human capital inequality is 
higher in liberal welfare states and in Anglican areas such as the United Kingdom. 
Regression 12 shows that educational inequality is lower in Nordic family structures. 
Finally, taking into account the standardised coefficients (Appendix A6.2), educational 
attainment accounts for a major part of the variation in educational inequality.
(b) Dynamic Model
Table 6.13 displays the long-run results for the GMM estimation of the dynamic 
educational inequality (EGE\) model. The short-run evolution of the determinants of
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educational inequality in the EU and the test statistics for serial correlation and 
overidentifying restriction87 are presented in Appendix A6.23.
The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable lies in the interval between 0.2049 
(equation 7c) and 0.5335 (equation la) (Appendix A6.23). It is higher when the explanatory 
variables are assumed to be exogenous, except for Regression 5. Additionally, the 
coefficients on lagged educational inequality are statistically significant at least at the five 
per cent level in both homoskedastic and robust cases. One would expect to find that 
educational inequality in the current period depends on educational inequality in the lagged 
one-year period. However, most people in the survey (older people) have already 
completed their formal studies and thus their time-series variation in education level 
completed is zero. People who have not completed their studies (like young people) change 
education level at least every three years (i.e. from the first stage to the second stage of 
secondary education level completed).
The long-run effect of educational attainment (EMN), which is obtained after full 
adjustment of educational inequality, is negative, robust and statistically significant at the 
one per cent level (Regressions 1-7). The higher the educational attainment, the lower the 
educational inequality. This finding is consistent with the static results. Regression 2 
displays the introduction of income distribution as measured by income per capita (IMN) 
and income inequality (IGEX). This regression indicates that regional economic 
development has a negative influence on human capital inequality. The negative 
relationship seems to concur with the Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993) hypothesis. However, 
this outcome is sensitive to the econometric specifications. For instance, the coefficients on 
income per capita are not statistically significant in Regressions 5-7. Additionally, the 
income per capita coefficient is fairly constant through the different and statistically 
significant specifications. I therefore find some evidence that both educational attainment 
and income per capita alleviate the inequality in human capital. As in the static models, the 
results also show that a more unequal distribution of income is associated with higher
87 In all equations, the Sargan tests reject the overidentifying restrictions, because they indicate correlation 
between the instruments and the error term. The tests regarding serial correlation reject the absence o f first- 
order in all equations. The tests o f second-order are rejected in heteroskedastic equations 3b, 5a, 7a and 7b. 
Based on the specification tests, the heteroskedastic equations 3b, 5a, 7a and 7b are the most appropriate.
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educational inequality. The coefficient on income inequality is significant and does not 
disappear when other background factors are held constant.
The long-run impact of population ageing (AGE) on educational inequality is positive. 
However, there is a significant coefficient on the ageing variable in 6 out of 15 equations. 
In Regressions 4 and 5 ,1 include work access controls. While the impact of the percentage 
of normally working respondents (LFSTOCK) is not clear, that of the economic activity 
rate of total population (ECACRA) is negative and statistically significant, no matter what 
the explanatory variables are assumed to be. Regression 6 shows that the impact of 
unemployment (UNEM) on educational inequality is not clear, as in the respective FEs 
model. Although the OLS, FEs and REs coefficients on inactivity (INACTIVE) are not 
statistically significant, the long-run GMM results (Regression 7) show that the 
predetermined and endogenous impact of the percentage of inactive respondents on 
educational inequality is negative and statistically significant. The higher the percentage of 
inactive young people, the lower the educational inequality in the long run, because more 
widespread access to education means that young people are kept out of the labour market, 
as reflected in the high incidence of youth inactivity (Rodriguez-Pose 2002). Finally, 
Regressions 6 and 7 show a negative connection between women’s access to work 
(ECACRF) and educational inequality.
It is remarkable that apart from income per capita, regressors have been found to be robust, 
in the sense that their estimated parameters keep the same sign and are statistically 
significant in both static and dynamic specifications. Additionally, the coefficients on 
educational attainment and income inequality are not sensitive in the inclusion of different 
control variables.
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Table 6.13: Long Run GMM: Dependent Variable is EGE1 and Independent Variables are IMN and IGE1
REGRESSION (1) REGRESSION (2) REGRESSION (3) REGRESSION (4)
(a)
strictly
exogenous
Q » x it
predetermine
d
(c) Xit 
endogenous
(a) Xu
strictly
exogenous
o»
predetermine
d
(O Xa 
endogenous
(a) X„
strictly
exogenous
0» x u
predetermine
d
(O x u
endogenous
(a) X„
strictly
exogenous
(b) x u
predetermine
d
(c) Xu 
endogenous
EMN -1.1667
(0.0982)***
(0.1254)***
-1.3155
(0.1363)***
(0.2353)***
-1.7170
(0.2330)***
(0.4263)***
-1.3328
(0.1201)***
(0.1691)***
-1.3964
(0.1207)***
(0.1632)***
-1.4555
(0.1397)***
(0.1831)***
-1.2518
(0.1175)***
(0.1616)***
-1.3231
(0.1200)***
(0.1454)***
-1.4251
(0.1430)***
(0.1719)***
-1.2364
(0.1167)***
(0.1628)***
-1.3261
(0.1248)***
(0.1407)***
-1.4413
(0.1421)***
(0.1577)***
IMN 0.0050
(0.0127)
(0.0099)
-0.0292
(0.0141)**
(0.0133)**
-0.0346
(0.0195)*
(0.0235)
-0.0008
(0.0124)
(0.0093)
-0.0343
(0.0138)**
(0.0143)**
-0.0355
(0.0194)*
(0.0234)
0.0027
(0.0128)
(0.0092)
-0.0408
(0.0155)***
(0.0150)***
-0.0315
(0.0206)
(0.0193)
IGE1 1.0584
(0.2947)***
(0.3557)***
1.9193
(0.3111)***
(0.6291)***
2.5936
(0.3726)***
(0.8933)***
1.0074
(0.2818)***
(0.3285)***
1.9102
(0.3060)***
(0.6096)***
2.5589
(0.3758)***
(0.8631)***
0.9166
(0.2950)***
(0.3116)***
1.8040
(0.3575)***
(0.5712)***
2.6584
(0.4728)***
(0.6860)***
AGE 0.0444
(0.0175)**
(0.0182)**
0.0175
(0.0146)
(0.0172)
0.0157
(0.0161)
(0.0192)
0.0423
(0.0174)**
(0.0178)**
0.0155
(0.0155)
(0.0172)
0.0133
(0.0157)
(0.0178)
LFSTOCK -0.5085
(0.5873)
(0.4853)
0.1098
(0.8206)
(0.9988)
0.9495
(1.2682)
(1.7498)
ECACRA
UNEM
INACTIVE
ECACRF
OBS. 392 392 392 392
REGRESSION (5) REGRESSION (6) REGRESSION (7)
EMN -1.3252
(0.1041)***
(0.1415)***
-1.3678
(0.1478)***
(0.1963)***
-1.3097
(0.1379)***
(0.1655)***
-1.3239
(0.1104)***
(0.1439)***
-1.3340
(0.1268)***
(0.1594)***
-1.3343
(0.1285)***
(0.1428)***
-1.3016
(0.1106)***
(0.1411)***
-1.2905
(0.1299)***
(0.1625)***
-1.3062
(0.1456)***
(0.1664)***
IMN 0.0016
(0.0139)
(0.0084)
0.0248
(0.0190)
(0.0173)
0.0080
(0.0171)
(0.0145)
-0.0024
(0.0146)
(0.0087)
0.0080
(0.0171)
(0.0131)
-0.0025
(0.0166)
(0.0121)
-0.0014
(0.0149)
(0.0092)
0.0109
(0.0182)
(0.0151)
-0.0002
(0.0186)
(0.0146)
IGE1 0.7199
(0.2755)***
(0.2862)**
0.4135 
(0.4323) 
(0.5027) .
0.9974
(0.5290)*
(0.5877)*
0.8870
(0.2879)***
(0.3653)**
0.8276
(0.3777)**
(0.4036)**
1.3005
(0.4709)***
(0.4774)***
0.8500
(0.2905)***
(0.3554)**
0.6281
(0.3709)*
(0.3541)*
1.0146
(0.5171)*
(0.5664)*
AGE 0.0242
(0.0159)
(0.0173)
0.0317 
(0.0193) 
(0.0233) ■
0.0138
(0.0176)
(0.0191)
0.0295
(0.0168)*
(0.0187)
0.0383
(0.0170)**
(0.0252)
0.0184
(0.0170)
(0.0229)
0.0286
(0.0174)
(0.0196)
0.0506
(0.0191)***
(0.0264)*
0.0442
(0.0196)**
(0.0236)*
LFSTOCK
ECACRA -0.0244
(0.0079)***
(0.0110)**
-0.0392
(0.0136)***
(0.0225)*
-0.0436
(0.0146)***
(0.0234)*
UNEM -0.5645
(0.9049)
(0.7823)
-1.3964
(1.2954)
(1.8041)
0.5442
(1.5256)
(1.6406)
INACTIVE 0.2723
(0.6836)
(0.6438)
-2.0501
(1.1022)*
(1.1537)*
-4.7262
(1.7725)***
(1.6964)***
ECACRF -0.0164
(0.0075)**
(0.0108)
-0.0243
(0.0106)**
(0.0183)
-0.0311
(0.0121)***
(0.0206)
-0.0160
(0.0077)**
(0.0112)
-0.0278
(0.0113)**
(0.0188)
-0.0597
(0.0186)***
(0.0240)**
OBS. 325 325 325
Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (*), (**) and (***) denote the significance of the White (1980) estimator.
6.4.1.2 Independent Income Variable: Income o f Normally Working People
(a) Static Model
The FEs model is the most appropriate model to determine the impact of income 
distribution on inequality of the education level completed (EGE\). The FEs results of the 
study are displayed in Table 6.14, while the OLS and REs results are presented in 
Appendices A6.8 and A6.16, respectively.
In Regression 1, the unconditional impact of educational attainment (EMN) on educational 
inequality has been analysed. The addition of income distribution for normally working 
people (Regression 2) and of control variables (Regressions 3-9) does not change the 
estimated effect of the variable for the average education level completed. The conditional 
impact is negative and statistically significant at the one per cent level. Additionally, the 
educational attainment coefficient fairly constant throughout the different specifications. 
Once more, the results show that the expansion of educational opportunity enables people 
to take up higher formal education levels, because the increased opportunity of acquiring 
higher education helps individuals to improve their socioeconomic circumstances and to 
achieve appropriate positions in the regional economy, regardless of their social 
background.
Regression 2 allows us to assess whether the distribution of income among normally 
working people is capable of explaining the variation in educational inequality. First, 
Regression 2 concedes the unclear effect of the income per capita of normally working 
people (NMN) on inequality in the education level completed. The inclusion of the other 
elements of the model (Regressions 3-9) does not change this result. While educational 
attainment reduces educational inequality, income per capita seems not to affect 
educational inequality. Hence the expansion of state education promotes a meritocratic 
basis for educational attainment, regardless not only of the social background, but also of 
the economic background of the individual. Second, the impact of income inequality among 
normally working people (NGEX) on educational inequality is positive and statistically 
significant. When the additional covariates of the model are added, the positive relationship 
still persists, indicating the robustness of the results. The analysis carried out highlights the 
fact that the rich and normally working people have greater educational opportunities than
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the poor. The results obtained reveal the role of human capital returns at different education 
levels. Greater equality of educational opportunities may only be achieved through equality 
at all levels and stages of education. Consequently, Regression 2 shows that the citizens of 
European regions become better off through education at a different rate.
Regressions 1 and 2 offered a simple framework for understanding the differences in levels 
of educational inequality across EU regions and over time. The next step is to test whether 
a set of additional structural variables provides insight into educational inequality. The sign 
and significance of the coefficients on the additional time-variant variables is the same no 
matter how income inequality is measured (either for the whole of the population or for 
normally working people). Regression 3, for instance, controls for population ageing 
{AGE) . As in the regressions for income distribution for the population as a whole, the 
impact of the average age of respondents on human capital inequality seems to be unclear, 
because it is statistically significant in Regression 8 only, which shows that an increasing 
number of elderly and probably retired people lead to a rise in educational inequality. The 
impact of the percentage of normally working people {LFSTOCK), of unemployed 
respondents {UNEM) and of inactive respondents {INACTIVE) is unclear, while the 
economic activity rate of total population {ECACRA) and of women {ECACRF) is 
negatively associated with educational inequality. Regressions 8 and 9 show that while the 
effect of urbanisation decreased gradually between 1998 and 2000, the effect of latitude 
was higher in 1999. The respective OLS and FEs results (Appendices A6.8 and A6.16) 
display the positive coefficient on urbanisation and the negative coefficient on latitude.
The identifying time-variant determinants explain up to 75.81 per cent of the variation in 
educational inequality levels across regions and over time. In terms of goodness-of-fit, it is 
likely to indicate good FEs models.
Appendices A6.8 and A6.16 show that human capital inequality is higher in liberal welfare 
states and in Anglican areas such as the United Kingdom. Once more, taking into account 
the standardised coefficients (Appendix A6.2), educational attainment explains a major part 
of the variation in educational inequality.
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Table 6.14: FEs: Dependent Variable is EGE1 and Independent Variables are NMN and NGE1
0 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
EMN -1.0761
(0.0251)***
(0.0225)***
-1.0932
(0.0315)***
(0.0338)***
-1.0933
(0.0315)***
(0.0338)***
-1.0848
(0.0326)***
(0.0340)***
-1.1281
(0.0356)***
(0.0399)***
-1.1260
(0.0362)***
(0.0407)***
-1.1273
(0.0367)***
(0.0398)***
-0.8903
(0.0623)***
(0.0476)***
-1.1808
(0.0428)***
(0.0536)***
NMN 0.0019
(0.0021)
(0.0016)
0.0016
(0.0021)
(0.0016)
0.0019
(0.0021)
(0.0016)
0.0014
(0.0027)
(0.0019)
0.0019
(0.0027)
(0.0019)
0.0018
(0.0027)
(0.0019)
0.0022
(0.0039)
(0.0046)
-0.0009
(0.0032)
(0.0026)
NGE1 0.2020
(0.0864)**
(0.0665)***
0.2024
(0.0865)**
(0.0667)***
0.1925
(0.0870)**
(0.0671)***
0.1371
(0.1093)
(0.0824)*
0.1559
(0.1105)
(0.0788)**
0.1623
(0.1096)
(0.0807)**
0.2366
(0.1329)*
(0.1088)**
0.1737
(0.1103)
(0.0847)**
AGE 0.0022
(0.0043)
(0.0039)
0.0021
(0.0043)
(0.0038)
0.0036
(0.0047)
(0.0046)
0.0052
(0.0049)
(0.0047)
0.0045
(0.0048)
(0.0050)
0.0102
(0.0058)*
(0.0052)**
-0.0002
(0.0051)
(0.0048)
LFSTOCK -0.1665
(0.1658)
(0.1375)
ECACRA -0.0102
(0.0031)***
(0.0034)***
UNEM 0.1463
(0.3193)
(0.2590)
0.3492
(0.4478)
(0.4573)
0.3877
(0.3233)
(0.2768)
INACTIV
E
0.0254
(0.2073)
(0.2084)
ECACRF -0.0059
(0.0027)**
(0.0029)**
-0.0061
(0.0026)**
(0.0027)**
-0.0098
(0.0036)***
(0.0038)**
-0.0090
(0.0028)***
(0.0030)***
YR96*UR
BANDPA
V
-0.0147
(0.0316)
(0.0434)
YR97*UR
BANDPA
V
-0.0158
(0.0323)
(0.0391)
YR98*UR
BANDPA
V
-0.0879
(0.0349)**
(0.0381)**
YR99*UR
BANDPA
V
-0.0860
(0.0369)**
(0.0419)**
YROO*UR
BANDPA
V
-0.1049 
(0.0390)* ♦♦ 
(0.0484)**
YR96*LA
T
-0.0002
(0.0003)
(0.0003)
YR97*LA
T
0.0000
(0.0003)
(0.0002)
YR98*LA
T
0.0003
(0.0003)
(0.0002)
YR99*LA
T
0.0009
(0.0003)***
(0.0003)***
YR00*LA
T
0.0006
(0.0003)*
(0.0003)*
CONSTA
NT
1.5964
(0.0189)***
(0.0176)***
1.5355
(0.0307)***
(0.0197)***
1.4406
(0.1887)***
(0.1694)***
1.5250
(0.2066)***
(0.1990)***
1.9704
(0.2765)***
(0.2747)***-
1.5812
(0.2566)***
(0.2534)***
1.6215 
(0.2416)** * 
(0.2103)***
1.4137
(0.3351)***
(0.3134)***
2.0225
(0.2848)***
(0.2789)***
ADJ R-SQ 0.7888 0.7916 0.7918 0.7922 0.7609 0.7581 0.7580 0.8347 0.7684
OBS. 596 596 596 596 513 513 513 299 513
LM TEST 
(p-value)
1134.37
(0.0000)
1064.72
(0.0000)
1068.11
(0.0000)
906.42
(0.0000)
793.34
(0.0000)
809.09
(0.0000)
788.76
(0.0000)
466.20
(0.0000)
822.97
(0.0000)
HAUSMA 
N TEST 
(p-value)
23.91
(0.0000)
47.16
(0.0000)
43.05
(0.0000)
128.82
(0.0000)
50.79
(0.0000)
61.08
(0.0000)
67.81
(0.0000)
Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (*), (**) and (***) denote the significance of the White 
(1980) estimator. LM TEST is the Lagrange Multiplier test for the random effects model, based on the OLS residuals (Breusch and Pagan, 1980). 
HAUSMAN TEST is the Hausman (1978) test for fixed or random effects.
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(b) Dynamic Model
Table 6.15 presents the long-run coefficients on the educational inequality (EGE\) 
variables. The validity of the model is conformed by the tests88 reported in Appendix 
A6.24, where the short-run coefficients are also displayed.
First, all the equations reject that the lagged human capital inequality is zero. The pure 
long-run impact of educational attainment (EMN) on educational inequality (Regression 1) 
has already been presented. Nevertheless, the conditional impact of human capital stock 
remains negative and statistically significant at the one per cent level. Introducing, income 
distribution for normally working people into the equations, the effect of income per capita 
(NMN) is negative but sensitive to the model specifications, while income inequality 
(NGE\) is positively associated with human capital inequality. The same long-run results 
are produced when the income distribution for the population as a whole is considered as 
the explanatory variable. Hence, the results are robust to changes in the measure o f ‘income 
per capita’ and ‘income inequality’ and under many different dynamic model 
specifications.
The coefficient on population ageing (AGE) is positive and robust to the model 
specifications, because it is statistically significant in 11 out of 15 equations, especially 
when the explanatory variables are assumed to be strictly exogenous or predetermined. As 
in the regressions with income distribution for the population as a whole, the impact of the 
percentage of normally working respondents (LFSTOCK) is not clear, while that of 
economic activity rate of total population (ECACRA) is negative and statistically 
significant, no matter what the explanatory variables are assumed to be. The impact of 
unemployment (UNEM) on educational inequality is not clear. Although the OLS, FEs and 
REs coefficients on inactivity (INACTIVE) are not statistically significant, the long-run 
GMM results (Regression 7) show that the predetermined and endogenous impact of the 
percentage of inactive respondents on educational inequality is negative and statistically
88 The Sargan tests reject the overidentifying restrictions in all equations. The tests for serial correlation 
reject the absence of first-order, except for equations 2c, 3c and 4c (both homoskedastic and heteroskedastic 
case); while they reject the absence of second-order in the heteroskedastic equations 2b, 2c and 4c. Based on 
the specification tests, the heteroskedastic equation 2b is the most appropriate.
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significant. Finally, Regressions 6 and 7 show the negative impact of the variable for 
women’s access to work (ECACRF) on educational inequality.
It is worth noting that apart from the coefficient on income per capita for normally working 
people, which is not statistically significant in the static models, but negative and non- 
robust in the dynamic ones, all the other regressors have been found to be robust, in the 
sense that their estimated parameters keep the same sign and are statistically significant in 
the same static and dynamic model specifications. The coefficients on educational 
attainment and income inequality are not sensitive to the inclusion of different control 
variables.
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Table 6.15: Long Run GMM: Dependent Variable is EGG1 and Independent Variables are NMN and NGE1
REGRESSION (1) REGRESSION (2) REGRESSION (3) REGRESSION (4)
(a) Xu
strictly
exogenous
(b )* ,. |
predetermine
d
(c) Xu 
endogenous
(a) Xu
strictly
exogenous
(b) x u
predetermine
d
(O X, 
endogenous
00 Xit
strictly
exogenous
(b) x u
predetermine
d
(c) X„ 
endogenous
(a)
strictly
exogenous
(b) x u
predetermine
d
endogenous
EMN -1.1667
(0.0982)***
(0.1254)***
-1.3155
(0.1363)***
(0.2353)***
-1.7170
(0.2330)***
(0.4263)***
-1.3019
(0.1289)***
(0.1883)***
-1.2910
(0.1329)***
(0.2016)***
-1.4928
(0.1662)***
(0.2426)***
-1.2233
(0.1239)***
(0.1703)***
-1.2465
(0.1306)***
(0.1827)***
-1.4775
(0.1658)***
(0.2272)***
-1.2099
(0.1282)***
(0.1755)***
-1.2587
(0.1289)***
(0.1714)***
-1.3997
(0.1583)***
(0.1847)***
NMN 0.0062
(0.0098)
(0.0100)
-0.0146
(0.0107)
(0.0106)
-0.0299
(0.0164)*
(0.0203)
0.0018
(0.0095)
(0.0088)
-0.0159
(0.0105)
(0.0101)
-0.0318
(0.0166)*
(0.0202)
0.0014
(0.0097)
(0.0074)
-0.0204
(0.0105)*
(0.0102)**
-0.0285
(0.0167)*
(0.0189)
NGEl 0.7330
(0.3164)**
(0.3056)**
1.6640
(0.3670)***
(0.5793)***
3.0082
(0.5358)***
(1.2096)**
0.6635
(0.3009)**
(0.2799)**
1.5710
(0.3612)***
(0.5348)***
2.9019
(0.5357)***
(1.1381)**
0.6502
(0.3048)**
(0.2716)**
1.5962
(0.3567)***
(0.5078)***
2.3961
(0.5495)***
(0.8270)***
AGE 0.0597
(0.0203)***
(0.0205)***
0.0342
(0.0162)**
(0.0177)*
0.0267
(0.0168)
(0.0196)
0.0568
(0.0201)***
(0.0199)***
0.0326
(0.0158)**
(0.0174)*
0.0235
(0.0159)
(0.0193)
LFSTOCK 0.0707
(0.6541)
(0.6347)
-0.4246
(0.8040)
(1.0760)
-1.8224
(1.2169)
(2.0221)
ECACRA
UNEM
INACTIVE
ECACRF
OBS. 392 392 392 392
REGRESSION (5) REGRESSION (6) REGRESSION (7)
EMN -1.2890
(0.1058)***
(0.1467)***
-1.2203
(0.1332)***
(0.1697)***
-1.3154
(0.1594)***
(0.2051)***
-1.2960
(0.1149)***
(0.1535)***
-1.1766
(0.1245)***
(0.1424)***
-1.2666
(0.1423)***
(0.1723)***
-1.2996
(0.1191)***
(0.1590)***
-1.2536
(0.1315)***
(0.1735)***
-1.3246
(0.1573)***
(0.1997)***
NMN -0.0016
(0.0102)
(0.0072)
0.0074 
(0.0125) . 
(0.0094)
0.0071
(0.0145)
(0.0124)
-0.0039
(0.0111)
(0.0083)
-0.0004
(0.0122)
(0.0090)
0.0002
(0.0132)
(0.0101)
-0.0026
(0.0112)
(0.0077)
0.0004
(0.0123)
(0.0088)
0.0012
(0.0134)
(0.0099)
NGEl 0.4273
(0.3026)
(0.2369)*
0.5495
(0.4422)
(0.5018)
1.3247
(0.7693)*
(0.8087)
0.6372
(0.3269)*
(0.3203)**
0.8876
(0.4090)**
(0.3694)**
1.6243
(0.6992)**
(0.6970)**
0.5733
(0.3283)*
(0.2945)*
0.7539
(0.4057)*
(0.3121)**
1.0988
(0.7294)
(0.7919)
AGE 0.0327
(0.0177)*
(0.0177)*
0.0406
(0.0184)**
(0.0225)*
0.0095
(0.0218)
(0.0257)
0.0376
(0.0190)**
(0.0198)*
0.0506
(0.0179)***
(0.0251)**
0.0241
(0.0201)
(0.0250)
0.0378
(0.0197)*
(0.0208)*
0.0548
(0.0191)***
(0.0258)**
0.0419
(0.0221)*
(0.0242)*
LFSTOCK
ECACRA -0.0284
(0.0084)***
(0.0122)**
-0.0369
(0.0118)***
(0.0215)*
-0.0436
(0.0150)***
(0.0263)*
UNEM -1.0489
(1.0521)
(1.1002)
-1.6125
(1.2455)
(1.5632)
-0.5911
(1.7971)
(1.9354)
INACTIVE -0.2514
(0.7566)
(0.6985)
-2.6880
(1.1056)**
(1.3632)**
-4.2736
(1.9399)**
(2.0418)**
ECACRF -0.0204
(0.0084)**
(0.0122)*
-0.0267
(0.0104)**
(0.0167)
-0.0328
(0.0133)**
(0.0229)
-0.0198
(0.0087)**
(0.0127)
-0.0300
(0.0109)***
(0.0172)*
-0.0617
(0.0199)***
(0.0238)**
OBS. 325 325 325
Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (*), (**) and (***) denote the significance of the White (1980) estimator.
6.4.2 Inequality in the Age at which the Highest Education Level was 
Completed
6.4.2.1 Independent Income Variable: Income o f the Population as a Whole
(a) Static Model
The OLS, FEs and REs models of inequality in the age at which the highest education level 
was completed (AGE\) are estimated. The specification tests are in favour of the FEs 
models. Table 6.16 displays the FEs results, while the OLS and the REs are presented in 
Appendices A6.9 and A6.17, respectively.
271
Table 6.16: FEs: Dependent Variable is AGE1 and Independent Variables are IMN and IGE1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
AMN 0.0042
(0.0005)***
(0.0008)***
0.0042
(0.0005)***
(0.0007)***
0.0042
(0.0005)***
(0.0007)***
0.0042
(0.0005)***
(0.0007)***
0.0038
(0.0006)***
(0.0007)***
0.0039
(0.0006)***
(0.0008)***
0.0037
(0.0006)***
(0.0008)***
0.0093
(0.0015)***
(0.0016)***
0.0045
(0.0007)***
(0.0009)***
IMN 0.0002
(0.0001)
(0.0002)
0.0001
(0.0001)
(0.0002)
0.0001
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
0.0002
(0.0002)
(0.0003)
0.0002
(0.0002)
(0.0003)
0.0001
(0.0002)
(0.0003)
0.0005
(0.0004)
(0.0003)*
0.0007
(0.0003)**
(0.0003)**
IGE1 0.0234
(0.0059)***
(0.0055)***
0.0241
(0.0060)***
(0.0056)***
0.0242
(0.0061)***
(0.0054)***
0.0312
(0.0077)***
(0.0078)***
0.0281
(0.0078)***
(0.0078)***
0.0312
(0.0076)***
(0.0077)***
0.0149
(0.0110)
(0.0103)
0.0219
(0.0083)***
(0.0081)***
AGE 0.0004
(0.0003)
(0.0004)
0.0004
(0.0003)
(0.0004)
0.0004
(0.0003)
(0.0004)
0.0005
(0,0003)
(0.0004)
0.0005
(0.0003)
(0.0003)
0.0006
(0.0005)
(0.0004)
0.0007
(0.0004)*
(0.0004)*
LFSTOCK 0.0007
(0.0113)
(0.0112)
ECACRA 0.0002
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
UNEM 0.0390
(0.0226)*
(0.0192)**
0.0268
(0.0351)
(0.0344)
0.0361
(0.0230)
(0.0190)*
INACTIV
E
-0.0260
(0.0144)*
(0.0154)*
ECACRF 0.0002
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
0.0001
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
0.0001
(0.0003)
(0.0002)
0.0002
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
YR96*UR
BANDPA
V
-0.0004
(0.0025)
(0.0017)
YR97*UR
BANDPA
V
-0.0023
(0.0024)
(0.0017)
YR98*UR
BANDPA
V
-0.0021
(0.0025)
(0.0018)
YR99*UR
BANDPA
V
-0.0021
(0.0028)
(0.0020)
YR00*UR
BANDPA
V
-0.0029
(0.0032)
(0.0024)
YR96*LA
T
0.0000
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
YR97*LA
T
0.0000
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
YR98*LA
T
0.0000
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
YR99*LA
T
0.0000
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
YR00*LA
T
-0.0001
(0.0000)*
(0.0000)**
CONSTA
NT
-0.0341 
(0.0095)*** 
(0.0141)** ■
-0.0453
(0.0098)***
(0.0127)***
-0.0610
(0.0163)***
(0.0164)***
-0.0614
(0.0172)***
(0.0168)***
-0.0710
(0.0233)***
(0.0190)***
-0.0762
(0.0212)***
(0.0195)***
-0.0567
(0.0206)***
(0.0193)***
-0.1620
(0.0367)***
(0:0350)***
-0.0990
(0.0255)***
(0.0251)***
ADJ R-SQ 0.1314 0.1646 0.1673 0.1673 0.1591 0.1654 0.1662 0.1128 0.1797
OBS. 534 534 534 534 455 455 455 299 455
LM TEST 
(p-value)
1172.18
(0.0000)
680.95
(0.0000)
693.42
(0.0000)
666.96
(0.0000)
630.85
(0.0000)
605.00
(0.0000)
600.39
(0.0000)
403.60
(0.0000)
621.52
(0.0000)
HAUSMA 
N TEST 
(p-value)
5.01
(0.0252)
113.42
(0.0000)
83.17
(0.0000)
52.00
(0.0000)
47.64
(0.0000)
46.72
(0.0000)
33.17
(0.0000)
Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (*), (**) and (***) denote the significance of the White 
(1980) estimator. LM TEST is the Lagrange Multiplier test for the random effects model based on the OLS residuals (Breusch and Paga,n 1980). 
HAUSMAN TEST is the Hausman (1978) test for fixed or random effects.
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First, it would be interesting to know the pure effects of educational attainment (AMN) , 
which is measured in terms of the average age at which the highest education level was 
completed, on educational inequality (Regression 1). The coefficient on educational 
achievement is positive and statistically significant at the one per cent level. This 
determinant explains approximately 13.14 per cent of the variation in inequality. The sign 
of the coefficient reported is small in magnitude. Regressions 2-9 also show the positive 
coefficient on educational attainment which remains statistically significant at the one per 
cent level, both in the homoskedastic and heteroskedastic case. I interpret the positive 
coefficient as evidence that an increase in educational attainment is more likely to be the 
consequence of an increase in private educational expenditures rather than the consequence 
of an increase in state educational grants or of a decrease in tuition fees. State grants are not 
enough so as to provide educational opportunities for all young people to continue their 
studies to higher education levels. To put it another way, rich people are more likely to 
continue their studies at an older age than the poor. While the first proxy for human capital 
stock (average education level completed) has a negative effect on the respective human 
capital inequality, the second proxy (average age at which the highest level of education 
was completed) has a positive effect. One possible explanation for this difference may be 
the broader concept of human capital that is embodied in the latter proxy. This proxy is 
likely to encompass experience, improved general and specific information about labour 
market institutions, leaming-by-doing and on-the-job training, from the positive point of 
view, and economic inactivity and short-term unemployment, from the negative point of 
view.
Second, the introduction of the income distribution for the population as a whole measured 
by income per capita (IMN) and income inequality (IGEl) is analysed. Regressions 2-9 
idicate that the higher the income per capita and the income inequality, the higher the 
human capital inequality, However, while the coefficient on income inequality is robust to 
the model specification, the coefficient on income per capita is very fragile since it is 
statistically significant only in Regressions 8 and 9. The sign of the income per capita 
coefficient in Regressions 2-7 is positive, but statistically insignificant. The basic argument 
is that rich people have greater educational opportunities than the poor. Rich people have 
better job chances and greater opportunities to take up an otherwise profitable education 
level, if it is necessary. Additionally, rich people are more likely to take time out of the
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labour market so as to continue their studies, even when they are older. Due to the causality 
effects, a positive impact of income inequality on inequality in the age at which the highest 
education level was completed is likely to reflect the responsiveness of the EU labour 
market to differences in qualifications and skills.
Third, the impact of the control time-variant variables on educational inequality is analysed 
in Regressions 3-9. The coefficients on population ageing (AGE) (except for Regression
9) and access to work (both access to work of the total population — measured by the 
percentage of normally working respondents (LFSTOCK) and by the economic activity 
rate (ECACRA) — and women’s access to work (ECACRF)) are not statistically 
significant, which suggests that their impact on human capital inequality is not clear. I then 
control for unemployment (UNEM) and inactivity (INACTIVE) to lessen the possibility 
that this proxy for human capital encompasses short-term unemployment and economic 
inactivity, respectively. Regressions 6 and 9 show that unemployment is positively 
associated with inequality. Students from more affluent families have access to more 
accurate labour market information than students from unemployed and poor families. On 
the other hand, Regression 7 shows the negative relationship between inactivity and 
inequality. This is perhaps because more young people remain outside the labour market in 
order to continue their studies (Rodrfguez-Pose, 1998). Combining the effect of 
unemployment and inactivity, Regressions 6 and 7 show that high unemployment may 
discourage young people from participating in the labour market, which implies a large 
increase in human capital in the short-term, while a high level of economic inactivity 
among young people is likely to push them to continue their studies in order to gain more 
skills and knowledge in the long-term.
Regressions 8 and 9 check whether the effects of urbanisation (URBANDPAV) and latitude 
(LAT), respectively, on educational inequality have changed over the period 1995-2000. 
The effects of urbanisation are almost the same between 1995 and 2000, while the effects 
of latitude are lower in 2000. The OLS and REs results of these regressions (Appendices 
A6.9 and A6.17) test for the EU urban-rural and EU north-south patterns. The coefficients 
on both urbanisation and latitude are negative. They show that human capital inequality is 
higher in the southern areas of Europe and in the rural regions.
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Appendices A6.9 and A6.17 show the OLS and REs results for the welfare state 
(Regression 10), religion (Regression 11) and family structure (Regression 12) variables. 
Human capital inequality is lower in social-democratic welfare states, in Protestant areas, 
and in regions with Nordic family structures. Finally, taking into account the standardised 
coefficients (Appendix A6.2), educational attainment accounts for a major part of the 
variation in inequality in the age at which the highest education level was completed, as it 
does for inequality in the education level completed.
(b) Dynamic Model
Table 6.17 displays the long-run GMM regression results on human capital inequality as 
measured by the age at which the highest education level was completed. The validity of 
the results is confirmed by the test results89 reported in Appendix A6.25, which also 
displays the short-run coefficients.
Regression 1 of Appendix A6.25 shows that the coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable is positive and statistically significant. I expected to find that educational 
inequality in the current period depends on educational inequality in the lagged one-year 
period. Nevertheless, when the income per capita and the income inequality covariates of 
the model are added, somewhat surprisingly, the coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable is insignificant. This finding was subjected to the sensitivity analysis. Considering 
the long-run coefficients (Table 6.17), first of all, the impact of the average age at which 
the highest education level was completed (AMN) on age inequality is not clear, because 
the coefficients on educational attainment are not statistically significant. On introducing 
income distribution for the population as a whole, both income per capita and income 
inequality are positively associated with educational inequality, but they are sensitive to the 
assumption of the explanatory variables. While the coefficients on income per capita 
(IMN) are statistically significant only when the independent variables are strictly 
exogenous, the coefficients on income inequality (IGEX) are statistically significant when
89 The Sargan tests accept the overidentifying restrictions in Regressions 4, 5 and 7, only when the 
explanatory variables are assumed to be predetermined or endogenous. The tests for serial correlation reject 
the absence of first-order except for equations2b, 2c, 3b, 3c, 4c (robust and non-robust standard errors), 4b 
and 7b (robust standard errors). On the other hand, the tests accept the absence of second-order except for 
equations 2c, 3b, 3c (both robust and non-robust standard errors) and 2b (non-robust standard errors). Hence, 
there is no any equation which satisfies all the specification tests.
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the independent variables are predetermined or endogenous. The latter are also significant 
in equation 6c (homoskedastic case). It is of note that the coefficients on the control 
variables (population ageing (AGE), economic activity rate of the total population 
(ECACRA) and of women (ECACRF), the percentage of unemployed respondents 
(UNEM) and the percentage of inactive respondents (INACTIVE)) are insignificant, 
except for the percentage of normally working respondents (LFSTOCK) which is 
statistically significant at the ten per cent level in equation 4c (homoskedastic case).
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Table 6.17: Long Run GMM: Dependent Variable is AGE1 and Independent Variables are IMN and IGE1
REGRESSION (1) REGRESSION (2) REGRESSION (3) REGRESSION (4)
(a) X(,
strictly
exogenous
( b ) * l7
predetermine
d
( 0  X „ 
endogenous
(a) Xa
strictly
exogenous
(b) xu
predetermine
d
<«> x u 
endogenous
(*) X»
strictly
exogenous
(b) Xu
predetermine
d
endogenous
(a) Xu
strictly
exogenous
(b) xit
predetermine
d
(«) x u 
endogenous
AMN -0.0036
(0.0051)
(0.0068)
-0.0002
(0.0034)
(0.0042)
-0.0003
(0.0048)
(0.0054)
0.0012
(0.0020)
(0.0029)
0.0006
(0.0015)
(0.0013)
0.0001
(0.0016)
(0.0015)
0.0014
(0.0018)
(0.0026)
0.0012
(0.0014)
(0.0012)
0.0004
(0.0016)
(0.0015)
0.0015
(0.0018)
(0.0026)
0.0015
(0.0015)
(0.0014)
0.0000
(0.0017)
(0.0018)
IMN 0.0013
(0.0005)**
(0.0005)**
0.0002
(0.0005)
(0.0006)
0.0001
(0.0006)
(0.0008)
0.0012
(0.0005)**
(0.0005)**
0.0002
(0.0005)
(0.0006)
0.0001
(0.0006)
(0.0009)
0.0014
(0.0006)**
(0.0007)**
0.0003
(0.0005)
(0.0006)
0.0002
(0.0006)
(0.0009)
IGE1 0.0163
(0.0161)
(0.0157)
0.0746
(0.0159)***
(0.0254)***
0.0822
(0.0214)***
(0.0291)***
0.0172
(0.0154)
(0.0147)
0.0713
(0.0155)***
(0.0245)***
0.0809
(0.0212)***
(0.0297)***
0.0132
(0.0165)
(0.0135)
0.0578
(0.0177)***
(0.0223)**
0.0749
(0.0215)***
(0.0289)**
AGE 0.0009
(0.0008)
(0.0009)
0.0008
(0.0006)
(0.0007)
0.0005
(0.0006)
(0.0006)
0.0008
(0.0009)
(0.0009)
0.0007
(0.0007)
(0.0007)
0.0002
(0.0006)
(0.0007)
LFSTOCK -0.0357
(0.0328)
(0.0363)
-0.0338
(0.0360)
(0.0390)
-0.0878
(0.0513)*
(0.0570)
ECACRA
UNEM
INACTIVE
ECACRF
OBS. 348 348 348 348
REGRESSION (5) REGRESSION (6) REGRESSION (7)
AMN 0.0013
(0.0016)
(0.0023)
0.0005 
(0.0020) . 
(0.0019)
0.0011
(0.0020)
(0.0019)
0.0012
(0.0016)
(0.0024)
0.0009
(0.0022)
(0.0020)
0.0013
(0.0023)
(0.0024)
0.0013
(0.0017)
(0.0023)
0.0015
(0.0020)
(0.0018)
0.0008
(0.0021)
(0.0021)
IMN 0.0012
(0.0006)*
(0.0006)**
-0.0001 
(0.0008) • 
(0.0007)
0.0002
(0.0008)
(0.0008)
0.0013
(0.0006)**
(0.0007)*
0.0001
(0.0008)
(0.0008)
0.0002
(0.0009)
(0.0009)
0.0013
(0.0007)*
(0.0007)*
0.0004
(0.0009)
(0.0007)
0.0002
(0.0010)
(0.0008)
IGE1 0.0259
(0.0163)
(0.0165)
0.0809
(0.0235)***
(0.0305)***
0.0825
(0.0273)***
(0.0358)**
0.0277
(0.0156)*
(0.0174)
0.0724
(0.0208)***
(0.0259)***
0.0671
(0.0246)***
(0.0289)**
0.0259
(0.0164)
(0.0159)
0.0457
(0.0242)*
(0.0235)*
0.0622
(0.0261)**
(0.0306)**
AGE 0.0010
(0.0009)
(0.0009)
0.0012 
(0.0010) 
(0.0009) .
0.0006
(0.0009)
(0.0008)
0.0010
(0.0008)
(0.0008)
0.0010
(0.0010)
(0.0009)
0.0006
(0.0009)
(0.0008)
0.0008
(0.0009)
(0.0008)
0.0003
(0.0012)
(0.0010)
-0.0001
(0.0011)
(0.0010)
LFSTOCK
ECACRA 0.0002
(0.0005)
(0.0004)
-0.0002
(0.0010)
(0.0011)
0.0002
(0.0011)
(0.0015)
UNEM -0.0317
(0.0476)
(0.0439)
0.0041
(0.0721)
(0.0666)
0.0662
(0.0897)
(0.0942)
INACTIVE 0.0285
(0.0385)
(0.0415)
0.1131
(0.0790)
(0.0728)
0.0796
(0.0970)
(0.1054)
ECACRF 0.0005
(0.0004)
(0.0005)
0.0002
(0.0008)
(0.0007)
0.0001
(0.0008)
(0.0009)
0.0006
(0.0004)
(0.0005)
0.0000
(0.0008)
(0.0006)
- 0.0001
(0.0011)
(0.0013)
OBS. 285 285 285
Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (*), (**) and (***) denote the significance of the White (1980) estimator.
6.4.2.2 Independent Income Variable: Income o f Normally Working People
(a) Static Model
The FEs model is the most appropriate model to explore the impact of income distribution 
among normally working people on human capital inequality as measured by the age at 
which the highest education level was completed {AGEX). The FEs results and the 
specification tests are displayed in Table 6.18, while the OLS and REs results are presented 
in Appendices A6.10 and A6.18, respectively.
The positive and statistically significant unconditional impact of educational attainment 
{AMN) on educational inequality has already been analysed (Table 6.16). The conditional 
influence is also positive and statistically significant at the one per cent level. Hence, the 
coefficients on educational achievement when the income of normally working people is 
considered as the explanatory variable are approximately the same as the coefficients when 
income of the population as a whole is considered as the explanatory income variable. The 
income per capita regressor {NMN) has been found to be very fragile (Regressions 2-8). 
In Regression 9, the coefficient on income per capita is positive and significant (as in 
income distribution for the population as a whole). The income inequality regressor 
(NGE\), on the other hand, is positive and robust to the inclusion of different control 
variables.
Taking into account the impact of control variables on inequality in the age at which the 
highest education level was completed, the sign and significance of coefficients are the 
same as in the regressions with the income distribution for the population as a whole 
explanatory variables. More specifically, the impact of population ageing {AGE) is 
positive and significant in Regression 9 only. The coefficients on access to work (both of 
the total population — measured by the percentage of normally working respondents 
{LFSTOCK) and by the economic activity rate {ECACRA) — and of women {ECACRF)) 
are insignificant. Regressions 6 and 9 show that unemployment is positively associated 
with educational inequality, while Regression 7 displays the negative relationship between 
inactivity and inequality. Regressions 8 and 9 show that the effects of urbanisation 
{URBANDPAV) are almost the same between 1995 and 2000, while the effects of latitude 
{LAT) are lower in 2000. The OLS and REs results of these regressions (Appendices
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A6.10 and A6.18) display once again that human capital inequality is higher in the southern 
areas of Europe and in the rural regions.
The OLS and REs results (Appendices A6.10 and A6.18) for the welfare state (Regression
10), religion (Regression 11) and family structure (Regression 12) variables demonstrate 
that educational inequality is lower in social-democratic welfare states, in Protestant areas, 
and in regions with Nordic family structures. Finally, taking into account the standardised 
coefficients (Appendix A6.2), educational attainment accounts for a major part of the 
variation in inequality in the age at which the highest education level was completed.
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Table 6.18: FEs: Dependent Variable is AGE1 and Independent Variables are NMN and NGE1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
AMN 0.0042
(0.0005)***
(0.0008)***
0.0041
(0.0005)***
(0.0008)***
0.0040
(0.0005)***
(0.0008)***
0.0041
(0.0005)***
(0.0008)***
0.0037
(0.0006)***
(0.0008)***
0.0039
(0.0006)***
(0.0008)***
0.0036
(0.0006)***
(0.0008)***
0.0095
(0.0015)***
(0.0016)***
0.0046
(0.0007)***
(0.0009)***
NMN 0.0001
(0.0001)
(0.0002)
0.0001
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
0.0001
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
0.0002
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
0.0002
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
0.0002
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
0.0002
(0.0003)
(0.0002)
0.0006
(0.0002)***
(0.0002)**
NGE1 0.0147
(0.0059)**
(0.0049)***
0.0147
(0.0059)**
(0.0049)***
0.0145
(0.0060)**
(0.0049)***
0.0179
(0.0079)**
(0.0066)***
0.0153
(0.0079)*
(0.0064)**
0.0182
(0.0078)**
(0.0063)***
0.0152
(0.0104)
(0.0084)*
0.0105
(0.0080)
(0.0062)*
AGE 0.0002
(0.0003)
(0.0004)
0.0002
(0.0003)
(0.0004)
0.0002
(0.0003)
(0.0004)
0.0004
(0.0003)
(0.0004)
0.0003
(0.0003)
(0.0003)
0.0005
(0.0005)
(0.0004)
0.0006
(0.0004)*
(0.0004)
LFSTOCK -0.0028
(0.0112)
(0.0122)
ECACRA 0.0000
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
UNEM 0.0484
(0.0226)**
(0.0189)**
0.0266
(0.0350)
(0.0333)
0.0403
(0.0230)*
(0.0182)**
INACTIV
E
-0.0259
(0.0145)*
(0.0167)
ECACRF 0.0000
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
-0.0001
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
0.0001
(0.0003)
(0.0002)
0.0002
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
YR96*UR
BANDPA
V
-0.0012
(0.0024)
(0.0017)
0.0000
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
YR97*UR
BANDPA
V
-0.0023
(0.0024)
(0.0017)
0.0000
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
YR98*UR
BANDPA
V
-0.0023
(0.0025)
(0.0019)
0.0000
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
YR99*UR
BANDPA
V
-0.0020
(0.0027)
(0.0021)
0.0000
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
YR00*UR
BANDPA
V
-0.0022
(0.0030)
(0.0021)
-0.0001
(0.0000)**
(0.0000)**
YR96*LA
T
YR97*LA
T
YR98*LA
T
YR99*LA
T
YR00*LA
T
CONSTA
NT
-0.0341
(0.0095)***
(0.0141)**
-0.0369
(0.0095)***
(0.0137)***
-0.0465
(0.0158)***
(0.0171)***
-0.0455
(0.0163)***
(0.0180)**
-0.0391
(0.0211)*
(0.0181)**
-0.0560
(0.0201)***
(0.0198)***
-0.0294
(0.0191)
(0.0180)
-0.1559
(0.0368)***
(0.0356)***
-0.0909
(0.0256)***
(0.0252)***
ADJ R-SQ 0.1314 0.1472 0.1484 0.1485 0.1338 0.1447 0.1414 0.2012 0.1657
OBS. 534 534 534 534 455 455 455 299 455
LM TEST 
(p-value)
1172.18
(0.0000)
648.20
(0.0000)
662.75
(0.0000)
655.72
(0.0000)
575.13
(0.0000)
562.67
(0.0000)
564.20
(0.0000)
364.49
(0.0000)
613.09
(0.0000)
HAUSMA 
N TEST 
(p-value)
5.01
(0.0252)
181.18
(0.0000)
611.77
(0.0000)
170.42
(0.0000)
76.62
(0.0000)
82.95
(0.0000)
12.22
(0.0573)
Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (*), (**) and (***) denote the significance of the White 
(1980) estimator. LM TEST is the Lagrange Multiplier test for the random effects model based on the OLS residuals (Breusch and Pagan, 1980). 
HAUSMAN TEST is the Hausman (1978) test for fixed or random effects.
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(b) Dynamic Model
Table 6.19 displays the long-run results for human capital inequality as measured by the 
age at which the highest education level was completed. The validity of the models is 
confirmed by the test results90 reported in Appendix A6.26, which also presents the short- 
run results.
Regression 1 of Appendix A6.26, which has already been presented, shows that the 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is positive and statistically significant. On 
adding income per capita and income inequality variables to the model, the coefficient on 
the lagged dependent variable is insignificant, expect for in equations 2a, 4a, 6b and 7b. 
Thus, the impact of lagged human capital inequality on current inequality is robust. 
Considering the long-run coefficients (Table 6.19), the impact of the average age at which 
the highest education level was completed (AMN) on inequality is not clear. Nevertheless, 
both the income per capita of normally working people (NMN) and income inequality 
among normally working people (NGE\) are positively associated with educational 
inequality. Their coefficients are also robust. The coefficients on all the control variables 
(population ageing (AGE), the economic activity rate of the total population (ECACRA) 
and women (ECACRF), the percentage of normally working respondents (LFSTOCK) , 
the percentage of unemployed respondents (UNEM) and the percentage of inactive 
respondents (INACTIVE)) are insignificant.
90 As in the dynamic regressions with the income distribution for the population as a whole explanatory 
variables, the Sargan tests accept the overidentifying restrictions in Regressions 4, 6 and 7, only when the 
explanatory variables are assumed to be predetermined or endogenous. The tests for serial correlation reject 
the absence of first-order except for equations 2c, 3c, 4c (robust and non-robust standard errors), 2b, 3b and 
4b (robust standard errors). On the other hand, the tests accept the absence of second-order in all equations. 
Hence, there is no any equation that satisfies all the specification tests (as was the case with dynamic 
regressions with the income distribution for the population as a whole explanatory variables).
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Table 6.19: Long Run GMM: Dependent Variable is AGE1 and Independent Variables are NMN and NGE1
REGRESSION (1) REGRESSION (2) REGRESSION (3) REGRESSION (4)
(a) Xlt
strictly
exogenous
( b ) * rt
predetermine
d
(c) Xu 
endogenous
(a) Xu 
strictly 
exogenous
W x„
predetermine
d
<0 Xu 
endogenous
(a) Xu
strictly
exogenous
W X„
predetermine
d
<*> * /i  
endogenous
(a) Xtt
strictly
exogenous
0»> Xtt
predetermine
d
W  x tt
endogenous
AMN -0.0036
(0.0051)
(0.0068)
-0.0002
(0.0034)
(0.0042)
-0.0003
(0.0048)
(0.0054)
0.0009
(0.0022)
(0.0030)
0.0009
(0.0016)
(0.0016)
0.0003
(0.0017)
(0.0019)
0.0012
(0.0020)
(0.0028)
0.0011
(0.0015)
(0.0015)
0.0007
(0.0017)
(0.0018)
0.0013
(0.0020)
(0.0027)
0.0004
(0.0016)
(0.0018)
-0.0007
(0.0019)
(0.0024)
NMN 0.0011
(0.0004)***
(0.0005)**
0.0007
(0.0003)**
(0.0004)*
0.0008
(0.0004)**
(0.0005)
0.0010
(0.0004)***
(0.0005)**
0.0006
(0.0003)**
(0.0004)*
0.0007
(0.0004)*
(0.0005)
0.0012
(0.0004)***
(0.0005)**
0.0006
(0.0003)**
(0.0004)*
0.0007
(0.0004)
(0.0005)
NGE1 0.0153
(0.0160)
(0.0131)
0.0724
(0.0158)***
(0.0298)**
0.0824
(0.0277)***
(0.0351)**
0.0164
(0.0152)
(0.0123)
0.0721
(0.0158)***
(0.0297)**
0.0808
(0.0278)***
(0.0349)**
0.0135
(0.0154)
(0.0116)
0.0681
(0.0161)***
(0.0320)**
0.0858
(0.0273)***
(0.0379)**
AGE 0.0008
(0.0009)
(0.0009)
0.0006
(0.0007)
(0.0007)
0.0004
(0.0007)
(0.0007)
0.0008
(0.0009)
(0.0009)
0.0006
(0.0007)
(0.0006)
0.0003
(0.0007)
(0.0007)
LFSTOCK -0.0403
(0.0343)
(0.0423)
-0.0479
(0.0359)
(0.0507)
-0.0926
(0.0577)
(0.0693)
ECACRA
UNEM
INACTIVE
ECACRF
OBS. 348 348 348 348
REGRESSION (5) REGRESSION (6) REGRESSION (7)
AMN 0.0011
(0.0018)
(0.0024)
-0.0004
(0.0019)
(0.0024)
-0.0001
(0.0022)
(0.0024)
0.0011
(0.0018)
(0.0025)
0.0007
(0.0021)
(0.0024)
-0.0003
(0.0023)
(0.0033)
0.0012
(0.0018)
(0.0024)
0.0002
(0.0021)
(0.0021)
-0.0017
(0.0024)
(0.0027)
NMN 0.0010
(0.0005)**
(0.0005)**
0.0005 
(0.0005) . 
(0.0005)
0.0008
(0.0006)
(0.0005)
0.0011
(0.0005)**
(0.0005)**
0.0006
(0.0006)
(0.0007)
0.0010
(0.0006)
(0.0007)
0.0011
(0.0005)**
(0.0005)**
0.0003
(0.0006)
(0.0005)
0.0003
(0.0007)
(0.0005)
NGE1 0.0202
(0.0176)
(0.0134)
0.0965
(0.0265)***
(0.0376)**
0.0964
(0.0405)**
(0.0508)*
0.0202
(0.0169)
(0.0135)
0.0780
(0.0247)***
(0.0351)**
0.0984
(0.0330)***
(0.0406)**
0.0205
(0.0175)
(0.0146)
0.0627
(0.0272)**
(0.0344)*
0.0838
(0.0370)**
(0.0408)**
AGE 0.0008
(0.0009)
(0.0009)
0.0006
(0.0010)
(0.0009)
0.0005
(0.0011)
(0.0009)
0.0008
(0.0009)
(0.0009)
0.0004
(0.0011)
(0.0011)
0.0003
(0.0010)
(0.0009)
0.0007 
(0.0010) 
(0.0008)
-0.0001
(0.0012)
(0.0010)
-0.0002
(0.0012)
(0.0010)
LFSTOCK
ECACRA 0.0001
(0.0005)
(0.0005)
-0.0001
(0.0009)
(0.0010)
0.0001
(0.0012)
(0.0018)
UNEM -0.0284
(0.0502)
(0.0441)
0.0114
(0.0744)
(0.0878)
0.0162
(0.0968)
(0.1040)
INACTIVE 0.0415
(0.0420)
(0.0513)
0.0946
(0.0743)
(0.0814)
0.1078
(0.1014)
(0.1319)
ECACRF 0.0004
(0.0005)
(0.0005)
0.0002
(0.0008)
(0.0008)
0.0008
(0.0009)
(0.0010)
0.0005
(0.0005)
(0.0005)
-0.0003
(0.0008)
(0.0007)
0.0000
(0.0012)
(0.0015)
OBS. 285 285 285
Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (*), (**) and (***) denote the significance of the White (1980) estimator.
6.4.3 Conclusion
Table 6.20 displays the general conclusions on the determinants of educational inequality 
measured either as inequality in the education level completed or as inequality in the age at 
which the highest education level was completed. More specifically, this table presents the 
sign and the robustness of educational attainment, income per capita and income inequality. 
First of all, the coefficients on educational attainment and income per capita are sensitive 
to the definition of human capital distribution. Partial conclusion 1 shows that while the 
impact of educational attainment on educational inequality is negative, robust and large in 
magnitude, the impact of income per capita on education inequality is not clear. Partial 
conclusion 2, on the other hand, shows that the influence of educational attainment on 
educational inequality is not clear, while the coefficient on income per capita is positive, 
statistically significant, but sensitive to the specification model. Combining both partial 
conclusions, and at the risk of some generalisations, the findings seem to indicate the 
ambiguous impact of educational attainment and income per capita on educational 
inequality. Nevertheless, no matter how educational and income inequalities are measured; 
the results show the positive and robust impact of income inequality on educational 
inequality. This finding highlight the fact that rich people have greater educational 
opportunities than the poor. Rich people have better job chances and greater opportunities 
to take up an otherwise profitable education level, if it is necessary. Moreover, the positive 
impact of income inequality on educational inequality most probably reflects the 
responsiveness of the EU labour market to differences in qualifications and skills, due to 
the causality effects. Education is causally related to increases in individual productivity 
and, therefore, in individual income. One key finding is that the coefficients on income 
inequality (both among the population as a whole and among normally working people) are 
higher when dependent variable is inequality in education level completed rather than 
inequality in the age at which the highest education level was completed. Moreover, the 
adjusted R-squared of the equations for inequality in education level completed are higher 
than those for the equations for inequality in age at which the highest education level was 
completed. What this seems to show is that the equations for the inequality in the education 
level completed constitute better FEs models in terms of goodness-of-fit. Finally, there is 
no great difference between the models for income of the population as a whole and the
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income of normally working people explanatory variables. The adjusted R-squared is 
higher in the former than in the latter models though.
Educational inequality has evolved differently in urban and rural areas. The OLS and REs 
results show that while inequality in the education level completed is higher in urban areas, 
inequality in the age at which the highest level of education was completed is lower in 
those areas. However, the fact that data were only available for a few regions available calls 
for some caution. Considering both proxies for educational inequality, the equations show 
that inequality is lower in the north than in the south. Finally, the results of my analysis 
show that the social-democratic welfare states, the mainly Protestant regions and those with 
Nordic family structures are among the most egalitarian.
Autoregressive models (short-run GMM regressions) highlight the persistence of 
educational inequality, because most people in the survey have already completed their 
formal studies and thus their time-series variation in education level completed is zero. 
However, the coefficients on the lagged age inequality are sensitive to the additional 
variables.
The educational inequality regressions have important policy implications. They show that 
improving access to education, providing a higher quality of education and generally 
increasing educational attainment will curb the increase in educational inequality only in 
such cases when the education level completed is a proxy for human capital distribution. 
They also indicate that income and educational inequality are connected, highlighting the 
responsiveness of the EU labour market to differences in qualifications and skills. 
Microeconomic changes in income distribution as measured by levels of inequality seem to 
be more important than those measured by the average income distribution.
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Table 6.20: Determinants of Educational Inequality
dependent variable
inequality in education level completed
inequality in age at which the highest education 
level w as completed
general
independent income for all income for normally partial income for all income for normally partial conclusi
variables people working people conclusi people working people conclusi on
on (1) on (2)
static dynamic static dynamic static dynamic static dynamic
educational - - - - - + not + not not not
attainmnet (rob) (rob) (rob) (rob) (rob) (rob) clear (rob) clear clear clear
income per + - not - not + + + + + not
capita (non rob) (non rob) clear (non rob) clear (non rob) (non rob) (non rob) (rob) (non rob) clear
income + + + + + + + + + + +
inequality (rob) (rob) (rob) (rob) (rob) (rob) (rob) (rob) (rob) (rob) (rob)
Note: 'not clear' means either not statistically significant coefficients in all equations or coefficients do not keep the same sign; 'robustness' means 
sensitivity of coefficients in terms of additional explanatory variables.
6.5 Conclusions
On the one hand, there is no great difference in the educational inequality models when the 
independent variable is the income of the population as a whole or the income of normally 
working people. On the other hand, income inequality models are sensitive to the definition 
of human capital variables (both educational attainment and educational inequality).
(1) The FEs for education level completed inequality models fit by far better than the FEs 
for income inequality (either for the population as a whole or for normally working people) 
models. The former models explain above 75.80 per cent of the variation in human capital 
inequality levels, while the latter explain from 0.01 to 27.04 per cent of the variation in 
income inequality. One reason for this may be that educational attainment explains the 
major part of the variation in educational inequality, while income per capita does not 
explain the major part of income inequality. In the former model, women’s access to work 
access explains the largest part of variability. Considering the negative, large in magnitude 
and robust relationship between educational attainment and educational inequality, the 
average education level completed seems to play a prominent role and to be one of the most 
powerful instruments for reducing educational inequality. The increased opportunity to 
acquire higher education enables more people to improve their socioeconomic 
circumstances. Moreover, educational expansion and free primary and secondary education 
have offered educational opportunities and numerous favourable chances to both 
advantaged and disadvantaged groups. Considering the positive, large in magnitude and
285
robust relationship between women’s access to work and income inequality, the impact of 
the increase in women’s access to work has been to lessen the trend toward greater income 
inequality caused by aspects of social change during the period of analysis such as 
inflexible working conditions and arrangements, inadequate sharing of family responsibility 
and the lack of sufficient services such as childcare. Although women still have limited 
access to the labour market, men have taken on more responsibilies in care-giving and 
household tasks than in the past.
(2) The FEs for inequality in the age at which the highest education level was completed 
models fit slightly better than the FEs for income inequality models. The former models 
explain from 13.14 to 17.97 per cent of the variation in human capital inequality levels. In 
these static models, educational attainment explains a major part of the variation in 
educational inequality. Taking into account the positive, large in magnitude and robust 
relationship in static models between educational attainment and educational inequality, an 
increase in educational attainment is more likely to be a consequence of an increase in 
expenditure on private education rather than a consequence of an increase in educational 
state grants or of a decrease in tuition fees. State grants are not large enough so as to 
provide educational opportunities for all young people to rise to higher education levels. To 
put it another way, rich people are more likely to continue their studies to an older age than 
the poor. However, this explanation requires some caution because the relationship is not 
clear in the long-run models. Parenthetically, the difference in sign between the average 
level of human capital and inequality in human capital in both proxies is most likely a 
reflection of the fact that a measurement of the age at which the highest education level was 
completed is a broader concept of human capital. This proxy is likely to encompass 
experience, improved information about labour market institutions, leaming-by-doing and 
on-the-job training, from a positive point of view, and economic inactivity and short-term 
unemployment, from a negative point of view.
The major conclusion of this chapter is the following. No matter how income inequality is 
measured and no matter how educational inequality is measured, the regression results 
show that the relationship between income and educational inequality is positive and 
robust to the specification static and dynamic models. On the one hand, a greater share of 
highly-educated workers of any age within a region may signal to employers that those with 
less education have a lower ability, which may also lead to larger wage differential between
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highly-educated and less-educated workers, and thus to greater income inequality, 
especially among normally working people. Based on this theory, an increase in the levels 
of education among the more highly-educated people tends to increase income inequality, 
as the imperfect competition for positions requiring advanced educational credentials leads 
to further increases in the wages of educated people. The human capital returns for highly- 
educated people are greater than those for less-educated people. Additionally, people with a 
very low education level (either people who have completed less than the second stage of 
secondary level education or people who completed their highest education level when they 
were young) are more likely to be unemployed. Another explanation is that the demand for 
unskilled labour is growing at a slower rate than the demand for skilled labour. Hence, the 
positive impact of educational inequality on income inequality seems to reflect the 
responsiveness of the EU labour market to differences in qualifications and skills. On the 
other hand, the higher the income inequality, the higher the human capital inequality. The 
most likely explanation here is that rich people have more educational opportunities than 
the poor. Rich people have better job chances and greater opportunities to take up even an 
otherwise profitable education level. Therefore, income and educational inequalities are 
mutually self-reinforcing processes. Human capital produces income, and vice versa. 
Income inequality is strongly related to educational inequality, but the scale of the effect is 
relatively small. Both income and human capital inequalities are likely to represent 
inequalities in abilities, knowledge, skills, aspirations, socioeconomic chances, 
opportunities, and so on. Furthermore, regional economies are internally tied to one another 
through income and human interdependencies, implying that they are the source of positive 
externalities. Those externalities are observable in diverse domains of regional economic 
activity, including dense knowledge and information flows, processes of leaming-by-doing, 
business and social networks (Storper, 1997; Scott, 2002; Scott and Storper, 2003).
The static regression models reveal two distinct patterns. First, the levels of inequality have 
evolved differently in urban and rural areas. While urbanisation is negatively associated 
with income inequality for the population as a whole, it is not statistically significant for 
income inequality for normally working people. This most probably reflects the fact that all 
members of a household move to urban areas in search of better opportunities rather than 
normally working people alone. Additionally, the impact of urbanisation on inequality in 
the age at which the highest education level was completed is negative, but its impact on
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education level completed inequality is, surprisingly, positive. This may reflect the 
differences in human capital proxies. The fact that the OLS and REs models are not the 
most appropriate models to explain the determinants of income and human capital 
inequality and that data on urbanisation were only available for a few countries indicate that 
results should be treated with some caution. Second, the levels of inequality have also 
evolved differently in southern and northern areas. More specifically, inequalities in 
income and education are higher in the south than in the north. The FEs findings show that 
the impact of both urbanisation and latitude on inequalities was greater in 2000 than in 
1995. This result may reveal the existence of convergence over the short period analysed. 
Finally, the regression results show that inequalities in income and education are lower in 
social-democratic welfare states, in Protestant areas, and in regions with Nordic family 
structures, such as in Swedish and Danish regions.
Most of the statistically significant coefficients indicate impacts that follow the directions 
suggested by the theory and previous research. As a whole, the results seem reasonable and 
there are socioeconomic theories in the literature that confirm the observed relationships. 
Microeconomic changes in income and educational distribution as measured by inequality 
seem to be more important than measured by those measured by average. The analysis 
provides useful insights for future regional and welfare policy in the EU and the goal of 
equalisation in income and educational opportunities and chances. Those policies should 
take into account the responsiveness of the EU labour market to differences in 
qualifications and skills.
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Appendix A6
Appendix A6.1: Descriptive Statistics of the ECHP Dataset
Year Statistic Quantitative variables Qualitative variables
Main activity status
Income
Educational
attainment Age Unemployed Inactive
Normally
working Urbanisation
1995 Obs 120413 119463 125395 7915 55169 61406 26863
Mean 9744.58 0.60 44.96
Percentage 6.36 44.32 49.33 46.68
Std. Dev. 11782.83 0.73 18.23
Variance 1.39E+08 0.53 332.35
Skewness 8.39 0.78 0.34
Kurtosis 311.52 2.27 2.12
1996 Obs 124663 114529 120413 7685 58933 53214 26863
Mean 10163.60 0.60 45.05
Percentage 6.41 44.41 49.18 46.68
Std. Dev. 11234.33 0.73 18.28
Variance 1.26E+08 0.53 334.28
Skewness 6.45 0.79 0.35
Kurtosis 205.83 2.27 2.12
1997 Obs 117886 118402 124756 7760 54183 62221 26863
Mean 10472.71 0.62 45.22
Percentage 6.25 43.64 50.11 46.68
Std. Dev. 11529.87 0.74 18.32
Variance 1.33E+08 0.55 335.47
Skewness 6.87 0.73 0.34
Kurtosis 213.47 2.17 2.13
1998 Obs 113455 115953 117980 6775 50646 59978 26863
Mean 10617.48 0.68 45.54
Percentage 5.77 43.14 51.09 46.68
Std. Dev. 12648.77 0.76 18.32
Variance 1.60E+08 0.57 335.66
Skewness 16.09 0.60 0.34
Kurtosis 1049.18 1.97 2.13
1999 Obs 108731 112406 113536 5908 48802 58342 26863
Mean 11037.64 0.68 45.78
Percentage 5.23 43.17 51.61 46.68
Std. Dev. 13552.43 0.77 18.33
Variance 1.84E+08 0.59 336.04
Skewness 30.58 0.63 0.33
. Kurtosis . 3616.64 . 1.96 .
2000 Obs 104953 107751 108848 5165 46890 56384 26863
Mean 11368.55 0.69 46.07
Percentage 4.76 43.24 52 46.68
Std. Dev. 12884.93 0.77 18.45
Variance 1.66E+08 0.59 340.32
Skewness 10.55 0.59 0.32
Kurtosis 442.83 1.92 2.12
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Appendix A6.2: Standardised Coefficients
Dependent Variable is IGE1 and Independent Variables are EMN and EGE1
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: IGE1
REGR. 1 REGR. 2 REGR. 3 REGR. 4 REGR. 5 REGR. 6 REGR. 7 REGR. 8 REGR. 9
IMN -0.6514 -0.3659 -0.3360 -0.0449 -0.1675 -0.0845 -0.1105 -0.2136 0.0526
EMN -0.5168 -0.5331 -0.1467 0.0171 0.0877 0.1149 0.1418 0.0624
EGE1 -0.1598 -0.1185 0.2067 0.2553 0.2854 0.2460 0.1985 0.1545
AGE -0.1662 -0.2178 -0.1712 -0.0964 -0.1661 -0.0537 -0.0945
LFSTOCK -0.5644
ECACRA -0.5712
UNEM 0.0531 0.1887 0.0501
INACTIVE 0.1974
ECACRF -0.6773 -0.5612 -0.5035 -0.4929
URBANDPA 
V, (fixed) -0.1148
LAT (fixed) -0.4330
Dependent Variable is IGE1 and Independent Variables are AMN and AGE1
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: IGE1
REGR. 1 REGR. 2 REGR. 3 REGR. 4 REGR. 5 REGR. 6 REGR. 7 REGR. 8 REGR. 9
IMN -0.6514 -0.4022 -0.3614 -0.0378 -0.2365 -0.1451 -0.1440 -0.1390 0.1136
AMN -0.2659 -0.3197 -0.3275 -0.2551 -0.2342 -0.1667 -0.1475 -0.1322
AGE1 0.3071 0.3714 0.3467 0.1134 0.0705 0.0865 0.1007 -0.0356
AGE -0.1582 -0.2081 -0.1655 -0.0934 -0.1735 -0.0456 -0.0973
LFSTOCK -0.5248
ECACRA -0.4921
UNEM 0.0833 0.2309 0.0656
INACTIVE 0.1887
ECACRF -0.5793 -0.4931 -0.4093 -0.4959
URBANDPA 
V (fixed) -0.0999
LAT (fixed) -0.5164
Dependent Variable is NGE1 and Independent Variables are EMN and EGE1
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: NGE1
REGR. 1 REGR. 2 REGR. 3 REGR. 4 REGR. 5 REGR. 6
NMN -0.3975 -0.0187 -0.0196 -0.0309 -0.1803 0.1063
EMN 0.0020 0.0023 0.3836 0.1752 0.3665
EGE1 0.5368 0.5340 0.6557 0.3556 0.4877
AGE 0.0118 0.0515 0.1522 0.0567
ECACRF -0.3757 -0.1102 -0.0985
URBANDPA 
V (fixed) -0.0883
LAT (fixed) -0.5556
Dependent Variable is NGE1 and Independent Variables are AMN and AGE1
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: NGE1
REGR. 1 REGR. 2 REGR. 3 REGR. 4 REGR. 5 REGR. 6
NMN -0.3975 -0.0775 -0.0936 -0.1570 -0.0099 0.0531
AMN -0.4638 -0.4357 -0.3871 -0.4010 -0.2811
AGEI 0.3046 0.2712 0.1069 0.1635 -0.0071
AGE 0.0997 0.0900 0.1678 0.0935
ECACRF -0.1016 -0.0138 0.0571
URBANDPA 
V (fixed) -0.0950
LAT (fixed) -0.5251
Dependent Variable is EGE1 and Independent Variables are IMN and IGE1
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: E G E 1 ......................................................................................................................................................................................
REGR. 1 REGR. 2 REGR. 3 REGR. 4 REGR. 5 REGR. 6 REGR. 7 REGR. 8 REGR. 9
EMN -0.8691 -0.7804 -0.7592 -0.7572 -0.8159 -0.7526 -0.8202 -0.7740 -0.7383
IMN -0.1760 -0.1777 -0.2474 -0.1649 -0.2510 -0.1669 -0.3523 -0.2079
IGE1 -0.0732 -0.0566 0.1238 0.1893 0.2424 0.2361 0.1737 0.1656
AGE 0.0512 0.0994 0.0575 -0.0004 0.0265 0.0240 -0.0067
LFSTOCK 0.2998
ECACRA 0.3385
UNEM -0.1654 -0.0269 -0.1590
INACTIVE 0.0164
ECACRF 0.3214 0.3902 0.4541 0.3250
URBANDPA 
V (fixed) 0.1452
LAT (fixed) -0.1384
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Dependent Variable is EGE1 and Independent Variables are NMN and NGE1
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: EGEI
REGR. 1 REGR. 2 REGR. 3 REGR. 4 REGR. 5 REGR. 6 REGR. 7 REGR. 8 REGR. 9
EMN -0.8691 -0.6651 -0.6566 -0.7583 -0.8174 -0.7903 -0.8179 -0.7632 -0.7648
NMN -0.1849 -0.1867 -0.2046 -0.1497 -0.1964 -0.1537 -0.3286 -0.1653
NGE1 0.1569 0.1543 0.1755 0.1816 0.1745 0.1968 0.0935 0.1379
AGE 0.0487 0.0549 0.0155 -0.0266 -0.0149 0.0008 -0.0250
LFSTOCK 0.2083
ECACRA 0.2250
UNEM -0.1072 0.0374 -0.1140
INACTIVE 0.0294
ECACRF 0.1776 0.2550 0.3219 0.2223
URBANDPA 
V (fixed) 0.1315
LAT (fixed) -0.1293
Dependent Variable is AGE1 and Independent Variables are IMN and IGE1
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: AGE1
REGR. 1 REGR. 2 REGR. 3 REGR. 4 REGR. 5 REGR. 6 REGR. 7 REGR. 8 REGR. 9
AMN 0.2172 0.5879 0.6144 0.6334 0.6107 0.6715 0.5680 0.4208 0.6563
IMN -0.6288 -0.5922 -0.6405 -0.6115 -0.6377 -0.6151 -0.5874 -0.4760
IGE1 0.2588 0.2943 0.4032 0.1505 0.1102 0.1356 0.1673 -0.0755
AGE 0.2092 0.2380 0.1517 0.1307 0.2379 0.0870 0.1049
LFSTOCK 0.1827
ECACRA -0.1361
UNEM -0.1244 -0.2575 -0.1137
INACTIVE -0.2449
ECACRF -0.2467 -0.3301 -0.3696 -0.2883
URBANDPA 
V (fixed) -0.0659
LAT (fixed) -0.3100
Dependent Variable is AGE1 and Independent Variables are NMN and NGE1
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: AGE1
REGR. 1 REGR. 2 REGR. 3 REGR. 4 REGR. 5 REGR. 6 REGR. 7 REGR. 8 REGR. 9
AMN 0.2172 0.5956 0.6022 0.6028 0.5960 0.6507 0.5791 0.4293 0.6582
NMN -0.6768 -0.6728 -0.5902 -0.5526 -0.5524 -0.5356 -0.5388 -0.4255
NGE1 0.2081 0.1796 0.1529 0.0855 0.0531 0.0670 0.0803 -0.0122
AGE 0.1472 0.1305 0.1019 0.1163 0.1886 0.0631 0.1119
LFSTOCK -0.1937
ECACRA -0.3454
UNEM -0.0860 -0.1834 -0.1042
INACTIVE -0.1735
ECACRF -0.4340 -0.5028 -0.5342 -0.3437
URBANDPA 
V (fixed) -0.0787
LAT (fixed) -0.2812
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Appendix A6.3: OLS: Dependent Variable is IGE1 and Independent Variables are EMN and EGE1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
IMN -0.0253
(0.0012)***
(0.0014)***
-0.0140
(0.0018)***
(0.0021)***
-0.0129
(0.0018)***
(0.0020)***
-0.0017
(0.0016)
(0.0018)
-0.0065
(0.0015)***
(0.0016)***
-0.0033
(0.0015)**
(0.0017)*
-0.0043
(0.0014)***
(0.0014)***
-0.0076
(0.0024)***
(0.0028)***
0.0020
(0.0014)
(0.0015)
0.0072
(0.0018)***
(0.0021)***
0.0005
(0.0015)
(0.0017)
0.0084
(0.0018)***
(0.0020)***
EMN -0.2817
(0.0355)***
(0.0304)***
-0.2906
(0.0347)***
(0.0285)***
-0.0800
(0.0312)**
(0.0263)***
0.0097
(0.0331)
(0.0315)
0.0498
(0.0298)*
(0.0288)*
0.0652
(0.0295)**
(0.0286)**
0.0710
(0.0375)*
(0.0381)*
0.0354
(0.0263)
(0.0237)
0.0309
(0.0338)
(0.0358)
0.1064
(0.0340)***
(0.0372)***
0.0381
(0.0283)
(0.0296)
EGEl -0.0556
(0.0210)***
(0.0199)***
-0.0412
(0.0206)***
(0.0179)***
0.0719
(0.0183)***
(0.0167)***
0.0961
(0.0189)***
(0.0181)***
0.1074
(0.0175)***
(0.0166)***
0.0926
(0.0166)***
(0.0152)***
0.0700
(0.0217)***
(0.0185)***
0.0582
(0.0160)***
(0.0141)***
0.0887
(0.0187)***
(0.0192)***
0.1483
(0.0188)***
(0.0198)***
0.0935
(0.0164)***
(0.0173)***
AGE -0.0130
(0.0023)***
(0.0024)***
-0.0170
(0.0019)***
(0.0019)***
-0.0138
(0.0019)***
(0.0018)***
-0.0078
(0.0018)***
(0.0018)***
-0.0134
(0.0020)***
(0.0022)***
-0.0041
(0.0023)*
(0.0022)*
-0.0076
(0.0016)***
(0.0015)***
-0.0082
(0.0017)***
(0.0017)***
-0.0113
(0.0018)***
(0.0017)***
-0.0077
(0.0017)***
(0.0016)***
LFSTOCK -1.1632
(0.0693)***
(0.0676)***
ECACRA -0.0134
(0.0008)***
(0.0007)***
UNEM 0.2519
(0.1304)*
(0.1352)*
0.8557
(0.2080)***
(0.1794)***
0.2375
(0.1150)**
(0.1190)**
0.4602
(0.1410)***
(0.1380)***
0.3112
(0.1384)**
(0.1431)**
0.5367
(0.1264)***
(0.1362)***
INACTIVE 0.4937
(0.1052)***
(0.1141)***
ECACRF -0.0116
(0.0006)***
(0.0005)***
-0.0096
(0.0007)***
(0.0008)***
-0.0083
(0.0010)***
(0.0009)***
-0.0084
(0.0006)***
(0.0006)***
-0.0085
(0.0007)***
(0.0007)***
-0.0104
(0.0006)***
(0.0006)***
-0.0082
(0.0007)***
(0.0007)***
URBANDP 
AV (fixed)
-0.0736
(0.0215)***
(0.0211)***
LAT
(fixed)
-0.0102
(0.0008)***
(0.0009)***
DWSLIB 0.0356
(0.0185)*
(0.0166)**
DWSCORP 0.0374
(0.0169)**
(0.0154)**
DWSRES 0.1814
(0.0261)***
(0.0291)***
DRLCATH 0.0408
(0.0109)***
(0.0112)***
DRLORTH 0.1584
(0.0196)***
(0.0179)***
DRLANGL -0.0104
(0.0122)
(0.0127)
DFNORD -0.0402
(0.0163)**
(0.0145)***
DFSC 0.1566
(0.0147)***
(0.0179)***
ADJ R-SQ 0.4233 0.4890 0.5144 0.6709 0.7139 0.7674 0.7755 0.7672 0.8192 0.8022 0.7978 0.8097
OBS. 604 596 596 596 513 513 513 299 513 513 513 513
Appendix A6.4: OLS: Dependent Variable is IGE1 and Independent Variables are AMN and AGE1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
IMN -0.0253
(0.0012)***
(0.0014)***
-0.0152
(0.0019)***
(0.0022)***
-0.0137
(0.0018)***
(0.0021)***
-0.0014
(0.0017)
(0.0020)
-0.0091
(0.0017)***
(0.0021)***
-0.0056
(0.0017)***
(0.0020)***
-0.0055
(0.0016)***
(0.0020)***
-0.0049
(0.0022)**
(0.0025)*
0.0044
(0.0016)***
(0.0019)**
0.0040
(0.0018)**
(0.0022)*
-0.0009
(0.0017)
(0.0021)
0.0038
(0.0018)**
(0.0021)*
AMN -0.0156
(0.0025)***
(0.0027)***
-0.0187
(0.0025)***
(0.0027)***
-0.0192
(0.0020)***
(0.0023)***
-0.0145
(0.0021)***
(0.0023)***
-0.0133
(0.0022)***
(0.0024)***
-0.0095
(0.0019)***
(0.0022)***
-0.0165
(0.0049)***
(0.0050)***
-0.0075
(0.0019)***
(0.0019)***
-0.0069
(0.0027)**
(0.0025)***
-0.0206
(0.0028)***
(0.0029)***
-0.0033
(0.0022)
(0.0021)
AGE1 2.1221
(0.3137)***
(0.3680)***
2.5662
(0.3185)***
(0.3591)***
2.3953
(0.2586)***
(0.3150)***
0.8442
(0.3023)***
(0.3711)**
0.5246
(0.2801)*
(0.3323)
0.6435
(0.2791)**
(0.3453)*
0.6948
(0.3111)**
(0.3442)**
-0.2652
(0.2415)
(0.2581)
-1.6838
(0.3448)***
(0.3325)***
0.7427
(0.2799)***
(0.3364)**
-1.4909
(0.3203)***
(0.3279)***
AGE -0.0119
(0.0023)***
(0.0025)***
-0.0157
(0.0019)***
(0.0019)***
-0.0129
(0.0020)***
(0.0018)***
-0.0073
(0.0019)***
(0.0018)***
-0.0135
(0.0022)***
(0.0024)***
-0.0035
(0.0023)
(0.0022)
-0.0076
(0.0016)***
(0.0015)***
-0.0064
(0.0018)***
(0.0016)***
-0.0110
(0.0019)***
(0.0019)***
-0.0050
(0.0018)***
(0.0017)***
LFSTOCK -1.0505
(0.0633)***
(0.0585)***
ECACRA -0.0120
(0.0008)***
(0.0007)***
UNEM 0.3711
(0.1504)**
(0.1418)***
1.0474
(0.2125)***
(0.1693)***
0.2921
(0.1261)**
(0.1181)**
0.5806
(0.1376)***
(0.1317)***
0.4357
(0.1430)***
(0.1389)***
0.6547
(0.1387)***
(0.1344)***
INACTIVE 0.4670
(0.1135)***
(0.1270)***
ECACRF -0.0105
(0.0007)***
(0.0006)***
-0.0089
(0.0008)***
(0.0008)***
-0.0067
(0.0010)***
(0.0008)***
-0.0090
(0.0006)***
(0.0006)***
-0.0070
(0.0007)***
(0.0007)***
-0.0083
(0.0007)***
(0.0007)***
-0.0077
(0.0007)***
(0.0006)***
URBANDP 
AV (fixed)
-0.0641
(0.0212)***
(0.0215)***
LAT
(fixed)
-0.0127
(0.0009)***
(0.0010)***
DWSLIB 0.0689
(0.0309)**
(0.0166)***
DWSCORP 0.1108
(0.0304)***
(0.0171)***
DWSRES 0.3012
(0.0418)***
(0.0350)***
DRLCATH 0.0098
(0.0132)
(0.0122)
DRLORTH 0.0823
(0.0224)***
(0.0196)***
DRLANGL -0.0581
(0.0175)***
(0.0166)***
DFNORD -0.0914
(0.0298)***
(0.0152)***
DFSC 0.2001
(0.0196)***
(0.0199)***
ADJ R-SQ 0.4233 0.5177 0.5396 0.6970 0.7108 0.7617 0.7672 0.7686 0.8328 0.8066 0.7855 0.8061
OBS. 604 534 534 534 455 455 455 299 455 455 455 455
Appendix A6.5: OLS; Dependent Variable is NGE1 and Independent Variables are EMN and EGE1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
NMN -0.0068
(0.0006)***
(0.0008)***
-0.0003
(0.0008)
(0.0009)
-0.0003
(0.0008)
(0.0009)
-0.0005
(0.0008)
(0.0009)
-0.0027
(0.0016)*
(0.0019)
0.0018
(0.0008)**
(0.0009)*
0.0034
(0.0010)***
(0.0011)***
0.0017
(0.0008)**
(0.0010)*
0.0039
(0.0009)***
(0.0011)***
EMN 0.0006
(0.0198)
(0.0180)
0.0006
(0.0198)
(0.0180)
0.1061
(0.0241)***
(0.0262)***
0.0404
(0.0313)
(0.0298)
0.1013
(0.0224)***
(0.0232)***
0.0435
(0.0259)*
(0.0287)
0.1008
(0.0263)***
(0.0297)***
0.0626
(0.0226)***
(0.0248)**
EGE1 0.0949
(0.0129)***
(0.0134)***
0.0944
(0.0130)***
(0.0140)***
0.1203
(0.0138)***
(0.0155)***
0.0578
(0.0184)***
(0.0177)***
0.0895
(0.0133)***
(0.0139)***
0.0710
(0.0152)***
(0.0168)***
0.1235
(0.0151)***
(0.0179)***
0.0791
(0.0131)***
(0.0142)***
AGE
5
0.0005
(0.0014)
(0.0013)
0.0020
(0.0014)
(0.0014)
0.0053
(0.0018)***
(0.0016)***
0.0022
(0.0013)*
(0.0013)*
0.0026
(0.0013)**
(0.0013)*
-0.0010
(0.0014)
(0.0013)
0.0026
(0.0013)**
(0.0013)**
ECACRF -0.0031
(0.0004)***
(0.0005)***
-0.0008
(0.0006)
(0.0006)
-0.0008
(0.0005)*
(0.0005)
0.0007
(0.0006)
(0.0006)
-0.0019
(0.0004)***
(0.0005)***
0.0011
(0.0005)**
(0.0005)**
URBANDP 
AV (fixed)
-0.0261
(0.0181)
(0.0172)
LAT
(fixed)
-0.0064
(0.0007)***
(0.0008)***
DWSLIB 0.1068
(0.0134)***
(0.0102)***
DWSCORP 0.0995
(0.0133)***
(0.0099)***
DWSRES 0.1945
(0.0201)***
(0.0187)***
DRLCATH 0.0352
(0.0086)***
(0.0086)***
DRLORTH 0.1528
(0.0152)***
(0.0155)***
DRLANGL 0.0212
(0.0088)**
(0.0093)**
DFNORD -0.1054
(0.0124)***
(0.0087)***
DFSC 0.1061
(0.0114)***
(0.0114)***
ADJ R-SQ 0.1566 0.2974 0.2963 0.3557 0.2191 0.4358 0.4512 0.4556 0.4763
OBS. 604 596 596 513 299 513 513 513 513
Appendix A6.6: OLS: Dependent Variable is NGEI and Independent Variables are AMN and AGE1
0 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
NMN -0.0068
(0.0006)***
(0.0008)***
-0.0013
(0.0009)
(0.0012)
-0.0015
(0.0009)*
(0.0012)
-0.0026
(0.0010)**
(0.0013)*
-0.0001
(0.0014)
(0.0017)
0.0009
(0.0010)
(0.0014)
0.0012 
(0.0011) 
(0.0014)
0.0003
(0.0010)
(0.0014)
0.0013
(0.0010)
(0.0013)
AMN -0.0134
(0.0014)***
(0.0014)***
-0.0126
(0.0014)***
(0.0015)***
-0.0104
(0.0016)***
(0.0017)***
-0.0206
(0.0039)***
(0.0038)***
-0.0075
(0.0015)***
(0.0015)***
-0.0043
(0.0022)**
(0.0022)*
-0.0144
(0.0020)***
(0.0021)***
-0.0020
(0.0017)
(0.0017)
AGE1 1.0358
(0.1730)***
(0.1902)***
0.9223
(0.1772)***
(0.1977)***
0.3753
(0.2254)*
(0.2553)
0.5198
(0.2541)**
(0.2737)*
-0.0248
(0.2188)
(0.2209)
-0.9961
(0.2899)***
(0.2858)***
0.7272
(0.2265)***
(0.2783)***
-1.0214
(0.2650)***
(0.2587)***
AGE 0.0037
(0.0014)***
(0.0013)***
0.0033
(0.0015)**
(0.0015)**
0.0059
(0.0018)***
(0.0016)***
0.0034
(0.0014)**
(0.0014)**
0.0038
(0.0014)***
(0.0014)***
-0.0003
(0.0015)
(0.0016)
0.0043
(0.0014)***
(0.0014)***
ECACRF -0.0009
(0.0005)*
(0.0004)*
-0.0001
(0.0006)
(0.0005)
0.0005
(0.0005)
(0.0005)
0.0014
(0.0006)**
(0.0006)**
0.0007
(0.0005)
(0.0005)
0.0013
(0.0005)***
(0.0005)***
URBANDP 
AV (fixed)
-0.0281
(0.0174)
(0.0171)
LAT
(fixed)
-0.0061
(0.0008)***
(0.0009)***
DWSLIB 0.0865
(0.0257)***
(0.0125)***
DWSCORP 0.1034
(0.0252)***
(0.0110)***
DWSRES 0.2192
(0.0342)***
(0.0275)***
DRLCATH 0.0026
(0.0105)
(0.0101)
DRLORTH 0.0891
(0.0180)***
(0.0189)***
DRLANGL -0.0289
(0.0139)**
(0.0144)**
DFNORD -0.0991
(0.0242)***
(0.0091)***
DFSC 0.1301
(0.0153)***
(0.0142)***
ADJ R-SQ 0.1566 0.3034 0.3113 0.3143 0.2616 0.3913 0.3878 0.3842 0.4112
OBS. 604 534 534 455 299 455 455 455 455
Appendix A6.7: OLS: Dependent Variable is EG El and Independent Variables are  IMN and IGE1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
EMN -1.3612
(0.0318)***
(0.0467)***
-1.2223
(0.0525)***
(0.0589)***
-1.1891
(0.0540)***
(0.0590)***
-1.1859
(0.0497)***
(0.0540)***
-1.2297
(0.0523)***
(0.0628)***
-1.1343
(0.0530)***
(0.0584)***
-1.2362
(0.0540)***
(0.0676)***
-1.0990
(0.0765)***
(0.0800)***
-1.1127
(0.0529)***
(0.0580)***
-1.3622
(0.0501)***
(0.0516)***
-1.2859
(0.0510)***
(0.0497)***
-1.1899
(0.0529)***
(0.0571)***
IMN -0.0194
(0.0036)***
(0.0031)***
-0.0195
(0.0036)***
(0.0031)***
-0.0272
(0.0034)***
(0.0031)***
-0.0170
(0.0035)***
(0.0030)***
-0.0259
(0.0036)***
(0.0034)***
-0.0172
(0.0035)***
(0.0031)***
-0.0355
(0.0061)***
(0.0056)***
-0.0214
(0.0038)***
(0.0034)***
-0.0075
(0.0044)*
(0.0047)
-0.0207
(0.0033)***
(0.0038)***
-0.0256
(0.0046)***
(0.0048)***
IGE1 -0.2104
(0.0795)***
(0.0790)***
-0.1627
(0.0814)**
(0.0740)**
0.3557
(0.0904)***
(0.0832)***
0.5029
(0.0991)***
(0.0844)***
0.6440
(0.1050)***
(0.0861)***
0.6272
(0.1123)***
(0.0997)***
0.4926
(0.1528)***
(0.1372)***
0.4398
(0.1208)***
(0.1004)***
0.4814
(0.1016)***
(0.0923)***
0.7405
(0.0940)***
(0.0732)***
0.6511
(0.1139)***
(0.1008)***
AGE 0.0115
(0.0046)**
(0.0050)**
0.0223
(0.0044)***
(0.0045)***
0.0123
(0.0046)***
(0.0049)**
-0.0001
(0.0045)
(0.0051)
0.0057
(0.0054)
(0.0058)
0.0052
(0.0061)
(0.0076)
-0.0014
(0.0045)
(0.0050)
0.0111
(0.0041)***
(0.0052)**
0.0163
(0.0041)***
(0.0049)***
0.0047
(0.0045)
(0.0052)
LFSTOCK 1.7752
(0.1724)***
(0.1759)***
ECACRA 0.0211
(0.0021)***
(0.0021)***
UNEM -2.0828
(0.3068)***
(0.3052)***
-0.3464
(0.5673)
(0.7354)
-2.0025
(0.3048)***
(0.2980)***
0.1922
(0.3317)
(0.4129)
-0.3720
(0.3104)
(0.3817)
-1.5483
(0.3323)***
(0.3708)***
INACTIVE 0.1087
(0.2796)
(0.2723)
ECACRF 0.0146
(0.0018)***
(0.0016)***
0.0177
(0.0020)***
(0.0018)***
0.0212
(0.0026)***
(0.0022)***
0.0147
(0.0017)***
(0.0016)***
0.0166
(0.0018)***
(0.0018)***
0.0142
(0.0015)***
(0.0015)***
0.0186
(0.0019)***
(0.0018)***
URBANDP 
AV (fixed)
0.2642
(0.0561)***
(0.0440)***
LAT
(fixed)
-0.0087
(0.0026)***
(0.0023)***
DWSLIB 0.3650
(0.0401)***
(0.0348)***
DWSCORP 0.1249
(0.0391)***
(0.0326)***
DWSRES 0.2557
(0.0626)***
(0.0636)***
DRLCATH 0.0126
(0.0246)
(0.0216)
DRLORTH -0.1580
(0.0461)***
(0.0407)***
DRLANGL 0.2663
(0.0246)***
(0.0211)***
DFNORD -0.2059
(0.0423)***
(0.0334)***
DFSC -0.0158
(0.0429)
(0.0451)
ADJ R-SQ 0.7549 0.7658 0.7678 0.8029 0.7878 0.8024 0.7845 0.7963 0.8063 0.8480 0.8569 0.8123
OBS. 596 596 596 596 513 513 513 299 513 513 513 513
Appendix A6.8: OLS; Dependent Variable is EGE1 and Independent Variables are NMN and NGE1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (IQ (12)
EMN -1.3612
(0.0318)***
(0.0467)***
-1.0417
(0.0426)***
(0.0439)***
-1.0284
(0.0427)***
(0.0447)***
-1.1876
(0.0432)***
(0.0495)***
-1.2320
(0.0481)***
(0.0589)***
-1.1911
(0.0495)***
(0.0557)***
-1.2327
(0.0507)***
(0.0637)***
-1.0838
(0.0754)***
(0.0736)***
-1.1527
(0.0504)***
(0.0544)***
-1.3747
(0.0473)***
(0.0520)***
-1.3245
(0.0483)***
(0.0502)***
-1.2316
(0.0503)***
(0.0567)***
NMN -0.0176
(0.0025)***
(0.0023)***
-0.0178
(0.0025)***
(0.0023)***
-0.0195
(0.0023)***
(0.0022)***
-0.0136
(0.0024)***
(0.0023)***
-0.0179
(0.0026)***
(0.0026)***
-0.0140
(0.0025)***
(0.0024)***
-0.0301
(0.0047)***
(0.0042)***
-0.0151
(0.0027)***
(0.0025)***
-0.0056
(0.0031)*
(0.0036)
-0.0155
(0.0024)***
(0.0030)***
-0.0175
(0.0032)***
(0.0035)***
NGEI 0.8873
(0.1203)***
(0.1066)***
0.8729
(0.1198)***
(0.1103)***
0.9928
(0.1123)***
(0.1002)***
0.9899
(0.1222)***
(0.1097)***
0.9514
(0.1260)***
(0.1077)***
1.0727
(0.1261)***
(0.1166)***
0.5754 
(0.1803)*** 
(0.1643)***
0.7519
(0.1383)***
(0.1316)***
0.5903
(0.1251)***
(0.1306)***
0.9599
(0.1168)***
(0.1087)***
0.8194
(0.1403)***
(0.1394)***
AGE 0.0109
(0.0042)**
(0.0046)**
0.0123
(0.0039)***
(0.0040)***
0.0033
(0.0042)
(0.0044)
-0.0057
(0.0044)
(0.0048)
-0.0032
(0.0050)
(0.0052)
0.0002
(0.0061)
(0.0079)
-0.0053
(0.0043)
(0.0047)
0.0058
(0.0040)
(0.0053)
0.0096
(0.0040)**
(0.0047)**
-0.0023
(0.0044)
(0.0051)
LFSTOCK 1.2336
(0.1291)***
(0.1217)***
ECACRA 0.0140
(0.0016)***
(0.0017)***
UNEM -1.3506
(0.3049)***
(0.3012)***
0.4806
(0.5486)
(0.6450)
-1.4358
(0.3029)***
(0.3035)***
0.4535
(0.3156)
(0.3882)
0.1802
(0.3011)
(0.3675)
-1.0256
(0.3181)***
(0.3401)***
INACTIVE 0.1956
(0.2646)
(0.2461)
ECACRF 0.0081
(0.0014)***
(0.0013)***
0.0116
(0.0017)***
(0.0016)***
0.0150
(0.0023)***
(0.0021)***
0.0101
(0.0015)***
(0.0015)***
0.0117
(0.0017)***
(0.0019)***
0.0069
(0.0013)***
(0.0012)***
0.0109
(0.0019)***
(0.0019)***
URBANDP 
AV (fixed)
0.2392
(0.0551)***
(0.0441)***
LAT
(fixed)
-0.0081
(0.0024)***
(0.0024)***
DWSLIB 0.3196
(0.0423)***
(0.0404)***
DWSCORP 0.0841
(0.0410)**
(0.0371)**
DWSRES 0.2229
(0.0640)***
(0.0715)***
DRLCATH 0.0123
(0.0245)
(0.0214)
DRLORTH -0.1770
(0.0464)***
(0.0418)***
DRLANGL
- •
0.2454
(0.0249)***
(0.0214)***
DFNORD -0.1508
(0.0447)***
(0.0380)***
DFSC 0.0046
(0.0406)
(0.0453)
ADJ R-SQ 0.7549 0.7947 0.7966 0.8236 0.8033 0.8091 0.8019 0.7986 0.8129 0.8481 0.8583 0.8132
OBS. 596 596 596 596 513 513 513 299 513 513 513 513
Appendix A6.9: OLS: Dependent Variable is AGE1 and Independent Variables are IMN and IGE1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (ID (12)
AMN 0.0018
(0.0004)***
(0.0003)***
0.0050
(0.0003)***
(0.0002)***
0.0052
(0.0002)***
(0.0002)***
0.0054
(0.0002)***
(0.0002)***
0.0047
(0.0003)***
(0.0002)***
0.0051
(0.0003)***
(0.0003)***
0.0043
(0.0003)***
(0.0002)***
0.0068
(0.0008)***
(0.0009)***
0.0050
(0.0003)***
(0.0003)***
0.0047
(0.0003)***
(0.0002)***
0.0051
(0.0004)***
(0.0004)***
0.0046
(0.0002)***
(0.0002)***
IMN -0.0034
(0.0002)***
(0.0002)***
-0.0032
(0.0002)***
(0.0002)***
-0.0035
(0.0002)***
(0.0002)***
-0.0031
(0.0002)***
(0.0002)***
-0.0033
(0.0002)***
(0.0003)***
-0.0032
(0.0002)***
(0.0002)***
-0.0030
(0.0004)***
(0.0004)***
-0.0024
(0.0003)***
(0.0003)***
0.0001
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
-0.0034
(0.0002)***
(0.0003)***
-0.0002
(0.0003)
(0.0003)
IGE1 0.0375
(0.0055)***
(0.0048)***
0.0426
(0.0053)***
(0.0044)***
0.0583
(0.0063)***
(0.0052)***
0.0202
(0.0072)***
(0.0077)***
0.0148
(0.0079)*
(0.0086)**
0.0182
(0.0079)**
(0.0087)**
0.0243
(0.0109)**
(0.0108)**
-0.0101
(0.0092)
(0.0102)
-0.0302
(0.0062)***
(0.0060)***
0.0210
(0.0079)***
(0.0086)**
-0.0311
(0.0067)***
(0.0066)***
AGE 0.0023
(0.0003)***
(0.0003)***
0.0026
(0.0003)***
(0.0003)***
0.0016
(0.0003)***
(0.0004)***
0.0014
(0.0003)***
(0.0004)***
0.0025
(0.0004)***
(0.0005)***
0.0010
(0.0004)**
(0.0005)*
0.0011
(0.0003)***
(0.0004)***
0.0009
(0.0002)***
(0.0003)***
0.0019
(0.0003)***
(0.0004)***
0.0010
(0.0003)***
(0.0003)***
LFSTOCK 0.0529
(0.0120)***
(0.0106)***
ECACRA -0.0004
(0.0002)***
(0.0002)**
UNEM -0.0744
(0.0252)***
(0.0257)***
-0.1693
(0.0401)***
(0.0385)***
-0.0680
(0.0246)***
(0.0256)***
0.0241
(0.0188)
(0.0178)
-0.0771
(0.0240)***
(0.0251)***
0.0300
(0.0205)
(0.0181)*
INACTIVE -0.0814
(0.0191)***
(0.0191)***
ECACRF -0.0006
(0.0001)***
(0.0002)***
-0.0008
(0.0002)***
(0.0002)***
-0.0009
(0.0002)***
(0.0002)***
-0.0007
(0.0001)***
(0.0002)***
-0.0002
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
-0.0005
(0.0001)***
(0.0002)***
-0.0002
(0.0001)*
(0.0001)*
URBANDP 
AV (fixed)
-0.0061
(0.0040)
(0.0043)
LAT
(fixed)
-0.0010
(0.0002)***
(0.0002)***
DWSLIB 0.0217
(0.0040)***
(0.0050)***
DWSCORP 0.0210
(0.0040)***
(0.0050)***
DWSRES 0.0670
(0.0050)***
(0.0058)***
DRLCATH 0.0043
(0.0022)*
(0.0018)**
DRLORTH -0.0148
(0.0038)***
(0.0030)***
DRLANGL 0.0013
(0.0030)
(0.0027)
DFNORD -0.0196
(0.0042)***
(0.0051)***
DFSC 0.0420
(0.0024)***
(0.0032)***
ADJ R-SQ 0.0454 0.5936 0.6352 0.6476 0.6162 0.6273 0.6348 0.6158 0.6455 0.8078 0.6645 0.7761
OBS. 534 534 534 534 455 455 455 299 455 455 455 455
Appendix A6.10: OLS: Dependent Variable is AGE1 and Independent Variables are NMN and NGE1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (U ) (12)
AMN 0.0018
(0.0004)***
(0.0003)***
0.0051
(0.0003)***
(0.0002)***
0.0051
(0.0003)***
(0.0002)***
0.0051
(0.0003)***
(0.0002)***
0.0046
(0.0003)***
(0.0002)***
0.0050
(0.0003)***
(0.0003)***
0.0044
(0.0003)***
(0.0002)***
0.0070
(0.0008)***
(0.0010)***
0.0050
(0.0003)***
(0.0002)***
0.0050
(0.0003)***
(0.0002)***
0.0048
(0.0004)***
(0.0004)***
0.0048
(0.0002)***
(0.0002)***
NMN -0.0033
(0.0002)***
(0.0002)***
-0.0032
(0.0002)***
(0.0002)***
-0.0029
(0.0002)***
(0.0002)***
-0.0026
(0.0002)***
(0.0002)***
-0.0026
(0.0002)***
(0.0002)***
-0.0025
(0.0002)***
(0.0002)***
-0.0025
(0.0003)***
(0.0003)***
-0.0020
(0.0002)***
(0.0002)***
-0.0002
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
-0.0027
(0.0002)***
(0.0002)***
-0.0005
(0.0002)**
(0.0002)**
NGE1 0.0612
(0.0102)***
(0.0097)***
0.0528
(0.0101)***
(0.0101)***
0.0450
(0.0099)***
(0.0102)***
0.0244
(0.0099)**
(0.0106)**
0.0151
(0.0098)
(0.0107)
0.0191
(0.0098)*
(0.0105)*
0.0253
(0.0131)*
(0.0130)*
-0.0035
(0.0102)
(0.0106)
-0.0259
(0.0075)***
(0.0080)***
0.0299
(0.0097)***
(0.0110)***
-0.0315
(0.0082)***
(0.0089)***
AGE 0.0016
(0.0003)***
(0.0004)***
0.0014
(0.0003)***
(0.0004)***
0.0011
(0.0003)***
(0.0004)***
0.0012
(0.0003)***
(0.0004)***
0.0020
(0.0003)***
(0.0005)***
0.0007
(0.0004)
(0.0005)
0.0012
(0.0003)***
(0.0004)***
0.0012
(0.0002)***
(0.0003)***
0.0017
(0.0003)***
(0.0004)***
0.0013
(0.0002)***
(0.0003)***
LFSTOCK -0.0561
(0.0097)***
(0.0090)***
ECACRA -0.0011
(0.0001)***
(0.0001)***
UNEM -0.0514
(0.0245)**
(0.0258)**
-0.1206
(0.0385)***
(0.0400)***
-0.0623
(0.0239)***
(0.0261)**
0.0014
(0.0182)
(0.0170)
-0.0497
(0.0230)**
(0.0247)**
0.0041
(0.0195)
(0.0173)
INACTIVE -0.0577
(0.0186)***
(0.0189)***
ECACRF - 0.0011 
(0.0001)*** 
(0.0001)***
-0.0012
(0.0001)***
(0.0001)***
-0.0013
(0.0002)***
(0.0002)***
-0.0008
(0.0001)***
(0.0001)***
0.0001
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
-0.0009
(0.0001)***
(0.0001)***
0.0000
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
URBANDP 
AV (fixed)
-0.0073
(0.0039)*
(0.0041)*
LAT
(fixed)
-0.0009
(0.0002)***
(0.0002)***
DWSLIB 0.0218
(0.0041)***
(0.0050)***
DWSCORP 0.0202
(0.0040)***
(0.0049)***
DWSRES 0.0633
(0.0050)***
(0.0056)***
DRLCATH 0.0040
(0.0022)*
(0.0018)*
DRLORTH -0.0172
(0.0037)***
(0.0030)***
DRLANGL -0.0005
(0.0029)
(0.0026)
DFNORD -0.0194
(0.0043)***
(0.0049)***
DFSC " 0.0386
(0.0023)***
(0.0029)***
ADJ R-SQ 0.0454 0.5242 0.5439 0.5705 0.6180 0.6341 0.6382 0.6213 0.6542 0.8033 0.6780 0.7755
OBS. 534 534 534 534 455 455 455 299 455 455 455 455
Appendix A 6 .ll: REs: Dependent Variable is IGE1 and Independent Variables are EMN and EGE1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (U ) (12)
IMN -0.0036 
(0 0011)*** 
(0.0013)***
-0.0012
(0.0014)
(0.0015)
-0.0009
(0.0015)
(0.0016)
0.0008
(0.0015)
(0.0015)
-0.0001
(0.0015)
(0.0015)
0.0020
(0.0015)
(0.0015)***
0.0014
(0.0015)
(0.0015)
0.0020
(0.0017)
(0.0017)
0.0042
(0.0014)***
(0.0014)***
0.0053
(0.0015)***
(0.0015)***
0.0030
(0.0015)**
(0.0014)**
0.0054
(0.0015)***
(0.0015)***
EMN 0.0371
(0.0304)
(0.0339)
0.0370
(0.0305)
(0.0340)
0.0658
(0.0298)***
(0.0310)***
0.0175
(0.0286)
(0.0293)
0.0359
(0.0275)
(0.0270)***
0.0386
(0.0278)
(0.0278)
0.0697
(0.0318)**
(0.0342)**
0.0217
(0.0257)
(0.0249)
0.0189
(0.0272)
(0.0266)
0.0496
(0.0276)*
(0.0290)*
0.0230
(0.0260)
(0.0259)
EGE1 0.0847
(0.0222)***
(0.0267)***
0.0879
(0.0223)***
(0.0268)***
0.0901
(0.0213)***
(0.0244)***
0.0519
(0.0202)**
(0.0205)**
0.0600
(0.0193)***
(0.0182)***
0.0591
(0.0194)***
(0.0181)***
0.0802
(0.0255)***
(0.0282)***
0.0422
(0.0180)**
(0.0170)**
0.0446
(0.0192)**
(0.0173)**
0.0684
(0.0194)***
(0.0208)***
0.0477
(0.0182)***
(0.0170)***
AGE -0.0042
(0.0022)*
(0.0025)*
-0.0056
(0.0021)***
(0.0027)***
-0.0078
(0.0020)***
(0.0021)***
-0.0044
(0.0020)**
(0.0020)***
-0.0069
(0.0020)***
(0.0022)***
-0.0061
(0.0026)**
(0.0025)**
-0.0057
(0.0018)***
(0.0019)***
-0.0061
(0.0019)***
(0.0020)***
-0.0058
(0.0020)***
(0.0020)***
-0.0061
(0.0019)***
(0.0020)***
LFSTOCK -0.6963
(0.0788)***
(0.0895)***
ECACRA -0.0131
(0.0010)***
(0.0011)***
UNEM 0.3933
(0.1301)***
(0.1402)***
0.5955
(0.2030)***
(0.2215)***
0.4711
(0.1215)***
(0.1327)***
0.5059
(0.1272)***
(0.1374)***
0.4550
(0.1300)***
(0.1436)***
0.5122
(0.1248)***
(0.1374)***
INACTIVE 0.1725
(0.0882)*
(0.0894)*
ECACRF -0.0111 
(0.0008)*** 
(0.0008)***
-0.0110
(0.0008)***
(0.0009)***
-0.0083
(0.0011)***
(0.0012)***
-0.0073
(0.0008)***
(0.0009)***
-0.0073
(0.0009)***
(0.0009)***
-0.0089
(0.0008)***
(0.0010)***
-0.0072
(0.0009)***
(0.0009)***
URBANDP 
AV (fixed)
-0.1538
(0.0467)***
(0.0446)***
LAT
(fixed)
-0.0120
(0.0013)***
(0.0012)***
DWSLIB 0.0621
(0.0284)**
(0.0241)**
DWSCORP 0.0594
(0.0291)**
(0.0249)**
DWSRES 0.2259
(0.0357)***
(0.0301)***
DRLCATH 0.0955
(0.0221)***
(0.0248)***
DRLORTH 0.2243
(0.0411)***
(0.0373)***
DRLANGL 0.0262
(0.0219)
(0.0248)
DFNORD -0.0599
(0.0265)**
(0.0222)***
DFSC 0.1680
(0.0200)***
(0.0193)***
OBS. 604 596 596 596 513 513 513 299 513 513 513 513
Appendix A6.12: REs: Dependent Variable is IGE1 and Independent Variables are AMN and AGE1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
IMN -0.0036
(0.0011)***
(0.0013)***
-0.0022
(0.0011)**
(0.0014)
-0.0016
(0.0011)
(0.0015)
0.0012
(0.0012)
(0.0014)
-0.0003
(0.0013)
(0.0015)
0.0015
(0.0014)
(0.0015)
0.0013
(0.0014)
(0.0015)
0.0012
(0.0015)
(0.0015)
0.0040
(0.0014)***
(0.0014)***
0.0037
(0.0014)***
(0.0014)**
0.0025
(0.0014)*
(0.0014)*
0.0038
(0.0014)***
(0.0014)***
AMN -0.0194
(0.0032)***
(0.0034)***
-0.0203
(0.0032)***
(0.0035)***
-0.0187
(0.0029)***
(0.0032)***
-0.0144
(0.0028)***
(0.0034)***
-0.0132
(0.0027)***
(0.0032)***
-0.0121
(0.0027)***
(0.0031)***
-0.0064
(0.0065)
(0.0076)
-0.0090
(0.0025)***
(0.0029)***
-0.0095
(0.0031)***
(0.0035)***
-0.0114
(0.0031)***
(0.0034)***
-0.0087
(0.0027)***
(0.0032)***
AGE1 2.4000
(0.3036)***
(0.4849)***
2.5222
(0.3046)***
(0.4800)***
2.4649
(0.2841)***
(0.4363)***
1.7434
(0.2884)***
(0.4101)***
1.5539
(0.2826)***
(0.3535)***
1.6132
(0.2828)***
(0.3668)***
1.3460
(0.3308)***
(0.3592)***
0.7979
(0.2819)***
(0.2750)***
0.6693
(0.3226)**
(0.3221)**
1.3862
(0.2835)***
(0.3296)***
0.6576
(0.3172)**
(0.3142)**
AGE -0.0053
(0.0022)**
(0.0024)**
-0.0065
(0.0021)***
(0.0025)***
-0.0081
(0.0021)***
(0.0020)***
-0.0051
(0.0021)**
(0.0020)**
-0.0078
(0.0021)***
(0.0021)***
-0.0066
(0.0026)**
(0.0025)***
-0.0067
(0.0019)***
(0.0019)***
-0.0061
(0.0020)***
(0.0020)***
-0.0063
(0.0021)***
(0.0020)***
-0.0059
(0.0020)***
(0.0020)***
LFSTOCK -0.5853
(0.0766)***
(0.0832)***
ECACRA -0.0117
(0.0012)***
(0.0012)***
UNEM 0.3891
(0.1350)***
(0.1440)***
0.6187
(0.2001)***
(0.2097)***
0.4167
(0.1286)***
(0.1368)***
0.4798
(0.1353)***
(0.1421)***
0.4179
(0.1344)***
(0.1448)***
0.5019
(0.1334)***
(0.1421)***
INACTIVE 0.1950
(0.0896)**
(0.0879)**
ECACRF -0.0096
(0.0009)***
(0.0010)***
-0.0098
(0.0009)***
(0.0010)***
-0.0073
(0.0012)***
(0.0012)***
-0.0076
(0.0009)***
(0.0009)***
-0.0074
(0.0010)***
(0.0010)***
-0.0084
(0.0010)***
(0.0010)***
-0.0074
(0.0010)***
(0.0010)***
URBANDP 
AV (fixed)
-0.0963
(0.0468)**
(0.0439)**
LAT
(fixed)
-0.0114
(0.0015)***
(0.0015)***
DWSLIB 0.0646
(0.0668)
(0.0255)**
DWSCORP 0.0757
(0.0662)
(0.0234)***
DWSRES 0.1983
(0.0723)***
(0.0372)***
DRLCATH
•
0.0640
(0.0275)**
(0.0306)**
DRLORTH 0.1728
(0.0466)***
(0.0440)***
DRLANGL 0.0150
(0.0310)
(0.0342)
DFNORD -0.0714
(0.0653)
(0.0219)***
DFSC 0.1318
(0.0242)***
(0.0224)***
OBS. 604 534 534 534 455 455 455 299 455 455 455 455
Appendix A6.13: REs: Dependent Variable is NGE1 and Independent Variables are EMN and EGE1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
NMN -0.0009 
(0.0008) 
(0.00 10)
0.0011
(0.0010)
(0.0012)
0.0011 
(0.0010) 
(0.0012)
0.0008 
(0.0010) 
(0.0011)
0.0002
(0.0013)
(0.0013)
0.0016
(0.0010)
(0.0011)
0.0019
(0.0010)*
(0.0011)*
0.0015
(0.0010)
(0.0011)
0.0019
(0.0010)*
(0.0011)*
EMN 0.0564
(0.0248)**
(0.0249)**
0.0556
(0.0249)**
(0.0251)**
0.0762
(0.0251)***
(0.0251)***
0.0783
(0.0305)**
(0.0279)***
0.0704
(0.0245)***
(0.0249)***
0.0523
(0.0260)**
(0.0259)**
0.0705
(0.0259)***
(0.0264)***
0.0636
(0.0245)***
(0.0251)**
EGE1 0.0963
(0.0178)***
(0.0168)***
0.0952
(0.0179)***
(0.0170)***
0.0762
(0.0177)***
(0.0158)***
0.0828
(0.0239)***
(0.0194)***
0.0657
(0.0172)***
(0.0163)***
0.0573
(0.0183)***
(0.0158)***
0.0735
(0.0181)***
(0.0168)***
0.0654
(0.0171)***
10.0155)***
AGE 0.0010
(0.0018)
(0.0015)
-0.0002
(0.0018)
(0.0015)
0.0003
(0.0024)
(0.0020)
-0.0007
(0.0017)
(0.0015)
-0.0003
(0.0017)
(0.0016)
-0.0012
(0.0017)
(0.0015)
-0.0003
(0.0017)
(0.0015)
ECACRF -0.0037
(0.0006)***
(0.0006)***
-0.0019
(0.0009)**
(0.0009)**
-0.0014
(0.0007)**
(0.0007)**
-0.0011
(0.0008)
(0.0008)
-0.0025
(0.0007)***
(0.0007)***
-0.0006
(0.0008)
(0.0007)
URBANDP 
AV (fixed)
-0.0308
(0.0377)
(0.0334)
LAT
(fixed)
-0.0059
(0.0012)***
(0.0011)***
DWSLIB 0.0888
(0.0223)***
(0.0181)***
DWSCORP 0.0721
(0.0234)***
(0.0174)***
DWSRES 0.1482
(0.0298)***
(0.0226)***
DRLCATH 0.0474
(0.0171)***
(0.0194)**
DRLORTH 0.1645
(0.0315)***
(0.0331)***
DRLANGL 0.0412
(0.0164)**
(0.0193)**
DFNORD -0.0840
(0.0209)***
J0.0158)***
DFSC 0.0773
(0.0166)***
(0.0149)***
OBS. 604 596 596 513 299 513 513 513 513
Appendix A6.14: REs: Dependent Variable is NGE1 and Independent Variables are AMN and AGE1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
NMN -0.0009
(0.0008)
(0.0010)
0.0004
(0.0008)
(0.0011)
0.0002
(0.0008)
(0.0012)
0.0003
(0.0010)
(0.0012)
0.0000
(0.0012)
(0.0012)
0.0010
(0.0010)
(0.0012)
0.0009
(0.0010)
(0.0012)
0.0008
(0.0010)
(0.0012)
0.0010
(0.0010)
(0.0012)
AMN -0.0123
(0.0021)***
(0.0023)***
-0.0120
(0.0021)***
(0.0023)***
-0.0083
(0.0023)***
(0.0026)***
-0.0109
(0.0057)*
(0.0069)
-0.0063
(0.0024)***
(0.0026)**
-0.0048
(0.0028)*
(0.0031)
-0.0056
(0.0028)**
(0.0029)*
-0.0058
(0.0025)**
(0.0027)**
AGE1 1.2382
(0.2257)***
(0.2514)***
1.1868
(0.2305)***
(0.2527)***
0.7575
(0.2627)***
(0.2627)***
0.8396
(0.3160)***
(0.3206)***
0.4340
(0.2761)
(0.2474)*
0.3431
(0.3157)
(0.3090)
0.7939
(0.2633)***
(0.2720)***
0.2665
(0.3085)
(0.2906)
AGE 0.0020
(0.0019)
(0.0016)
0.0006
(0.0019)
(0.0016)
-0.0002
(0.0024)
(0.0021)
0.0002
(0.0018)
(0.0016)
0.0006
(0.0019)
(0.0016)
-0.0005
(0.0019)
(0.0016)
0.0004
(0.0018)
(0.0016)
ECACRF -0.0018
(0.0008)**
(0.0008)**
-0.0008
(0.0009)
(0.0009)
-0.0007
(0.0008)
(0.0008)
- 0.0011 
(0.0009) 
(0.0008)
-0.0017
(0.0008)*
(0.0008)**
-0.0005
(0.0008)
(0.0008)
URBANDP 
AV (fixed)
0.0028
(0.0372)
(0.0343)
LAT
(fixed)
-0.0044
(0.0014)***
(0.0013)***
DWSLIB 0.0756
(0.0541)
(0.0264)***
DWSCORP 0.1145
(0.0536)
(0.0242)**
DWSRES 0.0581
(0.0599)*
(0.0359)***
DRLCATH
-
0.0262
(0.0215)
(0.0244)
DRLORTH 0.1320
(0.0364)***
(0.0386)***
DRLANGL 0.0333
(0.0249)
(0.0280)
DFNORD -0.0677
(0.0517)
(0.0231)***
DFSC 0.0596
(0.0213)***
(0.0196)***
OBS. 604 534 534 455 299 455 455 455 455
Appendix A6.15: REs: Dependent Variable is EGE1 and Independent Variables are IMN and IGE1
0 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
EMN -1.1075
(0.0242)***
(0.0262)***
-1.1009
(0.0322)***
(0.0384)***
-1.0979
(0.0322)***
(0.0382)***
-1.1034
(0.0332)***
(0.0386)***
-1.1353
(0.0363)***
(0.0445)***
-1.1379
(0.0368)***
(0.0451)***
-1.1373
(0.0370)***
(0.0446)***
-1.0086
(0.0400)***
(0.0324)***
-1.1366
(0.0368)***
(0.0450)***
-1.1580
(0.0360)***
(0.0442)***
-1.1515
(0.0366)***
(0.0422)***
-1.1397
(0.0369)***
(0.0450)***
IMN 0.0013
(0.0026)
(0.0023)
0.0003
(0.0026)
(0.0024)
-0.0007
(0.0027)
(0.0026)
0.0003
(0.0033)
(0.0029)
-0.0014
(0.0034)
(0.0030)
-0.0002
(0.0034)
(0.0029)
-0.0064
(0.0038)*
(0.0025)**
-0.0002
(0.0035)
(0.0030)
0.0007
(0.0035)
(0.0028)
-0.0045
(0.0033)
(0.0032)
-0.0011
(0.0036)
(0.0029)
IGE1 0.2844
(0.0745)***
(0.0795)***
0.2935
(0.0746)***
(0.0800)***
0.3125
(0.0776)***
(0.0822)***
0.2372
(0.0963)**
(0.0859)***
0.2966
(0.1002)***
(0.0872)***
0.2685
(0.0995)***
(0.0861)***
0.3963
(0.1281)***
(0.1320)***
0.2326
(0.1069)**
(0.0905)**
0.2413
(0.1026)**
(0.0853)***
0.3719
(0.0997)***
(0.0953)***
0.2595
(0.1066)**
(0.0927)***
AGE 0.0068
(0.0040)*
(0.0039)*
0.0077
(0.0040)*
(0.0041)*
0.0062
(0.0045)
(0.0045)
0.0057
(0.0045)
(0.0045)
0.0065
(0.0046)
(0.0051)
0.0091
(0.0057)
(0.0051)*
0.0047
(0.0046)
(0.0044)
0.0077
(0.0044)*
(0.0042)*
0.0113
(0.0045)**
(0.0045)**
0.0060
(0.0046)
(0.0047)
LFSTOCK 0.1386
(0.1573)
(0.1396)
ECACRA -0.0002
(0.0026)
(0.0021)
UNEM -0.2987
(0.2981)
(0.2370)
0.1143
(0.4533)
(0.4163)
-0.2283
(0.3008)
(0.2266)
0.1034
(0.2989)
(0.2250)
-0.0431
(0.2986)
(0.2465)
-0.1833
(0.3064)
(0.2377)
INACTIVE -0.0255
(0.1968)
(0.1899)
ECACRF 0.0016
(0.0021)
(0.0017)
0.0010
(0.0022)
(0.0018)
-0.0008
(0.0028)
(0.0031)
0.0030
(0.0022)
(0.0020)
0.0027
(0.0023)
(0.0021)
0.0020
(0.0021)
(0.0018)
0.0041
(0.0023)*
(0.0021)*
URBANDP 
AV (fixed)
0.3561
(0.1200)***
(0.0913)***
LAT
(fixed)
-0.0066
(0.0038)*
(0.0038)*
DWSLIB 0.2691
(0.0640)***
(0.0382)***
DWSCORP -0.0126
(0.0667)
(0.0501)
DWSRES 0.1650
(0.0848)**
(0.0578)***
DRLCATH 0.0490
(0.0487)
(0.0383)
DRLORTH -0.0230
(0.0914)
(0.0777)
DRLANGL 0.2812
(0.0456)***
(0.0267)***
DFNORD -0.1386
(0.0700)**
(0.0432)***
DFSC 0.0469
(0.0547)
(0.0446)
OBS. 596 596 596 596 513 513 513 299 513 513 513 513
Appendix A6.16: REs: Dependent Variable is EGE1 and Independent Variables are NMN and NGE1
0 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
EMN -1 1075 
(0.0242)*** 
(0.0262)***
-1.0950
(0.0310)***
(0.0359)***
-1.0943
(0.0310)***
(0.0358)***
-1.0986
(0.0327)***
(0.0365)***
-1.1265
(0.0353)***
(0.0408)***
-1.1322
(0.0357)***
(0.0422)***
-1.1296
(0.0364)***
(0.0422)***
-1.0147
(0.0394)***
(0.0324)***
-1.1267
(0.0357)***
(0.0416)***
-1.1492
(0.0350)***
(0.0414)***
-1.1503
(0.0357)***
(0.0391)***
-1.1314
(0.0358)***
(0.0422)***
NMN -0.0012
(0.0020)
(0.0016)
-0.0018
(0.0020)
(0.0017)
-0.0025
(0.0021)-
(0.0018)
-0.0028
(0.0025)
(0.0021)
-0.0034
(0.0025)
(0.0021)
-0.0029
(0.0025)
(0.0021)
-0.0047
(0.0029)
(0.0019)**
-0.0026
(0.0025)
(0.0021)
-0.0014
(0.0025)
(0.0019)
-0.0053
(0.0025)**
(0.0022)**
-0.0030
(0.0026)
(0.0020)
NGE1 0.3348
(0.0840)***
(0.0746)***
0.3321
(0.0839)***
(0.0742)***
0.3604
(0.0858)***
(0.0790)***
0.3424
(0.1047)***
(0.0952)***
0.3679
(0.1053)***
(0.0986)***
0.3526
(0.1051)***
(0.0986)***
0.3955
(0.1289)***
(0.1261)***
0.3282
(0.1068)***
(0.0995)***
0.2838
(0.1048)***
(0.0925)***
0.3710
(0.1054)***
(0.1028)***
0.3291
(0.1074)***
(0.0984)***
AGE 0.0063
(0.0040)
(0.0038)
0.0070
(0.0040)*
(0.0039)*
0.0058
(0.0043)
(0.0044)
0.0048
(0.0045)
(0.0043)
0.0059
(0.0045)
(0.0048)
0.0066
(0.0057)
(0.0048)
0.0041
(0.0045)
(0.0043)
0.0069
(0.0044)
(0.0041)*
0.0097
(0.0044)**
(0.0043)**
0.0052
(0.0045)
(0.0045)
LFSTOCK 0.0740
(0.1492)
(0.1345)
ECACRA -0.0008
(0.0022)
(0.0022)
UNEM -0.2914
(0.2942)
(0.2295)
0.2650
(0.4492)
(0.3930)
-0.2358
(0.2946)
(0.2212)
0.1076
(0.2938)
(0.2205)
0.0164
(0.2952)
(0.2396)
-0.1700
(0.3002)
(0.2283)
INACTIVE -0.0061
(0.1974)
(0.1849)
ECACRF -0.0001
(0.0018)
(0.0018)
0.0001
(0.0018)
(0.0019)
-0.0031
(0.0026)
(0.0035)
0.0021
(0.0021)
(0.0020)
0.0014
(0.0021)
(0.0021)
-0.0005
(0.0018)
(0.0020)
0.0026
(0.0022)
(0.0022)
URBANDP 
AV (fixed)
0.2937
(0.1163)**
(0.0853)***
LAT
(fixed)
-0.0072
(0.0035)**
(0.0037)*
DWSLIB 0.2557
(0.0643)***
(0.0351)***
DWSCORP -0.0135
(0.0666)
(0.0477)
DWSRES 0.1674
(0.0823)**
(0.0505)***
DRLCATH 0.0651
(0.0473)
(0.0345)*
DRLORTH -0.0151
(0.0888)
(0.0668)
DRLANGL 0.2708
(0.0452)***
(0.0262)***
DFNORD -0.1298
(0.0698)*
(0.0406)***
DFSC 0.0554
(0.0512)
(0.0427)
OBS. 596 596 596 596 513 513 513 299 513 513 513 513
Appendix A6.17: REs: Dependent Variable is AGE1 and Independent Variables are IMN and IGE1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 0 1 ) (12)
AMN 0.0036
(0.0004)***
(0.0006)***
0.0039
(0.0004)***
(0.0004)***
0.0040
(0.0004)***
(0.0004)***
0.0040
(0.0004)***
(0.0004)***
0.0040
(0.0004)***
(0.0004)***
0.0041
(0.0004)***
(0.0004)***
0.0040
(0.0004)***
(0.0004)***
0.0061
(0.0011)***
(0.0015)***
0.0043
(0.0004)***
(0.0004)***
0.0047
(0.0004)***
(0.0004)***
0.0038
(0.0005)***
(0.0005)***
0.0045
(0.0003)***
(0.0004)***
IMN -0.0003
(0.0001)**
(0.0002)*
-0.0005
(0.0002)***
(0.0002)***
-0.0005
(0.0002)***
(0.0002)***
-0.0006
(0.0002)***
(0.0003)**
-0.0005
(0.0002)**
(0.0003)**
-0.0006
(0.0002)***
(0.0003)**
-0.0003
(0.0003)
(0.0003)
-0.0001
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
0.0001
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
-0.0005
(0.0002)**
(0.0002)**
0.0001
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
IGE1 0.0447
(0.0056)***
(0.0052)***
0.0466
(0.0055)***
(0.0053)***
0.0469
(0.0058)***
(0.0056)***
0.0434
(0.0071)***
(0.0067)***
0.0404
(0.0074)***
(0.0067)***
0.0417
(0.0073)***
(0.0066)***
0.0391
(0.0098)***
(0.0092)***
0.0240
(0.0076)***
(0.0068)***
0.0098
(0.0068)
(0.0061)
0.0366
(0.0075)***
(0.0064)***
0.0124
(0.0070)*
(0.0062)**
AGE 0.0012
(0.0003)***
(0.0004)***
0.0012
(0.0003)***
(0.0004)***
0.0011
(0.0003)***
(0.0004)***
0.0012
(0.0003)***
(0.0004)***
0.0012
(0.0003)***
(0.0004)***
0.0011
(0.0004)**
(0.0005)**
0.0008
(0.0003)**
(0.0004)**
0.0007
(0.0003)**
(0.0003)**
0.0011
(0.0003)***
(0.0004)***
0.0007
(0.0003)**
(0.0003)**
LFSTOCK -0.0029
(0.0114)
(0.0100)
ECACRA -0.0003
(0.0002)*
(0.0002)*
UNEM 0.0105
(0.0220)
(0.0192)
-0.0147
(0.0348)
(0.0326)
0.0219
(0.0212)
(0.0173)
0.0421
(0.0198)**
(0.0167)**
0.0077
(0.0221)
(0.0184)
0.0429
(0.0200)**
(0.0161)***
INACTIVE -0.0147
(0.0144)
(0.0134)
ECACRF -0.0004
(0.0002)**
(0.0002)**
-0.0004
(0.0002)**
(0.0002)***
-0.0004
(0.0002)**
(0.0002)**
-0.0001
(0.0002)
(0.0001)
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
(0.0001)
-0.0002
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
0.0001
(0.0002)
(0.0001)
URBANDP 
AV (fixed)
-0.0227
(0.0083)***
(0.0093)**
LAT
(fixed)
-0.0018
(0.0003)***
(0.0003)***
DWSLIB 0.0183
(0.0083)**
(0.0195)
DWSCORP 0.0171
(0.0082)**
(0.0194)
DWSRES 0.0574
(0.0090)***
(0.0198)***
DRLCATH 0.0091
(0.0046)**
(0.0042)**
DRLORTH 0.0018
(0.0079)
(0.0086)
DRLANGL -0.0036
(0.0051)
(0.0050)
DFNORD -0.0167
(0.0090)*
(0.0214)
DFSC 0.0375
(0.0031)***
(0.0030)***
OBS. 534 534 534 534 455 455 455 299 455 455 455 455
Appendix A6.18: REs: Dependent Variable is AGE1 and Independent Variables are NMN and NGE1
0 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
AMN 0.0036
(0.0004)***
(0.0006)***
0.0034
(0.0004)***
(0.0005)***
0.0035
(0.0004)***
(0.0005)***
0.0036
(0.0004)***
(0.0005)***
0.0037
(0.0004)***
(0.0005)***
0.0038
(0.0004)***
(0.0005)***
0.0038
(0.0004)***
(0.0005)***
0.0061
(0.0011)***
(0.0015)***
0.0042
(0.0004)***
(0.0004)***
0.0046
(0.0004)***
(0.0004)***
0.0035
(0.0005)***
(0.0005)***
0.0045
(0.0003)***
(0.0004)***
NMN -0.0003
(0.0001)**
(0.0002)*
-0.0004
(0.0001)***
(0.0001)***
-0.0003
(0.0001)**
(0.0001)**
-0.0005
(0.0002)***
(0.0002)**
-0.0004
(0.0002)**
(0.0002)*
-0.0004
(0.0002)**
(0.0002)**
-0.0003
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
-0.0001
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
0.0001
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
-0.0004
(0.0002)**
(0.0002)**
0.0001
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
NGE1 0.0263
(0.0064)***
(0.0061)***
0.0257
(0.0064)***
(0.0062)***
0.0237
(0.0065)***
(0.0062)***
0.0225
(0.0080)***
(0.0072)***
0.0212
(0.0080)***
(0.0068)***
0.0221
(0.0080)***
(0.0068)***
0.0250
(0.0101)**
(0.0083)***
0.0131
(0.0076)*
(0.0060)**
0.0071
(0.0071)
(0.0062)
0.0219
(0.0080)***
(0.0064)***
0.0074
(0.0072)
(0.0061)
AGE 0.0009
(0.0003)***
(0.0004)**
0.0009
(0.0003)***
(0.0004)**
0.0007
(0.0003)**
(0.0004)*
0.0010
(0.0003)***
(0.0004)**
0.0009
(0.0003)***
(0.0004)**
0.0009
(0.0004)*
(0.0005)
0.0007
(0.0003)**
(0.0004)*
0.0007
(0.0003)**
(0.0003)*
0.0009
(0.0003)***
(0.0004)**
0.0007
(0.0003)**
(0.0003)*
LFSTOCK -0.0274
(0.0110)**
(0.0102)***
ECACRA -0.0009
(0.0002)***
(0.0002)***
UNEM 0.0253
(0.0223)
(0.0195)
0.0032
(0.0348)
(0.0323)
0.0291
(0.0210)
(0.0171)*
0.0446
(0.0195)**
(0.0163)***
0.0185
(0.0223)
(0.0188)
0.0466
(0.0196)**
(0.0158)***
INACTIVE -0.0065
(0.0148)
(0.0139)
ECACRF -0.0008
(0.0001)***
(0.0001)***
-0.0009
(0.0001)***
(0.0001)***
-0.0008
(0.0002)***
(0.0002)***
-0.0003
(0.0002)**
(0.0001)**
0.0001
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
-0.0005
(0.0002)***
(0.0002)***
0.0001
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
URBANDP 
AV (fixed)
-0.0274
(0.0082)***
(0.0089)***
LAT
(fixed)
-0.0020
(0.0003)***
(0.0003)***
DWSLIB 0.0182
(0.0084)**
(0.0198)
DWSCORP
-
0.0172
(0.0083)**
(0.0197)
DWSRES 0.0583
(0.0089)***
(0.0199)***
DRLCATH 0.0107
(0.0045)**
(0.0042)**
DRLORTH 0.0042
(0.0077)
(0.0081)
DRLANGL -0.0047
(0.0051)
(0.0051)
DFNORD -0.0169
(0.0089)*
(0.0214)
DFSC 0.0386
(0.0029)***
(0.0026)***
OBS. 534 534 534 534 455 455 455 299 455 455 455 455
Appendix A6.19: Short Run GMM: Dependent Variable is 1GE1 and Independent Variables are EMN and EGE1
REGRESSION 1 REGRESSION 2 REGRESSION 3 REGRESSION 4
(a) Xu
strictly
exogenous
( b ) X *
predetermined
(c) X" 
endogenous
(a) Xlt
strictly
exogenous
(b) xit
predetermine
d
( ')  x*
endogenous
(a) Xlt
strictly
exogenous
(b) xM
predetermine
d
(c) XM 
endogenous
(a) X"
strictly
exogenous
(b) xit
predetermine
d
(c) Xit 
endogenous
IGE\lt_x 0.7531(0.1234)***
(0.1199)***
0.8135
(0.1230)***
(0.1445)***
0.6965
(0.1451)***
(0.1525)***
0.8993
(0.1441)***
(0.1563)***
0.6388
(0.1232)***
(0.1743)***
0.4526
(0.1574)***
(0.2283)**
0.9188
(0.1469)***
(0.1662)***
0.6125
(0.1212)***
(0.1717)***
0.4405
(0.1543)***
(0.2289)*
0.9913
(0.1688)***
(0.1864)***
0.5709
(0.1219)***
(0.1857)***
0.4193 
(0.1539)*** 
(0.2203)*
IMNit 0.0139(0.0026)***
(0.0027)***
-0.0057
(0.0031)*
(0.0032)*
0.0063
(0.0038)*
(0.0044)
-0.0014
(0.0050)
(0.0042)
0.0132
(0.0042)***
(0.0050)***
-0.0017
(0.0065)
(0.0045)
0.0175
(0.0032)***
(0.0033)***
-0.0109
(0.0045)**
(0.0048)**
0.0202
(0.0055)***
(0.0061)***
-0.0089
(0.0068)
(0.0081)
0.0239
(0.0058)***
(0.0064)***
-0.0108
(0.0075)
(0.0085)
0.0184
(0.0033)***
(0.0035)***
-0.0124
(0.0047)***
(0.0054)**
0.0204
(0.0055)***
(0.0056)***
-0.0071
(0.0068)
(0.0074)
0.0241
(0.0058)***
(0.0061)***
-0.0103
(0.0073)
(0.0081)
0.0181
(0.0034)***
(0.0036)***
-0.0137
(0.0050)***
(0.0061)**
0.0195
(0.0051)***
(0.0052)***
-0.0035
(0.0066)
(0.0069)
0.0231
(0.0055)***
(0.0053)***
-0.0108
(0.0076)
(0.0067)
EMNit 
EMNlt_ i
0.0901
(0.0518)*
(0.0493)*
-0.1282
(0.0504)**
(0.0494)***
0.1584
(0.0775)**
(0.0913)*
-0.1375
(0.0503)***
(0.0448)***
0.2503
(0.0846)***
(0.1029)**
-0.0850
(0.0701)
(0.0687)
0.1004
(0.0521)*
(0.0517)*
-0.1412
(0.0513)***
(0.0520)***
0.1577
(0.0763)**
(0.0873)*
-0.1423
(0.0498)***
(0.0439)***
0.2517
(0.0842)***
(0.0995)**
-0.0895
(0.0694)
(0.0694)
0.0950
(0.0540)*
(0.0530)*
-0.1465
(0.0531)***
(0.0543)***
0.1478
(0.0703)**
(0.0755)*
-0.1316
(0.0492)***
(0.0416)***
0.2666
(0.0829)***
(0.0843)***
-0.0900
(0.0688)
(0.0711)
EGE\it
EGE\it_x
0.0587
(0.0346)*
(0.0256)**
-0.0720
(0.0357)**
(0.0249)***
0.1006
(0.0479)**
(0.0419)**
-0.0677
(0.0370)*
(0.0264)**
0.1275
(0.0572)**
(0.0551)**
-0.0342
(0.0506)
(0.0465)
0.0560
(0.0352)
(0.0258)**
-0.0735
(0.0361)**
(0.0265)***
0.1029
(0.0478)**
(0.0433)**
-0.0658
(0.0366)*
(0.0259)**
0.1293
(0.0567)**
(0.0559)**
-0.0364
(0.0502)
(0.0468)
0.0560
(0.0363)
(0.0266)**
-0.0772
(0.0374)**
(0.0280)***
0.1124
(0.0437)**
(0.0398)***
-0.0601
(0.0350)*
(0.0240)**
0.1524
(0.0550)***
(0.0522)***
-0.0384
(0.0483)
(0.0472)
AGEU
AGEi(_x
0.0092 
(0.0049)* 
(0.0054)* 
-0.0011 
(0.0033) 
(0.0036)
0.0082
(0.0045)*
(0.0050)*
-0.0035
(0.0027)
(0.0030)
0.0081
(0.0044)*
(0.0051)
-0.0010
(0.0028)
(0.0030)
0.0100
(0.0051)*
(0.0057)*
-0.0018
(0.0034)
(0.0038)
0.0077
(0.0044)*
(0.0052)
-0.0041
(0.0028)
(0.0030)
0.0073
(0.0045)
(0.0051)
-0.0004
(0.0030)
(0.0030)
LFSTOCKit 
LFSTOCKit
•
0.2505
(0.1565)
(0.1739)
0.0726
(0.1291)
(0.1161)
0.1588
(0.2936)
(0.3475)
-0.1505
(0.1747)
(0.1589)
-0.2972
(0.3870)
(0.4391)
0.2316
(0.3129)
(0.3589)
ECACRAit
ECACRAit_x
UNEMa
UNEMit_x
INACTIVE"
INACTIVEit
ECACRFit
ECACRFit_x
OBS. 400 392 392 392
SARGAN TEST 
(p-value)
12.26
(0.1989)
26.20 
(0.0709) .
18.09
(0.1541)
10.67
(0.2988)
49.79
(0.0306)
32.29
(0.0547)
9.54
(0.3888)
48.36
(0.0412)
31.29
(0.0690)
9.29
(0.4107)
59.13
(0.0331)
35.24
(0.0840)
AR(1)TEST
(p-value)
-5.85
(0.0000)
-4.42
(0.0000)
-6.11
(0.0000)
-4.29
(0.0000)
-4.82
(0.0000)
-4.09
(0.0000)
-5.64
(0.0000)
-3.82
(0.0001)
-5.39
(0.0000)
-3.58
(0.0003)
-3.44
(0.0006)
-2.32
(0.0202)
-5.72
(0.0000)
-3.77
(0.0002)
-5.35
(0.0000)
-3.47
(0.0005)
-3.40
(0.0007)
-2.24
(0.0254)
-5.57
(0.0000)
-3.72
(0.0002)
-5.33
(0.0000)
-3.37
(0.0008)
-3.61
(0.0003)
-2.51
(0.0120)
AR(2) TEST 
(p-value)
-1.19
(0.2339)
-0.68
(0.4977)
-1.38
(0.1671)
-0.79
(0.4289)
-1.14
(0.2562)
-0.65
(0.5188)
-1.45
(0.1480)
-0.85
(0.3941)
-1.35
(0.1783)
-0.83
(0.4078)
-0.89
(0.3725)
-0.60
(0.5470)
-1.28
(0.2018)
-0.74
(0.4573)
-1.23
(0.2193)
-0.73
(0.4679)
-0.78
(0.4356)
-0.51
(0.6100)
-1.17
(0.2428)
-0.68
(0.4996)
-1.11
(0.2680)
-0.63
(0.5274)
-0.96
(0.3361)
-0.69
(0.4912)
REGRESSION 5 REGRESSION 6 REGRESSION 7
(a) Xu
strictly
exogenous
( b ) X *
predetermined
( 0  X„ 
endogenous
(a) Xu
strictly
exogenous
(b) x it
predetermine
d
endogenous
(a) X„ 
strictly 
exogenous
predetermine
d
(O x lt
endogenous
ig e \,,a 0.6263(0.1278)***
(0.1423)***
0.4689
(0.1113)***
(0.1382)***
0.5554
(0.1392)***
(0.1788)***
0.7371
(0.1434)***
(0.1626)***
0.3899
(0.0977)***
(0.1225)***
0.4300
(0.1255)***
(0.1537)***
0.7274
(0.1365)***
(0.1499)***
0.5741
(0.1072)***
(0.1369)***
0.4963
(0.1341)***
(0.1656)***
IMNU
IM N ,,-,
0.0163
(0.0040)***
(0.0047)***
-0.0106
(0.0045)**
(0.0056)*
0.0054
(0.0062)
(0.0074)
0.0016
(0.0062)
(0.0081)
0.0075
(0.0077)
(0.0096)
-0.0037
(0.0076)
(0.0108)
0.0168 
(0.0043)** ♦ 
(0.0049)*** 
-0.0130 
(0.0048)*** 
(0.0060)**
0.0127
(0.0056)**
(0.0060)**
-0.0042
(0.0054)
(0.0059)
0.0138
(0.0071)*
(0.0076)*
-0.0083
(0.0070)
(0.0080)
0.0157
(0.0042)***
(0.0048)***
-0.0128
(0.0047)***
(0.0055)**
0.0095
(0.0058)
(0.0063)
-0.0021
(0.0055)
(0.0062)
0.0109
(0.0071)
(0.0081)
-0.0050
(0.0069)
(0.0076)
EMNU
EMN
0.0780
(0.0520)
(0.0563)
-0.1182
(0.0473)**
(0.0534)**
0.0277 .
(0.0751)
(0.0979)
-0.0978
(0.0513)*
(0.0503)*
0.0391
(0.0899)
(0.1158)
-0.1689
(0.0679)**
(0.0810)**
0.0851
(0.0548)
(0.0541)
-0.1214
(0.0504)**
(0.0560)**
0.0866
(0.0654)
(0.0697)
-0.1057
(0.0486)**
(0.0474)**
0.1129
(0.0841)
(0.0960)
-0.1273
(0.0628)**
(0.0676)*
0.0865
(0.0539)
(0.0533)
-0.1267
(0.0498)**
(0.0588)**
0.0312
(0.0669)
(0.0618)
-0.0900
(0.0506)*
(0.0508)*
-0.0036
(0.0846)
(0.0849)
-0.1188
(0.0635)*
(0.0739)
EGEl„
EGE1ijA
0.0456
(0.0318)
(0.0269)*
-0.0655
(0.0317)**
(0.0263)**
0.0765
(0.0448)*.
(0.0527)
-0.0659
(0.0351)*.
(0.0282)**
0.0504
(0.0618)
(0.0590)
-0.1297
(0.0537)**
(0.0520)**
0.0511
(0.0337)
(0.0287)*
-0.0664
(0.0336)**
(0.0282)**
0.0702
(0.0404)*
(0.0406)*
-0.0429
(0.0319)
(0.0205)**
0.0439
(0.0559)
(0.0526)
-0.0587
(0.0464)
(0.0388)
0.0525
(0.0331)
(0.0272)*
-0.0715
(0.0332)**
(0.0300)**
0.0524
(0.0424)
(0.0369)
-0.0511
(0.0342)
(0.0252)**
0.0016
(0.0578)
(0.0601)
-0.0592
(0.0470)
(0.0480)
a g e „
AGE,,_x
0.0080
(0.0049)*
(0.0057)
-0.0011
(0.0030)
0.0013
(0.0050)
(0.0061)
-0.0070
(0.0027)**
0.0027
(0.0055)
(0.0070)
-0.0033
(0.0031)
0.0083
(0.0051)
(0.0055)
-0.0021
(0.0032)
0.0050
(0.0046)
(0.0053)
-0.0059
(0.0026)**
0.0088
(0.0054)
(0.0068)
-0.0005
(0.0031)
0.0108
(0.0053)**
(0.0056)*
-0.0022
(0.0032)
0.0080
(0.0055)
(0.0062)
-0.0071
(0.0029)**
0.0113
(0.0063)*
(0.0075)
-0.0030
(0.0032)
(0.0036) (0.0032)** (0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0031)* (0.0035) (0.0037) (0.0035)** (0.0035)
LFSTOCKu 
LFSTOCKit
ECACRAit
ECACRA
-0.0078
(0.0022)***
(0.0021)***
-0.0046
(0.0023)**
(0.0021)**
-0.0051
(0.0035) .
(0.0036)
-0.0067
(0.0032)**
(0.0032)**
-0.0072
(0.0042)*
(0.0039)*
-0.0082
(0.0046)*
(0.0050)
UNEMit 
UNEMit_ i
-0.0865
(0.2213)
(0.1836)
-0.3702
(0.2206)*
(0.2556)
0.1723
(0.3225)
(0.3195)
0.2074
(0.2431)
(0.2703)
0.2386
(0.3890)
(0.3674)
0.8445
(0.3645)**
(0.2979)***
INACTIVElt 
INACTIVEit
-0.4672
(0.1766)***
(0.2104)**
0.0567
(0.1394)
(0.1236)
-0.6287
(0.3249)*
(0.3580)*
0.2356
(0.1733)
(0.1577)
-0.8120
(0.4393)*
(0.5851)
-0.3325
(0.3420)
(0.3591)
ECACRFit
ECACRFit_x
-0.0048
(0.0020)**
(0.0020)**
-0.0056
(0.0021)***
(0.0020)***
-0.0043
(0.0026)
(0.0025)*
-0.0059
(0.0026)**
(0.0030)**
-0.0066
(0.0034)**
(0.0032)**
-0.0033
(0.0040)
(0.0043)
-0.0053
(0.0019)***
(0.0021)**
-0.0052
(0.0020)**
(0.0019)***
-0.0062
(0.0033)*
(0.0029)**
-0.0036
(0.0028)
(0.0030)
-0.0132
(0.0047)***
(0.0051)**
-0.0062
(0.0041)
(0.0044)
OBS. 325 325 325
SARGAN TEST 
(p-value)
9.12
(0.4264)
58.44
(0.0378)
27.06
(0.3527)
8.71
(0.4644)
86.75
(0.0007)
36.89
(0.1491)
7.32
(0.6041)
64.35
(0.0696)
32.70
(0.2899)
AR(1)TEST
(p-value)
-4.93
(0.0000)
-3.51
(0.0005)
-4.79
(0.0000)
-3.36
(0.0008)
-4.09
(0.0000)
-2.92
(0.0035)
-5.03
(0.0000)
-3.56
(0.0004)
-4.93
(0.0000)
-3.22
(0.0013)
-4.02
(0.0001)
-3.01
(0.0026)
-5.20
(0.0000)
-3.79
(0.0002)
-5.28
(0.0000)
-3.44
(0.0006)
-2.99
(0.0028)
-2.31
(0.0210)
AR(2) TEST 
(p-value)
-0.87
(0.3866)
-0.50
(0.6168)
-1.46
(0.1441)
-0.77
(0.4422)
-1.36
(0.1723)
-0.76
(0.4443)
-0.67
(0.5056)
-0.40
(0.6876)
-1.66
(0.0960)
-0.92
(0.3583)
-1.82
(0.0692)
-1.15
(0.2493)
-0.65
(0.5181)
-0.39
(0.6996)
-0.75
(0.4558)
-0.43
(0.6705)
-1.36
(0.1752)
-0.95
(0.3415)
Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (*), (**) and (***) denote the significance of the White (1980) estimator. SARGAN TEST is the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions (Sargan,
1958). AR(1)TEST and AR(2) TEST are the Arellano-Bond test for the first and the second-order autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals, respectively. Time dummies and a constant are included.
Appendix A6.20: Short Run GMM: Dependent Variable is IGE1 and Independent Variables are AMN and AGE1
REGRESSION 1 REGRESSION 2 REGRESSION 3 REGRESSION 4 .
w * *
strictly
exogenous
(b) X, 
predetermined
(c) X, 
endogenous
(a) Xa
strictly
exogenous
(b) x ,
predetermine
d
(c) X, 
endogenous
(a) * „
strictly
exogenous
(b) x,
predetermine
d
(c) X, 
endogenous
(*) x,
strictly
exogenous
(b) X„
predetermine
d
(c)
endogenous
ig e \ u_x 0.7531(0.1234)***
(0.1199)***
0.8135 
(0 1230)*** 
(0.1445)***
0.6965
(0.1451)***
(0.1525)***
0.6006
(0.1289)***
(0.1606)***
0.2682
(0.1242)**
(0.1669)
0.2967
(0.1709)*
(0.1754)*
0.6086
(0.1292)***
(0.1702)***
0.2600
(0.1222)**
(0.1690)
0.2828
(0.1689)*
(0.1777)
0.6433
(0.1426)***
(0.1838)***
0.2802
(0.1313)**
(0.1975)
0.2909
(0.1798)
(0.2479)
IMN,
^ V i
0.0139
(0.0026)***
(0.0027)***
-0.0057
(0.0031)*
(0.0032)*
0.0063
(0.0038)*
(0.0044)
-0.0014
(0.0050)
(0.0042)
0.0132
(0.0042)***
(0.0050)***
-0.0017
(0.0065)
(0.0045)
0.0124
(0.0025)***
(0.0026)***
-0.0025
(0.0033)
(0.0034)
0.0066
(0.0029)**
(0.0032)**
0.0025
(0.0037)
(0.0042)
0.0094
(0.0039)**
(0.0050)*
0.0028
(0.0042)
(0.0047)
0.0129
(0.0025)***
(0.0027)***
-0.0033
(0.0033)
(0.0036)
0.0073
(0.0029)**
(0.0030)**
0.0024
(0.0037)
(0.0043)
0.0097
(0.0039)**
(0.0048)**
0.0032
(0.0041)
(0.0048)
0.0128
(0.0026)***
(0.0027)***
-0.0040
(0.0037)
(0.0042)
0.0067
(0.0031)**
(0.0032)**
0.0023
(0.0042)
(0.0051)
0.0109
(0.0043)**
(0.0050)**
0.0006
(0.0048)
(0.0064)
AMN,  
AMNit_x
0.0128
(0.0066)*
(0.0053)**
-0.0018
(0.0084)
(0.0060)
0.0179
(0.0097)*
(0.0117)
0.0009
(0.0126)
(0.0137)
0.0099
(0.0110)
(0.0115)
0.0160
(0.0146)
(0.0153)
0.0133
(0.0067)**
(0.0053)**
-0.0010
(0.0084)
(0.0057)
0.0173
(0.0096)*
(0.0114)
0.0020
(0.0125)
(0.0142)
0.0114
(0.0110)
(0.0113)
0.0171
(0.0145)
(0.0158)
0.0133
(0.0068)*
(0.0054)**
-0.0016
(0.0086)***
(0.0058)
0.0120
(0.0100)
(0.0109)
-0.0007
(0.0127)
(0.0144)
0.0058
(0.0125)
(0.0121)
0.0186
(0.0151)
(0.0171)
AGE\it
AGE\it_x
0.1297
(0.4545)
(0.4278)
1.3248
(0.6237)**
(0.5281)**
2.1196
(0.9680)**
(1.2177)*
2.7477
(0.9932)***
(1.0891)**
2.2061
(1.2600)*
(1.4654)
1.6044
(1.5886)
(1.5294)
0.0732
(0.4576)
(0.4010)
1.3626
(0.6237)**
(0.5238)***
1.9597
(0.9747)**
(1.1677)*
2.8579
(0.9689)***
(1.0931)***
2.1319
(1.2785)*
(1.4602)
1.5218
(1.5780)
(1.4669)
0.0633
(0.4655)
(0.4066)
1.3366
(0.6354)**
(0.5247)**
2.9557
(0.9795)***
(1.4496)**
2.4976
(1.0276)**
(1.1217)**
3.2514
(1.2482)***
(1.8339)*
1.8898
(1.5999)
(1.5306)
AGE,
AGElt_x
0.0095
(0.0046)**
(0.0049)*
-0.0009
(0.0030)
(0.0030)
0.0058
(0.0043)
(0.0050)
-0.0010
(0.0027)
(0.0026)
0.0061
(0.0044)
(0.0048)
-0.0004
(0.0027)
(0.0026)
0.0099 
(0.0048)** 
(0.0053)* 
-0.0011 
(0.0031) 
(0.0031)
0.4100
(0.2582)
(0.3006)
-0.2424
(0.1920)
(0.2153)
0.7367
(0.3069)**
(0.4008)*
0.1065
(0.3435)
(0.3651)
LFSTOCK,
LFSTOCKit_x
0.0847
(0.1393)
(0.1655)
0.0177
(0.1187)
(0.1009)
0.0064
(0.0046)
(0.0058)
-0.0020
(0.0029)
(0.0029)
0.0079
(0.0050)
(0.0060)
-0.0021
(0.0032)
(0.0031)
ECACRA,
ECACRAit_x
UNEM,
UNEMit_x
INACTIVE,
INACTIVE
ECACRFit
ECACRFlt_x
OBS. 400 348 348 348
SARGAN TEST 
(p-value)
12.26
(0.1989)
26.20
(0.0709)
18.09
(0.1541)
14.06
(0.1200)
49.74
(0.0309)
33.77
(0.0383)
13.14
(0.1562)
50.84
(0.0244)
35.08
(0.0277)
12.37
(0.1935)
49.17
(0.1784)
25.33
(0.4440)
AR(1)TEST
(p-value)
-5.85
(0.0000)
-4.42
(0.0000)
-6.11
(0.0000)
-4.29
(0.0000)
-4.82
(0.0000)
-4.09
(0.0000)
-4.33
(0.0000)
-2.96
(0.0031)
-2.07
(0.0388)
-1.62
(0.1054)
-1.70
(0.0882)
-1.83
(0.0676)
-4.38
(0.0000)
-2.86
(0.0043)
-2.03
(0.0427)
-1.57
(0.1172)
-1.67
(0.0941)
-1.78
(0.0743)
-4.40
(0.0000)
-2.95
(0.0032)
-2.18
(0.0289)
-1.60
(0.1105)
-0.94
(0.3487)
-0.80
(0.4264)
AR(2) TEST 
(p-value)
-1.19
(0.2339)
-0.68
(0.4977)
-1.38
(0.1671)
-0.79.
(0.4289)
-1.14
(0.2562)
-0.65
(0.5188)
-1.35
(0.1774)
-0.77
(0.4387)
-1.42
(0.1561)
-0.85
(0.3977)
-1.13
(0.2598)
-0.74
(0.4583)
-1.21
(0.2252)
-0.69
(0.4904)
-1.40
(0.1602)
-0.82
(0.4097)
-0.95
(0.3431)
-0.64
(0.5222)
-1.11
(0.2653)
-0.65
(0.5168)
-0.77
(0.4427)
-0.49
(0.6216)
-0.26
(0.7980)
-0.19
(0.8455)
REGRESSION 5 REGRESSION 6 REGRESSION 7
(a) Xu
strictly
exogenous
(b) X ,
predetermined
(c) Xu 
endogenous
(a) Xu
strictly
exogenous
(b) xit
predetermine
d
(O xit
endogenous
(a) X,
strictly
exogenous
(b)
predetermine
d
(c) X 
endogenous
0.4541
(0.1313)***
(0.1622)***
0.2664
(0.1133)**
(0.1205)**
0.2386
(0.1440)*
(0.1529)
0.5480
(0.1410)***
(0.1762)***
0.2557
(0.1036)**
(0.0972)***
0.1426
(0.1262)
(0.1458)
0.5627
(0.1378)***
(0.1673)***
0.3869
(0.1064)***
(0.0996)***
0.3719
(0.1248)***
(0.1146)***
IMN„
™ V ,
0.0115
(0.0031)***
(0.0029)***
-0.0052
(0.0035)
(0.0038)
0.0054
(0.0034)
(0.0032)*
-0.0033
(0.0036)
(0.0042)
0.0043
(0.0038)
(0.0037)
-0.0054
(0.0044)
(0.0050)
0.0121
(0.0033)***
(0.0033)***
-0.0068
(0.0038)*
(0.0042)
0.0077
(0.0035)**
(0.0037)**
-0.0041
(0.0035)
(0.0038)
0.0064
(0.0039)
(0.0046)
-0.0020
(0.0041)
(0.0043)
0.0104
(0.0032)***
(0.0031)***
-0.0067
(0.0038)*
(0.0042)
0.0061
(0.0035)*
(0.0032)*
-0.0042
(0.0040)
(0.0046)
0.0062
(0.0038)
(0.0037)*
-0.0047
(0.0049)
(0.0053)
AMN„
AAfNij-i
0.0092
(0.0064)
(0.0048)*
-0.0010
(0.0079)
(0.0055)
0.0048
(0.0089)
(0.0097)
0.0070
(0.0113)
(0.0128)
-0.0087
(0.0116)
(0.0113)
0.0171
(0.0130)
(0.0142)
0.0097
(0.0068)
(0.0053)*
-0.0032
(0.0086)
(0.0061)
0.0094
(0.0085)
(0.0094)
-0.0004
(0.0121)
(0.0155)
0.0032
(0.0115)
(0.0123)
0.0138
(0.0150)
(0.0216)
0.0083
(0.0068)
(0.0050)*
-0.0025
(0.0083)
(0.0058)
0.0032
(0.0093)
(0.0107)
-0.0011
(0.0114)
(0.0125)
-0.0054
(0.0124)
(0.0121)
0.0139
(0.0136)
(0.0152)
AGE 1„ 
AGEl,,_t
-0.0753
(0.4481)
(0.3143)
1.2372
(0.5816)**
(0.5570)**
0.7177
(0.8543)
(1.1031)
2.3077
(0.8055)***
(0.7294)***
1.3473
(1.0962)
(1.3324)
1.9888
(1.1065)*
(1.2050)*
-0.0508
(0.4734)
(0.3498)
1.3452
(0.6129)**
(0.5518)**
0.6524
(0.7649)
(0.8520)
2.9948
(0.7730)***
(0.8556)***
1.4672
(0.9530)
(1.0831)
3.4025
(1.0030)***
(1.2075)***
-0.1134
(0.4727)
(0.3260)
1.1975
(0.6189)*
(0.5167)**
0.2461
(0.8587)
(0.8394)
2.2348
(0.8347)***
(0.7560)***
0.9953
(1.0069)
(0.9492)
1.7921
(1.0027)*
(0.9396)*
AGE„
a g e ,,_x
0.0098
(0.0050)**
(0.0062)
-0.0012
(0.0029)
0.0081
(0.0046)*
(0.0060)
-0.0022
(0.0027)
0.0062
(0.0049)
(0.0056)
-0.0017
(0.0028)
0.0097
(0.0052)*
(0.0057)*
-0.0019
(0.0031)
0.0078
(0.0048)
(0.0051)
-0.0027
(0.0027)
0.0053
(0.0051)
(0.0053)
-0.0024
(0.0028)
0.0112 
(0.0054)** 
(0.0062)* 
-0.0019 
(0.0031)
0.0093
(0.0054)*
(0.0057)
-0.0032
(0.0029)
0.0096
(0.0057)*
(0.0061)
-0.0031
(0.0031)
(0.0032) (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0036)
LFSTOCK„ 
LFSTOCKit_x
ECACRA"
ECACRAlt_x
-0.0073 
(0.0021)*** 
(0.0018)*** 
-0.0041 
(0.0024)* 
(0.0023)*
-0.0065
(0.0033)*
(0.0035)*
-0.0076
(0.0039)**
(0.0047)
-0.0065
(0.0039)*
(0.0035)*
-0.0112
(0.0048)**
(0.0052)**
UNEMU
UNEMit_x
-0.1851
(0.2218)
(0.1782)
-0.4068
(0.2092)*
(0.2479)
-0.1464
(0.3262)
(0.4192)
-0.2677
(0.2208)
(0.3191)
-0.0605
(0.3947)
(0.5950)
-0.5017
(0.3643)
(0.4883)
INACTIVE it 
INACTIVE
-0.2821
(0.1768)
(0.1998)
0.1617
(0.1413)
(0.1203)
-0.1607
(0.3121)
(0.2956)
0.4753
(0.1726)***
(0.2005)**
-0.3470
(0.3630)
(0.4030)
0.3675
(0.3276)
(0.3413)
ECACRFU
ECACRFit_x
-0.0050
(0.0019)**
(0.0019)***
-0.0048
(0.0021)**
(0.0021)**
-0.0049
(0.0032)
(0.0036)
-0.0059
(0.0033)*
(0.0038)
-0.0024
(0.0039)
(0.0042)
-0.0087
(0.0044)**
(0.0049)*
-0.0050
(0.0020)**
(0.0019)***
-0.0045
(0.0021)**
(0.0021)**
-0.0069
(0.0034)**
(0.0035)**
-0.0065
(0.0033)**
(0.0037)*
-0.0064
(0.0046)
(0.0041)
-0.0065
(0.0044)
(0.0046)
OBS. 285 285 285
SARGAN TEST 
(p-value)
11.12
(0.2675)
44.72
(0.3185)
25.53
(0.4328)
10.39
(0.3201)
69.59
(0.0281)
42.02
(0.0560)
8.60
(0.4746)
53.97
(0.2900)
34.56
(0.2194)
AR(1)TEST
(p-value)
-3.95
(0.0001)
-2.80
(0.0051)
-3.31
(0.0009)
-2.65
(0.0081)
-2.93
(0.0034)
-2.62
(0.0089)
-4.07
(0.0000)
-2.88
(0.0039)
-3.07
(0.0021)
-2.54
J0.0112)
-1.72
(0.0846)
-1.38
(0.1683)
-4.42
(0.0000)
-3.21
(0.0013)
-4.13
(0.0000)
-3.37
(0.0008)
-3.43
(0.0006)
-3.04
(0.0024)
AR(2) TEST 
(p-value)
-1.00
(0.3196)
-0.54
(0.5877)
-1.71
(0.0866)
-0.90
(0.3661)
-1.98
(0.0478)
-1.15
(0.2488)
-0.62
(0.5348)
-0.36
(0.7177)
r - i' s t ..............
(0.1307)
-0.83
(0.4061)
-1.81
(0.0703)
-1.05
(0.2932)
-0.64
(0.5217)
-0.37
(0.7080)
-1.08
(0.2820)
-0.60
(0.5505)
-1.27
(0.2034)
-0.76
(0.4488)
Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (*), (**) and (***) denote the significance o f the White (1980) estimator. SARGAN TEST is the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions (Sargan,
1958). AR(1) TEST and AR(2) TEST are the Arellano-Bond test for the first and the second-order autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals, respectively. Time dummies and a constant are included.
Appendix A6.21: Short Run GMM: Dependent Variable is NGE1 and Independent Variables are EMN and EGE1
REGRESSION 1 REGRESSION 2 REGRESSION 3 REGRESSION 4
(a) Xu
strictly
exogenous
(b) x *
predetermined
(c) Xit 
endogenous
(a) Xu
strictly
exogenous
(b) X ,
predetermine
d
(c) Xit 
endogenous
(a) X ,
strictly
exogenous
(b) xl(
predetermine
d
(c) Xu 
endogenous
(a) Xit
strictly
exogenous
(b) xit
predetermine
d
(c) Xu 
endogenous
N G E l^ 0.7220(0.1354)***
(0.1248)***
0.8090
(0.1496)***
(0.1637)***
0.8863
(0.1751)***
(0.1895)***
0.8326
(0.1602)***
(0.1553)***
0.4428
(0.1134)***
(0.1089)***
0.4213
(0.1616)***
(0.2213)*
0.8360
(0.1600)***
(0.1553)***
0.4375
(0.1134)***
(0.1064)***
0.4019
(0.1615)**
(0.2165)*
0.5717
(0.1233)***
(0.1644)***
0.3222
(0.0958)***
(0.1240)***
0.4142
(0.1248)***
(0.1246)***
NMNit 
NMNit_ i
0.0061
(0.0022)***
(0.0031)*
-0.0009
(0.0025)
(0.0029)
-0.0023
(0.0038)
(0.0051)
-0.0055
(0.0061)
(0.0051)
0.0038
(0.0061)
(0.0087)
-0.0197
(0.0110)*
(0.0087)**
0.0091
(0.0026)***
(0.0037)**
-0.0045
(0.0034)
(0.0045)
0.0127
(0.0050)**
(0.0052)**
-0.0057
(0.0058)
(0.0065)
0.0147
(0.0070)**
(0.0064)**
-0.0076
(0.0069)
(0.0078)
0.0090
(0.0027)***
(0.0038)**
-0.0048
(0.0034)
(0.0046)
0.0143
(0.0049)***
(0.0048)***
-0.0072
(0.0056)
(0.0059)
0.0169
(0.0068)**
(0.0058)***
-0.0087
(0.0066)
(0.0069)
0.0094
(0.0030)***
(0.0045)**
-0.0066
(0.0030)**
(0.0043)
0.0190
(0.0048)***
(0.0063)***
-0.0134
(0.0043)***
(0.0054)**
0.0171
(0.0056)***
(0.0066)**
-0.0140
(0.0054)**
(0.0061)**
EMNit 
EMN„. i
0.0999
(0.0579)*
(0.0618)
-0.1644
(0.0605)***
(0.0555)***
0.1921
(0.0788)**
(0.0943)**
-0.1322
(0.0620)**
(0.0577)**
0.2511
(0.1074)**
(0.1097)**
-0.1241
(0.0894)
(0.1015)
0.0974
(0.0579)*
(0.0608)
-0.1670
(0.0611)***
(0.0570)***
0.2049
(0.0784)***
(0.0931)**
-0.1469
(0.0618)**
(0.0559)***
0.2688
(0.1084)**
(0.1089)**
-0.1400
(0.0888)
(0.0929)
0.1371
(0.0523)***
(0.0531)**
-0.1621
(0.0525)***
(0.0595)***
0.2248
(0.0682)***
(0.0766)***
-0.2169
(0.0568)***
(0.0627)***
0.2318
(0.0840)***
(0.0850)***
-0.2059
(0.0738)***
(0.0684)***
EGE\it
EGE\ll_l
0.0388
(0.0405)
(0.0299)
-0.0855
(0.0422)**
(0.0302)***
0.1078
(0.0516)**
(0.0414)***
-0.0444
(0.0437)
(0.0295)
0.1162
(0.0723)
(0.0635)*
-0.0515
(0.0614)
(0.0640)
0.0293
(0.0413)
(0.0286)
-0.0863
(0.0423)**
(0.0301)***
0.1045
(0.0528)**
(0.0413)**
-0.0467
(0.0438)
(0.0288)
0.1131
(0.0731)
(0.0627)*
-0.0528
(0.0617)
(0.0627)
0.0485
(0.0335)
(0.0253)*
-0.0851
(0.0343)**
(0.0286)***
0.0493
(0.0456)
(0.0374)
-0.0675
(0.0372)*
(0.0288)**
0.0602
(0.0602)
(0.0573)
-0.0754
(0.0569)
(0.0456)*
AGE„
*GEit_ i
0.0047
(0.0057)
(0.0058)
0.0033
(0.0040)
(0.0031)
0.0056
(0.0052)
(0.0058)
-0.0003
(0.0032)
(0.0027)
0.0063
(0.0057)
(0.0063)
0.0005
(0.0034)
(0.0029)
0.0092
(0.0052)*
(0.0058)
0.0026
(0.0033)
(0.0027)
0.0115
(0.0052)**
(0.0059)*
-0.0013
(0.0028)
(0.0027)
0.0130
(0.0059)**
(0.0064)**
0.0004
(0.0031)
(0.0028)
ECACRFU
ECACRFil_l
-0.0026
(0.0020)
(0.0020)
-0.0073
(0.0021)***
(0.0020)***
-0.0025
(0.0030)
(0.0026)
-0.0082
(0.0029)***
(0.0032)**
-0.0049
(0.0036)
(0.0034)
-0.0036
(0.0046)
(0.0040)
OBS. 400 392 392 325
SARGAN TEST 
(p-value)
10.84
(0.2871)
16.09
(0.5175)
9.96
(0.6974)
8.88
(0.4484)
43.72
(0.1005)
38.10
(0.0126)
8.68
(0.4674)
42.85
(0.1170)
37.38
(0.0152)
4.75
(0.8557)
49.94
(0.1597)
26.57
(0.3776)
AR(1) TEST 
(p-value)
-5.57
(0.0000)
-4.78
(0.0000)
-5.32
(0.0000)
-4.46-
(0.0000)
-5.16
(0.0000)
-4.48
(0.0000)
-5.28
(0.0000)
-4.60
(0.0000)
-5.07
(0.0000)
-4.46
(0.0000)
-3.40
(0.0007)
-2.56
(0.0105)
-5.32
(0.0000)
-4.58
(0.0000)
-5.10
(0.0000)
-4.37
(0.0000)
-3.30
(0.0010)
-2.59
(0.0095)
-5.12
(0.0000)
-3.50
(0.0005)
-5.24
(0.0000)
-3.35
(0.0004)
-4.40
(0.0010)
-3.79
(0.0002)
AR(2) TEST 
(p-value)
-1.79
(0.0739)
-1.07
(0.2851)
-1.72
(0.0848)
-1.07
(0.2836)
-1.44
(0.1500)
-0.99
(0.3234)
-2.10
(0.0355)
-1.31
(0.1895)
-2.95
(0.0032)
-1.65
(0.0988)
-2.53
(0.0113)
-1.54
(0.1244)
-2.04
(0.0411)
-1.26
(0.2077)
-2.91
(0.0036)
-1.60
(0.1087)
-2.46
(0.0140)
-1.47
(0.1429)
-1.19
(0.2356)
-0.73
(0.4633)
-0.76
(0.4468)
-0.57
(0.5656)
-0.49
(0.6217)
-0.37
(0.7088)
Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (*), (**) and (***) denote the significance o f the White (1980) estimator. SARGAN TEST is the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions (Sargan, 
1958). AR(1) TEST and AR(2) TEST are the Arellano-Bond test for the first and the second-order autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals, respectively. Time dummies and a constant are included.
Appendix A6.22; Short Run GMM: Dependent Variable is NGE1 and Independent Variables are AMN and AGE1
REGRESSION 1 REGRESSION 2 REGRESSION 3 REGRESSION 4
(a) Xit
strictly
exogenous
(b) Xit
predetermined
(c) Xu 
endogenous
(a) Xu
strictly
exogenous
(b)
predetermine
d
(c) Xi( 
endogenous
(a) Xu
strictly
exogenous
(b) xit
predetermine
d
(c) X„ 
endogenous
(a) Xit
strictly
exogenous
(b) xit
predetermine
d
(c) XM 
endogenous
N G E li^ 0.7220(0.1354)***
(0.1248)***
0.8090
(0.1496)***
(0.1637)***
0.8863
(0.1751)***
(0.1895)***
0.5620
(0.1356)***
(0.1337)***
0.3766
(0.1297)***
(0.1362)***
0.4541
(0.1873)**
(0.2123)**
0.5617
(0.1354)***
(0.1306)***
0.3354
(0.1281)***
(0.1387)**
0.4501
(0.1868)**
(0.2120)**
0.3901
(0.1188)***
(0.1419)***
0.1739
(0.1109)
(0.1283)
0.1569
(0.1572)
(0.1701)
NMNit
NMNit_x
0.0061
(0.0022)***
(0.0031)*
-0.0009
(0.0025)
(0.0029)
-0.0023
(0.0038)
(0.0051)
-0.0055
(0.0061)
(0.0051)
0.0038
(0.0061)
(0.0087)
-0.0197
(0.0110)*
(0.0087)**
0.0053
(0.0022)**
(0.0029)*
0.0012
(0.0026)
(0.0030)
0.0001
(0.0027)
(0.0025)
0.0017
(0.0033)
(0.0031)
0.0001
(0.0036)
(0.0037)
0.0009
(0.0039)
(0.0036)
0.0049
(0.0022)**
(0.0029)*
0.0012
(0.0026)
(0.0030)
0.0001
(0.0027)
(0.0024)
0.0022
(0.0033)
(0.0032)
-0.0005
(0.0037)
(0.0036)
0.0015
(0.0040)
(0.0036)
0.0037
(0.0024)
(0.0029)
-0.0007
(0.0024)
(0.0027)
-0.0017
(0.0026)
(0.0028)
-0.0005
(0.0026)
(0.0032)
-0.0020
(0.0029)
(0.0028)
-0.0016
(0.0032)
(0.0033)
AMNit 
AMN,M
0.0117
(0.0082)
(0.0064)*
0.0005
(0.0103)
(0.0078)
0.0117
(0.0121)
(0.0117)
0.0125
(0.0151)
(0.0151)
0.0060
(0.0146)
(0.0125)
0.0239
(0.0176)
(0.0198)
0.0129
(0.0082)
(0.0065)**
0.0023
(0.0104)
(0.0076)
0.0110
(0.0119)
(0.0118)
0.0120
(0.0148)
(0.0156)
0.0082
(0.0148)
(0.0127)
0.0219
(0.0175)
(0.0201)
0.0108
(0.0071)
(0.0059)*
0.0036
(0.0086)
(0.0068)
0.0016
(0.0091)
(0.0098)
0.0142
(0.0117)
(0.0124)
-0.0036
(0.0115)
(0.0110)
0.0211
(0.0134)
(0.0147)
AGE\it
AGElit_x
-0.1072
(0.5661)
(0.6053)
1.0688
(0.7653)
(0.6399)*
1.9254
(1.2142)
(1.4418)
1.2950
(1.2342)
(1.1259)
1.9692
(1.6500)
(1.5675)
0.5630
(1.7321)
(1.4176)
-0.1333
(0.5681)
(0.6254)
0.9577
(0.7674)
(0.6197)
2.0079
(1.2230)
(1.4962)
1.5347
(1.1868)
(1.1357)
1.9063
(1.6575)
(1.5520)
0.4004
(1.7324)
(1.4069)
-0.4050
(0.4975)
(0.4050)
0.5978
(0.6392)
(0.4864)
1.0425
(0.8810)
(1.0078)
1.0709
(0.8388)
(0.8552)
1.5821
(1.2145)
(1.1495)
0.3965
(1.1450)
(1.0166)
a g e u
AGElt_x
0.0023
(0.0057)
(0.0061)
0.0048
(0.0038)
(0.0029)
-0.0002
(0.0053)
(0.0060)
0.0057
(0.0035)
(0.0027)**
-0.0001
(0.0057)
(0.0061)
0.0063
(0.0038)*
(0.0027)**
0.0064
(0.0054)
(0.0070)
0.0049
(0.0033)
(0.0026)*
0.0044
(0.0051)
(0.0066)
0.0051
(0.0030)*
(0.0026)*
0.0037
(0.0057)
(0.0061)
0.0050
(0.0031)
(0.0028)*
ECACRFit
ECACRFit_x
-0.0028
(0.0020)
(0.0018)
-0.0072
(0.0022)***
(0.0022)***
-0.0025
(0.0037)
(0.0032)
-0.0104
(0.0037)***
(0.0040)***
-0.0044
(0.0044)
(0.0038)
-0.0110
(0.0053)**
(0.0049)**
OBS. 400 348 348 285
SARGAN TEST 
(p-value)
10.84
(0.2871)
16.09
(0.5175)
9.96
(0.6974)
13.92
(0.1251)
33.86
(0.4257)
26.93
(0.1733)
13.80
(0.1297)
35.78
(0.3391)
27.57
(0.1527)
8.31
(0.5033)
46.73
(0.2486)
33.74
(0.1135)
AR(1)TEST
(p-value)
-5.57
(0.0000)
-4.78
(0.0000)
-5.32
(0.0000)
-4.46
(0.0000)
-5.16
(0.0000)
-4.48
(0.0000)
-4.60
(0.0000)
-4.16
(0.0000)
-3.88
(0.0001)
-3.21
(0.0013)
-3.19
(0.0014)
-2.71
(0.0067)
-4.62
(0.0000)
-4.23
(0.0000)
-3.69
(0.0002)
-3.08
(0.0021)
-3.19
(0.0014)
-2.74
(0.0061)
-4.26
(0.0000)
-3.59
(0.0003)
-3.60
(0.0003)
-3.52
(0.0004)
-2.57
(0.0101)
-2.69
(0.0072)
AR(2) TEST 
(p-value)
-1.79
(0.0739)
-1.07
(0.2851)
-1.72
(0.0848)
-1.07
(0.2836)
-1.44
(0.1500)
-0.99
(0.3234)
-2.09
(0.0363)
-1.27
(0.2036)
-2.02
(0.0429)
-1.24
(0.2142)
-1.78
(0.0752)
-1.19
(0.2328)
-2.11
(0.0352)
-1.27
(0.2045)
-2.19
(0.0286)
-1.34
(0.1803)
-1.77
(0.0771)
-1.17
(0.2440)
-1.35 ' 
(0.1779) 
-0.75 
(0.4536)
-2.21
(0.0268)
-1.18
(0.2392)
-2.10
(0.0355)
-1.17
(0.2411)
Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (*), (**) and (***) denote the significance o f the White (1980) estimator. SARGAN TEST is the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions 
(Sargan, 1958). AR(1) TEST and AR(2) TEST are the Arellano-Bond test for the first and the second-order autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals, respectively. Time dummies and a constant are included.
Appendix A6.23: Short Run GMM: Dependent Variable is EGE1 and Independent Variables are IMN and IGE1
REGRESSION 1 REGRESSION 2 REGRESSION 3 REGRESSION 4
(a) X ,
strictly
exogenous
(b) x it
predetermined
(c) Xit 
endogenous
(a) Xu
stricdy
exogenous
(b) x it
predetermine
d
(c) X, 
endogenous
(a) Xlf
strictly
exogenous
(b) xk
predetermine
d
(c) Xu 
endogenous
(a) Xit
strictly
exogenous
(b) xM
predetermine
d
( 0  x it
endogenous
EGE\it_x 0.5335(0.0692)***
(0.1546)***
0.4642
(0.0662)***
(0.1592)***
0.4850
(0.0690)***
(0.1641)***
0.4597
(0.0689)***
(0.1410)***
0.3207
(0.0668)***
(0.1225)***
0.2847
(0.0737)***
(0.1130)**
0.4445
(0.0682)***
(0.1414)***
0.3100
(0.0660)***
(0.1212)**
0.2818
(0.0733)***
(0.1128)**
0.4408
(0.0681)***
(0.1417)***
0.3349
(0.0649)***
(0.1152)***
0.2785
(0.0725)***
(0.1087)**
EMNU
EMNlt_x
-1.0509
(0.0455)***
(0.0777)***
0.5066
(0.0847)***
(0.1786)***
-1.0173 
(0.0651)*** 
(0.1005)*** 
0.3125 
(0.0928)*** 
JO. 1642)*
-1.1366
(0.0803)***
(0.1448)***
0.2524
(0.1125)**
(0.2146)
-1.2015
(0.0554)***
(0.0941)***
0.4814
(0.0897)***
(0.1564)***
-1.3466
(0.0861)***
(0.1468)***
0.3980
(0.0967)***
(0.1254)***
-1.2691
(0.1208)***
(0.1537)***
0.2280
(0.1191)*
(0.1502)
-1.1632
(0.0573)***
(0.0927)***
0.4678
(0.0891)***
(0.1532)***
-1.2938
(0.0886)***
(0.1312)***
0.3808
(0.0964)***
(0.1220)***
-1.2546
(0.1252)***
(0.1478)***
0.2310
(0.1190)*
(0.1465)
-1.1524
(0.0578)***
(0.0931)***
0.4609
(0.0892)***
(0.1536)***
-1.2765 
(0.0861 )*♦♦ 
(0.1183)*** 
0.3945 
(0.0978)*** 
(0.1126)***
-1.2641
(0.1158)***
(0.1336)***
0.2242
(0.1181)*
(0.1442)
IMNit
i
-0.0231
(0.0058)***
(0.0069)***
0.0258
(0.0073)***
(0.0081)***
-0.0512
(0.0109)***
(0.0158)***
0.0313
(0.0131)**
(0.0136)**
-0.0444
(0.0152)***
(0.0187)**
0.0197
(0.0157)
(0.0149)
-0.0218
(0.0058)***
(0.0071)***
0.0214
(0.0075)***
(0.0080)***
-0.0472
(0.0110)***
(0.0137)***
0.0235
(0.0129)*
(0.0121)*
-0.0439
(0.0157)***
(0.0181)**
0.0184
(0.0154)
(0.0146)
-0.0211
(0.0059)***
(0.0071)***
0.0225
(0.0076)***
(0.0081)***
-0.0469
(0.0105)***
(0.0124)***
0.0198
(0.0132)
(0.0105)*
-0.0422
(0.0144)***
(0.0144)***
0.0195
(0.0151)
(0.0135)
IGElu
IGE\lt_x
0.4930
(0.1224)***
(0.1648)***
0.0788
(0.1298)
(0.0963)
0.8107
(0.2616)***
(0.3747)**
0.4931
(0.2907)*
(0.4405)
1.4792
(0.3491)***
(0.5037)***
0.3759
(0.3820)
(0.5096)
0.4699
(0.1215)***
(0.1575)***
0.0897
(0.1285)
(0.0987)
0.8487
(0.2632)***
(0.3412)**
0.4694
(0.2835)*
(0.4103)
1.4920
(0.3535)***
(0.4998)***
0.3459
(0.3799)
(0.5017)
0.4557
(0.1227)***
(0.1507)***
0.0569
(0.1338)
(0.0949)
0.8935
(0.2471)***
(0.3388)***
0.3063
(0.2846)
(0.4291)
1.4805
(0.3251)***
(0.4557)***
0.4375
(0.3757)
(0.4791)
AGElt
a g e ^
0.0121
(0.0080)
(0.0088)
0.0125
(0.0056)**
(0.0072)*
0.0029
(0.0089)
(0.0085)
0.0092
(0.0053)*
(0.0072)
0.0033
(0.0099)
(0.0102)
0.0080
(0.0059)
(0.0071)
0.0109
(0.0081)
(0.0086)
0.0128
(0.0056)**
(0.0072)*
0.0005
(0.0091)
(0.0089)
0.0098
(0.0056)*
(0.0071)
0.0043
(0.0099)
(0.0092)
0.0053
(0.0062)
(0.0075)
LFSTOCKu
LFSTOCKit_x
-0.1522
(0.2360)
(0.1955)
-0.1322
(0.2059)
(0.2219)
-0.5413
(0.5874)
(0.6106)
0.6144
(0.3475)*
(0.3533)*
0.6687
(0.7495)
(0.7166)
0.0164
(0.6458)
(0.8318)
ECACRAit
ECACRAit_x
UNEMit
UNEMlt_x
INACTIVE„ 
INACTIVE it_x ■
ECACRFU
ECACRFit_x
OBS. 392 392 392 392
SARGAN TEST 
(p-value)
70.04
(0.0000)
106.35
(0.0000)
72.33
(0.0000)
74.97
(0.0000)
108.10
(0.0000)
54.85
(0.0001)
73.50
(0.0000)
108.69
(0.0000)
54.10
(0.0001)
73.69
(0.0000)
117.15
(0.0000)
59.63
(0.0001)
AR(1)TEST
(p-value)
-7.26
(0.0000)
-3.57
(0.0004)
-7.16.
(0.0000)
-3.53
(0.0004)
-6.58
(0.0000)
-3.28
(0.0010)
-6.50
(0.0000)
3^.76
(0.0002)
-3.94
(0.0001)
-2.75
(0.0060)
-2.18
(0.0290)
-1.70
(0.0893)
-6.36 
(0.0000) 
-3. 61 
(0.0003)
-3.76
(0.0002)
-2.55
(0.0108)
-2.18
(0.0296)
-1.68
(0.0926)
-6.40
(0.0000)
-3.53
(0.0004)
-3.96
(0.0001)
-2.93
(0.0034)
-2.49
(0.0127)
-2.18
(0.0292)
AR(2) TEST 
(p-value)
-0.47
(0.6394)
-0.93
(0.3544)
-0.64.
(0.5222)
-1.18
(0.2395)
-0.93
(0.3548)
-1.30
(0.1926)
0.30
(0.7629)
0.59
(0.5541)
1.03
(0.3017)
1.42
(0.1553)
0.91
(0.3614)
1.27
(0.2046)
0.81
(0.4171)
1.61
(0.1067)
1.15
(0.2510)
1.68
(0.0923)
1.05
(0.2935)
1.43
(0.1516)
0.72
(0.4737)
1.38
(0.1685)
0.49
(0.6268)
0.73
(0.4645)
1.19
(0.2321)
1.39
(0.1645)
REGRESSION 5 REGRESSION 6 REGRESSION 7
(a) XM
strictly
exogenous
<b> X ,
predetermined
(c) Xit 
endogenous
(a) XM
strictly
exogenous
(b) xM
predetermine
d
(c) X,, 
endogenous
(a) X,
strictly
exogenous
predetermine
d
(c) X, 
endogenous
e g e \,m 0.3233
(0.0756)***
(0.1538)**
0.3432
(0.0708)***
(0.1234)***
0.2445
(0.0766)***
(0.1053)**
0.3520
(0.0768)***
(0.1592)**
0.3291
(0.0636)***
(0.0919)***
0.2338
(0.0723)***
(0.0868)***
0.3547
(0.0763)***
(0.1568)**
0.3368
(0.0661)***
(0.1222)***
0.2049
(0.0830)**
(0.1295)
EMNU
EMN
-1.2725
(0.0646)***
(0.0935)***
0.3757
(0.1038)***
(0.1830)**
-1.2377
(0.10.73)***
(0.1337)***
0.3393
(0.1100)***
(0.1614)**
-1.2496
(0.1271)***
(0.1424)***
0.2601
(0.1187)**
(0.1368)*
-1.2625
(0.0656)***
(0.0931)***
0.4047
(0.1063)***
(0.1898)**
-1.2235
(0.0930)***
(0.1148)***
0.3285
(0.1046)***
(0.1160)***
-1.2610 
(0.1147)*** 
(0.1208)*** 
0.2387 
(0.1176)** 
(0.1080)**
-1.2586
(0.0657)***
(0.0916)***
0.4187
(0.1058)***
(0.1898)**
-1.1803
(0.0918)***
(0.1126)***
0.3245
(0.1044)***
(0.1513)**
-1.1968
(0.1311)***
(0.1315)***
0.1583
(0.1358)
(0.1697)
IMNU
im n ,,_,
-0.0252
(0.0079)***
(0.0089)***
0.0263
(0.0081)***
(0.0090)***
-0.0195
(0.0134)
(0.0144)
0.0358
(0.0131)***
(0.0147)**
-0.0312
(0.0160)*
(0.0163)*
0.0373
(0.0150)**
(0.0159)**
-0.0251
(0.0080)***
(0.0090)***
0.0236
(0.0082)***
(0.0085)***
-0.0206
(0.0125)*
(0.0136)
0.0259
(0.0116)**
(0.0115)**
-0.0352
(0.0151)**
(0.0145)**
0.0333
(0.0140)**
(0.0133)**
-0.0259
(0.0081)***
(0.0098)***
0.0250
(0.0083)***
(0.0090)***
-0.0155
(0.0123)
(0.0109)
0.0228
(0.0114)**
(0.0120)*
-0.0194
(0.0174)
(0.0159)
0.0192
(0.0157)
(0.0147)
IGE\a
IGE\t ,_x
0.4146
(0.1400)***
(0.1436)***
0.0725
(0.1399)
(0.0951)
0.6213
(0.2781)**
(0.2820)**
-0.3497
(0.2747)
(0.2424)
0.9512
(0.3957)**
(0.3670)**
-0.1977
(0.3485)
(0.4414)
0.4672
(0.1396)***
(0.1666)***
0.1076
(0.1415)
(0.0977)
0.4778
(0.2297)**
(0.2068)**
0.0774
(0.2312)
(0.1704)
0.9362
(0.3409)***
(0.2995)***
0.0603
(0.2970)
(0.3353)
0.4757
(0.1404)***
(0.1661)***
0.0728
(0.1484)
(0.0995)
0.4433 
(0.2576)* 
(0.2558) * 
-0.0268 
(0.2695) 
(0.2051)
0.7412
(0.4151)*
(0.3845)*
0.0655
(0.3683)
(0.3751)
AGE„
a g e , iA
0.0038
(0.0091)
(0.0098)
0.0125
(0.0058)**
(0.0068)*
0.0118
(0.0108)
(0.0118)
0.0090
(0.0062)
(0.0080)
0.0015
(0.0112)
(0.0108)
0.0089
(0.0062)
(0.0075)
0.0067
(0.0092)
(0.0099)
0.0124
(0.0059)**
(0.0072)*
0.0161
(0.0100)
(0.0118)
0.0097
(0.0058)*
(0.0082)
0.0053 
(0.0111) 
(0.0132) 
0.0088 
(0.0062) 
(0.0081)
0.0049
(0.0096)
(0.0103)
0.0135
(0.0059)**
(0.0071)*
0.0236
(0.0115)**
(0.0137)*
0.0099
(0.0063)
(0.0070)
0.0257
(0.0145)*
(0.0150)*
0.0095
(0.0074)
(0.0085)
LFSTOCK„ 
LFSTOCKit_x
ECACRAit
ECACRAit_x
-0.0127
(0.0041)***
(0.0063)**
-0.0038
(0.0043)
(0.0039)
-0.0309
(0.0070)***
(0.0W6)***
0.0052
(0.0071)
(0.0059)
-0.0230
(0.0088)***
(0.0127)*
-0.0099
(0.0091)
(0.0085)
UNEMlt
UNEMlt_x
0.2051
(0.3987)
(0.3053)
-0.5709
(0.3817)
(0.3558)
0.5696
(0.7011)
(0.8967)
-1.5064
(0.5138)***
(0.5788)***
1.3752
(0.8235)*
(0.8543)
-0.9583
(0.7835)
(0.7173)
INACTIVEit 
INACTIVEit_x
0.0463
(0.3153)
(0.2198)
0.1294
(0.2602)
(0.3095)
-1.3642
(0.6882)**
(0.6459)**
0.0047
(0.3674)
(0.4255)
-2.6741
(1.0069)***
(0.8799)***
-1.0835
(0.8268)
(0.7037)
ECACRF,
ECACRFit_x
-0.0091
(0.0035)**
(0.0050)*
-0.0015
(0.0038)
(0.0040)
-0.0188
(0.0056)***
(0.0093)**
0.0025
(0.0058)
(0.0045)
-0.0155
(0.0069)**
(0.0107)
-0.0083
(0.0078)
(0.0074)
-0.0086
(0.0036)**
(0.0050)*
-0.0017
(0.0038)
(0.0042)
-0.0222
(0.0069)***
(0.0100)**
0.0038
(0.0060)
(0.0045)
-0.0297
(0.0109)***
(0.0111)***
-0.0178
(0.0099)*
(0.0105)*
OBS. 325 325 325
SARGAN TEST 
(p-value)
50.77
(0.0000)
100.02
(0.0000)
62.18
(0.0001)
54.42
(0.0000)
124.77
(0.0000)
71.76
(0.0000)
52.44
(0.0000)
124.48
(0.0000)
56.30
(0.0017)
AR(1)TEST
(p-value)
-4.34
(0.0000)
-3.25
(0.0012)
-4.90
(O.OO0O)
-4.23
(0.0000)
-3.31
(0.0009)
-2.63
(0.0085)
-4.44 
(0.0000) 
-3. 06 
(0.0022)
-4.78
(0.0000)
-3.86
(0.0001)
-3.32
(0.0009)
-2.42
(0.0154)
-4.66 
(0.0000) 
-3. 26 
(0.0011)
-5.68
(0.0000)
-4.19
(0.0000)
-2.81
(0.0050)
-2.12
(0.0336)
AR(2) TEST 
(p-value)
1.09
(0.2739)
1.85
(0.0644)
0.51
(0.6083) 
0.68 . 
(0.4956)
1.26
(0.2067)
1.52
(0.1281)
0.85
(0.3968)
1.48
(0.1394)
0.40
(0.6877)
0.60
(0.5464)
0.95
(0.3396)
1.08
(0.2815)
1.07
(0.2848)
2.02
(0.0434)
0.97
(0.3338)
1.65
(0.0986)
0.94
(0.3482)
1.17
(0.2408)
Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (*), (**),and (***) denote the significance of the White (1980) estimator. SARGAN TEST is the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions (Sargan,
1958). A R (l) TEST and AR(2) TEST are the Arellano-Bond test for the first and the second-order autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals, respectively. Time dummies and a constant are included.
Appendix A6.24: Short Run GMM: Dependent Variable is EGE1 and Independent Variables are NMN and NGE1
REGRESSION 1 REGRESSION 2 REGRESSION 3 REGRESSION 4
(a) X,
strictly
exogenous
predetermined
(c) X,  
endogenous
(a) X,
strictly
exogenous
(b) X,,
predetermine
d
(c) X„ 
endogenous
(a) X,
stricdy
exogenous
(b) X,
predetermine
d
<«> X,t
endogenous
(a) X,
strictly
exogenous
(b) x it
predetermine
d
(c) X,  
endogenous
EGEllt_x 0.5335(0.0692)***
(0.1546)***
0.4642
(0.0662)***
(0.1592)***
0.4850
(0.0690)***
(0.1641)***
0.5098
(0.0697)***
(0.1512)***
0.3909
(0.0680)***
(0.1415)***
0.3244 
(0.0796)** ♦ 
(0.1563)**
0.4941
(0.0685)***
(0.1497)***
0.3842
(0.0671)***
(0.1380)***
0.3276
(0.0779)***
(0.1553)**
0.4902
(0.0692)***
(0.1537)***
0.3628
(0.0667)***
(0.1325)***
0.3011
(0.0764)***
(0.1417)**
EMNU 
EMNlt_x
-1.0509
(0.0455)***
(0.0777)***
0.5066
(0.0847)***
(0.1786)***
-1.0173
(0.0651)***
(0.1005)***
0.3125
(0.0928)***
(0.1642)*
-1.1366
(0.0803)***
(0.1448)***
0.2524
(0.1125)**
(0.2146)
-1.1655
(0.0551)***
(0.0992)***
0.5273
(0.0921 )♦♦*
(0.1698)***
-1.1766
(0.0961)***
(0.1504)***
0.3903
(0.1080)***
(0.1706)**
-1.2484
(0.1324)***
(0.1934)***
0.2399
(0.1450)*
(0.2101)
-1.1350
(0.0557)***
(0.0938)***
0.5162
(0.0912)***
(0.1639)***
-1.1470
(0.0961)***
(0.1353)***
0.3794
(0.1072)***
(0.1608)**
-1.2628
(0.1330)***
(0.1855)***
0.2693
(0.1428)*
(0.2030)
-1.1273
(0.0598)***
(0.0973)***
0.5105
(0.0924)***
(0.1696)***
-1.1749
(0.0946)***
(0.1254)***
0.3729
(0.1072)***
(0.1544)**
-1.2246
(0.1318)***
(0.1511)***
0.2464
(0.1397)*
(0.1886)
NMNlt
NMNit_x
-0.0114
(0.0040)***
(0.0036)***
0.0144
(0.0050)***
(0.0057)**
-0.0214
(0.0092)**
(0.0111)*
0.0125
(0.0103)
(0.0111)
-0.0185
(0.0132)
(0.0144)
-0.0017
(0.0126)
(0.0116)
-0.0117
(0.0040)***
(0.0039)***
0.0126
(0.0050)**
(0.0052)**
-0.0205
(0.0090)**
(0.0099)**
0.0108
(0.0098)
(0.0093)
-0.0216
(0.0132)
(0.0136)
0.0002
(0.0122)
(0.0106)
-0.0116
(0.0042)***
(0.0041)***
0.0123
(0.0053)**
(0.0050)**
-0.0238
(0.0082)***
(0.0091)***
0.0108
(0.0101)
(0.0088)
-0.0198
(0.0124)
(0.0106)*
-0.0002
(0.0121)
(0.0085)***
NGE\it
NGE\lt_x
0.3040
(0.1082)***
(0.1239)**
0.0553
(0.1181)
(0.0799)
0.8430
(0.2529)***
(0.3465)**
0.1706
(0.2304)
(0.2993)
1.2627
(0.3344)***
(0.5372)**
0.7696
(0.3204)**
(0.5134)
0.2754
(0.1066)**
(0.1123)**
0.0602
(0.1161)
(0.0802)
0.8021
(0.2515)***
(0.3279)**
0.1653
(0.2259)
(0.2899)
1.1959
(0.3266)***
(0.5161)**
0.7553
(0.3122)**
(0.4927)
0.2742
(0.1086)**
(0.1053)***
0.0573
(0.1177)
(0.0767)
0.7768
(0.2259)***
(0.3032)**
0.2403
(0.2260)
(0.3614)
1.0463
(0.2968)***
(0.4148)**
0.6284
(0.3227)*
(0.4302)
AGE,
AGElt_x
0.0152
(0.0082)*
(0.0086)*
0.0150
(0.0057)***
(0.0070)**
0.0126
(0.0091)
(0.0087)
0.0084
(0.0054)
(0.0069)
0.0100
(0.0107)
(0.0097)
0.0080
(0.0064)
(0.0071)
0.0144
(0.0083)*
(0.0085)*
0.0146
(0.0057)**
(0.0071)**
0.0108
(0.0090)
(0.0090)
0.0100
(0.0056)*
(0.0075)
0.0075
(0.0104)
(0.0090)
0.0089
(0.0067)
(0.0082)
LFSTOCK,
LFSTOCKtI_x
0.0734
(0.2511)
(0.2074)
-0.0374
(0.2131)
(0.2242)
-0.4761
(0.5854)
(0.4459)
0.2055
(0.3912)
(0.5273)
-0.6317
(0.8010)
(0.7404)
-0.6421
(0.6573)
(0.8952)
ECACRA,
ECACRAit_x
UNEM,
UNEMit_x
INACTIVE„ 
INACTIVE it_x
ECACRFit
ECACRFlt_x
OBS. 392 392 392 392
SARGAN TEST 
(p-value)
70.04
(0.0000)
106.35
(0.0000)
72.33
(0.0000)
70.79
(0.0000)
111.11
(0.0000)
45.76
(0.0014)
69.23
(0.0000)
111.22
(0.0000)
46.27
(0.0012)
74.21
(0.0000)
123.38
(0.0000)
49.96
(0.0022)
AR(1)TEST
(p-value)
-7.26
(0.0000)
-3.57
(0.0004)
-7.16
(0.0000)
-3.53
(0.0004)
-6.58
(0.0000)
-3.28
(0.0010)
-6.80
(0.0000)
-3.60
(0.0003)
A ll
(0.0000)
-2.71
(0.0066)
-1.58
(0.1148)
-1.01
(0.3126)
-6.63
(0.0000)
-3.48
(0.0005)
-4.88
(0.0000)
-2.71
(0.0068)
-1.60
(0.1098)
-1.01
(0.3122)
-6.69
(0.0000)
-3.38
(0.0007)
-4.46
(0.0000)
-2.46
(0.0138)
-1.51
(0.1313)
-0.99
(0.3203)
AR(2) TEST 
(p-value)
-0.47
(0.6394)
-0.93
(0.3544)
-0.64
(0.5222)
-1.18
(0.2395)
-0.93
(0.3548)
-1.30
(0.1926)
-0.72
(0.4745)
-1.19
(0.2345)
-1.20
(0.2308)
-1.65
(0.0980)
-1.62
(0.1053)
-1.74
(0.0825)
0.05
(0.9625)
0.09
(0.9293)
-0.64
(0.5206)
-0.90
(0.3671)
-1.14
(0.2551)
-1.24
(0.2165)
0.11
(0.9089)
0.21
(0.8369)
-0.85
(0.3951)
-1.26
(0.2064)
-1.42
(0.1545)
-1.74
(0.0815)
REGRESSION 5 REGRESSION 6 REGRESSION 7
(a) X*
strictly
exogenous
(b) xk
predetermined
(c) Xu 
endogenous
(a) Xu
strictly
exogenous
(b) x it
predetermine
d
(c) Xu 
endogenous
(a) Xit
strictly
exogenous
(b) x „
predetermine
d
(c) X, 
endogenous
EGE\ 0.3735(0.0773)***
(0.1754)**
0.3548
(0.0749)***
(0.1499)**
0.3281
(0.0855)***
(0.1468)**
0.4083
(0.0793)***
(0.1810)**
0.3439
(0.0707)***
(0.1255)***
0.3124
(0.0790)***
(0.1167)***
0.4145
(0.0775)***
(0.1832)**
0.3621
(0.0702)***
(0.1516)**
0.2905
(0.0861)***
(0.1598)*
EMNa
e m n ,,_,
-1.2523
(0.0635)***
(0.0968)***
0.4448
(0.1090)***
(0.2080)**
-1.1486
(0.1112)***
(0.1256)***
0.3613
(0.1283)***
(0.1984)*
-1.2851
(0.1413)***
(0.1616)***
0.4013
(0.1481)***
(0.2241)*
-1.2465 
(0.0657)*** 
(0.0978)*** 
0.4796 
(0.1132)*** 
(0.2160)**
-1.0797
(0.1094)***
(0.1004)***
0.3076
(0.1279)**
(0.1549)**
-1.1948
(0.1312)***
(0.1222)***
0.3239
(0.1428)**
(0.1572)**
-1.2563
(0.0664)***
(0.0986)***
0.4954
(0.1109)***
(0.2204)**
-1.1822
(0.0996)***
(0.1139)***
0.3825
(0.1191)***
(0.1888)**
-1.2450
(0.1281)***
(0.1296)***
0.3051
(0.1520)**
(0.2267)
NMN„
N M N u-i
-0.0168
(0.0056)***
(0.0057)***
0.0158
(0.0054)***
(0.0058)***
-0.0119
(0.0107)
(0.0099)
0.0167
(0.0093)*
(0.0085)**
-0.0249
(0.0135)*
(0.0137)*
0.0297
(0.0126)**
(0.0131)**
-0.0162
(0.0057)***
(0.0056)***
0.0139
(0.0056)**
(0.0056)**
-0.0063
(0.0107)
(0.0089)
0.0061
(0.0094)
(0.0066)
-0.0165
(0.0122)
(0.0097)*
0.0167
(0.0115)
(0.0088)*
-0.0178
(0.0058)***
(0.0063)***
0.0163
(0.0056)***
(0.0057)***
-0.0157
(0.0097)
(0.0078)**
0.0160
(0.0087)*
(0.0073)**
-0.0195
(0.0124)
(0.0107)*
0.0204
(0.0118)*
(0.0098)**
NGE\U
n g e \,m
0.2913
(0.1360)**
(0.1091)***
-0.0236
(0.1319)
(0.0830)
0.4707
(0.2795)*
(0.26.45)*
-0.1162
(0.2270)
(0.2469)***
1.1411
(0.4963)**
(0.5730)**
-0.2510
(0.3354)
(0.4423)
0.3342
(0.1385)**
(0.1201)***
0.0429
(0.1358)
(0.0878)
0.2801
(0.2676)
(0.2033)
0.3023
(0.2171)
(0.2256)
0.9536
(0.4168)**
(0.3963)**
0.1633
(0.2939)
(0.3415)
0.3459
(0.1389)**
(0.1217)***
-0.0103
(0.1354)
(0.0850)
0.3800
(0.2601)
(0.2051)*
0.1009
(0.2090)
(0.2124)
0.6278
(0.4513)
(0.4520)
0.1518
(0.3097)
(0.3329)
AGEa
* g e u_x
0.0051
(0.0093)
(0.0093)
0.0154
(0.0059)***
(0.0063)**
0.0167
(0.0109)
(0.0117)
0.0095
(0.0058)
(0.0078)
-0.0014
(0.0133)
(0.0132)
0.0078
(0.0064)
(0.0077)
0.0079
(0.0095)
(0.0095)
0.0143
(0.0060)**
(0.0068)**
0.0241
(0.0110)**
(0.0116)**
0.0091
(0.0058)
(0.0080)
0.0092
(0.0126)
(0.0128)
0.0073
(0.0063)
(0.0081)
0.0070
(0.0098)
(0.0098)
0.0151
(0.0061)**
(0.0064)**
0.0248
(0.0114)**
(0.0121)**
0.0101
(0.0060)*
(0.0076)
0.0232
(0.0149)
(0.0151)
0.0065
(0.0071)
(0.0082)
LFSTOCKit 
LFSTOCKit_x
ECACRAit
ECACRAit_x
-0.0135
(0.0042)***
(0.0065)**
-0.0043
(0.0044)
(0.0046)
-0.0290
(0.0065)***
(0.0105)***
0.0052
(0.0069)
(0.0053)
-0.0229
(0.0084)***
(0.0132)*
-0.0064
(0.0096)
(0.0088)
UNEMit
UNEMil_x
0.0547
(0.4177)
(0.3154)
-0.6754
(0.3951)*
(0.4051)*
0.5640
(0.6840)
(0.7134)
-1.6220
(0.5344)***
(0.6010)***
0.8371
(0.8381)
(0.8380)
-1.2436
(0.8448)
(0.8154)
INACTIVE„ 
INACTIVE it_x
-02550
(0.3210)
(0.2208)
0.1078
(0.2674)
(0.3250)
-1.6203
(0.6348)**
(0.5373)***
-0.0944
(0.3681)
(0.4706)
-2.7970
(0.9919)***
(0.9856)***
-0.2352
(0.8534)
(0.7758)
ECACRFit
ECACRFit_x
-0.0101
(0.0036)***
(0.0053)*
-0.0019
(0.0039)
(0.0043)
-0.0196
(0.0058)***
(0.0089)**
0.0021
(0.0061)
(0.0044)
-0.0163
(0.0068)**
(0.0104)
-0.0062
(0.0082)
(0.0073)
-0.0099
(0.0037)***
(0.0053)*
-0.0017
(0.0040)
(0.0046)
-0.0220
(0.0067)***
(0.0093)**
0.0029
(0.0060)
(0.0046)
-0.0297
(0.0105)***
(0.0111)***
-0.0140
(0.0098)
(0.0101)
OBS. 325 325 325
SARGAN TEST 
(p-value)
46.09
(0.0000)
95.06
(0.0000)
56.63
(0.0003)
51.49
(0.0000)
112.41
(0.0000)
71.89
(0.0000)
49.44
(0.0000)
119.00
(0.0000)
59.81
(0.0007)
AR(l)TEST
(p-value)
-4.44
(0.0000)
-3.14
(0.0017)
-4.64
(0.0000)
-3.37
(0.0002)
-3.33
(0.0009)
-2.23
(0.0256)
-4.65
(0.0000)
-3.06
(0.0022)
-4.75
(0.0000)
-3.59
(0.0003)
-3.44
(0.0006)
-2.43
(0.0150)
-4.92
(0.0000)
-3.20
(0.0014)
-5.36
(0.0000)
-3.64
(0.0003)
-3.19
(0.0014)
-2.35
(0.0185)
AR(2) TEST 
(p-value)
0.11
(0.9089)
0.18
(0.8543)
-0.47
(0.6351)
-0.61
(0.5435)
-0.53 
(0.5587)r 
-0.51 
(0.6099)
-0.03
(0.9794)
-0.05
(0.9634)
-0.31
(0.7583)
-0.58
(0.5634)
-1.01
(0.3148)
-1.10
(0.2729)
0.17
(0.8670)
0.32
(0.7492)
0.52
(0.6026)
0.86
(0.3923)
0.53
(0.5968)
0.69
(0.4892)
Note: (*), (**), and (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (*), (**) and (***) denote the significance o f the White (1980) estimator. SARGAN TEST is the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions (Sargan,
1958). AR(1) TEST and AR(2) TEST are the Arellano-Bond test for the first and the second-order autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals, respectively. Time dummies and a constant are included.
Appendix A6.25: Short Run GMM: Dependent Variable is AGE1 and Independent Variables are IMN and IGE1
REGRESSION 1 REGRESSION 2 REGRESSION 3 REGRESSION 4
(a) Xu
strictly
exogenous
(b) x it
predetermined
(c) X t  
endogenous
(a) Xu
strictly
exogenous
(b) x u
predetermine
d
(c) Xu 
endogenous
(a) Xu
strictly
exogenous
(b)
predetermine
d
(c) Xu 
endogenous
(a) Xlt
strictly
exogenous
(b) x it
predetermine
d
(O x it
endogenous
AGElit_x 0.5747(0.1913)***
(0.2167)***
0.4429
(0.1589)***
(0.2309)*
0.5498
(0.2030)***
(0.2309)**
0.2739
(0.1987)
(0.2015)
-0.0465
(0.1520)
(0.1794)
-0.1435
(0.1862)
(0.1828)
0.2448
(0.1900)
(0.1939)
-0.0670
(0.1500)
(0.1759)
-0.1511
(0.1835)
(0.1763)
0.2551
(0.1893)
(0.1936)
-0.0420
(0.1540)
(0.1619)
-0.1598
(0.1974)
(0.1758)
AMNit
AMN
0.0054
(0.0008)***
(0.0016)***
-0.0070
(0.0016)***
(0.0018)***
0.0030
(0.0013)**
(0.0019)
-0.0031
(0.0023)
(0.0023)
0.0008
(0.0018)
(0.0021)
-0.0009
(0.0029)
(0.0032)
0.0058
(0.0008)***
(0.0016)***
-0.0049
(0.0016)***
(0.0015)***
0.0018 
(0.0014) 
(0.0017) 
- 0.0011 
(0.0018) 
(0.0015)
0.0010
(0.0017)
(0.0020)
-0.0009
(0.0020)
(0.0018)
0.0058
(0.0008)***
(0.0015)***
-0.0047
(0.0016)***
(0.0015)***
0.0019
(0.0014)
(0.0016)
-0.0007
(0.0018)
(0.0016)
0.0010
(0.0017)
(0.0019)
-0.0006
(0.0020)
(0.0018)
0.0058
(0.0008)***
(0.0015)***
-0.0047
(0.0016)***
(0.0015)***
0.0023
(0.0014)
(0.0016)
-0.0007
(0.0018)
(0.0016)
0.0013
(0.0019)
(0.0018)
-0.0013
(0.0021)
(0.0020)
IMNit 0.0006(0.0003)*
(0.0003)*
0.0003
(0.0004)
(0.0004)
0.0004
(0.0004)
(0.0007)
-0.0002
(0.0005)
(0.0006)
0.0003
(0.0005)
(0.0007)
-0.0002
(0.0006)
(0.0007)
0.0007
(0.0003)**
(0.0003)**
0.0002
(0.0004)
(0.0004)
0.0005
(0.0004)
(0.0007)
-0.0003
(0.0005)
(0.0006)
0.0004
(0.0005)
(0.0007)
-0.0003
(0.0006)
(0.0007)
0.0007
(0.0003)**
(0.0003)**
0.0004
(0.0004)
(0.0004)
0.0004
(0.0005)
(0.0006)
-0.0001
(0.0006)
(0.0006)
0.0001
(0.0006)
(0.0007)
0.0002
(0.0007)
(0.0008)
IGE\it
IGE\it_,
0.0020
(0.0091)
(0.0057)
0.0098
(0.0088)
(0.0105)
0.0415
(0.0193)**
(0.0257)
0.0366
(0.0177)**
(0.0221)*
0.0644
(0.0269)**
(0.0311)**
0.0296
(0.0202)
(0.0224)
0.0018
(0.0091)
(0.0054)
0.0111
(0.0088)
(0.0103)
0.0376 
(0.0194)* 
(0.0240) 
0.0385 
(0.0174)** 
(0.0208)*
0.0589
(0.0260)**
(0.0307)*
0.0342
(0.0197)*
(0.0216)
0.0007
(0.0092)
(0.0054)
0.0091
(0.0092)
(0.0099)
0.0529
(0.0186)***
(0.0254)**
0.0074
(0.0194)
(0.0215)
0.0805
(0.0259)***
(0.0365)**
0.0063
(0.0243)
(0.0278)
AGEit
AGElt_x
0.0009
(0.0006)
(0.0006)
-0.0002
(0.0004)
(0.0005)
0.0008
(0.0006)
(0.0006)
0.0000
(0.0004)
(0.0006)
0.0006
(0.0006)
(0.0008)
0.0000
(0.0004)
(0.0005)
0.0008
(0.0006)
(0.0006)
-0.0002
(0.0004)
(0.0004)
0.0004
(0.0007)
(0.0007)
0.0002
(0.0004)
(0.0006)
0.0001
(0.0007)
(0.0009)
0.0002
(0.0005)
(0.0006)
LFSTOCKu
LFSTOCKlt_x
-0.0098
(0.0168)
(0.0210)
-0.0168
(0.0148)
(0.0114)
-0.0725
(0.0359)**
(0.0354)**
0.0373
(0.0271)
(0.0310)
-0.0887
(0.0453)*
(0.0481)*
-0.0131
(0.0480)
(0.0423)
ECACRAit
ECACRAlt_x
UNEMit 
UNEM it_x
INACTIVEu 
INACTIVElM
ECACRFit
ECACRFit_x
OBS. 348 348 348 348
SARGAN TEST 
(p-value)
24.97
(0.0030)
34.76
(0.0067)
20.59
(0.0814)
22.06
(0.0087)
47.89
(0.0453)
31.96
(0.0592)
21.72
(0.0098)
47.42
(0.0498)
31.89
(0.0601)
20.78
(0.0137)
43.81
(0.3531)
27.57
(0.3281)
AR(1)TEST
(p-value)
-4.30
(0.0000)
-3.32
(0.0009)
-4.18
(0.0000)
-2.37
(0.0180)
-4.50
(0.0000)
-2.95
(0.0031)
-2.61
(0.0090)
-2.40
(0.0162)
-1.37
(0.1694)
-1.02
(0.3076)
0.76
(0.4481)
-0.74
(0.4566)
-2.58
(0.0098)
-2.41
(0.0161)
-1.30
(0.1946)
-0.98
(0.3268)
-0.70
(0.4846)
-0.69
(0.4892)
-2.55
(0.0107)
-2.38
(0.0172)
-2.08
(0.0375)
-1.64
(0.1005)
-0.61
(0.5401)
-0.61
(0.5425)
AR(2) TEST 
(p-value)
0.36
(0.7205)
0.42
(0.6780)
0.07
(0.9443)
0.08
(0.9387)
0.44
(0.6601)
0.47
(0.6368)
-0.38
(0.7040)
-0.46
(0.6466)
-1.67
(0.0951)
-1.46
(0.1449)
-2.00
(0.0453)
-1.79
(0.0730)
-0. 82 
(0.4144) 
-1.02 
(0.3095)
-2.17
(0.0299)
-1.81
(0.0698)
-2.40
(0.0166)
-1.98
(0.0483)
-0. 79 
(0.4305) 
-1.01 
(0.3106)
-1.02
(0.3078)
-1.05
(0.2932)
-0.92
(0.3567)
-0.96
(0.3392)
REGRESSION 5 REGRESSION 6 REGRESSION 7
(a) X ,
strictly
exogenous
(b) x it
predetermined
(c)
endogenous
(a) X u
strictly
exogenous
(b) x u
predetermine
d
(c) X a 
endogenous
(a) X it
strictly
exogenous
(b) x it
predetermine
d
(c) X it 
endogenous
AGE\ijA 0.1189(0.2072)
(0.2010)
0.1424
(0.1427)
(0.1662)
0.0156
(0.1704)
(0.1620)
0.0961
(0.2040)
(0.1983)
0.1512
(0.1382)
(0.1361)
0.0123
(0.1648)
(0.1428)
0.1339
(0.2052)
(0.1983)
0.1993
(0.1477)
(0.1498)
0.0860
(0.1619)
(0.1492)
AMN„
AMNu-i
0.0050
(0.0009)***
(0.0016)***
-0.0039
(0.0016)**
(0.0014)***
0.0015
(0.00)4)
(0.0015)
-0.0010
(0.0019)
(0.0014)
0.0011 
(0.0018) 
(0.0021) 
- 0.0001 
(0.0022) 
(0.0018)
0.0051
(0.0009)***
(0.0015)***
-0.0040
(0.0016)**
(0.0016)**
0.0025
(0.0014)*
(0.0014)*
-0.0017
(0.0020)
(0.0017)
0.0017
(0.0018)
(0.0019)
-0.0005
(0.0024)
(0.0022)
0.0051
(0.0009)***
(0.0015)***
-0.0040
(0.0016)**
(0.0015)***
0.0032
(0.0015)**
(0.0016)**
-0.0020
(0.0019)
(0.0014)
0.0022
(0.0020)
(0.0022)
-0.0015
(0.0022)
(0.0018)
IMNU
IM N ,^
0.0009
(0.0004)**
(0.0005)**
0.0001
(0.0005)
(0.0004)
0.0005
(0.0006)
(0.0006)
-0.0006
(0.0006)
(0.0005)
0.0008
(0.0006)
(0.0008)
-0.0006
(0.0007)
(0.0006)
0.0010
(0.0004)**
(0.0005)**
0.0001
(0.0005)
(0.0004)
0.0005
(0.0006)
(0.0007)
-0.0004
(0.0006)
(0.0005)
0.0005
(0.0007)
(0.0008)
-0.0004
(0.0006)
(0.0006)
0.0009
(0.0004)**
(0.0004)**
0.0002
(0.0005)
(0.0003)
0.0004
(0.0006)
(0.0005)
-0.0001
(0.0007)
(0.0005)
0.0007
(0.0006)
(0.0007)
-0.0005
(0.0008)
(0.0007)
IGEl"
IGE\,,_X
0.0040
(0.0111)
(0.0065)
0.0188
(0.0102)*
(0.0109)*
0.0216
(0.0244)
(0.0237)
0.0478
(0.0186)**
(0.0182)***
0.0446
(0.0332)
(0.0327)
0.0366
(0.0213)*
(0.0206)*
0.0057
(0.0109)
(0.0064)
0.0193
(0.0102)*
(0.0114)*
0.0159
(0.0195)
(0.0157)
0.0456
(0.0167)***
(0.0177)**
0.0346
(0.0268)
(0.0257)
0.0317
(0.0195)
(0.0192)*
0.0046
(0.0109)
(0.0063)
0.0178
(0.0105)*
(0.0101)*
0.0062
(0.0230)
(0.0171)
0.0304
(0.0196)
(0.0169)*
0.0280
(0.0280)
(0.0232)
0.0288
(0.0216)
(0.0203)
AGE" 0.0009(0.0007)
(0.0008)
-0.0001
0.0010 
(0.0008) 
(0.0008) 
0.0000
0.0007
(0.0008)
(0.0010)
-0.0001
0.0010
(0.0007)
(0.0007)
-0.0001
0.0009
(0.0008)
(0.0008)
-0.0001
0.0007
(0.0008)
(0.0010)
-0.0001
0.0008
(0.0007)
(0.0007)
-0.0001
-0.0001
(0.0009)
(0.0010)
0.0003
-0.0001
(0.0010)
(0.0011)
0.0000
AGElt_ i (0.0004)(0.0005)
(0.0004)
(0.0006)
(0.0004)
(0.0005)
(0.0004)
(0.0005)
(0.0004)
(0.0006)
(0.0004)
(0.0005)
(0.0004)
(0.0005)
(0.0005)
(0.0007)
(0.0005)
(0.0006)
LFSTOCKu 
LFSTOCKit_x
ECACRAit
ECACRAit_x
0.0001
(0.0003)
(0.0003)
0.0001
(0.0003)
(0.0003)
0.0005
(O.OO06)
(0.0006)
-0.0006
(0.0007)
(0.0007)
0.0006
(0.0007)
(0.0008)
-0.0005
(0.0009)
(0.0009)
UNEMit
UNEMlt_{
-0.0315
(0.0300)
(0.0390)
0.0029
(0.0273)
(0.0199)
-0.0064
(0.0535)
(0.0579)
0.0098
(0.0365)
(0.0384)
0.0270
(0.0704)
(0.0690)
0.0384
(0.0581)
(0.0692)
INACTIVEit 
INACTIVE
0.0105
(0.0233)
(0.0253)
0.0142
(0.0194)
(0.0130)
0.1133
(0.0504)**
(0.0557)**
-0.0228
(0.0311)
(0.0314)
0.0700
(0.0610)
(0.0585)
0.0027
(0.0541)
(0.0572)
ECACRFit
ECACRFit.x
0.0002
(0.0003)
(0.0003)
0.0002
(0.0003)
(0.0002)
0.0008
(0.0005)
(0.0006)
-0.0006
(0.0005)
(0.0005)
0.0006
(0.0006)
(0.0005)
-0.0005
(0.0007)
(0.0007)
0.0002
(0.0003)
(0.0003)
0.0003
(0.0003)
(0.0002)
0.0012
(0.0006)**
(0.0006)**
-0.0012
(0.0006)**
(0.0006)**
0.0010
(0.0007)
(0.0006)
-0.0010
(0.0007)
(0.0010)
OBS. 285 285 285
SARGAN TEST 
(p-value)
20.97
(0.0128)
49.85
(0.1617)
26.98
(0.3567)
21.07
(0.0123)
63.15
(0.0843)
41.49
(0.0624)
20.53
(0.0149)
47.18
(0.5473)
34.04
(0.2377)
AR(1)TEST
(p-value)
-1.77
(0.0766)
-1.73
(0.0833)
-3.31
(0.0009)
-1.98
(0.0478)
-2.06
(0.0397)
-1.72
(0.0860)
-1.67
(0.0947)
-1.66
(0.0975)
-3.66
(0.0003)
-2.32
(0.0202)
-2.09
(0.0366)
-2.09
(0.0362)
-1.76
(0.0790)
-1.78
(0.0744)
-4.44
(0.0000)
-2.42
(0.0154)
-2.58
(0.0099)
-1.61
(0.1064)
AR(2) TEST 
(p-value)
-0.82
(0.4142)
-1.09
(0.2747)
-0.70.
(0.4865)
-0.74
(0.4610)
-1.10
(0.2711)
-1.04
(0.2987)
-0.71
(0.4751)
-0.97
(0.3336)
-0.38
(0.7042)
-0.41
(0.6818)
-0.72
(0.4702)
-0.72
(0.4723)
-0.76
(0.4494)
-1.04
(0.3000)
0.06
(0.9557)
0.06
(0.9510)
-0.06
(0.9561)
-0.05
(0.9629)
Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (*), (**) and (***) denote the significance of the White (1980) estimator. SARGAN TEST is the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions (Sargan,
1958). AR(1) TEST and AR(2) TEST are the Arellano-Bond test for the first and the second-order autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals, respectively. Time dummies and a constant are included.
Appendix A6.26: Short Run GMM: Dependent Variable is AGE! and Independent Variables are NMN and NGE1
REGRESSION 1 REGRESSION 2 REGRESSION 3 REGRESSION 4
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7 Chapter Seven. Regional Economic Growth and 
Income and Educational Inequality
7.1 Introduction
The linkage between inequality and growth is far from being well understood, 
especially in its regional context. When looking at the effects of income and educational 
inequality on regional economic growth, we are primarily interested in the ways in 
which distribution can affect aggregate output and growth through its impact on 
different channels. The impact of inequality on growth remains controversial and 
decades of economic, sociological and political studies offer evidence that the 
inequality-growth relationship is, indeed, complex (Galor, 2000; Galor and Moav, 
2004). There is a range of theoretical and empirical evidence suggesting that inequality 
can actually be good for growth (i.e. Mirrlees, 1971; Rebelo, 1991), while other studies 
support the idea that inequality may harm growth (i.e. Perotti, 1996; Easterly, 2001).
The analysis performed here aims to shed light on the inequality-growth relationship. 
This chapter addresses the main research question of this thesis. Do income and 
educational inequalities matter for growth? To what extent are inequalities associated 
with growth? Given that income inequalities are associated with educational inequalities 
and they are affected by common factors (see Chapter 6), this chapter also explores 
whether those factors affect regional economic growth either directly or indirectly 
through their impact on inequalities. Although income and educational inequalities are 
highly correlated, this chapter attempts to synthesise the impact of inequalities on 
growth, comparing the magnitude and significance of their coefficients. The 
methodology is based on the estimation of static regression models.
The aim of this chapter is the focal point of this research. It examines how 
microeconomic changes in income and educational distribution affect the evolution of 
regional economic growth in the EU. As has been stated previously, microeconomic 
changes in income and in human capital endowments are measured in terms of average 
measures and inequality. This chapter contributes to two different strands within the 
field of economic growth: the relationship of income per capita, educational attainment 
and growth (the first strand); and inequality and growth (the second strand). To this end, 
it examines which strand outweighs the other. This is a significant omission in the 
literature to date.
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The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I present the 
theoretical background on the impact of the labour- and physical capital-related 
variables and the role of urbanisation, geography and institutions . Section 7.3 illustrates 
the combined impact of income and educational inequality on growth, while Section 7.4 
explores causality issues. The last section discusses the conclusions, the implications 
and the limitations of the results. It also offers some policy recommendations.
7.2 The Determinants of Growth
This section discusses the theoretical background with regard to the determinants of 
growth. The growth literature presented here is not meant to be exhaustive, but rather it 
highlights those areas of thought and empirical work relevant to an investigation of the 
impact of the labour- and physical capital-related variables and of some time-invariant 
variables. The first subsection considers the economic impact of population ageing, 
access to work, unemployment and inactivity. The second provides an overview on the 
possible impacts of transport infrastructures, and more specifically, of road and rail 
infrastructures, on growth. The last subsection discusses the theoretical background on 
the impact of urbanisation, geography and institutions on growth.
7.2.1 Labour-related Variables
7.2.1.1 Population Ageing
Population ageing has a significant impact not only on income and human capital 
distribution, but also on regional economic growth. A number of theoretical and 
empirical arguments have been constructed in order to assess the linkage between 
population ageing and economic growth through different channels such as an 
individuals’ natural capacity, incentives to produce, technical progress, tax structure, 
savings and government policy responses.
On the one hand, it would seem plausible to assume that the relationship between 
population ageing and growth should be negative. Older workers are, on average, less 
productive than younger ones for several reasons (Tang and MacLeod, 2006). First, 
younger and older workers differ in their levels of technology adoption, as the former 
are the primary adopters and beneficiaries of new the technologies that are most 
probably more productive than old technologies, while the latter tend to be more set in 
their ways and to be less willing to learn new ways of doing things, partly due to a
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natural decline in their capacity (Galenson and Weinberg, 2000, 2001). Second, younger 
and older workers tend to differ in work effort, as younger workers work more hours 
and are able to concentrate more on the job, they are healthier on average and thus take 
fewer days in sick leave than older workers (Cheal, 2000). Since productivity declines 
as a worker gets closer to retirement (Diamond, 1986; Oster and Hamermesh, 1998; 
Bhattacharya and Russell, 2001), population ageing has a negative impact on regional 
economic growth. Nevertheless, Disney (1996) argues that the relationship between an 
ageing labour force and productivity is unclear. Hence, differences in technology 
adoption and work effort may lead to different productive capacities across different age 
groups of the workforce.
A somewhat different view has been built on the assumption that retired people tend to 
spend their savings, decreasing capital investment, while working people save for their 
retirement. Therefore, if a longer life span increases the ratio of retired people to 
working people, it reduces the aggregate saving rate, which decelerates economic 
growth (Futagami and Nakajima, 2001).
On the other hand, the relationship between population ageing and economic growth 
may be positive. Changes in the demographic composition of a regional economy affect 
its production structure. Descriptive statistical analysis has shown that population 
ageing has increased between 1996 and 2000. The labour force has declined because of 
the rapid population ageing. However, a declining labour force does not necessarily 
reduce potential growth as production is more capital-intensive. New technology is 
embodied in new machines and investment is induced by technical progress, which is 
the ultimate source of growth (Hicks, 1977). Capital and technical progress are much 
more important than labour in determining growth (Yoshikawa, 2000). Additionally, 
population ageing is beneficial for economic growth because young people invest more 
capital in preparation for their longer life-spans (Pecchenino and Pollard, 1997).
It is known that the increase in population ageing is due to the declining birth rate and 
increased life expectancy. Some studies, such as those by de la Croix and Licandro 
(1999), Fuster (1999), Cipriani (2000), and Boucekkine et al. (2002) posit an inverted 
U-shaped relationship between life expectancy and growth. In economies in which life 
expectancy is sufficiently low, an increase in life expectancy motivates agents to save 
more for their old-age, increasing the aggregate saving rate, and thus enhancing the
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growth rate of the economy; while in economies in which life expectancy is sufficiently 
high, a rise in life expectancy increases the healthcare cost burden to young agents,91 
reducing the aggregate saving rate, and thus lowering the growth rate (Tabata, 2005: 
474).
Demographic changes may also have significant economic consequences, depending on 
the position taken with regard to important policy measures and challenges. Policies on 
fertility and pensions are likely to affect the ageing-growth relationship. If, for instance, 
the state pension age were to increase, it is likely to alter regional productivity and 
growth. An ageing population shifts the underlying distribution of preferences in a way 
that results in stronger demands for unemployment benefits, health insurance, pensions 
and public expenditure in general, which reduce potential growth (Boix, 2001). 
Futagami and Nakajima (2001) examine the effects of a policy of postponing the 
retirement age and suggest that such a policy would slow growth. Moreover, a policy 
aimed at attracting young immigrant workers from abroad would serve to reduce 
regional population ageing, which in turn affects growth either positively or negatively. 
Consequently, social policy reform is a subject that matters greatly for both economic 
growth and age distribution.
To summarise, population ageing has an effect on economic growth, depending on the 
adjustment of factor inputs (labour, capital, technical progress) and on government 
policy responses (policies on fertility and pensions).
7.2.1.2 Access to Work
Differentials in growth rates may arise from differences in workforce participation, 
particularly between men and women. The effect of access to work on regional 
economic growth seems to be clear-cut. Access to work usually stimulates growth. First, 
higher participation in labour market is argued to contribute to a competitive economic 
environment, promoting allocative efficiency (i.e. sectoral factor reallocation), and thus 
enhancing economic growth (Azzoni and Silveira-Neto, 2005). Second, higher labour 
force participation implies more work-related education and training, which are 
positively associated with wage and income growth (Lynch, 1992; Bartel, 1995; Parent,
91 The elderly need much more healthcare, including nursing care and other social services, and the 
medical care required by older people often involves relatively expensive technology and hospitalisation, 
increasing the healthcare cost o f the economy (Tabata, 2005).
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1999). Third, work access differs by gender. Women and men, on average, occupy 
different class positions, with women more likely to be poor and less-educated relative 
to the position of men, implying gender wage and social differentials. Women not only 
hold the majority of low-income jobs, but also have less continuous employment than 
men and do not receive the same job rewards. Women are often placed in jobs where 
less training is provided due to their lower labour force attachment (Barron et al., 1993; 
Royalty, 1996). These differentials may be a stimulus to export expansion (Seguino,
2000). Export earnings may provide the resources to purchase sophisticated 
technologies, which permit economies of scale and specialisation and enhance 
economic growth. However, low female wages that stimulate exports may not be 
sufficient to promote growth, because the labour force should be able to competently 
adopt new technologies. State policies and institutions that promote learning, to enable 
workers to integrate new imported technologies, are also required (Amsden, 1989). 
Therefore, gender wage inequality could have a positive effect on growth via the effect 
on investment under certain structural economic and political conditions. In other 
words, greater access to work for women is likely to promote regional economic growth 
due to their low wage levels. If, on the other hand, economic inefficiencies arise from 
persisting gender differentials in the labour market (Tzannatos, 1999), greater female 
access to work may stimulate growth because higher employment means a greater level 
of inputs and that firms can produce more.
Nevertheless, the effect of work access on regional economic growth may be negative 
via the effect on income distribution. More specifically, greater work access is likely to 
reduce income inequality (see Chapter 6), which may reduce economic growth. 
Additionally, the causal link between regional growth and work access might be 
negative. In countries with low per capita income and growth, most people remain in 
the labour force until a very advanced age or until they are unable to continue working. 
Hence, as income and growth increase, the structural changes in the economy (i.e. a 
decline in agricultural employment) imply a lower labour force participation (Clark et 
al., 1999). Finally, policies are likely to affect the relationship between growth and work 
access. For example, higher labour regulation is associated with lower labour force 
participation and higher unemployment, especially among the young (Botero et al., 
2004).
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7.2.1.3 Unemployment and Inactivity
The relationship between unemployment and growth is not clear-cut. One of the major 
difficulties is that multiple linkages exist between these two variables, and many 
common factors exert an influence upon them (Muscatelli and Tirelli, 2001).
Four different views have emerged on the relationship between unemployment and 
growth. The first view is that the rate of unemployment is independent of the rate of 
economic growth (Phelps, 1968). Thus, research on growth and on unemployment 
should be carried out independently, as is the case with the empirical study by Layard et 
al. (1991). The second strand of theories (i.e. Stadler, 1990; Muscatelli and Tirelli, 
2001) is based on the notion that periods of low economic activity and high 
unemployment have an adverse effect on growth. The higher the unemployment rate, 
the greater the skill losses, the greater the unexploited opportunities for leaming-by- 
doing and the greater the inefficiencies in the production of human capital, and thus the 
lower the growth rate. The third view is that periods of high growth tend to be periods 
of high unemployment (Hall, 1991; Caballero and Hammour, 1994). High levels of 
economic inactivity and unemployment stimulate efficiency gains by causing less 
efficient firms to exit and encourage firms to adopt reorganising investments and 
innovative activities. This leads to faster economic growth, only if the entry rates of 
new and more efficient firms and the reorganising investment rates of existing firms are 
not too low during periods of recession. Hence, recessions may also stimulate regional 
economic growth.
The last strand of the literature highlights the causal links running from economic 
growth to unemployment. The model developed by Pissarides (2000), and based on 
neoclassical growth theory, shows that a growth in labour productivity increases the 
value of hiring an employee for firms. In other words, an increase in growth raises the 
capitalised returns from creating jobs, inducing a faster exit rate from unemployment. 
Therefore, as a result of higher growth, firms increase the number of vacancies posted 
and unemployment declines. More economic growth requires more R&D which, in turn, 
requires more labour and leads to more employment. This negative effect of growth on 
unemployment is known as the capitalisation effect. The model developed by Aghion 
and Howitt (1994), based on the endogenous growth theory (Aghion and Howitt, 1992), 
compares the two competing effects of growth on unemployment. The first is the 
capitalisation effect and the second is the creative destruction effect. According to the 
latter effect, an increase in economic growth may reduce the duration of a job match,
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raising the level of unemployment both directly, by raising the lay-off rate (job- 
separation rate), and indirectly, by discouraging the creation of job vacancies and hence 
reducing the job-finding rate. Increased growth reduces the life expectancy of a firm and 
thus increases unemployment. In Aghion and Howitt’s model (1994), growth results 
from the introduction of innovative production systems and of new technologies that 
require labour reallocation for their implementation. The balance between the 
capitalisation and the creative destruction effect depends on the costs of 
implementation, which vary widely across firms, industries and sectors (Mortensen and 
Pissarides, 1994).
Many other factors are likely to influence the causal relationship between 
unemployment and growth, such as saving behaviour (Bean and Pissarides, 1993), trade 
unions (Bean and Crafts, 1995), labour market policy (Mortensen, 2005) and 
immigration (Bencivenga and Smith, 1997). For instance, if people who are not 
economically active leave regions with low levels of GDP per capita and join those with 
high levels, GDP per capita and growth will increase in the former and decrease in the 
latter (Fagerberg et al., 1997). However, if some people are more productive and 
innovative than others because, for example, they are better educated, growth might 
decrease (Fagerberg et al., 1997).
The empirical research on the relationship between unemployment and growth has 
yielded mixed results. Bean and Pissarides (1993) find no correlation between 
unemployment and productivity growth across OECD economies. Muscatelli and Tirelli 
(2001) and Mauro and Carmeci (2003) provide evidence of a negative unemployment- 
growth relationship, while Caballero (1993) and Hoon and Phelps (1997) find a positive 
relationship. Therefore, there is no consensus regarding the sign of the correlation 
between unemployment and growth.
7,2,2 Physical Capital-related Variables: Transport Infrastructures
The impact of transport infrastructures on economic growth is different for motorways 
and railways and is a highly complex issue involving aspects of public-good provision, 
the generation of externalities, political decision-making and long time periods 
(McCann and Shefer, 2004).
Most studies have accepted the position that transport infrastructures contribute 
positively to economic growth. The pioneering studies of Aschauer (1989a, 1989b) 
concluded that public capital (including transport infrastructures) was a factor of
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enormous importance in explaining the evolution of economic growth in the United 
States. Later studies (Duffydeno and Eberts, 1991; Banister and Berechman, 2000) 
provided additional evidence for the results obtained by Aschauer. The theoretical 
background on the positive relationship between transport infrastructures and economic 
growth is multifarious. First, the net benefits associated with the public transport 
infrastructure are related to increases in the net local income, which stem from either 
private investments due to the reductions in transport costs and travel times or positive 
externalities as the income of the non-users of the infrastructure may increase due to 
increases in local demand on the part of the infrastructure users (McCann and Shefer, 
2004). Second, investments in transportation change the relative accessibility of a 
region. An increase in the level of connectivity implies a greater ability on the part of 
local firms to develop profitable market relationships with firms and consumers either 
within or between regions. In other words, a high quality transport infrastructure creates 
opportunities for interaction among firms and customers. Firms that are located in areas 
with a better infrastructure will be more integrated into the market system and more 
exposed to competition and, thus, under more pressure to improve productivity 
(Deichmann et al., 2004). Greater choice, innovation and intellectual opportunities for 
agents imply the development of inter-regional and intra-regional linkages, and thus 
higher growth (Vickerman 1991). When the road and rail infrastructure improves the 
relative accessibility of a region, it can provide for an increased rate of return on 
investments relative to other competing locations (McCann and Shefer, 2004: 181). 
Additional mobile resources (either capital or labour) from outside the region may be 
attracted to the area with the new infrastructure. This immigration of factors contributes 
to regional growth. Based on this evidence, where transport infrastructure facilities are 
developed, it is easier for entrepreneurs to adopt new technologies and, consequently, 
this generates technical progress and regional economic growth (Demurger, 2001). 
Third, poor resource endowments may lead to limited access to educational and 
socioeconomic opportunities. Transport infrastructures offset some of the inherent 
disadvantages of lagging regions, because they connect remote regions to urban areas 
(Henderson et al., 2001). Fourth, transport infrastructures reinforce the cumulative 
causation process. Firms produce more efficiently and workers enjoy higher levels of 
welfare by being linked to large markets through a good transport infrastructure 
network. The large markets are, in turn, those where more firms and workers are 
located. Fifth, a good infrastructure network across regions might imply efficiency in 
the transportation of inputs (labour and capital) as well as potential increases in their
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price, and thus a higher growth rate. Transport facilities for both passengers and freight 
are usually critical to the competitiveness and prosperity of a region (European 
Commission, 1999). Without a good infrastructure network, problems of both 
inefficiency and competitiveness may impede economic development (Demurger,
2001). Therefore, infrastructure can contribute to growth, either directly as a measurable 
final product, or indirectly as an intermediate input, because infrastructure enhances the 
productivity of all other inputs in producing output (Wang, 2002) and it generates 
positive externalities. In other words, the first impact comes from the construction 
expenditure, while the second comes from the costs and revenues associated with its 
operation (Puga, 2002).
The results of some studies, either at national or at regional levels, seem to contradict 
the widely accepted hypothesis that investment in the transport infrastructure always 
favours high rates of economic growth (Holtz-Eakin, 1994; Holtz-Eakin and Lovely, 
1996). However, while a transport infrastructure may encourage development in under­
developed regions, its construction alone will not be enough to bring about any desired 
economic changes (McCann and Shefer, 2004: 179). Other factors such as the resource 
endowments of the region, the economic climate in the region, the prices of the input 
factors of production, government policies and underlying infrastructure tend to 
determine the economic viability of a region, far more than its transport infrastructures 
(Vickerman, 1991; McCann and Shefer, 2004). Complementary actions and policies 
need to be taken to ensure that lagging regions are in a position to profit from the 
opportunities created by improvements in road and rail transport (European 
Commission, 1999). Additionally, the benefits of a good transport infrastructure are not 
necessarily unlimited. If infrastructure investments increase the rate of growth, this does 
not imply that further investments will increase growth even more (Puga, 2002). Some 
of the more central regions of the EU arguably face constraints on future economic 
development, despite high levels of transport infrastructure endowment, because of the 
inability of the structure in place to cope with further economic growth (European 
Commission, 1999). The nature of road infrastructure tends to mean that there are 
capacity limits, beyond which negative externalities (i.e. congestion costs) start to 
dominate. Productivity will decline as congestion exceeds a certain threshold level 
(Glaeser and Kohlhase, 2004). Hence congestion on urban roads may have a negative 
impact on productivity and thus lead to a negative growth rate. The existing transport 
infrastructure may become obsolete because of high spatial movements of the 
population and business activity or a change in technology (McCann and Shefer, 2004).
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According to Puga (2002: 396), a better connection between two regions with different 
economic development levels not only gives firms in a remote region better access to 
the inputs and markets of more developed regions, but also makes it easier for firms in 
richer regions to supply poorer regions at a distance, and can thus harm the 
industrialisation prospects of less developed areas.
A network of transport infrastructures may indirectly influence regional economic 
growth either positively or negatively, through other public infrastructures such as the 
public buildings for education and hospitals. A public infrastructure investment in a 
region has effects not only on that region, but also on other regions connected by a 
network (Hulten, 1991). Regional spillovers can exist insofar as the network can 
generate positive or negative external effects beyond the regions where infrastructures 
are located.
Reverse causation in growth-infrastructure relationship might matter. Not only may 
public infrastructure influence regional economic growth, but growth is also likely to 
affect the expansion of public investments. The existing empirical evidence (Duffy- 
Deno and Eberts, 1991; Holtz-Eakin, 1994; Looney, 1997) remains ambiguous as to 
whether a positive correlation indicates that the public infrastructure raises private 
output or a rise in private output raises the demand for infrastructure (Wang, 2002). It is 
not clear in which direction the causal relationship runs. The nature of the causal link is 
still a subject of debate (European Commission, 1999). Looney (1997), for instance, 
found that public facilities expanded largely in response to the needs of the private 
sector.
There are many characteristics that distinguish road from rail infrastructure. Those 
characteristics may distinguish the impact of road infrastructure on growth from that of 
a rail network. First of all, a motorway is a light transport infrastructure, while railway 
is a heavy one. According to Puga (2002), the road infrastructure is likely to have a 
more substantial effect on the spatial allocation of production, and hence on regional 
inequalities. Lynde and Richmond (1992) have argued that public capital can play an 
important complementary role in the productivity of the regional private sector. The 
complementary role of road infrastructures in productivity is more significant than the 
role of rail infrastructure, because the services of the former are mostly freely 
distributed to private producers. The sunk infrastructure cost of railways (especially 
high-speed rail) is higher than the cost of roads. The value of the transportation 
infrastructure can vary significantly, not only among different forms of transport, but
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also from sector to sector and firm to firm (McCann and Shefer, 2004). For example, 
high-speed rail lines are generally not suitable for the transportation of goods, and are 
thus unlikely to have much effect on the location of industry (Puga, 2002).
According to the European Commission (1999), the simplest measure of infrastructure 
is the physical scale of provision in relation to the potential use. Physical measures of 
the existing transport stock are used, as in Biehl’s (1986) analysis. More specifically, 
road stock (ROAD) is measured as the average (between 1995 and 2000) of the length 
of road-motorways per square kilometre, while rail capital (RAIL) is measured as the 
average (between 1995 and 2000) of the length of railways per square kilometer. Both 
variables are assumed to be fixed and are extracted from the Eurostat’s dataset. 
However, since the transport infrastructure of 1995-2000 had been constructed over a 
great many years, it may reflect lagged requirements and patterns of development rather 
than current and prospective ones (European Commission, 1999).
The physical scale measurement does not give a clear picture of infrastructure stock, 
because it is extremely difficult to approach an estimation of the qualitative 
characteristics of the infrastructure capacity (Rovolis and Spence, 2002: 394). Questions 
related to infrastructure measurements remain open to analysis in greater depth 
(Haughwout, 1998; European Commission, 1999; Haughwout, 2002).92 Nevertheless, 
neither the indicators of scale nor of quality can convey how suitable the existing 
transport endowment in any region is to its regional development needs (European 
Commission, 1999: 122). Therefore, the indicators devised need to be interpreted with 
caution.
7.2.2.1 Road Infrastructure
Most of the passenger and freight traffic in the EU travels by road. In 1996, for 
example, nearly 75 per cent of freight movements and more than 85 per cent of 
passenger movements were made by car (European Commission, 1999). A good road 
network is not only beneficial in itself, but it is also important to ensure effective use of 
other forms of transport (European Commission, 1999). Figure 7.1 shows the spatial 
distribution of road infrastructure (ROAD). The economically stronger regions in the
92 Indicators o f quality are more tricky to define. For the rail network, the extent o f electrification and 
the number o f separate tracks, which affect both the speed o f the service and its carrying capacity, can be 
used to give a reasonable indication of quality (European Commission, 1999: 122).
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EU, with higher levels o f  income and human capital, such as the city-regions, are 
generally better endowed than lagging and peripheral regions. The road infrastructure in 
Region Bruxelles-capitale, Vlaams Gewest, Bremen, Hamburg, Nordrhein-Westfalen, 
Comunidad de Madrid, Greater Manchester and the West Midlands is the densest. The 
road network in Belgium, Luxemburg and Germany is over twice as extensive as the 
EU average. By contrast, the network is much less extensive in Greece, Ireland, 
Scotland and northern Sweden. Roads tend to be concentrated not only in the more 
central areas with higher levels o f  economic activity, but also in the more peripheral 
areas like in the Spanish Este and Sur. To sum up, differences in road infrastructure are 
recognised as probably contributing significantly to variations in regional 
competitiveness and economic growth.
Figure 7.1: Spatial Distribution of the Road Infrastructure
ROAD: length of road-motorways per square kilometre (1995-2000)
I I 0 .0 0 0 0 -  0.0051
| I 0 .0 0 5 2 -  0.0153
I | 0 .0 1 5 4 -  0.0296
H  0 .0 2 9 7  - 0.0488  
■ ■  0 .0 4 8 9 -  0.0816  
0 .0 8 1 7 -  0 .1265  
| I No data
7.2.2.2 Rail Infrastructure
Figure 7.2 shows the geographical distribution o f  the rail infrastructure (RAIL) . The 
rail network in lie de France, Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Luxemburg and Ostosterreich is the 
most extensive in the EU, while it is much less extensive in Greece, Ireland, Scotland 
and northern Sweden (in Mellersta Norrland and Ovre Norrland). The disparities in 
economic development are closely linked to geographical location and accessibility 
through a rail network, in the sense that the more peripheral and the less accessible the 
region, the lower its economic development. Finally, the rail network is much more 
extensive in large urban areas like lie de France.
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Figure 7.2: Spatia l D istribu tion  of the Rail In fra s tru c tu re
RAIL: length of railways per square
0 .0 1 2 6 -  0.0231  
0 .0232  - 0 .0344  
0 .0345  - 0 .0486  
0 .0 4 8 7 -  0 .0610  
0.0611 - 0 .0765  
0 .0 7 6 6 -  0.1531  
No data
7.2.3 Other Variables
One recurring theme in the literature on economic growth has been the topic o f  
urbanisation, geography and institutions. One o f  the major difficulties is that multiple 
social, economic and political linkages exist between inequality and growth, and 
urbanisation, geography and institutions all exert an influence upon them. The empirical 
evidence in this area has been very thin.
7.2.3.1 Urbanisation
The role played by urbanisation (or economic agglomeration at the city level) in 
economic growth has been emphasised by urban economists (Henderson, 1988; Fujita 
and Thisse, 2002), development economists (Williamson, 1988), growth economists 
(Lucas, 1988) and economic historians (Hohenberg and Lees, 1985), among others. The 
main conclusion o f  this vast literature is, without a doubt, that growth and urbanisation 
are mutually self-reinforcing processes.
First o f  all, agglomeration in one region is likely to spur economic growth because it 
reduces the costs o f  innovation, infrastructure, information and transactions in that 
region through technological and pecuniary externalities.93 This trend is evinced most
93 The former ‘deal with the effects o f nonmarket interactions that are realised through processes 
directly affecting the utility o f an individual’, while the latter ‘are by-products o f market interactions' and 
'arise from imperfect competition’ (Fujita and Thisse, 2002: 8). Pecuniary externalities in Europe are 
determined by the intensity of returns to scale, market power and factor mobility (Fujita and Thisse, 2002: 
9).
kilometre
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especially in the writings of the new growth and NEG theorists. Improvements in 
transport and communications processes, for instance, tend to reinforce the clustering of 
economic activity by widening the market range of any given centre and by helping to 
spark off new rounds of specialisation in established urban areas (Scott and Storper, 
2003: 582). Cities also allow goods, ideas and people to come together for the purposes 
of exchange and production (Polese, 2005). This allows regions to reap the gains of 
trade and specialisation, increasing economic development. Cities, moreover, foster and 
facilitate flows of local knowledge, ideas and innovations, the creation of dense social 
networks and the production of behavioural and cultural change. In cities, people have 
face-to-face contact, which is a fundamental prerequisite of tacit knowledge spillovers. 
Interaction between people promotes innovation, continually pushing up productivity 
and growth (Jacobs, 1970). Although the advent of new information and communication 
technologies have enormously increased the quantity, complexity and variety of the 
information and knowledge generated, face-to-face contact complements rather than 
substitutes for each other form of contact, such as an e-mail contact (Learner and 
Storper, 2001; McCann and Shefer, 2005).
Urbanisation is also likely to spur economic growth when its economic benefits 
outweigh its costs. On the one hand, the economic benefits of urbanisation arise due to 
the presence of knowledge spillovers among firms in an industry (Marshall, 1890), a 
buildup of knowledge and ideas associated with historical diversity (Jacobs, 1970), the 
local competition of an industry (Porter, 1989) and the lower infrastructure, 
information, transaction, training and recruitment costs (Polese, 2005). However, people 
may move to cities for reasons unrelated to their economic performance, for example, 
for the schools and local amenities. City life produces behavioural and cultural change 
such as changes in family structures and in religious beliefs. On the other hand, the 
costs of urbanisation arise due to the commuting expenditures within cities, the 
substantial pollution and the pervasive traffic congestion (Bertinelli and Black, 2004). 
The economic costs also arise from the pressure posed by geographic concentration on 
urban factor markets that bids up prices and from dispersed demand (Martin and 
Ottaviano, 2001).
Therefore, cities act as locations where technological, economic and social innovations 
are developed (Brauninger and Niebuhr, 2005), enhancing the economic chances and 
opportunities of working people. Face-to-face interaction and ‘tacit knowledge’ promote
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innovation, productivity and economic development. Additionally, wages in cities are 
expected to be higher than in rural areas due to home market effects.
Nevertheless, reverse causation in the positive growth-urbanisation relationship is a 
subject of debate. Economic growth is likely to foster agglomeration, because as the 
sector at the origin of innovation expands, new firms tend to locate close to that sector 
(Martin and Ottaviano, 2001). The gains for a particular firm of being located in an 
urban area are scale economies due to greater market size, flexible and rapid input 
relationships and the presence of a large and diversified labour pool. The continuing 
agglomeration of human capital produces increasing returns to firms. The 
agglomeration of talented and educated individuals in specific areas encourages firms 
(i.e. research centres) to locate in those areas, and vice versa. According to the NEG 
context, the positive relationship indicates that the centripetal forces (i.e. knowledge 
spillovers and increasing returns to scale) are strong enough to offset the centrifugal 
forces (i.e. congestion and transportation costs).
A negative relationship between urbanisation and economic growth is likely to show 
that the centrifugal forces outweigh the centripetal ones. This relationship may highlight 
the rising costs of urban concentration due to pervasive traffic congestion, substantial 
pollution, escalating land prices, crime and family breakdown (Scott and Storper, 2003). 
For instance, the resource cost of transportation is likely to prevent a city from growing 
unboundedly (Palivos and Wang, 1996). Furthermore, public policy may shape the 
centripetal and centrifugal forces in various ways. Consequently, in many cases it is 
necessary to consider the relationship between public policies and economic growth 
(McCann and Shefer, 2004).
The city size also matters in the relationship between urbanisation and growth. Large 
cities depend more on ‘urbanisation’ economies,94 while small cities depend more on 
‘localisation’ economies (McCann and Shefer 2004).95 Large cities, for instance, are 
locomotives of the national economies within which they are situated, in that they are 
the sites of dense masses of interrelated economic activities (Scott and Storper, 2003: 
581). Large cities also offer a wider selection and better quality of the producer services
94 ‘Urbanisation’ economies refer to the gains derived from location in a large and diversified urban area 
(Polese 2005).
95 ‘Localisation’ economies refer to the between-industry specific economies, which are also called 
Marshallian scale economies (Polese, 2005).
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that are essential to technological innovation than the smaller ones. The level of 
urbanisation differs across space because only a few regions are able to attract 
investments in innovation and to acquire production capacity (Scott and Storper, 2003: 
584). Uneven densities of agglomerations can influence the overall rates of regional 
economic growth through locational interdependencies. Additionally, the particular 
patterns of agglomeration vary widely depending on historical path dependencies 
.(Fujita et al., 1999).
To sum up, conventional theories on the positive or negative relationship between 
urbanisation and economic growth have favoured the view that a circular causation 
between growth and a concentration of economic activities sets in. However, the causal 
link between these two processes is not clear cut (Jacobs, 1970), as urbanisation and 
economic growth seem so interconnected (Henderson, 2003). The dominant role of 
cities is the formation of new ideas, new initiatives and new firms, through the 
generation of strong systems of externalities. Cities are critical foundations of the 
regional economic development process. Urbanisation is a fundamental and ambiguous 
constituent of economic growth.
7.2.3.2 Geographical Variables such as Latitude
Latitude may be an important source of economic growth either directly or indirectly 
through its role in shaping the distribution of European income and education. The 
growth-latitude relationship has, in fact, been adopted in an international setting. A 
number of cross-country studies have found latitude to be an important factor in 
accounting for differences in cross-country economic growth rates. Considering latitude 
as a good proxy for the effect of a region’s climate on its level of productive efficiency, 
Gallup et al. (1999), Masters and McMillan (2001) and Sachs et al. (2001) have found 
that the tropical climate zones are confronted with high rates of infectious disease and 
low agricultural productivity. Nordhaus (1993) and Hall and Jones (1999), on the other 
hand, find that latitude contributed little to economic growth.
7.2.3.3 Some Institutional Variables
The aim of this next subsectionis to investigate the effects of the welfare state, religion 
and family structure on growth.
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(1) The Welfare State and Growth
Many scholars (i.e. Atkinson, 1995; Fic and Ghate, 2005) argue that the expansion of 
welfare state regimes is one of the elements found to be responsible for slow economic 
growth, while contracting welfare state regimes are associated with high economic 
growth. Other scholars (i.e. Herce et al., 2001), by contrast, have found a positive 
correlation between the welfare state and the economic growth. The positive benefits 
provided by the welfare state are the provision of security, poverty alleviation, income 
redistribution and expenditures on healthcare and education. The major criticisms are 
based on the fact that the welfare state introduces undesired rigidity in the functioning 
of labour markets, increases the size of government at the risk of inefficiency and its 
structure leads to disincentives (Atkinson, 1995). The funding of the welfare state 
programmes augments the amount of revenue to be raised, and so the magnitude of tax 
distortions. Thus, the welfare programmes may lead to cumulative deficits and 
mounting public debts (Dreze and Malinvaud, 1994: 95). It is difficult to disentangle the 
mixture of incentives and disincentives of the welfare state because it is a conglomerate 
of different targeted programmes (Herce et al., 2001). The expansion of the welfare 
state is a political decision that has an impact on the allocation of resources (Sandmo, 
1995; Romer, 2003). A retrenchment in state spending on social security is, in some 
cases, necessary, despite the pressure for redistributive spending.
(2) Religion and Growth
Can religious beliefs and behaviours affect a society’s economic growth? Do cultural 
factors explain the inter-regional differences in rates of economic development? The 
mechanism behind the religion and growth relationship is that religious beliefs and 
behaviours affect certain cultural values, attitudes and beliefs, which, in turn, influence 
one’s economic decision-making and, thus, economic outcomes (Mangeloja, 2005). 
Less empirical evidence has been produced on the relationship between religion and 
growth. Weber (1930) first introduced the relationship between religion and growth 
when he wrote about a positive relationship between Protestantism and growth. Based 
on a cross-national study of 63 former colonies, Grier (1997) found evidence that 
Protestantism is positively related to economic growth. Other scolars (i.e. Morse, 1964; 
Harrison, 1985) have highlighted the negative correlation between Catholicism and 
economic progress. They argue that the characteristics of Catholicism make it less 
conducive to the work ethic and economic development than Protestantism. Blum and 
Dudley (2001), in endeavouring to explain urban growth in early-modern Europe
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(between 1500 and 1750), note falling wages in Catholic cities and rising wages in 
Protestant cities.
(3) Family Structure and Growth
Does the family structure affect economic growth directly or indirectly through income 
and educational inequalities? Family structure is shaped by marriage, divorce, fertility 
and childrearing, which influence the socioeconomic activities of a person. Taken on 
average, those activities may reflect regional economic growth rates. Additionally, 
family structure is one of the most important determinants of achievement motivation 
and skills, and thus a determinant of productivity and growth (Elder, 1965). Greif 
(2006), for example, has shown that family structure and institutions are the foundations 
of economic growth.
7.3 Regression Results: Growth and Income and Educational 
inequality
This section explores the impact of inequality in income and education on regional 
economic growth. It is given by the following model.
GGR2Ilt = /?,' Incpcit + fi2' Inclneqit + EducAtt „ + /?4' Educlneqjt + P f x it + uit
with i denoting regions (i = l,...,N )  and t time (t = 1,...,3);96 GGR2Iit is regional 
economic growth; IncpcH is income per capita; Inclneqit is income inequality; 
EducAtt„ is educational attainment; Educlneqit is educational inequality; xit is a vector 
of control variables (see Table 6.2 including the transport infrastructure variables: road 
and rail infrastructure); /?, 5 are coefficients; and uit is the composite error.
The estimates of growth equations are pooled OLS, FEs and REs. To evaluate which 
technique is optimal, it is necessary to consider the relationship between the unobserved 
effect and the regressors.
(1) Introducing into the model the distribution o f education level completed, the p- 
values of Breusch and Pagan’s Lagrange multiplier test accept the validity of the pooled 
OLS estimates. Hence, the unobserved effect is uncorrelated with the explanatory
96 t = 1 denotes 1996, t = 2 denotes 1998 and t = 3 denotes 2000.
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variables and each region is independent and identically distributed, ignoring the panel 
structure of the data and the information it provides (Johnston and Dinardo, 1997). 
Table 7.1 depicts the OLS regression results when independent variables are the income 
per capita of the population as a whole (IMN) ,  income inequality for the population as 
a whole {IGEX), average education level completed (EMN) and inequality in education 
level completed (EGEl), while Table 7.2 shows the OLS results when independent 
variables are income per capita of normally working people {NM N), income inequality 
for normally working people {NGEX), average education level completed {EMN) and 
inequality in education level completed (EGEl). The FEs and REs results of the former 
model are reported in Appendices A7.1 and A7.3, respectively; whereas, the FEs and 
REs results of the latter model are reported in Appendices A7.2 and A7.4.
(2) Introducing into the model the distribution o f the age at which the highest education 
level was completed, the statistical evidence favours the FEs estimates. Additionally, the 
p-values of Hausman’s test accept the GLS estimator as an appropriate alternative to the 
FEs estimator. Table 7.3 depicts the OLS, FEs and REs results when independent 
variables are income per capita {IMN and NM N), income inequality 
{IGE\ and NGEX), the average age at which the highest education level was completed 
{AMN) and inequality in the respective age {AGEX), only. The OLS, FEs and REs 
results of the model, which also includes the control variables, are reported in Appendix 
A7.5.
Finally, there is not much difference between the significance of the homoskedasticity 
and the heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator, showing that the 
determinants of regional economic growth are robust to the model specification about 
the error term.
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Table 7.1: OLS: Dependent Variable is GGR2I and Independent Variables are IMNJLN, IGE1,
EMN and EGEl
(1) (FEs) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
IMN_LN -0.0480
(0.0208)**
(0.0213)**
0.0011
(0.0114)
(0.0153)
0.0011
(0.0114)
(0.0153)
0.0022
(0.0118)
(0.0157)
0.0028
(0.0117)
(0.0163)
-0.0013
(0.0130)
(0.0172)
IGE1 0.1697
(0.0701)**
(0.0618)***
0.0644
(0.0236)***
(0.0252)**
0.0635
(0.0244)**
(0.0258)**
0.0575
(0.0289)**
(0.0278)**
0.1031
(0.0308)***
(0.0292)***
0.0981
(0.0338)***
(0.0320)***
EMN 0.0542
(0.0173)***
(0.0160)***
0.0782
(0.0196)***
(0.0198)***
0.0778
(0.0198)***
(0.0201)***
0.0804
(0.0209)***
(0.0213)***
0.0559
(0.0228)**
(0.0243)**
0.0635
(0.0229)***
(0.0235)***
EGEl 0.0625
(0.0114)***
(0.0119)***
0.0644
(0.0122)***
(0.0122)***
0.0645
(0.0123)***
(0.0125)***
0.0666
(0.0134)***
(0.0135)***
0.0604
(0.0142)***
(0.0161)***
0.0613
(0.0151)***
(0.0165)***
AGE -0.0002
(0.0013)
(0.0013)
-0.0004
(0.0014)
(0.0013)
0.0005
(0.0014)
(0.0014)
-0.0002
(0.0014)
(0.0014)
LFSTOCK -0.0222
(0.0575)
(0.0544)
ECACRA 0.0015
(0.0007)**
(0.0008)*
UNEM -0.0811
(0.1013)
(0.0885)
INACTIVE
ECACRF 0.0008
(0.0006)
(0.0007)
ROAD
(fixed)
RAIL
(fixed)
URBANDPAV
(fixed)
LAT
(fixed)
DWSLIB
DWSCORP
DWSRES
DRLCATH
DRLORTH
DRLANGL
DFNC
DFSC
CONSTANT 0.1491
(0.0562)***
(0.0580)**
0.0105
(0.0214)
(0.0208)
-0.0365
(0.0401)
(0.0442)
-0.0257
(0.0764)
(0.0721)
-0.0110
(0.0855)
(0.0752)
-0.1447
(0.0899)
(0.0815)*
-0.0544
(0.0933)
(0.0916)
ADJ R-SQ 0.0533 0.1129 0.1327 0.1298 0.1273 0.1647 0.1546
OBS. 306 298 298 298 298 270 270
LM TEST 
(p-value)
4.94
(0.0262)
0.20
(0.6536)
0.02
(0.8845)
0.03
(0.8624)
0.04
(0.8482)
0.08
(0.7840)
0.08
(0.7818)
HAUSMAN
TEST
(p-value)
6.11
(0.0471)
3.89
(0.1428)
18.89
(0.0008)
25.24
(0.0001)
30.23
(0.0000)
27.31
(0.0001)
44.31
(0.0000)
Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (*), (**) and (***) denote the significance of the 
White (1980) estimator. LM TEST is the Lagrange Multiplier test for the random effects model based on the OLS residuals (Breusch and 
Pagan, 1980). HAUSMAN TEST is the Hausman (1978) test for fixed or random effects.
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(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
IMN_LN 0.0000
(0.0117)
(0.0171)
0.0390
(0.0244)
(0.0386)
-0.0180
(0.0203)
(0.0202)
-0.0028
(0.0136)
(0.0173)
-0.0181
(0.0162)
(0.0191)
0.0096
(0.0146)
(0.0203)
-0.0044
(0.0161)
(0.0203)
IGE1 0.0749
(0.0345)**
(0.0323)**
0.1384
(0.0474)***
(0.0613)**
0.1409
(0.0476)***
(0.0439)***
0.1045
(0.0379)***
(0.0395)***
0.1313
(0.0347)***
(0.0313)***
0.0918
(0.0356)**
(0.0320)***
0.1021
(0.0361)***
(0.0315)***
EMN 0.0726
(0.0228)***
(0.0233)***
0.0630
(0.0479)
(0.0605)
0.0492
(0.0292)*
(0.0314)
0.0634
(0.0229)***
(0.0236)***
0.0237
(0.0273)
(0.0297)
0.0290
(0.0282)
(0.0289)
0.0623
(0.0242)**
(0.0240)**
EGE1 0.0631
(0.0140)***
(0.0157)***
0.0410
(0.0245)*
(0.0225)*
0.0350
(0.0194)*
(0.0210)*
0.0619
(0.0152)***
(0.0166)***
0.0384
(0.0167)**
(0.0201)*
0.0502
(0.0180)***
(0.0212)**
0.0602
(0.0158)***
(0.0172)***
AGE -0.0025
(0.0017)
(0.0015)*
0.0000
(0.0018)
(0.0019)
-0.0002
(0.0014)
(0.0015)
0.0011
(0.0015)
(0.0015)
0.0000
(0.0015)
(0.0016)
-0.0001
(0.0015)
(0.0015)
LFSTOCK
ECACRA
UNEM -0.1199
(0.1718)
(0.1486)
-0.0808
(0.1015)
(0.0891)
-0.0097
(0.1127)
(0.1091)
0.0646
(0.1142)
(0.1028)
-0.0862
(0.1075)
(0.0925)
INACTIVE 0.2355
(0.0890)***
(0.0778)***
ECACRF 0.0017
(0.0006)***
(0.0007)**
0.0018
(0.0008)**
(0.0008)**
0.0008
(0.0006)
(0.0007)
0.0005
(0.0007)
(0.0007)
0.0010
(0.0006)
(0.0007)
0.0008
(0.0007)
(0.0008)
ROAD
(fixed)
0.2324
(0.4618)
(0.4617)
RAIL
(fixed)
-0.4222
(0.2435)*
(0.2475)*
URBANDPAV
(fixed)
0.0315
(0.0167)*
(0.0166)*
LAT
(fixed)
0.0003
(0.0008)
(0.0010)
DWSLIB 0.0087
(0.0146)
(0.0189)
DWSCORP -0.0159
(0.0137)
(0.0169)
DWSRES -0.0422
(0.0213)**
(0.0230)*
DRLCATH 0.0066
(0.0091)
(0.0074)
DRLORTH 0.0296
(0.0175)*
(0.0153)*
DRLANGL 0.0211
(0.0098)**
(0.0108)*
DFNC -0.0007
(0.0137)
(0.0173)
DFSC -0.0042
(0.0133)
(0.0146)
CONSTANT -0.1011
(0.0830)
(0.0765)
-0.1030
(0.0814)
(0.1024)
-0.0724
(0.1225)
(0.1172)
-0.0701
(0.1022)
(0.1053)
-0.0125
(0.1004)
(0.0950)
-0.0802
(0.0943)
(0.0883)
-0.0496
(0.0986)
(0.0930)
ADJ R-SQ 0.1746 0.0716 0.1512 0.1518 0.1941 0.1680 0.1484
OBS. 270 114 163 270 270 270 270
LM TEST 
(p-value)
0.00
(0.9903)
1.93
(0.1642)
0.42
(0.5194)
0.09
(0.7598)
0.00
(0.9934)
0.03
(0.8594)
0.11
(0.7455)
HAUSMAN
TEST
(p-value)
34.96
(0.0000)
Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (*), (**) and (***) denote the significance of the 
White (1980) estimator. LM TEST is the Lagrange Multiplier test for the random effects model based on the OLS residuals (Breusch and 
Pagan, 1980). HAUSMAN TEST is the Hausman (1978) test for fixed or random effects.
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Table 7.2: OLS: Dependent Variable is GGR2I and Independent Variables are NMN_LN, NGE1,
EMN and EGE1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
NMN_LN -0.0136
(0.0076)*
(0.0095)
0.0009
(0.0116)
(0.0156)
0.0010
(0.0117)
(0.0156)
0.0031
(0.0117)
(0.0158)
0.0027
(0.0120)
(0.0166)
0.0030
(0.0130)
(0.0169)
NGE1 0.1450
(0.0346)***
(0.0356)***
0.0980
(0.0376)**
(0.0408)**
0.0974
(0.0376)**
(0.0407)**
0.0853
(0.0384)**
(0.0407)**
0.1084
(0.0402)***
(0.0419)**
0.1022
(0.0416)**
(0.0434)**
EMN 0.0542
(0.0173)***
(0.0160)***
0.0528
(0.0176)***
(0.0180)***
0.0524
(0.0176)***
(0.0180)***
0.0694
(0.0209)***
(0.0213)***
0.0446
(0.0231)*
(0.0245)*
0.0550
(0.0233)**
(0.0238)**
EGE1 0.0625 
(0.0114)*** 
(0.0119)***
0.0529
(0.0132)***
(0.0142)***
0.0539
(0.0133)***
(0.0145)***
0.0614
(0.0142)***
(0.0151)***
0.0589
(0.0150)***
(0.0174)***
0.0630
(0.0154)***
(0.0174)***
AGE -0.0011
(0.0013)
(0.0013)
-0.0013
(0.0013)
(0.0012)
-0.0009
(0.0013)
(0.0013)
-0.0009
(0.0014)
(0.0014)
LFSTOCK -0.0682
(0.0455)
(0.0443)
ECACRA 0.0004
(0.0005)
(0.0006)
UNEM -0.0010
(0.0987)
(0.0882)
INACTIVE
ECACRF 0.0000
(0.0005)
(0.0005)
ROAD
(fixed)
RAIL
(fixed)
URBANDPAV
(fixed)
LAT
(fixed)
DWSLIB
DWSCORP
DWSRES
DRLCATH
DRLORTH
DRLANGL
DFNC
DFSC
CONSTANT 0.1032
(0.0248)***
(0.0303)***
0.0105
(0.0214)
(0.0208)
-0.0054
(0.0394)
(0.0433)
0.0460
(0.0705)
(0.0620)
0.0668
(0.0717)
(0.0608)
0.0072
(0.0751)
(0.0644)
0.0183
(0.0872)
(0.0847)
ADJ R-SQ 0.0962 0.1129 0.1271 0.1264 0.1301 0.1498 0.1448
OBS. 306 298 298 298 298 270 270
LM TEST 
(p-value)
2.06
(0.1510)
0.20
(0.6536)
0.03
(0.8644)
0.07
(0.7928)
0.05
(0.8147)
0.47
(0.4933)
0.52
(0.4712)
HAUSMAN
TEST
(p-value)
2.77
(0.2506)
3.89
(0.1428)
10.75
(0.0295)
18.66
(0.0022)
25.98
(0.0002)
23.32
(0.0007)
39.97
(0.0000)
Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (*), (**), and (***) denote the significance of the 
White (1980) estimator. LM TEST is the Lagrange Multiplier test for the random effects model, based on the OLS residuals (Breusch and 
Pagan, 1980). HAUSMAN TEST is the Hausman (1978) test for fixed or random effects.
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(8) (9) (10) 0 1 ) (12) (13) (14)
NMN_LN -0.0022
(0.0120)
(0.0175)
0.0267
(0.0227)
(0.0348)
-0.0141
(0.0206)
(0.0217)
0.0044
(0.0135)
(0.0168)
-0.0066
(0.0158)
(0.0180)
0.0141
(0.0143)
(0.0194)
0.0072
(0.0156)
(0.0189)
NGE1 0.0830 
(0.0411)** 
(0.0418)**
0.1787
(0.0629)***
(0.0689)**
0.1601
(0.0542)***
(0.0559)***
0.0963
(0.0446)**
(0.0519)*
0.1278
(0.0435)***
(0.0448)***
0.0730
(0.0444)
(0.0486)
0.1005
(0.0452)**
(0.0431)**
EMN 0.0666
(0.0233)***
(0.0234)***
0.0157
(0.0444)
(0.0602)
0.0465
(0.0294)
(0.0315)
0.0556
(0.0234)**
(0.0243)**
0.0186
(0.0275)
(0.0305)
0.0293
(0.0285)
(0.0297)
0.0590
(0.0244)**
(0.0242)**
EGE1 0.0594
(0.0148)***
(0.0171)***
0.0121
(0.0248)
(0.0219)
0.0391
(0.0198)*
(0.0228)*
0.0625
(0.0155)***
(0.0173)***
0.0426
(0.0170)**
(0.0216)*
0.0570
(0.0183)***
(0.0230)**
0.0650
(0.0158)***
(0.0176)***
AGE -0.0034
(0.0016)**
(0.0014)**
-0.0011
(0.0019)
(0.0020)
-0.0008
(0.0014)
(0.0014)
-0.0002
(0.0015)
(0.0014)
-0.0008
(0.0015)
(0.0015)
-0.0010
(0.0015)
(0.0014)
LFSTOCK
ECACRA
UNEM 0.0867
(0.1660)
(0.1398)
-0.0063
(0.0999)
(0.0912)
0.0893
(0.1076)
(0.1040)
0.1160
(0.1088)
(0.0969)
-0.0076
(0.1022)
(0.0893)
INACTIVE 0.2570
(0.0883)***
(0.0793)***
ECACRF 0.0011
(0.0006)**
(0.0006)*
0.0007
(0.0007)
(0.0007)
0.0001
(0.0005)
(0.0006)
-0.0006
(0.0006)
(0.0007)
0.0003
(0.0005)
(0.0005)
0.0000
(0.0006)
(0.0007)
ROAD
(fixed)
0.5623
(0.4483)
(0.4625)
RAIL
(fixed)
-0.4232
(0.2396)*
(0.2356)*
URBANDPAV
(fixed)
0.0221
(0.0165)
(0.0163)
LAT
(fixed)
-0.0003
(0.0008)
(0.0010)
DWSLIB 0.0015
(0.0153)
(0.0189)
DWSCORP -0.0233
(0.0145)
(0.0174)
DWSRES -0.0370
(0.0222)*
(0.0242)
DRLCATH 0.0081
(0.0091)
(0.0073)
DRLORTH 0.0362
(0.0177)**
(0.0160)**
DRLANGL 0.0193
(0.0098)*
(0.0109)*
DFNC 0.0047
(0.0145)
(0.0176)
DFSC 0.0057
(0.0126)
(0.0133)
CONSTANT -0.0173
(0.0739)
(0.0678)
-0.0173
(0.0693)
(0.0836)
0.0406
(0.1173)
(0.1136)
0.0263
(0.0899)
(0.0885)
0.0967
(0.1015)
(0.0978)
-0.0158
(0.0893)
(0.0837)
0.0088
(0.0983)
(0.0928)
ADJ R-SQ 0.1716 0.0638 0.1314 0.1420 270 270 270
OBS. 270 114 163 270 0.1731 0.1585 0.1397
LM TEST 
(p-value)
0.05
(0.8163)
1.07
(0.3016)
1.62
(0.2035)
0.44
(0.5092)
0.31
(0.5751)
0.21
(0.6434)
0.35
(0.5513)
HAUSMAN
TEST
(p-value)
31.54
(0.0000)
Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (*), (**) and (***) denote the significance of the 
White (1980) estimator. LM TEST is the Lagrange Multiplier test for the random effects model based on the OLS residuals (Breusch and 
Pagan, 1980). HAUSMAN TEST is the Hausman (1978) test for fixed or random effects.
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Table 7.3: OLS, FEs and REs: Dependent Variable is GGR2I and Independent Variables are
IMNJLN, IGE1, NMN_LN, NGE1, AMN and AGE1
REGRESSION 1 REGRESSION 2 REGRESSION 3
(a) OLS (b)FEs (c) REs (a) OLS (b)FEs (c) REs (a) OLS (b)FEs (c) REs
IMNJLN -0.0216
(0.0103)**
(0.0122)*
-0.0249
(0.0197)
(0.0212)
-0.0203
(0.0106)+
(0.0125)
IGE1 0.0234
(0.0242)
(0.0241)
0.1764
(0.0686)**
(0.0587)***
0.0279
(0.0255)
(0.0250)
NMN_LN -0.0221
(0.0102)**
(0.0129)*
-0.0179
(0.0199)
(0.0226)
-0.0217
(0.0103)*+
(0.0130)*
NGE1 0.1260
(0.0388)***
(0.04/2)***
0.1019
(0.0711)
(0.0639)
0.1252
(0.0396)***
(0.0415)***
AMN -0.0059 
(0.0009)+** 
(0.0008)***
-0.0043
(0.0057)
(0.0041)
-0 0059 
(0.0010)*** 
(0.0009)***
-0.0031
(0.0013)*+
(0.0013)**
-0.0010
(0.0058)
(0.0043)
-0.0031
(0.0014)**
(0.0013)**
-0.0024
(0.0013)*
(0.0013)*
-0.0040
(0.0058)
(0.0042)
-0.0025
(0.0013)*
(0.0013)*
AGE1 0.0083
(0.1167)
(0.1212)
0.0893 
(0.4807) 
(0.4294)
0.0102
(0.1248)
(0.1301)
-0.3811
(0.1734)++
(0.2017)*
-0.1382
(0.4869)
(0.5100)
-0.3727
(0.1818)**
(0.0367)***
-0.3809
(0.1603)+*
(0.1910)**
0.0423
(0.4876)
(0.4698)
-0.3732
(0.1642)**
(0.1962)*
CONSTANT 0.2094
(0.0173)***
(0.0150)***
0.1772
(0.1019)*
(0.0763)**
0.2092
(0.0186)+**
(0.0162)***
0.2157
(0.0305)***
(0.0353)***
0.1144
(0.1110)
(0.0931)
0.2106 
(0.0321 )*♦♦ 
(0.2143)*
0.1913
(0.0306)***
(0.0393)***
0.1964
(0.1095)*
(0.0951)**
0.1910
(0.0312)*+*
(0.0397)***
ADJ R-SQ 0.1284 0.0034 0.1517 0.0515 0.1796 0.0196
OBS. 263 263 263
LM TEST 
(p-value)
6.64
(0.0100)
5.17
(0.0230)
3.10
(0.0782)
HAUSMAN
TEST
(p-value)
0.15
(0.9286)
6.85
(0.1441)
1.10
(0.8936)
Note: (+), (**) and (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (*), (**) and (***) denote the significance of the 
White (1980) estimator. LM TEST is the Lagrange Multiplier test for the random effects model based on the OLS residuals (Breusch and 
Pagan, 1980). HAUSMAN TEST is the Hausman (1978) test for fixed or random effects.
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7.3.1 Growth and Income Inequality
The analysis performed here addresses the following model.
GGR2Ijt = Px' Incpcjt + P2' Inclneqit +uit
Regression 1 of Table 7.1 and Table 7.2 illustrates the combined impact of the natural 
logarithm of income per capita, as in Forbes’ (2000) empirical study, and income 
inequality on regional economic growth.
The elasticity coefficient on income per capita for both models (either for the population 
as a whole {IMN _ LN) or for normally working people (NMN _ LN ))  is negative. It is 
likely to show some convergence in the EU. Poor regions may grow faster than rich 
ones (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956; Mankiw et al., 1992; Jones, 1997, 1998).
The findings also show the positive impact of income inequality (either for the 
population as a whole (IGE\) or for normally working people (NGEl)) on regional 
economic growth.97 Inequality seems to be fundamentally good for incentives and 
therefore should be viewed as being growth-enhancing (Mirrlees, 1971; Rebelo, 1991; 
Aghion et al., 1998). Public polices aimed at reducing income inequality may not be 
strong enough to provide negative incentives for economic efficiency that may harm 
growth. The positive inequality-growth relationship is indicative of a laissez-faire 
economy, in which government intervention is minimal. The results may support the 
view of classical economists who claim that a certain level of income inequality favours 
capital accumulation, because the rich agents have a higher marginal propensity to save 
compared to the poor, increasing aggregate savings and growth. The results also are 
inconsistent with the modem approach. More specifically, between 1996 and 2002, the 
European economy is in the later stages of economic development. At this stage, 
equality stimulates investment in human capital, which promotes growth, as human 
capital accumulation is greater if it is shared by the largest segment of the society. 
Therefore, according to the modem approach, the inequality-growth relationship does 
not have the expected sign. Income inequality has decreased slightly between 1995 and 
2000. To this end, Champemowne and Cowell (1998) argue that once people are
97 Considering the model GGR2Iit — Px' Incpcit + P f  Inclneqit + P5'x jt +ujn the elasticity
coefficient on income per capita is very sensitive to the inclusion o f additional variables, while the 
coefficient on income inequality is robust (the results are provided on request).
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accustomed to a degree of comfort they will regard it as a hardship to return to an earlier 
and lower standard of living. Thus, a reduction in income inequality (but usually rapid) 
is likely to slow down economic progress, highlighting the difficulty of the adjustment 
process. Finally, considering the political economy models, the higher the income 
inequality, the higher the rate of taxation, the greater the expenditure on public 
education programmes, the higher the public investment in human capital and the higher 
the (national) economic growth (Aghion and Bolton, 1990; Saint-Paul and Verdier, 
1993).
7.3.2 Growth and Educational Inequality
The analysis performed here addresses the combined impact of educational attainment 
and inequality as in the following model.
GGR2lit -  /?3' EducAttit + J34' Educlneqit + uit
(1) Regression 2 of Table 7.1 (or Table 7.2) illustrates the following model.
GGR2I, = ' EMN, + PA' EGE\, + uit
The positive coefficient on educational attainment (EMN) most probably reflects the 
fact that education is one of the most powerful instruments known for laying the basis 
for sustained growth (Hannum and Buchmann, 2005). This finding is consistent both 
with Lucas’ (1988) theory, which is inspired by Schultz’s (1963) and Becker’s (1964) 
theories, and also with the theory developed by Nelson et al. (1966), which is a rival to 
the Schumpeterian growth literature (Schumpeter, 1934), as it is based on the idea that 
growth is primarily driven by education. Although the capacity of a region to absorb or 
to generate technical progress is basically determined by its institutional environment, 
human capital stock is also a critical factor in determining the productive capacity of the 
regional economy, because it determines the region’s ability to generate its own 
progress and it is an ingredient in determining the region’s ability to generate its 
technical progress (Armstrong and Taylor, 2000). The positive coefficient also 
highlights the major role of education not only in increasing the individual’s capacity, 
but also in facilitating the process of adaptation to new technologies so as to speed up 
the diffusion of technology throughout the EU (Aghion et al., 1998). Education seems 
to allow those European regions with currently less advanced technologies to learn 
more from advanced regions and thereby help the former to achieve a higher degree of 
productivity improvement when innovating, and thus a higher growth rate. The impact
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of education on growth may not reflect the way that the education system serves to help 
individual growth, but rather to sort individuals to fill slots in the labour market 
(Hannum and Buchmann, 2005). Education also has implications for the optimal capital 
structure. Technologically advanced societies build more human capital relative to 
physical capital (Aghion et al., 1998).
The positive coefficient on educational inequality (EGEl) most likely denotes the fact 
that inequality is fundamentally good for incentives and is viewed as being growth- 
enhancing (Mirrlees, 1971; Rebelo, 1991; Aghion et al., 1998) as most people require
Q O
qualifications that are not possessed by everyone. Hence, inequality enables people to 
increase their returns on investment in human capital by obtaining higher educational 
degrees. Moreover, the existence of less talented and educated people implies incentives 
to individuals to seize the higher returns to their skills (Voitchovsky, 2005). Educational 
inequality may enable members of the more highly-educated segments of society to 
increase their investment in human capital, while equality may trap the society as a 
whole at a low level of investment in human capital (Galor and Tsiddon, 1997a: 94).
(2) Regression 1 of Table 7.3 illustrates the following model.
GGR2Iit = /?3' AMN, + 0 A' AGEl, + uit
Educational attainment {AMN) yields a negative sign in growth regressions. 
According to de la Fuente and Domenech (2006: 5), the ‘wrong’ result has fuelled a 
growing scepticism over the role of education in the growth process. They also mention 
that a negative sign for the educational attainment variable may simply reflect the 
omission of some other structural factors that may account for the growth slowdown. 
Regression 1 also shows the insignificant coefficient on educational inequality 
(AGEl)
98 Considering the model GGR2I, = /?3' EMN, + /?4' EGE\ ,  +  f35' x , + u, , the coefficients on 
educational attainment and inequality are robust (the results are provided on request).
99 Considering the model GGR2I, — J33'AM N, + J34'AG E\, + J35'x , +u, , the coefficients
on educational attainment and inequality are negative, but very sensitive to the econometric estimation 
(OLS, FEs and REs estimates) and to the inclusion o f different control variables (the results are provided 
on request).
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7.3,3 Growth and Income and Educational Inequality
(1) Regressions 3-14 of Table 7.1 and Table 7.2 show the combined impact of income 
inequality (for the population as a whole and for normally working people, respectively) 
and educational inequality, measured by inequality in the education level completed 
(EGEl), on regional economic growth. They depict the following model.
GGR2Ilt = J3]' Incpcit + 'Inclneqlt + /?3'EMN u + P4 EGEl it + /?5'xit + uit
The findings show the that the impact of income per capita (either (IMN _L N )  or 
(NMN _  L N )) on growth is not clear, because the elasticity coefficient on income per 
capita is statistically insignificant. The coefficient on educational attainment (EMN) , 
on the other hand, is positive, significant and robust to the inclusion of additional 
control variables. The results also show that the higher the income and educational 
inequality, the higher the growth rate. This finding is also robust.
Regression 4 displays the introduction of population ageing (AG E). The negative and 
statistically significant coefficient may show that older people are less productive than 
younger ones, because they differ in their level of technology adoption and in work 
effort, since the former are the primary adopters and beneficiaries of new technologies, 
they work more hours and they are able to concentrate more on the job (Cheal, 2000; 
Galenson and Weinberg, 2000, 2001).
Regressions 5 and 6 control for access to work: the percentage of normally working 
respondents (LFSTOCK) and the economic activity rate of total population 
(ECACRA), respectively. The results show a positive coefficient on the latter proxy for 
access to work (in Table 7.1 only). This is likely to depict that high participation in the 
labour market contributes to a competitive economic environment, which promotes 
allocative efficiency (Azzoni and Silveira-Neto, 2005).
Regressions 7 and 8 introduce unemployment (UNEM) and inactivity levels 
(INACTIVE), as well as the female participation in the labour market (ECACRF). The 
positive coefficient on inactivity accords well with the theoretical work of Hall (1991) 
and Caballero and Hammour (1994), which emphasise that recession may stimulate 
growth. More specifically, inactivity may stimulate efficiency gains by causing less 
efficient firms to exit, and may encourage firms to adopt reorganising investments and 
innovative activities. The impact of women’s access to work on growth is positive and
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statistically significant. Although women usually hold the majority of low-income jobs 
and have less continuous employment than men, their participation in the labour market 
increases the economic efficiency.
Regression 9 examines the influence of the transport infrastructure on growth. While the 
coefficient on road infrastructure {ROAD) is not statistically significant, the coefficient 
on rail infrastructure {RAIL) is negative and significant. The negative impact of the rail 
infrastructure is likely to show its limited benefits. European regions may face 
constraints on development, because the nature of rail infrastructures tends to mean that 
there are capacity limits, beyond which negative externalities (i.e. delays) start to 
dominate. The rail infrastructure may, on average, have exceeded the critical threshold 
level. However, bearing in mind that data for only a few regions were available, some 
caution is called for in the interpretation of the results.
Regressions 10 and 11 test for the impact of urbanisation {URBANDPAV) and latitude 
{LAT) on regional economic growth. Regression 10 of Table 7.1 shows that the higher 
the urbanisation level within a region, the higher the growth rate. Urbanisation seems to 
spur economic growth, because city-regions are full of technological and pecuniary 
externalities. Cities allow goods, ideas and people to come together for the purposes of 
exchange and production (Polese, 2005). This, in turn, allows regions to reap the gains 
from trade and specialisation, enhancing growth. Additionally, cities foster and facilitate 
flows of local knowledge, the creation of dense social networks and the production of 
behavioural and cultural change. All of those factors promote development, innovation 
and growth. The coefficient on latitude, on the other hand, is not statistically significant 
in either table.
Regressions 12-14 examine the influence of qualitative time-invariant variables. The 
findings show that regional growth is lowest in ‘residual’ countries, according to the 
welfare state; Anglican areas have the highest growth rate; while the family structure 
does not matter for growth. Finally, considering the standardised coefficients for the 
above regressions (Appendix A7.6), income inequality and women’s access to work 
explain the largest variation in the growth rate.
(2) Measuring educational inequality as inequality in age at which the highest education 
level was completed {AGE\), Regressions 2-3 of Table 7.3 show the combined impact 
of income inequality (for the population as a whole {IGEl) and for normally working
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people (NGEl) , respectively) and educational inequality on regional economic growth. 
The model is:
GGR2Iit = /?,' Incpcit + J32' Inclneqit + /?3' AMNit + AGE\it +ujt
The p-values of Breusch and Pagan’s Lagrange multiplier test and of Hausman’s test 
favour both the FEs and the REs results.
In Regression 2, which considers income inequality for the population as a whole 
(IGEX), the FEs results show that income inequality matters for growth, but the 
remaining three coefficients are insignificant. The REs results, on the other hand, show 
a completely different view. Both income per capita and educational attainment have a 
negative sign, the coefficient on income inequality is statistically insignificant, while the 
coefficient on educational inequality does not have the expected sign. Nevertheless, the 
negative coefficient on educational inequality most probably reflects the fact that the 
accumulated knowledge of the highly-educated individuals trickles down to the less- 
educated ones via the technological progress in production (Galor and Tsiddon, 1997a). 
Additionally, the lower the educational inequality, the greater the educational 
opportunities for the poor, the more job chances there are, the better the allocation and 
efficiency of resources and the higher the regional economic development.
In Regression 3, which considers income inequality for normally working people 
(NG El), the FEs results show that neither income and educational distributions do not 
matter for growth. However, the REs results illustrate the positive coefficient on income 
inequality, the negative coefficients on educational attainment and educational 
inequality and the negative elasticity coefficient on income per capita. The REs 
specification demonstrates that income inequality and educational equality stimulate 
growth.
Regressions 2 and 3 show some convergence in the EU and the fact that income 
inequality and educational equality boost growth. The impact of control variables on 
growth are reported in Appendix A7.5, because their coefficients are not sensitive to 
two proxies for human capital.
To sum up, when independent variable is inequality in the education level completed 
(EGEl), the statistical evidence supports the OLS results, which show that the higher 
the income and educational inequality, the higher the growth rate. However, when 
independent variable is inequality in the age at which the highest education level was
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completed (.AGEl) , the statistical evidence is mostly in support of the FEs and REs 
results (and in some cases the OLS results — see Appendix A7.5) which illustrate that 
the higher the income inequality and the lower the educational inequality, the lower the 
growth rate. Finally, no matter how income and educational inequalities are measured, 
the low adjusted R-squared show that income and human capital variables account for a 
small proportion of the variation in regional economic growth levels.
7.4 Causality
The theoretical arguments advocate a causal link between inequality and economic 
growth. Still lacking in knowledge on the causality issue, the studies are less useful 
guide for regional economic policy. Nevertheless, the empirical impact of growth on 
inequality has long attracted less attention among the economists than the reverse 
impact. Mocan (1999), for instance, argued that growth is not necessarily associated 
with an improvement in income inequality, because growth can coexist with increased 
unemployment. Aghion et al. (1999), on the other hand, found that growth may increase 
wage inequality, both across and within education cohorts, and that technical change is 
a crucial factor in explaining this relationship. Finally, Griffin and Khan (1972), 
Sheahan (1980) and Papanek and Kyn (1986) demonstrated that a high rate of growth 
increases inequality because it requires great rewards for higher income groups such as 
inventors, managers and land owners. The question addressed here is: ‘does regional 
economic growth increase income and educational inequality?’.
Table 7.4 displays the OLS, FEs and REs results for the impact of inequality on regional 
economic growth (GGR2F) . The statistical evidence is in favour of the FEs models. In 
Regression 4, additionally, the REs model is an appropriate alternative to the FEs 
model.
Table 7.4 displays the following results.
Regressions 1-2: The impact of regional economic growth on income inequality fo r the 
population as a whole is not statistically significant, no matter how educational 
distribution is measured.
Regressions 3-4: The impact of growth on income inequality for normally working 
people seems to be positive, but sensitive to the inclusion of the human capital proxy 
and to the model specification. More specifically, while the FEs results show an 
insignificant coefficient in Regressions 3 and 4, the REs results of Regression 4 yield a
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positive coefficient. They show that the higher the regional economic growth rate, the 
higher the income inequality. One possible explanation for that result is that regional 
trade flows bring in new technologies and ideas, which enhance the productivity of the 
rich more than that of the poor. The former usually have skills that may be enhanced by 
the arrival of new technologies, thus increasing their wage relative to that of less- 
educated workers. However, the regression results must be interpreted with some 
caution due to the limited time-series analysis (two years). According to Aghion et al. 
(1999: 1655), the arrival of an embodied technical change will initially raise the 
transferability of knowledge (because of the generality of the current cutting-edge 
technology), increasing within-cohort inequality. Nevertheless, this increase would halt 
once the new technology is so widely spread that all workers have had some experience 
with it, reducing inequality over the long run.
Regressions 5-8: The impact of growth on both proxies for educational inequality is 
insignificant, no matter which income distribution is considered.
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Table 7.4: C ausality (1998, 2000)
REGRESSION 1 IGE1 REGRESSION 2: IGE1 REGRESSION 3: NGEl REGRESSION 4: NGEl
(a) OLS (b) FEs (c) REs (a) OLS (b) FEs (c) REs (a) OLS (b)FEs (c) REs (a) OLS (b)FEs (c) REs
IMN -0.0119
(0.0028)***
(0.0030)***
-0 0008 
(0.0036) 
(0.0040)
-0.0093
(0.0020)***
(0.0021)***
-0.0192
(0.0027)***
(0.0030)***
-0.0022
(0.0028)
(0.0032)
-0.0096
(0.0022)***
(0.0026)***
IGE1
NMN 0 0002 
(00014) 
(0.0016)
0.0022
(00027)
(0.0037)
-0.0009
(0.0013)
(0.0015)
-0.0016
(0.0014)
(0.0019)
-0.0016
(0.0021)
(0.0029)
-0.0014
(0.0014)
(0.0018)
NGEl
EMN -0.1922
(0.0562)***
(0.0445)***
0.0113
(0.1217)
(0.1389)
-0.2011
(0.0579)***
(0.0565)***
0.0356
(0.0332)
(0.0290)
0.1424
(0.1270)
(0.1293)
0.0405
(0.0390)
(0.0386)
EGEl -0.0018
(0.0386)
(0.0378)
0.0151
(0.0717)
(0.0549)
0.0020
(0.0425)
(0.0354)
0 1125
(0.0246)***
(0.0237)***
0.0300
(0.0738)
(0.0558)
0.0988
(0.0291)***
(0.0269)***
AMN -0.0087
(0.0036)**
(0.0040)**
-0.0036
(0.0117)
(0.0131)
-0.0155
(0.0040)***
(0.0045)***
-0.0082
(0.0022)***
(0.0024)***
0.0100
(0.0119)
(0.0091)
-0.0087
(0.0025)***
(0.0028)***
AGEl 0.5352
(0.5350)
(0.5472)
1.3221
(0.6705)*
(0.7988)
1.8358
(0.4623)***
(0.5746)***
0.6113
(0.3191)*
(0.3316)*
1.1426
(0.6826)*
(0.5978)*
0.7496
(0.3290)**
(0.3247)**
GGR2F 0.3226
(0.1835)*
(0.1659)*
-0.0624
(0.1174)
(0.0916)
0.1066
(0.1046)
(0.1016)
0.1844
(0.1873)
(0.1720)
-0.0642
(0.1342)
(0.1109)
0.0708
(0.1243)
(0.1075)
0.1565 
(0.1149) 
(0.1171)
-0.0135
(0.1174)
(0.0944)
0.1200
(0.0959)
(0.0926)
0.2905
(0.1158)**
(0.1067)***
0.0137
(0.1359)
(0.1127)
0.1741
(0.1058)
(0.0918)*
CONSTANT 0.6358
(0.0676)***
(0.0699)***
0.3659
(0.1662)**
(0.1794)**
0.6329
(0.0797)***
(0.0751)***
0.7325
(0.0626)***
(0.0687)***
0.4306
(0.2124)**
(0.2367)*
0 7009
(0.0713)***
(0.0776)***
0 0915 
(0 0443)** 
(0.0484)*
0.0495
(0.1733)
(0.1782)
0.1178
(0.0543)**
(0.0560)**
0.3521
(0.0394)***
(0.0452)***
00169
(0.2160)
(0.1850)
0.3637
(0.0446)***
(0.0529)***
ADJ R-SQ 0.4870 0 0061 0.5190 0.0579 0.2494 0.0189 0.2380 00508
OBS. 204 170 204 170
LM TEST 
(p-value)
74.08
(0.0000)
51.57
(0.0000)
40.55
(00000)
27.72
(0.0000)
HAUSMAN
TEST
(p-value)
10.85
(0.0283)
25.84
(0.0000)
8.93
(0.0629)
6.27
(0.1801)
Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (*), (**) and (***) denote the significance of the White (1980) estimator. LM TEST is the Lagrange Multiplier test for the random effects model
based on the OLS residuals (Breusch and Pagan, 1980). HAUSMAN TEST is the Hausman (1978) test for fixed or random effects
REGRESSION 5: EGEl REGRESSION 6: EGEl REGRESSION 7. AGEl REGRESSION 8: AGEl
(a) OLS (b) FEs (c) REs (a) OLS (b) FEs (c) REs (a) OLS (b) FEs (c) REs (a) OLS (b)FEs (c) REs
IMN -0 0159
(0.0053)***
(0.0050)***
-0.0149
(0.0048)***
(0.0041)***
-0.0098
(0.0032)***
(0.0026)***
-0.0034
(00004)***
(0.0004)***
0.0005
(0.0005)
(0.0006)
-0.0017
(0.0004)***
(0.0004)***
IGE1 -0.0062 
(0 1300)
(0.1276)
0.0299
(0.1423)
(0.1072)
-0.0015
(0.1135)
(0.0918)
0 0113
(0.0113)
(0.0105)
0.0346
(0.0176)*
(0.0147)**
0.0444
(0.0119)***
(0.0103)***
NMN -0.0141
(0.0037)***
(0.0034)***
-0.0126
(0.0035)***
(0.0033)***
-0.0086
(0.0024)***
(0.0021)***
-0.0030
(0.0003)***
(0.0002)***
0.0004
(0.0003)
(0.0004)
-0.0016
(0.0003)***
(0.0003)***
NGEl 0.8451
(0.1849)***
(0.1513)***
00562
(0.1381)
(0.1063)
0.2250
(0.1290)*
(0.1116)**
0.0356
(0.0186)*
(0.0167)**
0.0293
(0.0175)*
(0.0110)***
0.0412
(0.0168)**
(0.0135)***
EMN -0 9710
(00806)***
(0.0893)***
-1.3111
(0.1091)***
(0.1849)***
-1.1372
(0.0586)***
(0.0767)***
-0.9068
(0.0647)***
(0.0606)***
-1 3483
(0.1097)***
(0.1922)***
-1.1371
(0.0527)***
(0.0646)***
EGEl
AMN 0.0040
(0.0004)***
(0.0003)***
0.0032
(0.0019)*
(0.0026)
0.0036
(0.0006)***
(0.0005)***
0.0040
(0.0004)***
(0.0004)***
0.0028
(0.0019)
(0.0028)
0.0032
(0.0006)***
(0.0005)***
AGEl
GGR2F 1 4183
(0.3239)***
(0.3476)***
00874
(0.1655)
(0.1102)
0.1506
(0.1544)
(0.1334)
1.1577
(0.3057)***
(0.3417)***
0.0818
(0.1604)
(0.1146)
0.1505
(0.1558)
(0.1378)
0 0118
(0.0272)
(0.0246)
-0.0229
(0.0216)
(0.0201)
-0.0002
(0.0209)
(0.0184)
-0.0018
(0.0285)
(0.0258)
-0.0255
(0.0216)
(0.0207)
-0.0032
(0.0221)
(0.0203)
CONSTANT 1 5376 
(0.1017)*** 
(0.1212)***
1 9371
(0.1389)***
(0.2035)***
1.7380
(0.0908)***
(0.1020)***
1 3548
(0.0765)***
(0.0679)***
1.9842 
(0.1268)*** 
(0.1972)***
1.7042
(0.0677)***
(0.0775)***
0.0052
(0.0123)
(0.0127)
-0.0308
(0.0351)
(0.0446)
-0.0210
(0.0139)
(0.0135)
0.0088
(0.0116)
(0.0109)
-0.0170
(0.0345)
(0.0490)
-0.0006
(0.0131)
(0.0118)
ADJ R-SQ 07717 0.6406 0.7994 0.6501 05598 0.0975 0.5357 0.0884
OBS. 204 204 170 170
LM TEST 
(p-value)
73 66 
(0.0000)
66.57
(0.0000)
36.32
(0.0000)
31.20
(0.0000)
HAUSMAN
TEST
(p-value)
304 83 
(0.0000)
22.66
(0.0001)
64 89 
(0.0000)
116.12
(0.0000)
Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (*), (**) and (***) denote the significance of the White (1980) estimator. LM TEST is the Lagrange Multiplier test for the random effects model
based on the OLS residuals (Breusch and Pagan, 1980). HAUSMAN TEST is the Hausman (1978) test for fixed or random effects
7.5 Conclusion
As a whole, the results seem to be reasonable and there are socioeconomic theories in the 
literature that confirm the observed relationships. Although differences in income and 
educational inequalities explain a small part of the differences in regional economic growth 
rates, the positive inequality-growth relationship indicates a laissez-faire regional economy, 
in which government intervention is minimal. Income inequality and inequality in the 
education level completed seem to be fundamentally good for socioeconomic incentives 
and thus should be viewed as being growth-enhancing (Mirrlees, 1971; Rebelo, 1991; 
Aghion et al., 1998). For instance, most people require qualifications that are not possessed 
to everyone. Nevertheless, the relationship between inequality in the age at which the 
highest education level was completed and regional economic growth is negative, but very 
sensitive to the model specification. Therefore, considering educational inequality, its 
impact on growth seems to be sensitive to the definition of human capital. This fuels the 
growing scepticism over the role of human capital in the growth process (de la Fuente and 
Domenech, 2006). Besides, school quality is not taken into account in either proxy. The 
best measurement of human capital would be in terms of education output, but due to the 
difficulties of obtaining such measures, input measures tend to be used (Sianesi and Van 
Reenen, 2003). Although the theoretical arguments are in favour of a causal link between 
inequality and growth, the statistical evidence produced in this chapter does not suggest 
causality.
The findings indicate that the effect of the average income and human capital on growth is 
not clear-cut. More specifically, the impact of income per capita is negative, showing some 
convergence in the EU. However, the elasticity coefficient on income per capita is very 
sensitive to the inclusion of control variables. The coefficients on educational attainment 
are sensitive not only to the model specifications (because the OLS estimates are 
significant, while the FEs ones are not), but also to the definition of human capital (because 
the OLS coefficients on the average education level completed are positive, while the OLS 
coefficients on the average age at which the highest education level was completed are 
negative).
The levels of growth have not evolved differently either in urban and rural areas or in 
northern and southern areas. More specifically, the impact of urbanisation on growth is
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positive only when income is considered as the explanatory variable in growth models, but 
it is insignificant when human capital is taken into account. The impact of latitude on 
growth is not statistically significant in any of the growth models. Nevertheless, some 
caution is called for in the interpretation of these results calls due to data limitations. 
Finally, growth rates do not vary across different welfare state regimes, religious 
affiliations or family structure clusters.
One of the major difficulties is that multiple direct and indirect linkages exist among 
income inequality, educational inequality and regional economic growth, and common 
factors, such as population ageing, also exert an influence upon them. Most control 
variables seem to both directly and indirectly affect regional economic growth. For 
instance, the findings show that the lower the population ageing, the higher the growth rate. 
Young workers not only are the primary adopters and beneficiaries of new technologies, 
but also work more hours and are able to concentrate more on the job than their older 
counterparts.
This chapter contributes to two different strands within the field of economic growth: the 
relationship among income per capita, educational attainment and growth (the first strand); 
and between inequality and growth (the second strand). To this end, the analysis shows that 
the second strand outweighs the first.
The findings have important policy implications. Income and human capital inequality are 
likely to increase growth, but the magnitude of their impact is small. However, increasing 
inequality does not emerge as a simple remedy for increasing growth due to their direct and 
indirect linkages. Policy-makers should also take into account that the reverse effect does 
not seem to be valid. Considerable light can be shed on these issues through further 
analysis of the ways in which the results are sensitive to the definition of human capital.
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Appendix A7
Appendix A7.1: FEs: Dependent Variable is GGR2I and Independent Variables are IMNJLN, IGE1, EMN and
EGEl
(1) (OLS) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (10) ( I D
IMN_LN -0.0135
(0.0082)
(0.0101)
-0.0855
(0.0282)***
(0.0277)***
-0.0547
(0.0314)*
(0.0320)*
-0.0403
(0.0318)
(0.0325)
-0.0304
(0.0348)
(0.0380)
-0.0098
(0.0341)
(0.0349)
-0.0152
(0.0347)
(0.0367)
0.1115
(0.0523)**
(0.0535)**
0.1318
(0.0349)***
(0.0400)***
IGE1 0.0452
(0.0227)**
(0.0252)*
0.1710
(0.0719)**
(0.0614)***
0.1453
(0.0722)**
(0.0644)**
0.0920
(0.0757)
(0.0733)
0.0921
(0.0825)
(0.0832)
-0.0027
(0.0835)
(0.0854)
0.0528
(0.0834)
(0.0868)
0.0423
(0.1113)
(0.1006)
-0.0605
(0.0715)
(0.0709)
EMN -0.0144
(0.0495)
(0.0485)
0.0256
(0.0516)
(0.0500)
0.0332
(0.0512)
(0.0504)
0.0524
(0.0515)
(0.0513)
-0.0285
(0.0551)
(0.0584)
-0.0204
(0.0531)
(0.0569)
-0.0250
(0.0552)
(0.0578)
-0.1342
(0.0674)**
(0.0709)*
-0.1698
(0.0490)***
(0.0571)***
EGEl -0.0119
(0.0403)
(0.0411)
-0.0319
(0.0394)
(0.0375)
-0.0194
(0.0395)
(0.0380)
-0.0181
(0.0391)
(0.0381)
-0.0414
(0.0405)
(0.0433)
-0.0438
(0.0392)
(0.0432)
-0.0406
(0.0399)
(0.0441)
0.0141
(0.0501)
(0.0552)
-0.0302
(0.0328)
(0.0404)
AGE -0.0104
(0.0048)**
(0.0047)**
-0.0116
(0.0048)**
(0.0045)**
-0.0108
(0.0049)**
(0.0045)**
-0.0070
(0.0048)
(0.0043)
-0.0102
(0.0050)**
(0.0047)**
-0.0101
(0.0059)*
(0.0058)*
-0.0069
(0.0046)
(0.0046)
LFSTOCK -0.3462
(0.1601)**
(0.1767)*
ECACRA -0.0038
(0.0027)
(0.0030)
UNEM 0.6455
(0.2501)**
(0.2144)***
0.0605
(0.1989)
(0.1904)
0.6148
(0.3592)*
(0.3993)
0.2864
(0.2140)
(0.2109)
INACTIVE -0.0061
(0.0023)***
(0.0026)**
ECACRF -0.0057
(0.0022)**
(0.0025)**
-0.0049
(0.0028)*
(0.0031)
-0.0048
(0.0019)**
(0.0021)**
YR98*URB
ANDPAV
0.0587
(0.0206)***
(0.0191)***
YR00*URB
ANDPAV
0.0046
(0.0251)
(0.0237)
YR98*LAT 0.0007
(0.0001)***
(0.0001)***
YR00*LAT -0.0004
(0.0002)*
(0.0002)**
CONSTAN
T
0.1140
(0.0262)***
(0.0321)***
0.1201
(0.0668)*
(0.0668)*
0.2414
(0.0872)***
(0.0835)***
0.6340
(0.2021)***
(0.1926)***
0.8441
(0.2225)***
(0.2135)***
0.8963
(0.2734)***
(0.2821)***
0.7269
(0.2302)***
(0.2273)***
0.8957
(0.2263)***
(0.2217)***
0.5724
(0.3246)*
(0.3692)
0.4869
(0.2440)**
(0.2538)*
ADJ R-SQ 0.0632 0.0005 0.0748 0.0967 0.1184 0.1023 0.1638 0.1313 0.2485 0.4216
OBS. 306 298 298 298 298 270 270 270 163 270
Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (*), (**) and (***) denote the significance of the White (1980) 
estimator.
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Appendix A7.2: FEs: Dependent Variable is GGR2I and Independent Variables are NMN_LN, NGEl, EMN
and EGEl
0 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (10) ' (11)
NMN_LN -0.0395
(0.0212)*
(0.0229)*
-0.0637
(0.0276)**
(0.0280)**
-0.0311
(0.0293)
(0.0304)
-0.0277
(0.0288)
(0.0293)
-0.0182
(0.0312)
(0.0339)
-0.0111
(0.0302)
(0.0312)
-0.0105
(0.0310)
(0.0323)
0.1164
(0.0437)***
(0.0453)**
0.1176
(0.0298)***
(0.0352)***
NGEl 0.0890
(0.0735)
(0.0666)
0.0941
(0.0760)
(0.0672)
0.0731
(0.0750)
(0.0690)
0.0404
(0.0746)
(0.0745)
0.0191
(0.0844)
(0.0860)
-0.0299
(0.0817)
(0.0823)
0.0046
(0.0826)
(0.0869)
-0.0208
(0.1058)
(0.1059)
-0.0826
(0.0682)
(0.0732)
EMN -0.0144
(0.0495)
(0.0485)
0.0144
(0.0518)
(0.0504)
0.0298
(0.0511)
(0.0507)
0.0562
(0.0511)
(0.0514)
-0.0332
(0.0540)
(0.0567)
-0.0186
(0.0520)
(0.0549)
-0.0234
(0.0544)
(0.0562)
-0.1448
(0.0670)**
(0.0702)**
-0.1678
(0.0481)***
(0.0550)***
EGEl -0.0119
(0.0403)
(0.0411)
-0.0239
(0.0403)
(0.0404)
-0.0092
(0.0398)
(0.0400)
-0.0127
(0.0392)
(0.0396)
-0.0381
(0.0407)
(0.0447)
-0.0433
(0.0391)
(0.0439)
-0.0382
(0.0399)
(0.0452)
0.0128
(0.0490)
(0.0539)
-0.0276
(0.0326)
(0.0389)
AGE -0.0134
(0.0047)***
(0.0043)***
-0.0134
(0.0046)***
(0.0041)***
-0.0127
(0.0046)***
(0.0041)***
-0.0070
(0.0047)
(0.0041)*
-0.0112
(0.0047)**
(0.0042)***
-0.0099
(0.0058)*
(0.0056)*
-0.0071
(0.0045)
(0.0047)
LFSTOCK -0.4256
(0.1513)***
(0.1651)**
ECACRA -0.0049
(0.0026)*
(0.0028)*
UNEM 0.6643
(0.2432)***
(0.2129)***
0.5548
(0.3560)
(0.4039)
0.2162
(0.2109)
(0.2086)
INACTIVE 0.0931
(0.1967)
(0.1827)
ECACRF -0.0059
(0.0021)***
(0.0023)**
-0.0066
(0.0022)***
(0.0024)***
-0.0049
(0.0028)*
(0.0030)
-0.0041
(0.0019)**
(0.0020)**
YR98*URB
ANDPAV
0.0648
(0.0207)***
(0.0190)***
YR00*URB
ANDPAV
0.0054
(0.0234)
(0.0214)
YR98*LAT 0.0008
(0.0001)***
(0.0001)***
YR00*LAT -0.0003
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
CONSTAN
T
0.1845
(0.0573)***
(0.0613)***
0.1201
(0.0668)*
(0.0668)*
0.2551
(0.0912)***
(0.0917)***
0.7607
(0.1967)***
(0.1828)***
0.9659
(0.2065)***
(0.1869)***
1.0559
(0.2502)***
(0.2396)***
0.7422
(0.2191)***
(0.2041)***
0.9584
(0.2109)***
(0.1936)***
0.5476
(0.3200)*
(0.3596)
0.4540
(0.2431)*
(0.2580)*
ADJ R-SQ 0.0220 0.0005 0.0332 0.0736 0.1106 0.0940 0.1647 0.1290 0.2616 0.4290
OBS. 306 298 298 298 298 270 270 270 163 270
Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (*), (**) and (***) denote the significance of the White (1980) 
estimator.
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Appendix A7.3: REs: Dependent Variable is GGR2I and Independent Variables are IMN_LN, IGE1,
EMN and EGEl ________________
(D (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
IMNJLN -0.0144
(0.0089)
(0.0108)
0.0003
(0.0116)
(0.0154)
0.0001
(0.0116)
(0.0155)
0.0008
(0.0121)
(0.0160)
0.0002
(0.0123)
(0.0171)
-0.0037
(0.0139)
(0.0183)
IGE1 0.0464
(0.0249)*
(0.0273)*
0.0638
(0.0239)***
(0.0256)**
0.0623
(0.0247)**
(0.0262)**
0.0553
(0.0295)*
(0.0284)*
0.0996
(0.0324)***
(0.0305)***
0.0916
(0.0362)**
(0.0342)***
EMN 0.0540
(0.0175)***
(0.0162)***
0.0780
(0.0198)***
(0.0201)***
0.0773
(0.0201)***
(0.0205)***
0.0800
(0.0214)***
(0.0218)***
0.0543
(0.0237)**
(0.0255)**
0.0611
(0.0242)**
(0.0253)**
EGEl 0.0623 
(0.0116)*** 
(0.0120)***
0.0636
(0.0124)***
(0.0124)***
0.0636
(0.0125)***
(0.0127)***
0.0655
(0.0138)***
(0.0139)***
0.0579
(0.0150)***
(0.0170)***
0.0589
(0.0161)***
(0.0178)***
AGE -0.0003
(0.0014)
(0.0014)
-0.0005
(0.0014)
(0.0014)
0.0001
(0.0015)
(0.0015)
-0.0006
(0.0015)
(0.0016)
LFSTOCK -0.0244
(0.0591)
(0.0560)
ECACRA 0.0015
(0.0007)**
(0.0008)*
UNEM -0.0627
(0.1081)
(0.0955)
INACTIVE
ECACRF 0.0007
(0.0006)
(0.0008)
ROAD
(fixed)
RAIL
(fixed)
URBANDPAV
(fixed)
LAT
(fixed)
DWSLEB
DWSCORP
DWSRES
DRLCATH
DRLORTH
DRLANGL
DFNC
DFSC
CONSTANT 0.1156
(0.0285)***
(0.0344)***
0.0108
(0.0217)
(0.0210)
-0.0335
(0.0406)
(0.0448)
-0.0170
(0.0775)
(0.0733)
0.0026
(0.0873)
(0.0771)
-0.1152
(0.0947)
(0.0867)
-0.0214
(0.0991)
(0.0985)
OBS. 306 298 298 298 298 270 270
Note: (*), (**), and (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (*), (**) and (***) denote the significance of the White 
(1980) estimator.
366
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
IMNJLN -0.0020
(0.0122)
(0.0177)
0.0390
(0.0244)
(0.0386)
-0.0187
(0.0213)
(0.0213)
-0.0059
(0.0145)
(0.0183)
-0.0205
(0.0169)
(0.0199)
0.0064
(0.0154)
(0.0213)
-0.0091
(0.0171)
(0.0211)
IGE1 0.0714
(0.0360)**
(0.0338)**
0,1384
(0.0474)***
(0.0613)**
0.1333
(0.0510)***
(0.0456)***
0.1002
(0.0405)**
(0.0418)**
0.1279
(0.0368)***
(0.0331)***
0.0872
(0.0380)**
(0.0340)**
0.0984
(0.0389)**
(0.0341)***
EMN 0.0714
(0.0237)***
(0.0244)***
0.0630
(0.0479)
(0.0605)
0.0474
(0.0308)
(0.0339)
0.0611
(0.0243)**
(0.0254)**
0.0226
(0.0284)
(0.0309)
0.0255
(0.0294)
(0.0304)
0.0594
(0.0256)**
(0.0259)**
EGEl 0.0613
(0.0146)***
(0.0165)***
0.0410
(0.0245)*
(0.0225)*
0.0350
(0.0210)*
(0.0235)
0.0597
(0.0163)***
(0.0180)***
0.0362
(0.0177)**
(0.0212)*
0.0460
(0.0191)**
(0.0224)**
0.0572
(0.0169)***
(0.0186)***
AGE -0.0027
(0.0018)
(0.0015)*
-0.0004
(0.0020)
(0.0022)
-0.0006
(0.0016)
(0.0016)
0.0008
(0.0016)
(0.0016)
-0.0003
(0.0017)
(0.0017)
-0.0005
(0.0016)
(0.0016)
LFSTOCK
ECACRA
UNEM 0.2319
(0.0929)**
(0.0814)***
-0.0749
(0.1849)
(0.1654)
-0.0624
(0.1085)
(0.0961)
0.0039
(0.1182)
(0.1147)
0.0816
(0.1204)
(0.1085)
-0.0710
(0.1149)
(0.0999)
INACTIVE 0.0016
(0.0007)**
(0.0008)**
ECACRF 0.0019
(0.0008)**
(0.0009)**
0.0007
(0.0006)
(0.0008)
0.0004
(0.0007)
(0.0008)
0.0009
(0.0006)
(0.0008)
0.0007
(0.0007)
(0.0008)
ROAD
(fixed)
0.2324
(0.4618)
(0.4617)
RAIL
(fixed)
-0.4222
(0.2435)*
(0.2475)*
URBANDPAV
(fixed)
0.0319
(0.0186)*
(0.0183)*
LAT
(fixed)
0.0004
(0.0009)
(0.0010)
DWSLEB 0.0093
(0.0154)
(0.0203)
DWSCORP -0.0164
(0.0145)
(0.0182)
DWSRES -0.0437
(0.0226)*
(0.0246)*
DRLCATH 0.0066
(0.0100)
(0.0081)
DRLORTH 0.0292
(0.0191)
(0.0166)*
DRLANGL 0.0228
(0.0106)**
(0.0117)*
DFNC -0.0007
(0.0148)
(0.0190)
DFSC -0.0075
(0.0144)
(0.0152)
CONSTANT -0.0772
(0.0866)
(0.0806)
-0.1030
(0.0814)
(0.1024)
-0.0534
(0.1311)
(0.1278)
-0.0421
(0.1090)
(0.1137)
0.0111
(0.1055)
(0.1006)
-0.0505
(0.1003)
(0.0948)
-0.0117
(0.1048)
(0.0993)
OBS. 270 114 163 270 270 270 270
Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (*), (**) and (***) denote the significance of the White 
(1980) estimator.
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Appendix A7.4: REs: Dependent Variable is GGR2I and Independent Variables are NMN_LN, NGEl,
EMN and EGEl
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
NMN_LN -0.0149
(0.0081)*
(0.0099)
0.0006
(0.0117)
(0.0157)
0.0000
(0.0118)
(0.0158)
0.0016
(0.0120)
(0.0161)
-0.0004
(0.0127)
(0.0175)
-0.0004
(0.0139)
(0.0180)
NGEl 0.1395
(0.0364)***
(0.0374)***
0.0979
(0.0378)**
(0.0410)**
0.0969
(0.0381)**
(0.0412)**
0.0842
(0.0392)**
(0.0414)**
0.1074
(0.0423)**
(0.0438)**
0.1010
(0.0444)**
(0.0461)**
EMN 0.0540
(0.0175)***
(0.0162)***
0.0527
(0.0177)***
(0.0181)***
0.0522
(0.0179)***
(0.0184)***
0.0694
(0.0215)***
(0.0218)***
0.0429
(0.0243)*
(0.0259)*
0.0525
(0.0250)**
(0.0258)**
EGEl 0.0623
(0.0116)***
(0.0120)***
0.0526
(0.0133)***
(0.0143)***
0.0531
(0.0135)***
(0.0148)***
0.0602
(0.0145)***
(0.0155)***
0.0556 
(0.0159)*** 
(0.0185)***
0.0590
(0.0167)***
(0.0190)***
AGE -0.0012
(0.0013)
(0.0013)
-0.0014
(0.0013)
(0.0013)
-0.0013
(0.0014)
(0.0014)
-0.0013
(0.0016)
(0.0016)
LFSTOCK -0.0697
(0.0468)
(0.0458)
ECACRA 0.0004
(0.0006)
(0.0007)
UNEM 0.0169
(0.1066)
(0.0967)
INACTIVE
ECACRF 0.0000
(0.0005)
(0.0006)
ROAD
(fixed)
RAIL
(fixed)
URBANDPAV
(fixed)
LAT
(fixed)
DWSLIB
DWSCORP
DWSRES
DRLCATH
DRLORTH
DRLANGL
DFNC
DFSC
CONSTANT 0.1078
(0.0262)***
(0.0315)***
0.0108
(0.0217)
(0.0210)
-0.0043
(0.0396)
(0.0435)
0.0531
(0.0717)
(0.0633)
0.0786
(0.0737)
(0.0627)
0.0374
(0.0803)
(0.0693)
0.0516
(0.0941)
(0.0921)
OBS. 306 298 298 298 298 270 270
Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (*), (**) and (***) denote the significance of the White 
(1980) estimator.
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(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
NMN_LN -0.0043
(0.0126)
(0.0182)
0.0262
(0.0229)
(0.0350)
-0.0136
(0.0215)
(0.0223)
0.0000
(0.0146)
(0.0179)
-0.0107
(0.0166)
(0.0188)
0.0095
(0.0152)
(0.0205)
0.0008
(0.0166)
(0.0197)
NGEl 0.0827
(0.0428)*
(0.0434)*
0.1782
(0.0632)***
(0.0693)**
0.1603
(0.0587)***
(0.0576)***
0.0996
(0.0473)**
(0.0537)*
0.1261
(0.0461)***
(0.0467)***
0.0753
(0.0470)
(0.0504)
0.1036
(0.0479)**
(0.0462)**
EMN 0.0652
(0.0243)***
(0.0246)***
0.0152
(0.0446)
(0.0606)
0.0451
(0.0313)
(0.0348)
0.0526
(0.0250)**
(0.0260)**
0.0174
(0.0290)
(0.0321)
0.0251
(0.0297)
(0.0315)
0.0555
(0.0261)**
(0.0263)**
EGEl 0.0570
(0.0155)***
(0.0180)***
0.0116
(0.0250)
(0.0219)
0.0389
(0.0218)*
(0.0262)
0.0589
(0.0168)***
(0.0189)***
0.0388
(0.0184)**
(0.0231)*
0.0506
(0.0195)**
(0.0244)**
0.0605
(0.0171)***
(0.0193)***
AGE -0.0036
(0.0017)**
(0.0015)**
-0.0015
(0.0021)
(0.0023)
-0.0013
(0.0016)
(0.0016)
-0.0005
(0.0016)
(0.0016)
-0.0010
(0.0016)
(0.0017)
-0.0015
(0.0016)
(0.0016)
LFSTOCK
ECACRA
UNEM 0.1206
(0.1833)
(0.1627)
0.0156
(0.1074)
(0.0990)
0.1048
(0.1151)
(0.1117)
0.1333
(0.1160)
(0.1043)
0.0076
(0.1104)
(0.0974)
INACTIVE 0.2519
(0.0927)***
(0.0832)***
ECACRF 0.0011
(0.0006)*
(0.0006)*
0.0007
(0.0008)
(0.0008)
0.0000
(0.0006)
(0.0006)
-0.0007
(0.0007)
(0.0007)
0.0003
(0.0005)
(0.0006)
-0.0001
(0.0007)
(0.0008)
ROAD
(fixed)
0.5628
(0.4515)
(0.4664)
RAIL
(fixed)
-0.4215
(0.2413)*
(0.2374)*
URBANDPAV 
(fixed)
0.0224
(0.0191)
(0.0185)
LAT
(fixed)
-0.0001
(0.0009)
(0.0010)
DWSLIB 0.0021
(0.0165)
(0.0210)
DWSCORP -0.0242
(0.0157)
(0.0192)
DWSRES -0.0395
(0.0239)*
(0.0263)
DRLCATH 0.0079
(0.0101)
(0.0083)
DRLORTH 0.0344
(0.0195)*
(0.0174)**
DRLANGL 0.0212
(0.0108)**
(0.0120)*
DFNC 0.0054
(0.0157)
(0.0195)
DFSC 0.0013
(0.0137)
(0.0139)
CONSTANT 0.0055
(0.0779)
(0.0717)
-0.0154
(0.0697)
(0.0841)
0.0554
(0.1278)
(0.1270)
0.0535
(0.0972)
(0.0965)
0.1300
(0.1082)
(0.1048)
0.0164
(0.0960)
(0.0901)
0.0552
(0.1049)
(0.0992)
OBS. 270 114 163 270 270 270 270
Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (*), (**) and (***) denote the significance of the White 
(1980) estimator
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Appendix A7.5: OLS, FEs and REs: D ependent V ariable is GGR2I and Independent Variables are IM N JLN, IGE1, AMN and A G El
REGRESSION 1 REGRESSION 2 REGRESSION 3 REGRESSION 4
(a) OLS (b)FEs (c) REs (a) OLS (b)FEs (c) REs (a) OLS (b) FEs (c) REs (a) OLS (b) FEs (c) REs
IMNLN -0.0218
(0.0103)**
(0.0121)*
-0.0050
(0.0226)
(0.0246)
-0.0205
(0.0106)*
(0.0124)*
-00252
(00105)**
(0.0129)*
0.0096
(0.0248)
(0.0286)
-0.0239
(0.0109)**
(0.0134)*
-0 0278 
(0.0105)*** 
(0.0126)**
-0.0034
(0.0247)
(0.0289)
-0.0276
(0.0108)**
(0.0129)**
-0.0247
(0.0111)**
(0.0138)*
0.0112
(0.0252)
(0.0280)
-0.0243
(0.0114)**
(0.0142)*
IGE1 0.0278
(00248)
(0.0247)
0.1606
(0.0688)**
(0.0605)***
0.0315
(0.0262)
(0.0259)
0.0535
(0.0303)*
(0.0282)*
0.1296
(0.0720)*
(0.0665)*
0.0541
(0.0317)*
(0.0292)*
00891
(0.0307)***
(0.0295)***
0.0932
(0.0833)
(0.0771)
00886
(0.0316)***
(0.0300)***
0 1040
(0.0335)***
(0.0309)***
0.0338
(0.0851)
(0.0804)
0.1018
(0.0348)***
(0.0316)***
AMN -0.0028
(00014)**
(0.0013)**
-0.0002
(0.0057)
(0.0045)
-0.0029
(0.0015)*
(0.0014)**
-0 0024 
(0 0014)* 
(0.0014)*
0.0003
(0.0057)
(0.0045)
-0.0025
(0.0015)*
(0.0015)*
-0.0025
(0.0014)*
(0.0014)*
-0.0012
(0.0057)
(0.0045)
-0.0025
(0.0014)*
(0.0015)*
-0 0035 
(0.0015)** 
(0.0016)**
0.0006
(0.0057)
(0.0046)
-0.0036
(0.0016)**
(0.0017)**
AGEl -0.4317
(0.1845)**
(0.2038)**
-0.0554
(0.4859)
(0.5464)
-0.4138
(0.1945)**
(0.2180)*
-04599
(0.1851)**
(0.2108)**
-0.0645
(0.4845)
(0.5477)
-0.4418
(0.1948)**
(0.2244)**
-0 3523 
(0.1903)*
(0.2178)
0.2460
(0.5072)
(0.5328)
-0.3486 
(0 I 960)*
(0.2265)
-0 3134 
(0.1927) 
(0.2171)
0.2211
(0.5021)
(0.5651)
-0.3085
(0.2001)
(0.2278)
AGE 0.0011
(0.0014)
(0.0013)
-0.0085
(0.0047)*
(0.0047)*
0.0009
(0.0015)
(0.0014)
0.0016
(00014)
(0.0013)
-0.0091
(0.0047)*
(0.0046)*
0.0014
(0.0015)
(0.0014)
0.0021
(0.0014)
(0.0013)
-0.0110
(0.0048)**
(0.0047)**
00019
(0.0015)
(0.0014)
0 0018
(0.0015)
(0.0015)
-0.0085
(0.0048)*
(0.0047)*
0.0017
(0.0015)
(0.0016)
LFSTOCK 0.0776
(00525)
(0.0539)
-0.2044
(0.1456)
(0.1699)
0.0705
(0.0555)
(0.0570)
ECACRA 0.0027
(0.0006)***
(0.0006)***
-0.0027
(0.0026)
(0.0028)
0.0027
(0.0006)***
(0.0007)***
UNEM 0.0903 
(0.1056) 
(0. 1046)
0.4700
(0.2386)*
(0.2192)**
0.1034
(0.1094)
(0.1082)
INACTIVE
ECACRF 0.0024
(0.0006)***
(0.0005)***
-0.0033
(0.0022)
(0.0024)
0.0024
(0.0006)***
(0.0006)***
ROAD
(fixed)
RAIL
(fixed)
URBANDPAV
(fixed)
ADJ R-SQ 0.1505 0.0694 0.1544 0.0804 0.2269 0.0867 0.2235 0.1194
OBS. 263 263 237 237
LM TEST 
(p-value)
4.70
(0.0302)
3.76
(0.0524)
1.76
(0.1852)
2.12
(0.1452)
HAUSMAN
TEST
(p-value)
11.17
(0.0481)
14.62
(0.0235)
14.07
(0.0288)
19.32
(0.0072)
REGRESSION 5 REGRESSION 6 REGRESSION 7 REGRESSION 8
(a) OLS (b) FEs (c) REs (a) OLS (b) FEs (c) REs (a) OLS (b) FEs (c) REs (a) OLS (b) FEs (c)REs
IMN_LN -0.0259
(0.0106)**
(0.0124)**
0.0035
(0.0260)
(0.0306)
-0.0259
(00108)**
(0.0127)**
-0.0216
(0.0297)
(0.0363)
-0.0216
(0.0297)
(0.0363)
-0.0436
(0.0157)***
(0.0190)**
0.0337
(0.0455)
(0.0469)
-0.0415
(00163)**
(0.0197)**
-0.0241
(0.0129)*
(0.0145)*
0.0473
(0.0339)
(0.0365)
-0.0242
(0.0132)*
(0.0148)
IGE1 00936
(0.0341)***
(0.0310)***
0.0732
(0.0854)
(0.0816)
0 0931
(0.0349)***
(0.0315)***
0.0510
(0.0518)
(0.0619)
00510 
(0 0518) 
(0.0619)
0.1559
(0.0467)***
(0.0409)***
0 0628
(0.1183)
(0. 1089)
0 1540 
(0 0499)*** 
(0.0430)***
0.1023
(0.0386)***
(0.0400)**
-0.0317
(0.0792)
(0.0732)
0 1013
(0.0400)**
(0.0405)**
AMN -0.0026
(0.0014)*
(0.0014)*
-0.0004
(0.0057)
(0.0045)
-0 0026
(0.0014)*
(0.0014)*
0.0074
(0.0047)
(0.0052)
0 0074
(0.0047)
(0.0052)
0 0054
(0.0038)
(0.0042)
0.0105
(0.0163)
(0.0196)
00049 
(0 0041) 
(0.0045)
-0.0035
(0.0015)**
(0.0016)**
0.0044
(0.0067)
(0.0061)
-0.0037
(0.0016)**
(0.0017)**
AGEl -0.2668
(0.1946)
(0.2125)
0.3002
(0.5087)
(0.5474)
-0.2658 
(0 1995) 
(0.2200)
-0.7194
(0.2887)**
(0.2305)***
-0 7194
(0.2887)**
(0.2305)***
-0.5597
(0.2369)**
(0.2908)*
-0.1437
(0.6158)
(0.9716)
-05328
(02549)**
(0.3165)*
-0.3177
(0.1991)
(0.2254)
-0.0930
(0.4695)
(0. 7002)
-0.3091
(0.2071)
(0.2366)
AGE -0.0003
(0.0017)
(0.0015)
-0.0107
(0.0050)**
(0.0050)**
-0.0003 
(0 0018)
(0.0016)
0.0004
(0.0019)
(0.0021)
-0 0068 
(0 0060) 
(0.0057)
00003
(0.0021)
(0.0022)
0.0018
(0.0015)
(0.0015)
-0.0034
(0.0050)
(0.0052)
0.0016
(0.0015)
(0.0016)
LFSTOCK
ECACRA
UNEM -0.2347
(0.1752)
(0. 1728)
0.6726
(0.3724)
(0.4076)*
-0 1892 
(0 1886)
(0. 1865)
0.0908
(0.1059)
(0. 1046)
0.4016
(0.2186)*
(0.2224)*
0.1042
(0.1100)
(0.1083)
INACTIVE 0.1443
(0.0874)
(0.0833)*
0.0309
(0.1856)
(0.1961)
0.1401
(0.0894)
(0.0855)
ECACRF 0.0029
(0.0007)***
(0.0006)***
-0.0036
(0.0023)
(0.0025)
0.0028 
(0 0007)*** 
(0.0006)***
0.0020
(0.0007)***
(0.0007)***
-0 0039 
(0.0031) 
(0.0034)
00020 
(0 0008)** 
(0.0008)***
0.0024
(0.0006)***
(0.0005)***
-0.0028
(0.0021)
(0.0022)
0.0024
(0.0006)***
(0.0006)***
ROAD
(fixed)
0.3140
(0.4918)
(0.4877)
0.3140
(0.4918)
(0.4877)
RAIL
(fixed)
-0.5725
(0.2616)**
(0.2776)**
-0.5725
(0.2616)**
(0.2776)**
URBANDPAV 
(fixed)
0.0389
(0.0162)**
(0.0163)**
00388
(0.0180)**
(0.0179)**
YR98 *URB ANDP 
AV
0.0187
(0.0161)
(0.0167)
YROO’URBANDP
AV
-0.0118
(0.0254)
(0.0255)
LAT
(fixed)
-0.0001
(0.0009)
(0.0012)
0.0000
(0.0010)
(0.0012)
YR98*LAT 0.0003
(0.0002)*
(0.0002)**
YROO’LAT -0.0004
(0.0003)
(0.0002)*
ADJ R-SQ 0.2302 0.0960 0.1770 0.1610 0.1927 0.2201 0.2801
OBS. 237 83 163 237
LM TEST 
(p-value)
1.30
(0.2546)
0.53
(0.4666)
0.16
(0.6873)
2.10
(0.1469)
HAUSMAN
TEST
(p-value)
16.80
(0.0187)
REGRESSION 9 REGRESSION 10 REGRESSION 11 REGRESSION 12
(a) OLS (b)FEs (c) REs (a) OLS (b) FEs (c) REs (a) OLS (b) FEs (c) REs (a) OLS (b) FEs (c) REs
IMN_LN -0.0402
(0.0129)***
(0.0155)**
-0.0394
(0.0132)***
(0.0158)**
-0.0299
(0.0122)**
(0.0152)*
-0 0290
(0.0125)**
(0.0156)*
-0.0146
(0.0125)
(0.0162)
-0.0151
(0.0128)
(0.0164)
IGE1 0.1349
(0.0354)***
(0.0349)***
0.1324
(0.0365)***
(0.0355)***
0.1143
(0.0352)***
(0.0309)***
0.1116
(0.0367)***
(0.0320)***
0.0824
(0.0358)**
(0.0331)**
0.0826
(0.0368)**
(0.0337)**
AMN -0.0014
(0.0021)
(0.0021)
-0.0016
(0.0021)
(0.0021)
-0.0022
(0.0022)
(0.0020)
-0.0024
(0.0022)
(0.0021)
-0 0025 
(0.0017) 
(0.0021)
-0.0027
(0.0017)
(0.0022)
AGEl -0.0541
(0.2591)
(0.3059)
-0.0493
(0.2664)
(0.3147)
-0.3462
(0.2108)
(0.2544)
-0.3321
(0.2190)
(0.2653)
-0.5763
(0.2473)**
(0.3910)
-0.5514
(0.2536)**
(0.3991)
AGE 0.0021
(0.0015)
(0.0015)
0.0020
(00015)
(0.0016)
0.0023
(0.0016)
(0.0016)
0.0021
(0.0017)
(0.0017)
0.0019
(0.0015)
(0.0016)
0.0018
(0.0015)
(0.0017)
LFSTOCK
ECACRA
UNEM 0.0300
(0.1070)
(0.1113)
0.0467
(0.1104)
(0.1144)
0.0727
(0.1074)
(0.1044)
0.0904
(0.1116)
(0.1087)
0.1322
(0.1084)
(0.1146)
0.1385
(0.1114)
(0.1175)
INACTIVE
ECACRF 0.0017
(0.0006)***
(0.0006)***
0.0017
(0.0006)***
(0.0007)**
0.0022
(0.0006)***
(0.0006)***
0.0022
(0.0006)***
(0.0006)***
0.0026 
(0.0006)*** 
(0.0006)** *
0.0026
(0.0006)***
(0.0006)***
ROAD
RAIL
URBANDPAV
LAT
DWSLIB -0.0014
(0.0234)
(0.0272)
-0.0020
(0.0246)
(0.0293)
DWSCORP -0.0272
(0.0233)
(0.0277)
-0.0271
(0.0245)
(0.0297)
DWSRES -0.0454
(0.0320)
(0.0396)
-0.0459
(0.0333)
(0.0416)
DRLCATH 0.0012
(0.0099)
(0.0079)
0.0010
(0.0106)
(0.0085)
DRLORTH -0.0071
(0.0172)
(0.0157)
-0.0064
(0.0184)
(0.0167)
DRLANGL 0.0091
(0.0134)
(0.0121)
0.0093
(0.0141)
(0.0127)
DFNC -0.0038
(0.0230)
(0.0269)
-0.0029
(0.0240)
(0.0286)
DFSC 0.0271
(0.0159)*
(0.0243)
0.0251
(0.0164)
(0.0247)
ADJ R-SQ 0.2240 0.2173 02268
OBS. 237 237 237
LM TEST 
(p-value)
0.87
(0.3519)
1.92
(0.1661)
1 08
(0.2994)
Appendix A7.6: Standardised Coefficients: Dependent Variable is GGR2I
Independent Variables are IMN LN, IGE1, EMN and EGEl
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: GGR2I
REGR. 1 REGR. 2 REGR 3 REGR. 4 REGR. 5 REGR. 6 REGR. 7 REGR. 8 REGR 9 REGR 10 REGR. 11
IMN LN -0.1290 0.0109 0.0107 0.0207 0.0262 -0.0126 -0.0002 0.3839 -0.1845 -0.0263
IGEI 0.1560 0.2175 0.2141 0.1940 0.3495 0.3326 0.2540 0.5163 0.4691 0.3542
EMN 0.3404 0.4913 0.4886 0.5049 0.3373 0.3828 0.4377 0.2840 0.3293 0.3821
EGEl 0.5933 0.6109 0.6123 0.6317 0.5290 0.5366 0.5525 0.3285 0.3182 0.5419
AGE -0.0096 -0.0160 0.0214 -0.0083 -0.1037 -0.0020 -0.0065
LFSTOCK -0.0362
ECACRA 0.2194
UNEM -0.0584 -0.0839 -0.0581
INACTIVE 0.3207
ECACRF 0.1569 0.3381 0.3775 0.1529
MOTOR 0.0676
RAIL -0.2735
URBANDP 
AV (fixed)
0.1685
LAT (fixed) 0.0459
Independent Variables are NMN LN, N G E l, EMN and EGEl
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: GGR2I
REGR. 1 REGR. 2 REGR 3 REGR. 4 REGR. 5 REGR. 6 REGR. 7 REGR 8 REGR 9 REGR 10 REGR 11
NMN LN -0.1084 0.0073 0.0079 0.0248 0.0204 0.0228 -0.0165 0.2128 -0.1183 0.0337
NGEl 0.2555 0.1676 0.1665 0.1459 0.1803 0.1700 0.1380 0.3404 0.2447 0.1601
EMN 0.3404 0.3317 0.3291 0.4362 0.2689 0.3318 0.4016 0.0707 0.3115 0.3353
EGEl 0.5933 0.5020 0.5116 0.5826 0.5158 0.5518 0.5203 0.0971 0.3550 0.5468
AGE -0.0490 -0.0550 -0.0375 -0.0360 -0.1430 -0.0486 -0.0357
LFSTOCK -0.1113
ECACRA 0.0583
UNEM -0.0007 0.0607 -0.0045
INACTIVE 0.3500
ECACRF -0.0014 0.2258 0.1358 0.0145
MOTOR 0.1635
RAIL -0.2742
URBANDP 
AV (fixed)
0.1180
LAT (fixed) -0.0429
Independent Variables are IMN LN, IGEI, NMNJLN, N G E l, EMN and EGEl
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: GGR2I
REGR 1 REGR 2 REGR 3
IMN LN -0.2228
IGEI 0.0822
NMN LN -0.1909
NGEl 0.2168
AMN -0.3684 -0.1943 -0.1527
AGEl 0.0042 -0.1935 -0.1934
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8 Chapter Eight. Conclusion
8.1 Introduction
As noted in the first chapter, the main objective of this thesis has been to analyse the 
impact of income and educational inequalities on regional economic growth. Because of 
the complexity of the issue and the relative absence of a coherent analytical background 
on which to base the empirical investigation, this analysis was divided into 
methodological steps. The first step dealt mainly with the association between income 
and educational distribution, while the second focused explicitly on the main research 
question, which was whether income and educational inequalities matter for growth. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to combine the conclusions from the previous 
chapters, to draw out a number of policy implications about the role of inequalities in 
regional economic growth, to discuss some potential limitations of the thesis and to 
suggest areas for further research.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 8.2 answers the research questions in view 
of the findings and limitations of this study. Each answer will be presented separately. 
After the questions have been answered, Section 8.3 provides useful insights for the 
planning of regional policy in the EU. The conclusion, and this thesis, ends with a 
section on the issues proposed for further research.
8.2 Empirical Findings: A Short Answer to the Research 
Questions
In light of the empirical findings and the existing theoretical background, this section 
gives a brief answer to the research questions.
The main research question is the following.
Do income and educational inequalities matter for growth?
The focal point of this study has been to examine the impact of income and educational 
distribution on regional economic growth.
(1) Considering the distribution o f the education level completed, the regression results 
indicate that, on the basis of existing levels of inequality in Europe, an increase in a 
region’s level of income inequality (either for the population as a whole or for normally
374
working people) and educational one has a significant positive relationship with 
subsequent economic growth. This relationship indicates a laissez-faire regional 
economy, in which government intervention is minimal and inequality is fundamentally 
seen to be good for socioeconomic incentives (Mirrlees, 1971; Rebelo, 1991; Aghion et 
al., 1998). Educational inequality motivates and enables people to increase their 
investment in human capital in order to obtain higher educational qualifications, 
because they require qualifications that are not possessed to everyone so as to benefit 
from the higher returns to their skills. Income inequality enables people to acquire well- 
paid jobs, increasing competition in the labour market and, therefore, growth. 
Additionally, public policies (i.e. tax policies) aimed at reducing income inequality may 
not be strong enough to produce negative incentives. The results also coincide with the 
current belief that educational achievement has a positive relationship with economic 
growth. Education seems to be a critical factor in determining the productive capacity of 
the regional economy, and thus is one of the most powerful instruments for laying the 
basis for sustained growth (Hannum and Buchmann, 2005).
(2) Considering the distribution o f the age at which the highest education level was 
completed, the results reveal negative coefficients on educational inequality and 
educational attainment, but they are very sensitive to the model specification. In this 
case, educational equality may encourage more members of society to increase their 
investment in human capital, thus stimulating growth. According to de la Fuente and 
Domenech (2006: 5), the ‘wrong’ sign of educational attainment has fuelled growing 
scepticism with regard to its role in the growth process.
No matter how income and educational inequality is measured, the empirical arguments 
do not favour a causal link between growth and changes in inequality levels. Moreover, 
the regression results indicate a convergence process across European regions, but this 
is very sensitive to the inclusion of control variables.
To sum up, both income and educational inequalities matter for regional economic 
growth. While the influence of income inequality is robust to the definition of income 
distribution, the impact of educational inequality is sensitive to the definition of 
educational distribution. This may have to do with the meaning of human capital, 
because a measure of age on completing the highest qualification includes any activity 
prior to that final qualification, some of which may contribute to building human capital 
and some not. Finally, the standardised coefficients show that the effect of income and 
educational inequalities on growth is more intensive than that of income per capita and
375
educational attainment. As this study contributes to two different strands within the field 
of economic growth, the strand focused on inequality and growth outweighs the strand 
of average and growth in terms of its significance.
In order to come to the above conclusions, the research question was decomposed into a 
number of sub-questions, for which the main concluded points are as follows.
1. Are income inequalities associated with educational inequalities?
Educational attainment reflects non-monetary rewards, while income reflects monetary 
rewards. Nevertheless, income inequality is positively associated with educational 
inequality.
On the one hand, people with more education earn more money. Both degrees and 
personal characteristics (i.e. innate ability, psychological traits) matter for income 
variations. Firstly, the most-educated get the highest earnings because education 
directly increases workers’ productivity and allows them to command higher earnings. 
Education also increases the social and job opportunities available to people. It is an 
instrument for a higher level of aspiration, leading people to be more informed and, 
therefore, gain specific traits which may increase productivity. Secondly, the most 
talented and high-ability people have a high level productivity, because they can 
function better with less knowledge than others do. In this case, education has no direct 
effect on wages because it acts as ‘signal’ (Spence, 1973, 1974). Education is seen as an 
elaborate device for detecting and labelling those who have skills (Champemowne and 
Cowell, 1998; Wolf, 2004). On this basis, a greater share of highly-educated workers 
may signal to employers that those with less education have a lower ability, which may 
also lead to a larger wage differential between highly-educated and low-educated 
workers, and thus to higher income inequality. Therefore, the greater the educational 
inequality, the greater the inequality in productivity — either due to qualifications or 
due to personal characteristics — and the greater the income inequality. The positive 
impact of educational inequality on income inequality may reflect the responsiveness of 
the EU labour market to differences in qualifications and skills.
On the other hand, although education is a key instrument in securing equal 
opportunities for people and for helping to improve their living standards (Wolf, 2002), 
rich people have more educational opportunities than the poor. An increase in income 
inequality may lead to a self-perpetuating poverty trap that may increase educational 
inequality (Checchi, 2000). Therefore, the higher the income inequality, the larger the
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population that is excluded from educational opportunities, and the higher the 
educational inequalities.
Income and educational inequalities seem to be mutually self-reinforcing processes. 
Human capital produces income, and vice versa. Income inequality is strongly related to 
educational inequality, but the scale of the effect is relatively small. Both income and 
human capital inequalities are likely to indicate inequalities in abilities, knowledge, 
skills, aspiration, socioeconomic chances, opportunities and so on.
To delve a little deeper, regardless the quality of institutions, two European forces 
behind the positive income-education relationship are tertiary education and individual 
abilities. First, primary and secondary education is compulsory and free in all European 
countries. Ceteris paribus, this gives poor people the ‘same’ educational opportunities 
as the rich, they then might use these to have the ‘same’ job chances so as to earn the 
‘same’ wages and probably have the ‘same’ income. If primary and secondary 
education per se does not affect income distribution because it is provided to all people, 
it may be that it is individual abilities and certain psychological and personality traits 
(such as diligence) that employers reward and, thus, it is these factors that determine an 
individual’s income. Moreover, people differ with regard to their potential skills and 
preferences. Thus, a person with a higher level of cognitive ability can work better than 
a person with otherwise the same level of education (Galor and Tsiddon, 1997b; Hassler 
and Mora, 2000). The former is more productive and is likely to have a larger income. 
Second, the European capital markets are not so perfect that anyone may borrow against 
their expected future earnings. The imperfect allocation of educational loans for tertiary 
education (since primary and secondary education is free and public) seems to reinforce 
the positive correlation between income and education. Otherwise, income and 
educational inequality, for example, could be negatively correlated or uncorrelated, 
because every individual would have access to the ‘same’ educational opportunities and 
chances. Hence, tertiary education might be a crucial factor under current credit market 
constraints. Tertiary education exerts an influence on the demand for and supply of 
skilled labour and, hence, on relative wages and incomes (Tinbergen, 1975).
Overall, tertiary education and individual abilities seem to be the most important factors 
underlying the income-education relationship. Although the European educational 
policy is to make tertiary education more affordable over time through grants, 
subsidised loans and other financial devices, this alone is insufficient to ensure that all 
people have access to the ‘same’ educational opportunities, because low individual
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abilities may restrict the option of higher educational attainment. Differences in tertiary 
educational attainment and in abilities probably explain a small part of the differences in 
income and human capital distribution, because most socioeconomic theories tend to 
have offsetting effects.
2. Are income and educational inequalities affected by common factors, such as 
population ageing, work access, unemployment and inactivity?
Both income and educational inequalities are affected by population ageing, work 
access, unemployment and inactivity (Table 8.1). The impact of population ageing on 
income inequalities is unclear. On the one hand, regions with a very young population 
may have lower rate of participation in the labour force, leading to high levels of 
income inequality for the population as a whole. Additionally, young people in work 
earn less in the labour market. On the other hand, an increasing number of elderly and 
retired people, whose income is lower than the mature working age cohort, may lead to 
a rise in income inequality among normally working people (Estudillo, 1997). The 
coefficient on population ageing for educational inequality models is positive, reflecting 
the fact that as people get older, the luck of educational opportunities diversifies the 
educational distribution (Motonishi, 2006). The effect of both proxies for work access 
on income and educational inequalities is negative. Higher access to work seems to lead 
to less inequality. While the impact of unemployment on inequality is positive, the 
impact of inactivity is negative. On the one hand, increases in unemployment aggravate 
the relative position of low-income and low-education groups, because marginal 
workers with the relatively low wages, skills and qualifications are at the bottom of the 
income and educational distribution and their jobs are at greater risk during an 
economic downturn. Forms of income support and benefits are not enough to offset the 
loss in income due to transitory unemployment. On the other hand, the higher the 
percentage of inactive young people, the lower the educational inequality in the long 
run, because more widespread access to education means that young people remain out 
of the labour market for longer, which means the increased occurrence of youth 
inactivity (Rodriguez-Pose, 2002). The coefficients on women’s work access are 
negative and statistically significant for the most regressions. The impact of the increase 
in women’s access to work has been to lessen the trend toward greater income and 
educational inequality caused by aspects of social change during the period of analysis. 
Additionally, increasing women’s access to the labour market through more adequate 
childcare services, more flexible working conditions and more sharing of family
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responsibilities implies greater opportunities to engage in paid work. Finally, female 
participation in the labour force explains a major part of the variation in income and 
educational inequality.
Table 8.1: The Impact of Population Ageing, Work Access, Unemployment and Inactivity on 
Inequality
dependent variable
income inequality for all 
people
income inequality for 
normally working people
inequality in education 
level completed
inequality in age at which 
the highest education 
level was completed
independent
variables
education
level
completed
age at which 
the highest 
education 
level was 
completed
education
level
completed
age at which 
the highest 
education 
level was 
completed
income for all 
people
income for 
normally 
working 
people
income for all 
people
income for 
normally 
working 
people
St. dyn. St. dyn. St. dyn. St. dyn. St. dyn. St. dyn. St. dyn. St. dyn.
population
ageing - n.s. - n.s. n.s.
+ n.s. + + + + + + n.s. + n.s.
work access  
(micro) - n.s. - n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. - n.s. n.s.
work access  
(macro) - - - - - - - - n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
unemploym
ent
+ + + n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. + n.s. + n.s.
inactivity n.s. - n.s. n.s. n.s. - n.s. - - n.s. - n.s.
women's 
work access n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Note: 'n.s.' means not statistically significant coefficient; st. denotes static models; and dyn. denotes dynamic models.
3. Does the exploratory analysis o f income and educational inequalities suggest any 
form o f spatial heterogeneity such as an urban-rural divide or an EU north-south 
divide?
Both the ESDA and the static regression models reveal two distinct patterns.
Firstly, income and educational inequalities have evolved differently in urban and rural 
areas. Urbanisation, as measured by the proportion of respondents who live in a densely 
populated area, is negatively associated with income inequality, but this is sensitive to 
the definition of income inequality. The coefficient on urbanisation is statistically 
significant when the dependent variable is the income inequality of the population as a 
whole and statistically insignificant the when dependent variable is the income 
inequality of normally working people. That sensitivity is likely to reflect the fact that it 
is more likely that all members of a household move to urban areas in search of better 
opportunities rather than only normally working people. The income inequality of the
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population as a whole is lower in agglomerated areas, which is as might be expected 
because considering that urbanisation is a measure of economic development (Kuznets, 
1955) and most European regions are at an advanced stage of economic development, a 
greater metropolitan share should reduce income inequality. In terms of educational 
inequality, the urban-rural divide is statistically significant for both proxies but in a 
different direction. The impact of urbanisation on inequality in the age at which the 
highest education level was completed is negative, but its impact on inequality in the 
education level completed is, surprisingly, positive. This may be a reflection of the 
differences in human capital proxies. Highly-educated workers living in rural areas are 
likely to move to cities in order to achieve promotion and greater employment returns, 
while people who completed their education at an older age are more likely to move to 
rural areas. Nevertheless, the fact that data on urbanisation were available for only a few 
regions means that the results should be treated with a certain degree of caution.
Secondly, the ESDA on income and educational inequality has addressed the role of 
latitude as a major determinant of inequalities, highlighting the EU north-south divide, 
among other effects. Income and educational inequality is higher in the south than in the 
north. This finding is robust to the definition of income and human capital. The north- 
south divide in terms of inequality may reflect the differences in female participation in 
the labour market, in unemployment, in the provision of the welfare state and in family 
structure. The analytical concept in understanding the relationship between latitude and 
inequalities may not be a matter of the ‘second’ nature of geography alone, but also a 
matter of its ‘first’ nature, because latitude is a pure geographical variable. Adam Smith 
made a notable hypothesis that physical geography influences regional economic 
performance and, thus, inequalities. Considering that latitude serves as a good proxy for 
a region’s climate, the results show that climatic variation may affect productivity and 
inequality.
Finally, the regression analysis also shows that the impact of both urbanisation and 
latitude on inequalities was higher in 2000 than in 1995.
4. What is the impact o f institutional factors, such as welfare state, religion and family 
structure, on inequalities?
The regression results show that income and educational inequalities are lower in social- 
democratic welfare states, in Protestant areas, and in regions with Nordic family
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structures, such as the Swedish and Danish regions. This finding is robust to the 
definition of inequalities.
Firstly, in social-democratic welfare states, the state provision of income and services is 
higher, the benefits and taxes are mainly individually-based, there is support for 
women’s participation in the labour market and public care services to families enable 
women to have both children and careers. These factors reduce inequalities. According 
to Orloff (1993), social-democratic regimes are ‘egalitarian’. Inequality is higher in the 
‘residual’ welfare states, because the share of national income devoted to social 
purposes is very low, the social benefits are meagre and cover only the minority of the 
population (Sainsbury, 1991).
Secondly, religion as an aspect of social life and culture shapes income and educational 
distributions. The basic channels through which religion may influence income and 
education are marriage and divorce, fertility, childrearing, attitudes towards work, 
family traditions and cultures, and the creation of public institutions such as blue laws 
and prohibition. Although the impact of these factors on inequalities across religious 
affiliations is complex, income and educational equalities are lower in Protestant 
societies because gender equality in terms of housework is actively pursued, since 
women are encouraged to participate full-time in the labour market. Additionally, 
Protestants and Catholics are strongest on individualistic beliefs, which locate the 
causes of low income and a lack of education in the individuals themselves. This 
motivates them to acquire higher qualifications and to participate fully in the labour 
market so as to get better jobs.
Thirdly, the concept of family structure developed in this study is linked to the 
household size. Income and educational inequalities are lower in Nordic countries 
because both husband and wife contribute to living expenses and both support the 
children. In contrast to this view, in Southern/Catholic societies the husband is expected 
to support the wife, who usually acts as a full-time homemaker. Women are the main 
care providers in these households. In these societies, the husband’s wage must be large 
enough to support his wife and their children. This increases the intra-household income 
inequality. With regard to education, the larger the household size, the higher the intra- 
household educational inequality, as rich people have usually less children than poor 
ones do.
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Finally, the impact of institutions on inequalities has some overlapping outcomes. For 
instance, conservative regimes are influenced by the social policy of the Catholic 
Church (Geist, 2005: 26) and religions which favour low levels of fertility decrease the 
household size.
5. Do population ageing, work access, unemployment and inactivity affect regional 
economic growth directly or indirectly through their impact on inequalities?
Population ageing, work access, unemployment and inactivity affect regional economic 
growth both directly and indirectly (Table 8.2). The findings indicate that population 
ageing is negatively associated with growth. This most probably reflects the fact that 
younger workers are more productive than older ones, because the former are the 
primary adopters and beneficiaries of new technologies, work more hours, are able to 
concentrate more on the job, are healthier and take fewer days off as sick leave. The 
impact of access to work on regional economic growth is positive. Greater access to 
work access may contribute to a competitive regional economic environment, 
promoting allocative efficiency, and thus enhancing economic growth (Azzoni and 
Silveira-Neto, 2005). However, women hold the majority of low-income jobs, have less 
continuous employment than men and do not receive the same job-related rewards. 
Hence, a higher level of female participation in the labour market may not only promote 
allocative efficiency, but also may stimulate export expansion and the export earnings 
which, in turn, may provide the resources to purchase sophisticated technologies that 
permit economies of scale and specialisation and, thus, growth (Seguino, 2000). Both 
effects are highlighted in the positive coefficient on women’s access to work. The 
influence of unemployment and inactivity on growth is positive. High economic 
inactivity and unemployment may stimulate efficiency gains by causing less efficient 
firms to exit and by encouraging firms to adopt reorganising investments and innovative 
activities. Hence economic recessions may stimulate growth.
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Table 8.2: The Impact of Population Ageing, Work Access, Unemployment and Inactivity on 
Regional Economic Growth
dependent variable
regional eco n o m ic  growth
independent
variables
income for all 
people / education 
level completed
income for 
normally working 
people / education 
level completed
income for all 
people / age at 
which the highest 
education level 
was completed
income for 
normally working 
people / age at 
which the highest 
education level 
was completed
population
ageing
n.s. - - -
work a c c e s s  
(micro)
n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
work a c c e s s  
(m acro)
+ n.s. n.s. n.s.
unem ploym e
nt
n.s. n.s. + +
inactivity + + n.s. n.s.
w om en's  
work a c c e s s
+ + n.s. n.s.
Note: 'n.s.' means not statistically significant coefficient.
6. Do urbanisation, geography and institutions shape growth patterns?
v.
Urbanisation shapes not only inequality patterns, but also patterns of growth. The 
coefficient on urbanisation is positive and statistically significant in most regressions. 
Highly agglomerated regions seem to have low costs of innovation, infrastructure, 
information and transaction, and to foster and facilitate flows of local knowledge, ideas 
and innovations, the creation of dense social networks and the production of 
behavioural and cultural change, because they are full of technological and pecuniary 
externalities. Additionally, cities allow goods, ideas and people to come together for the 
purposes of exchange and production (Polese, 2005). This allows city-regions to reap 
the gains from trade, services and specialisation. In cities, people have face-to-face 
contact which is a fundamental condition of tacit knowledge spillovers. Hence, the 
higher the degree of urbanisation, the greater the technological, pecuniary and tacit 
knowledge externalities and the higher the regional economic growth rate as well. This 
study has not found latitude to be an important factor in accounting for differences in 
cross-regional growth rates. However, latitude may shape growth through its impact on 
income and educational inequalities. The growth-institutions relationship is not very 
clear, because most of the dummies are statistically insignificant. Nevertheless, the 
regression results seem to show that regional economic growth is lower in ‘residual’
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countries than in social-democratic ones, higher in Anglican areas than in Protestant 
areas, and higher in southern Catholic regions than in Nordic countries.
The main empirical results from the analysis of these questions are summarised as 
follows.
1. Income inequality is positively associated with educational inequality.
2. Inequalities matter for regional economic growth.
3. Urbanisation shapes both inequalities and growth, while geography and 
institutions shape only inequalities.
8.3 Policy Implications
The analysis provides useful insights that may be vital in the planning of regional policy 
in the EU. In this section I combine the conclusions drawn from the various parts of the 
analysis and draw out a number of policy implications with regard to the role of 
regional economic policy. Generally speaking, European regional policy should seek a 
synergy in the achievement of both efficiency and equity. However, this may involve 
trade-offs in the extent to which the two goals can be attained. The pursuit of these 
goals is a matter of political choice (Wossmann and Schutz, 2006). Liberal societies 
may put more emphasis on efficiency, while the emphasis in social-democratic ones 
may be on equity.
(1) The goals of European educational policy are two-fold, encompassing both goals of 
efficient allocation and goals of equitable distribution. The goals of efficiency and 
equity are likely to be achieved at each level of formal education and are not trade-offs, 
since educational policies may advance both efficiency and equity in such a way that 
each complements the other. The concept of equity is more evasive because it has to do 
with scientific definitions of fairness and justice (Wossmann and Schutz, 2006). 
Inequality in educational attainment should be tolerated only if it is due to differences in 
individual levels of effort (i.e. studying), but not if it is due to circumstances which are 
beyond a person’s control (i.e. gender and family background). Hence, a person’s 
expected educational outcome should be a function only of his/her effort, but not of 
his/her circumstances (Wossmann and Schutz, 2006). If this is the case, then individual 
abilities, along with certain specific traits and qualities, are likely to play the most 
prominent role in the income-education relationship. The regression results highlight the 
fact that educational policies have an impact on welfare policies, because the lower the
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educational inequality, the lower the income inequality. Taking into account the goals 
of European educational policy, regional policies should take into account the 
responsiveness of the EU labour market to differences in qualifications and skills. The 
pursuit of the goal of equitable educational distribution is likely to decrease inequality 
in productivity and, thus, inequality in income. If, for example, European educational 
policy aims to reduce the cost of studying (i.e. by providing free accommodation to 
poor students) and to provide free education for all students (without tuition fees) so 
that more of the population to have the opportunity to attain higher education, 
occupations that require high levels of education will not be beyond the reach of poor 
people. European citizens who live in poverty will have a means of escape, because the 
problems of access to education will be eased. This is likely to lead to lower income 
inequality. However, the pursuit of goal of equitable educational distribution, all other 
things being constant, is likely to lead in the long-run to inflation in the value of 
educational credentials which, in turn, is likely to reduce the wages of highly-educated 
workers. In this case, people would not have the incentive to acquire higher 
qualifications. Therefore, policies which improve access to education, provide a higher 
quality of education and, generally, increase educational attainment are likely to 
alleviate inequalities not only in education, but also in income.
(2) One key goal of European welfare policy is the equitable distribution of income. 
Policies of income redistribution from rich to poor may reduce educational inequalities, 
as rich people generally have more educational opportunities than the poor. Government 
intervention may improve regional economic performance, because sometimes markets 
do not allocate resources efficiently. The government usually taxes the rich by taxing 
the incomes of rich people or the goods that rich people buy.
(3) European regional policies should take into account that income and educational 
externalities spill over the barriers of regional economies. A decrease in inequality 
within a region might well be caused by a policy (i.e. tax policy) which decreased 
inequality within neighbouring regions. Common regional activities in neighbouring 
regions (i.e. public infrastructures) and common policies across neighbouring regions 
(i.e. Structural Funds) affect all regions, highlighting the spatial autocorrelation of 
inequalities. Welfare and educational policies should account for the spillover effects 
with adjoining regions. Trade, migration, infrastructure and technological policies may 
also lead to geographically dependent regions. Factors such as labour force mobility, 
capital mobility, technology and transportation costs may be particularly important,
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because they directly affect regional interactions (Le Gallo et al., 2003). For instance, 
policies on investment in infrastructure may influence the distribution of income and 
education within a region by changing the competitive advantages of neighbouring 
regions. If, for example, policies favour factor mobility, public infrastructure 
investments in one location can draw production away from other locations or provide 
access to adjacent locations that were not not previously accessible (Abreu et al., 2004). 
The economic and educational environment surrounding a region seems to influence the 
economic and educational perspectives of that region. Hence policy-makers should take 
into consideration that space matters for inequalities. The microeconomic data patterns 
and anomalies also should be considered in regional policy, because the exploratory 
analysis illuminates not only spatial dependence, but also spatial heterogeneity. The 
probability of neighbouring economies sharing similar conditions in terms of 
urbanisation, institutions and latitude is relatively high. In other words, there are urban, 
institutional and geographical limits to the spread of externalities. Regional economies 
within a specific welfare state regime, for example, interact more with one another than 
with those outside the regime. The mechanisms which directly affect regional 
interactions are stronger between regions of the same welfare state category. This 
implies that welfare state policies, such as unemployment benefits, affect inequality 
patterns. Since inequality evolves differently across family structures and religious 
affiliations, fertility, family, social, pension and cultural policies may also affect 
patterns of inequality. Policy-makers should also consider the role of the EU north- 
south divide in terms of income and educational inequality. A poor southern region with 
high inequality surrounded by other poor regions with high inequality will probably stay 
in this state of development, whereas a poor northern region with high inequality 
surrounded by richer regions and low inequality has a greater probability of reaching a 
higher state of development. Hence, the prevalence of interregional income and 
educational externalities can create poverty trap, because the clusters of the poorest and 
highest inequality European regions in Southern Europe may create a great 
disadvantage for those regions. If regional policies aim to reduce inequalities, they 
should place more emphasis on the south than the north. Finally, regional policies 
concerning inequalities may illustrate the systematic differences between 
agglomerations and rural peripheral regions with respect to the distribution of income 
and education. Consequently, spatial autocorrelation and spatial heterogeneity are, 
indeed, unavoidable features for efficient and equitable European regional policies.
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(4) Policy-makers should pay more attention to the within-region income and 
educational inequalities than to between-region and between-country inequalities so as 
to formulate effective policies, because the within-region component constitutes the 
major portion of the European inequality. Moreover, national economic policies, such 
as monetary policies, tax policies, trade reforms and educational policies and guidelines, 
which have a common effect on all regions within national borders, may have a greater 
impact on wages and education than purely regional policies, because the between- 
country component is more significant than the between-region one.
(5) Inequalities in income and education level completed are likely to increase growth, 
but the magnitude of their impact is small. Policy-makers, therefore, should take into 
account that inequality is strongly related to growth, but the scale of the effect is 
relatively small, and thus the effectiveness of a regional policy to increase growth 
through inequalities is likely to be low. Policy-makers also should bear in mind that the 
reverse effect seems not to be valid. The positive inequality-growth relationship 
highlights that regional policies involve a trade-off, by either advancing growth 
efficiency to the detriment of educational and income equity or by advancing equity to 
the detriment of efficiency. Regions necessarily have to choose between efficiency and 
equity. Policy attempts to achieve one or the other are likely to be both inefficient and 
inequitable. Nevertheless, equality in the age at which the highest education level was 
completed is likely to increase growth. In this case, there is a complementarity in the 
achievement of both efficiency and educational equity. However, the overall outcome 
may not be complementarity, but rather a trade-off, because the lower the inequality in 
age, the lower the income inequality (either for the population as a whole or for 
normally working people) and, therefore, the lower the growth.
(6) As income distribution is positively associated with educational distribution, the 
relationship between income distribution and regional economic growth may be 
governed by the relationship between educational distribution and growth (Galor and 
Tsiddon, 1997a: 95). Although public policies aimed at reducing income inequality are 
expected to reduce educational inequality as well, and policies aimed at reducing 
educational inequalities are expected to reduce income inequality as well, those policies 
may produce negative incentives for regional economic efficiency and, therefore, may 
harm economic growth. Increasing inequality does not emerge as a simple remedy for 
increasing growth.
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(7) Geographical, institutional and urban policies may not affect regional economic 
growth, because it is randomly distributed across the EU. Nevertheless, those policies 
may indirectly affect economic growth through their impact on income and educational 
inequalities.
To sum up, the analysis highlights the significance of a combined regional policy 
perspective that would address other policies such as labour market policies, educational 
policies, social policies, institutional policies and immigration policies. The combined 
policy should determine joined-up policy solutions, which encompass both the goal of 
economic efficiency (high growth) and the goals of equitable income and educational 
distribution (low income and educational inequality). The extent to which each of these 
goals should be pursued is a matter of political choice.
8.4 Limitations and Further Research
There are some plausible reasons for inconclusive or ambiguous findings. These 
insights should serve to advance future research. It is important to synthesise these 
empirical results and their implications at greater length. Considerable light can be shed 
on the following issues by further analysis.
(1) The analysis of this thesis has some limitations which to a large extent large result 
from the availability and quality o f the data. The fact that data on only a limited time 
period were available means that the results should be interpreted with some caution. 
Longer time-series will reinforce the analysis. A potential limitation of the analysis — 
which is also a limitation in most cross-sectional studies — is the fact that regions are 
more homogeneous than countries, because the regions are subunits of a single national 
entity (Nielsen and Alderson, 1997). Regions do not encompass as wide a range of 
variation in income and educational distribution, in economic development and in some 
unobserved characteristics, such as institutions and socio-cultural conditions, as a cross­
national sample. Regional boundaries may not define autonomous and internally 
integrated socioeconomic systems with respect to the distributional process (Nielsen 
and Alderson, 1997). Thus, the administrative boundaries used to organise the data 
series do not coincide perfectly with the actual boundaries, introducing nuisance spatial 
autocorrelation into data (Anselin and Rey, 1991). Finally, it would be valuable to 
refine the results on regional economic growth by considering data spanning longer 
periods. In terms of the quality of data, the fact that people are classified into just three 
categories with respect to the education level completed is a limitation.
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(2) The use of other inequality indices, such as the Gini coefficient, the relative mean 
deviation index, or the squared coefficient of variation, in order to check the sensitivity 
o f the results to inequality indices would reinforce the analysis. Nevertheless, one 
would expect the results to be expected robust to the inequality indices, because the 
analysis has demonstrated that the correlation among indices is very high, except for the 
squared coefficient of variation.
(3) The analysis shows that income distribution and educational distribution evolve 
jointly. Not only do income inequalities affect educational inequalities, but educational 
inequalities also affect income inequalities. This is an issue of endogeneity. The pattern 
of correlations between income and human capital raises the problem of difficulties in 
disentangling cause and effect. It is not clear in which direction the causal relationship 
runs. Thus, problems of simultaneity and causality are likely to abound. How income 
and human capital distributions are jointly determined is not well understood. The 
nature of the causal link is a subject of further research.
(4) The dynamic models were estimated using Arellano and Bond’s (1991) estimator, 
which treats the dynamic model as a system of equations, one for each time period. This 
estimator is called the ‘difference GMM’ (GMM-DIF). One problem with the GMM- 
DIF estimator is that lagged levels are often poor instruments for first differences, 
especially for variables that are close to a random walk (Roodman, 2005). Arellano and 
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) show that the efficiency of the GMM-DIF 
estimator may be improved by using an extended system GMM estimator that uses not 
only lagged levels of the instruments for equations in first differences, but also lagged 
differences as instruments for equations in levels (Roodman, 2005). This estimator is 
called the ‘system GMKf (GMM-SYS). Hence, another suggestion for further research 
is that dynamic models might also be estimated by GMM-SYS.
(5) The arguments summarised above are tested empirically by estimating the reduced- 
form equation. The determinants of income and educational inequalities and the impact 
of those inequalities on regional economic growth are explored by estimating static and 
dynamic reduced-form equations. If, however, a significant coefficient estimate is 
obtained for the reduced-form equation, it is not obvious which of the structural 
mechanisms are responsible for this result. This could be tested empirically by, 
estimating a system o f equations. This is a step for further research.
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(6) Income and educational inequalities have evolved differently in urban and rural 
areas, in northern and southern areas and across institutional categories (across welfare 
states, religious affiliations and family structures). A next step is to investigate whether 
these alternate paths are due to different responses to changes in population ageing, 
work access, unemployment and inactivity. However, this analysis requires more cross- 
sectional observations.
(7) As has been mentioned earlier, the proxies presented for educational attainment are 
measured in terms of the input of formal education, without considering the output of 
knowledge, skills and competences embodied in individuals (Sianesi and Van Reenen, 
2003). This is a limitation of this study. Moreover, the regression results for growth 
equations are non-robust to the definition of human capital, since inequality in the 
education level completed is positively associated with growth, while inequality in the 
age at which the highest education level was completed negatively affects growth. This 
sensitivity may reflect the differences in educational attainment concepts. The main 
difference is that a measure of the age at which an individual acquired their highest 
qualification includes any activity prior to that final qualification, some of which may 
have contributed to building human capital and some not. Considerable light can be 
shed on these issues by further analysis of the ways that the growth results are sensitive 
to the definition of human capital. The analysis shows, for instance, that a major factor 
driving inequality patterns is the national differences in education systems.
(8) This study uses for the whole population to measure the average and inequality in 
human capital stock. Because of this, any recent expansion in education is likely to 
result in greater inequality, because it is only the younger cohorts that increase their 
education; older cohorts remain at the level that prevailed when they were in the 
education system. Should this be the case, measures of educational inequality really 
only pick up a cohort effect rather than inequality among people of the same generation. 
Hence, another step of the analysis would be to calculate educational inequality across 
different cohorts.
(9) This study deals with the non-spatial econometric literature, and therefore the notion 
of spatial heterogeneity has concentrated on models of absolute location. The analysis 
could be extended to spatial econometrics as a further line of research. As has been 
mentioned above, spatial econometrics have concentrated on models of relative location 
and are tightly linked to the concept of spatial regimes (Abreu et al., 2004). Spatial 
econometric techniques can provide a natural framework to test for the occurrence of
390
interregional externalities and to estimate their magnitude (Vaya et al., 2004), but have 
been known to ignore the time dimension and focus on a single spatial interaction 
equation (Anselin, 2000). In spatial econometric models, spatial relationships are 
summarised in a spatial weights matrix. Although the appropriate choice of the spatial 
weights matrix is one of the most difficult and controversial methodological issues in 
spatial econometrics, by means of differentiating the operationalisation of the matrix, 
we are able to distinguish differing hypotheses regarding the interregional interaction 
through externalities (Vaya et al., 2004). More specifically, the spatial econometric 
models concern the estimation of spatial lag models and spatial error models, which are 
usually supported by means of the ML method (Anselin and Bera, 1998; Smirnov and 
Anselin, 2001) and the GMM (Conley 1999; Kelejian and Prucha, 1999). The spatial 
heterogeneity could be illustrated by the estimation of the heteroskedastic error model. 
Three different model specifications are considered for further research. First, the 
generic heteroskedasticity when urbanisation and latitude are heteroskedastic variables 
which are squared in the specification of the heteroskedastic error variance. Second, the 
groupwise heteroskedasticity when the dummies are heteroskedastic variables. This 
model, for example, tests whether regional economies within a group (northern regions) 
interact more with one another than with members of the other group (southern 
regions). Third, the random coefficients when the heteroskedastic variables are 
constructed as the squares of the explanatory variables in the model. For each model, 
two estimations are included: the three-step feasible generalised least squares and the 
ML estimator. Another method in spatial econometrics incorporates spatial effects in 
the form of spatial filters: spatial autoregressive and spatial moving average filters. Both 
filters may be used to eliminate spatial dependence in a variable. This method centres 
on spatial filtering of the existing variables in such a way that one can make use of the 
OLS estimation (Getis, 1995; Griffith, 2002; Getis and Aldstadt, 2004; Griffith, 2004; 
Tiefelsdorf and Griffith, 2006). Existing methods developed for dynamic, but non- 
spatial, and for spatial, but non-dynamic, panel data models produce biased estimates 
when these models are put together. No straightforward estimation procedure is 
available (Elhorst, 2001, 2003; Badinger et al., 2004; Elhorst, 2005). Nevertheless, to 
overcome this deficit, Badinger et al. (2004) propose to employ a two-step procedure; 
first, a filtering technique as proposed in Getis and Griffith (2002) is applied to remove 
the spatial correlation from the data; and second, a GMM estimator is applied to make 
inference on dynamic panel data.
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(10) The analysis shows that space and time are intrinsically mixed in the process of 
inequalities and regional economic growth. According to Elhorst (2005), the models for 
dynamic panels in time and space presented by Anselin (2000) deal with serial 
dependence between the observations on each region over time (time-series 
econometrics literature); spatial dependence between the observations on regions at 
each point in time (spatial cross-section econometrics literature); and unobservable 
spatial and time period specific effects (panel data econometrics literature). The study of 
space and time interaction is a hard task (Fujita and Thisse, 1996). Nevertheless, it is a 
challenge for future empirical research.
Overall, this study provided coherent evidence that income and educational inequalities 
matter for growth. The analysis undertaken here and the contributions made will 
constitute a solid basis for regional policy implications and further investigation into the 
issues addressed.
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